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 1 
 
INTRODUCTION 
 
In recent years states have endorsed the principle of non-impunity, asserting that 
individuals should be held accountable for the commission of international crimes.  
The former Secretary-General of the United Nations has remarked that there must be 
‘…an end to the global culture of impunity – the culture in which it is easier to bring 
someone to justice for killing one person than for killing 100,000’.1  Support for the 
principle of non-impunity is based on two factors:  the nature of international crimes 
and the benefits to be gained from trials.  The first basis for non-impunity is that 
‘[I]nternational Justice is built on the notion that heinous international crimes, such as 
genocide and crimes against humanity, harm all of us.  Therefore, we all have an 
obligation to prevent such crimes and to punish those responsible for them’.2  Second, 
trials may have the important effect of deterring the perpetrators – or future 
perpetrators – of such crimes and of marginalizing and delegitimizing perpetrators.3  
However, the principle of non-impunity is an idealized notion as politics and other 
factors will determine those individuals to be held accountable for which crimes and  
those who will remain immune from prosecution, as well as the forum used to secure 
accountability.   
 
This thesis examines the response of international and domestic criminal law to 
atrocities.  It will not consider alternatives to criminal justice, such as truth 
commissions, lustration or traditional justice mechanisms.  Criminal law is by its 
nature coercive.  It imposes responsibilities directly on individuals and punishes 
violations through the imposition of sanctions.4  Enforcement of criminal law 
necessitates the power to arrest and detain suspects, to investigate alleged violations, 
to obtain the testimony of witnesses and victims and to protect witnesses, judges and 
staff of the tribunal and to punish those found guilty.  International criminal courts do 
not have coercive powers and must rely on the support and cooperation of states.  The 
                                                 
1 Annual Report of the Secretary-General on the Work of the Organization 1998, 27 August 
1998, A/53/1, para. 180.  See also Basic Principles and Guidelines on the Right to a Remedy 
and Reparation for Victims of Gross Violations of International Human Rights Law and 
Serious Violations of International Humanitarian Law, 21 March 2006, A/Res/60/147. 
2 Gurd, T., ‘Arresting the “Big Fish”:  Lessons on State Cooperation for the International 
Criminal Court’ in Aegis Trust, ‘Report: The Enforcement of International Criminal Law’ 
(2009), 28. 
3 Flintoft, C. and Grono, N., ‘The Politics of Ending Impunity’ in Aegis Trust, ‘Report: The 
Enforcement of International Criminal Law’ (2009), 19.  See also Lattimer, M. and Sands, P. 
(eds), Justice for Crimes Against Humanity (2003), Introduction. 
4 Cryer, et al, An Introduction to International Criminal Law and Procedure (2007). 
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willingness to cooperate and the effectiveness of such cooperation will be a major 
factor in whether the tribunal can successfully fulfil its mandate. 
 
Developments in international criminal law, including the establishment of the 
International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia (ICTY), the International 
Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda (ICTR) and the International Criminal Court (ICC), and 
the reliance by states on the principle of universal jurisdiction, have been motivated by 
the desire to avoid impunity for international crimes.5  One way of achieving criminal 
accountability is through national trials, which are generally considered to be the 
primary forum for accountability.  The important role of trials before national courts is 
also reflected in the principle of complementarity found in the Rome Statute.6  
However, national proceedings may be restricted through the operation of legal 
principles such as statutes of limitation, amnesties, immunity and insufficient or 
inadequate provision for such crimes in domestic law.  Trials may also encounter a 
lack of political support and/or insufficient resources.  
 
Another mechanism is the establishment of international criminal tribunals by the 
United Nations Security Council.  This model has the benefit of legal coercion and 
universality of application by virtue of the near-universal membership of the United 
Nations.  However, this method is also hostage to the priorities and the political 
dynamics of the Security Council.  The five permanent members can veto any decision 
to establish a tribunal that may affect their own national interests, or the interests of 
states or individuals closely associated with that state.  This means that it is unlikely 
that individuals within those states, or their allies, will face trials for their actions 
before an international tribunal.  Even amongst states that do not fall within this 
protected category, the limited attention and resources of the Security Council and the 
United Nations means that international mechanisms are not established for the 
majority of situations.  Similarly, the ICC seeks to achieve universality, without 
coercive power, based on participation in the Rome Statute.  Its ability to investigate 
situations and to try offenders is restricted both by its jurisdictional provisions, the 
limited number of parties to the Rome Statute and the limited resources of the ICC. It 
also depends on sufficient domestic implementation in the legal systems of states 
parties. 
                                                 
5 For example, see the preamble to the Rome Statute, ‘Determined to put an end to impunity 
for the perpetrators of these crimes…’. 
6 Article 17.  For discussion see Kleffner, J., Complementarity in the Rome Statute and 
National Criminal Jurisdictions (2008). 
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There therefore exists a lacuna in the system of international criminal law 
enforcement.  Hybrid or internationalized tribunals have been developed as a 
pragmatic solution to the failure of the international community to achieve, at least in 
part, the utopian ideal of non-impunity.  The role of such institutions is to fill the gap 
between national courts, tribunals established by the Security Council and the 
competence of the ICC.  Such tribunals are not a perfect solution to this lacuna; their 
creation requires sufficient political will within the community of states, the support of 
the state(s) most affected and in some cases the backing of the Security Council.  
Their establishment is on an ad hoc basis, meaning that certain situations will continue 
to escape accountability.  As Brownlie noted ‘[P]olitical considerations, power and 
patronage will continue to determine who is to be tried for international crimes and 
who not’.7  Even where the political will is present both internationally and 
domestically, some impunity will persist as due to their limited mandates and 
resources the internationalized tribunals will be unable to prosecute all offenders for 
all crimes.  However, the imperfect and ad hoc nature of such tribunals should not 
undermine their potential utility in achieving non-impunity.  The system of 
international criminal justice, which is still developing, is far from perfect. 
 
This thesis examines the role of the hybrid and internationalized tribunals in the quest 
to achieve the principle of non-impunity.  There are several past atrocities for which 
accountability is still to be achieved, and history suggests that atrocities will be 
perpetrated in future.  Given the weakness of some national legal systems, particularly 
those affected by conflicts, and the jurisdictional and resource constraints of the 
International Criminal Court and other international tribunals, there will continue to be 
a demand for the creation of hybrid or internationalized tribunals. These tribunals raise 
many complex and interesting issues, some of which are relevant to all such bodies, 
while others are linked to specific national circumstances.  Such issues include:  the 
fairness of trials before such institutions and the procedures adopted; the independence 
and impartiality of the tribunal and its personnel; allegations of corruption; issues of 
capacity; the selection and qualifications of personnel, in particular judges; the 
participation of victims and civil parties in proceedings; and the question of the legacy 
of such tribunals.  All these issues are worthy of detailed study.  However, this thesis 
                                                 
7 Brownlie, I., Principles of Public International Law (6th edn, 2003), 575.  See also Cryer, R., 
Prosecuting International Crimes: Selectivity and the International Criminal Law Regime 
(2005). 
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adopts a more focussed approach to these tribunals, and concentrates on jurisdictional 
issues and the impact of such issues on the effectiveness of these tribunals.   
 
The central issue explored is what are the options for the legal and jurisdictional basis 
for these tribunals, and how does the selection of the legal framework impact upon the 
operation of the tribunal in question. By examining the practice of states and the 
United Nations in designing and establishing such tribunals, and the practice and 
jurisprudence of the tribunals themselves, it is hoped to highlight the key jurisdictional 
issues that have arisen, most importantly the importance of identifying correctly the 
legal basis for the tribunal. This study demonstrates that the tribunals have not always 
adopted a correct, or even consistent, approach to their legal basis, and hence their 
findings on jurisdictional issues have been in some cases questionable.  
 
The study concludes that there are three models of hybrid and internationalized 
tribunals, each having a different legal and jurisdictional basis. These are: courts 
effectively operating as national institutions of the affected state; courts established by 
treaty; and courts established by the Security Council acting under its powers pursuant 
to Chapter VII of the Charter.  It is submitted that the majority of internationalized 
tribunals, if not all such tribunals, including those to be established in the future, fall 
within one of these three categories, despite vast differences in the circumstances 
leading to their establishment.  The study rejects the notion of universal jurisdiction as 
a basis for such an internationalized or hybrid tribunal. While universal jurisdiction 
may, of itself, form a basis for the jurisdiction of an international or internationalized 
tribunal in the future, it is submitted that international law does not support the notion 
of a ‘floating’ universal jurisdiction for international crimes. Jurisdiction for such a 
tribunal is sourced either in a conferral of authority from the Security Council or in the 
consent of the state(s) concerned, combined with the delegation of jurisdiction from 
that state(s).  The conclusions reached do not preclude further options, including 
universal jurisdiction, developing over time. Nor do they preclude a role for other 
entities, such as the General Assembly or other international organisations, from 
participating in the establishment of future tribunals. However, current concepts of 
jurisdiction, which remain linked to the notion of state sovereignty, have restricted 
examples to the three models discussed. 
 
It is important when assessing any aspect of an internationalized tribunal to consider 
its legal basis and the category into which the tribunal falls.  This will in turn 
determine the appropriate response to jurisdictional questions such as the applicability 
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of amnesties and immunities. The legal basis and the context within which a tribunal 
is created will also impact upon the jurisdictional framework to be adopted, including 
the personal, temporal, territorial and material jurisdiction. This study will also show 
that, while the blending of international and national elements into a single institution 
is a relatively new concept, the legal and conceptual framework within which such 
tribunals operate is not.  These tribunals operate within the existing legal framework, 
which includes areas such as the notion of jurisdiction in international law, the role 
and powers of the Security Council in the areas of international peace and security, 
and the notion of state sovereignty. Related concepts such as the rules governing state 
immunity and the need for a legal basis for state cooperation are also well-established.  
This thesis aims to assist those designing future such tribunals, and the judges and 
personnel appointed to them, to consider these issues more carefully and to draw on 
previous decisions and practice so as to ensure clear and consistent decision-making in 
future.   
 
The thesis adopts the following structure. In Chapter One, the available options for 
ensuring criminal trials are examined, including trials before national courts, trials 
before the courts of other states under the principle of universal jurisdiction, and trials 
before the international criminal tribunals, namely the ad hoc tribunals and the ICC.  
The strengths and weaknesses of each model will be assessed.  Beyond this, Chapter 
One turns to the increasing reliance on the hybrid or internationalized tribunal, and the 
defining characteristics of such institutions. 
 
Chapter Two outlines the background and establishment of the tribunals to be studied:  
the Special Court for Sierra Leone (SCSL); the International Judges and Prosecutors 
Programme in Kosovo (IJPP); the Special Panels for Serious Crimes in East Timor 
(SPSC); the Extraordinary Chambers in the Courts of Cambodia (ECCC); the War 
Crimes Chamber in the State Court of Bosnia and Herzegovina (WCC); the Iraqi High 
Tribunal (IHT); and the Special Tribunal for Lebanon (LST).  All of these tribunals 
have been established in difficult and diverse circumstances. As can be seen in Table 
One (which sets out the key features of the tribunals), while there are some similarities 
between the tribunals, there are also many differences.  Although this may suggest that 
no common defining features or unifying themes or approaches can be identified, this 
thesis aims to establish that it is possible to categorise the tribunal based on their legal 
basis.   
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Chapter Three studies the legal basis of each tribunal and identifies the three 
categories of tribunal outlined above.  The second section of this chapter builds upon 
the previous discussion.  It assesses the source of the tribunals’ competence having 
regard to the category in which it is placed.  Four possible sources of the jurisdiction 
conferred on the tribunal are examined:  the jurisdiction of the territorial state or the 
state of nationality; a delegation of jurisdiction to the tribunal from a state(s); the 
competence of the Security Council to take action under article 41 of the Charter for 
the maintenance or restoration of international peace and security; and the notion of 
universal jurisdiction supporting the prosecution of international crimes.  Of these 
possible bases, only the fourth is discounted.  
 
Chapter Four examines the jurisdictional competence of the tribunals studied:  
personal, temporal, territorial and material.  This chapter demonstrates how the 
decisions made in designing the tribunals, in particular their jurisdictional regime, 
result in only a limited number of individuals facing possible investigation and trial 
for a similarly limited range of crimes.  It also details how the different contexts in 
which the tribunals were established have impacted upon the mandate and 
jurisdictional reach of the institutions studied. 
 
Chapter Five considers three legal obstacles to the exercise of jurisdiction: immunity, 
amnesties, and the requirement to gain custody of the accused.  Building upon the 
discussion in Chapter Three, this chapter suggests that the tribunals studied have not 
always adopted the correct approach to whether these barriers to the exercise of 
jurisdiction apply.  It is argued that, when determining such issues, the tribunals need 
to consider the nature of their establishment, their legal basis and the nature and 
source of the jurisdiction that they are to exercise.  This approach would lead to a 
more principled and consistent basis for such decisions.  The final section offers some 
concluding remarks.  The thesis is current as at 31 December 2008. 
 6 
CHAPTER ONE 
THE DEVELOPMENT OF THE HYBRID OR INTERNATIONALIZED 
TRIBUNAL 
 
1 Introduction 
The internationalized or hybrid international criminal tribunal is one of the latest 
developments in the evolution of international criminal law. It is an important tool in 
the quest to end impunity for perpetrators of international crimes. After a brief 
introduction to the concept of jurisdiction in public international law, this chapter 
discusses the traditional response to international crimes, trials before the courts of the 
(normally) territorial state.   The recent and more controversial mechanism of trials 
before the courts of other states on the basis of universal jurisdiction is also 
considered.  The chapter then outlines the trend towards the establishment of 
international criminal tribunals, culminating in the entry into force of the Rome 
Statute of the International Criminal Court in 2002.  The advantages and 
disadvantages of trials before national courts and international criminal tribunals are 
outlined.  The chapter next discusses the concept of the hybrid or internationalized 
tribunal, including the difficulty in identifying a comprehensive definition of the term.  
A typology of such tribunals, based on the level of international involvement is 
suggested.  The final section recommends a number of guidelines that may assist in 
determining when to establish an internationalized or hybrid tribunal. 
2 National jurisdiction for international crimes 
2.1 Jurisdiction for international crimes 
Jurisdiction may be defined as describing ‘the limits of the legal competence of a State 
or other regulatory authority (such as the European Community) to make, apply, and 
enforce rules of conduct upon persons’.1 As Berman notes, ‘[C]riminal jurisdiction is 
essentially a jurisdiction to prescribe and to punish’.2  It is common to identify three 
‘types’ of jurisdiction:  jurisdiction to prescribe, jurisdiction to enforce, and 
jurisdiction to adjudicate.  Jurisdiction to prescribe – or legislative jurisdiction – is the 
authority of a state to prescribe rules, while jurisdiction to enforce is the authority of a 
                                                 
1 Lowe, V., ‘Jurisdiction’ in Evans ed. International Law, (2nd ed, 2006), 335. 
2 Berman, F., ‘Jurisdiction: The State’ in Capps, P. et al (eds) Asserting Jurisdiction:  
International and European Legal Approaches (2003), 5.  Jurisdiction also applies in a civil 
context, although there is some debate as to whether the rules to be applied are the same. This 
thesis will only examine criminal jurisdiction. 
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state to enforce those rules.3  The third category of jurisdiction, jurisdiction to 
adjudicate, refers to ‘the right of courts to receive, try and determine cases referred to 
them’.4  However, the authority of the courts within a state follows from the 
jurisdiction to prescribe. The organs of the court in question exercise the jurisdiction 
conferred on them (either by states or the Security Council) and, as will be seen in 
Chapter Four, the court will also interpret the jurisdiction conferred.  Accordingly, 
jurisdiction to adjudicate is not required as a separate category of jurisdiction and will 
not be considered further. 
 
It is now largely accepted that jurisdiction to prescribe must be exercised by a state 
based on recognised bases of jurisdiction.5 The most important principle is that of 
territorial jurisdiction, whereby a state may exercise jurisdiction for acts committed 
upon its territory. The territorial principle also includes ‘subjective’ and ‘objective’ 
territorial jurisdiction, so that the state may exercise jurisdiction where one of the 
constituent elements of the offence occurs within its territory.6 In recent years, at least 
in the human rights context, states have also been found to ‘exercise’ jurisdiction 
where they have control of the territory of another state, either due to military 
occupation or otherwise.7 Nationality of the offender is also an accepted basis for the 
exercise of jurisdiction by a state.8  Jurisdiction based upon the nationality of the 
victim – the so-called passive personality principle – may have found acceptance only 
in relation to certain categories of crimes, in particular terrorism.9 The protective 
                                                 
3 Unlike jurisdiction to prescribe, jurisdiction to enforce is always territorial, unless the consent 
of the third state is obtained. 
4 Lowe, note 1, 339. 
5 The contrary conclusion of the Permanent Court of International Justice in the Lotus case, 
which provided that states may exercise their jurisdiction to persons, property and acts outside 
of their territory subject only to a specific rule prohibiting the exercise of such jurisdiction, has 
been discredited and is now considered not to represent customary international law.  See:  
Lotus (SS) Case (France v. Turkey) PCIJ Ser. A. (1927) No. 9, 19. For further discussion see 
Lowe, note 1; Akehurst, M., ‘Jurisdiction in International Law’ (1973) 46 BYbIL 145; Cryer, 
R., Prosecuting International Crimes:  Selectivity and the International Criminal Law Regime 
(2005); and Ryngaert, C., Jurisdiction in International Law (2008), Chapter Two. 
6 Lotus Case, 23. The territorial principle may also include the so-called ‘effects doctrine’ 
whereby a state may exercise jurisdiction where the act in question has an effect within its 
territory: see Lowe, V., ‘US Extraterritorial Jurisdiction: the Helms-Burton and D’Amato Acts’ 
(1997) 46 ICLQ 378. 
7 Bankovic and other v Belgium and others (Appl. No. 52207/99), Admissibility Decision of 12 
December 2001, 11 BHRC 435. 
8 Arnell, P., ‘The Case for Nationality-Based Jurisdiction’ (2001) 50 ICLQ 955.  More 
recently, states have also relied on other criteria besides nationality, such as residence. See, for 
example, the International Criminal Court Act 2001 (United Kingdom). 
9 See United States v Yunis (1991) 30 ILM 403; United States v Yousef 327 F.3d 56 (US 2nd 
Cir., 2002), both concerning terrorist offences.  Three judges of the International Court of 
Justice have noted that ‘[p]assive personality…today meets with relatively little opposition, at 
least as far as a particular category of offences is concerned’:  Arrest Warrant of 11 April 2000 
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principle permits the exercise of jurisdiction where the offence in question is directed 
at ‘the essential interests of the State’.10 Offences prosecuted under this principle 
generally relate to national security or a threat to the existence of the state, but would 
also include offences such as counterfeiting of currency.11  The final basis for the 
exercise of criminal jurisdiction is the principle of universal jurisdiction. The widest 
view of universal jurisdiction is that it enables a state to criminalise conduct based 
solely on the nature of the crime, without regard to where the crime was committed, 
the nationality of the alleged perpetrator, the nationality of the victim, or any other 
connection to the state exercising such jurisdiction.12 To this list of possible bases for 
the exercise of extraterritorial jurisdiction must be added the growing reliance upon 
treaty-based jurisdiction.  Several treaties provide that states parties must provide 
effective penal sanctions for acts prohibited by the treaty, and, where persons accused 
of such conduct are located within the territory of the state party, must try the 
individual before domestic courts or extradite the individual for trial elsewhere.13 This 
is known as the aut dedere aut judicare principle.14  Such jurisdiction is not universal 
jurisdiction, as it is based on specific treaty obligations and applies only to those states 
parties to the relevant international legal instruments.15 
                                                                                                                                 
(Democratic Republic of Congo v. Belgium) ICJ Reports 2002 (hereafter the Arrest Warrant 
case), Separate Opinion of Judges Higgins, Kooijmans and Buergenthal, 11. 
10 Lowe, note 1, 347. 
11 Attorney General of the Government of Israel v Eichmann (1961) 36 ILR 5. 
12 The Princeton Principles on Universal Jurisdiction, 2001: available at 
http://www.law.ac.edu/morgan/newsdir/unive_jur.pdf; Justitia et Pace, Institute of International 
Law, Krakow Session – 2005, Seventeenth Commission, Universal criminal jurisdiction with 
regard to the crime of genocide, crimes against humanity and war crimes; Kress, C., 
‘Universal Jurisdiction over International Crimes and the Institut de Droit international’ (2006) 
4 JICJ 561; and O’Keefe, R., ‘Universal Jurisdiction: Clarifying the Basic Concept’ (2004) 2 
JICJ 735.  
13 Treaties that incorporate this principle include: the Geneva Conventions and Additional 
Protocol I to the Geneva Conventions in relation to grave breaches only, articles 49, 50 (GCI), 
articles 50 and 51 (GCII), articles 129 and 130 (GCIII), articles 146 and 147 (GCIV) and 
articles 11, 85, 86 and 88 (API); the Convention Against Torture (article 6); and many 
terrorism conventions, for example, the Convention for the Suppression of Unlawful Seizure of 
Aircraft, 1970 (article 7) and the Convention for the Suppression of Unlawful Acts Against the 
Safety of Civil Aviation 1971 (article 7). 
14 For further discussion of this principle, see Bassiouni, M.C. and Wise, E., Aut Dedere Aut 
Judicare: The Duty to Prosecute in International Law (1995).  See also the current work of the 
International Law Commission on the topic:  A/CN.4/571 (Preliminary report of the Special 
Rapporteur, 7 June 2006); A/CN.4/585 (Second Report of the Special Rapporteur, 11 June 
2007); and A/CN.4/603 (Third Report of the Special Rapporteur, 10 June 2008). 
15 Broomhall considers that ‘this form of jurisdiction is not truly “universal”, but is a regime of 
jurisdictional rights and obligations arising amongst a closed set of states parties’:  Broomhall, 
B., ‘Towards the Development of an Effective System of Universal Jurisdiction for Crimes 
Under International Law’, (2001) 35 NELR 399, at 401.  See also Brownlie, I., Principles of 
Public International Law (6th ed, 2003); Higgins, R., Problems and Processes – International 
Law and How We Use It (1994), 62-65; Lowe, note 1, 349-351. 
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2.2 Exercise of jurisdiction by the territorial state or the state of 
nationality 
Where a state has exercised its prescriptive jurisdiction so as to criminalize certain 
conduct occurring within its territory, it will generally confer jurisdiction to try such 
conduct on its national courts, such jurisdiction to be exercised by those courts in 
accordance with its national laws. The preference in international law for trials before 
domestic courts, in particular the courts of the territorial state, reflects certain 
advantages of domestic proceedings. First, this approach is based in and respects the 
traditional international law notions of state sovereignty and the principle of non-
interference in the internal affairs of a state.16 Second, domestic trials are generally 
considered to be the most practical option. Victims, defendants, witnesses and 
evidence will normally be found within that state. Third, domestic trials are considered 
to be the best means of conveying a sense that society is questioning the impact of the 
individual’s actions on the local populace – those most directly affected – and that 
society is dispensing ‘justice’ to the accused. This permits a sense of ownership of the 
judicial process, which may make a contribution to rehabilitation of the accused and 
reconciliation between victim and offender. Fourth, domestic trials, even in respect of 
cases that are particularly complex or significant, should improve the capacity and 
confidence of the judicial and legal system. Finally, domestic proceedings enable the 
territorial state to incorporate a bespoke approach to criminal justice, allowing a 
greater ability to tailor the design of the system to the needs of the situation.  This may 
include introducing new legal mechanisms, the use of traditional justice approaches, 
or amendments to the substantive or procedural law. 
 
Instances of states exercising jurisdiction to try crimes considered to be international 
crimes were rare until the last two decades, and those that did occur largely concerned 
war criminals from the Second World War. Other examples include trials for genocide 
in Equatorial Guinea,17 the convictions in absentia of Khmer-Rouge leaders in 
Cambodia in 1970,18 and several trials before national courts in relation to violations 
of the Geneva Conventions.  The 1990s saw an increase in the number of domestic 
                                                 
16 Article 2(7), Charter. 
17 In September 1979 Francisco Macias Nguema (the former President of Equatorial Guinea) 
was tried and convicted by a Special Military Court on charges including genocide, multiple 
murders and embezzlement. He was subsequently executed.  Ten political associates were also 
tried and convicted.  For further discussion, see Quigley, J., The Genocide Convention: An 
International Legal Analysis (2006). 
18 In 1979 the government installed in Cambodia by Vietnam ordered the trial by a 
revolutionary people’s court of Pol Pot and Ieng Sary, the deputy prime minister and minister 
of foreign affairs. Both men were convicted and sentenced to death in absentia.  
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trials for conduct that could constitute international crimes, although the majority were 
tried as ordinary crimes.  Domestic trials have in the past occurred in states including 
Ethiopia, Argentina, Germany, Rwanda, Guatemala, Chile, Indonesia and Hungary 
and are ongoing in several states of the former Yugoslavia, including Serbia, Croatia 
and Bosnia and Herzegovina (BiH).19 
 
The exercise of territorial or national jurisdiction in respect of international crimes 
presents many challenges.  The model presumes a stable state and justice system; 
essentially a state of normalcy in the territorial state.  Yet in many conflict and post-
conflict societies this presumption simply does not hold. The most extreme situation is 
where the local system has collapsed because of the conflict, leading to a lack of the 
physical, financial and human resources necessary to operate the judicial system. 
There is no infrastructure to conduct any trials, let alone complex and sensitive trials. 
A related concern is that where a conflict has recently ended, or is ongoing, the 
security situation may not permit the holding of trials, especially those connected to 
the conflict.  Even if the judicial system is operational it may not be able to cope with 
trials of all offenders where the conflict has produced a significant number of accused. 
Moreover, some otherwise-functioning systems raise specific concerns. The domestic 
system may not be capable of functioning either impartially or independently of the 
government or other key national power groups. The existing system may be tainted 
by association with a prior regime. Government and key officials may be implicated in 
the alleged actions and may wish to interfere with or avoid investigation and 
prosecutions altogether. Alternatively there may be a perceived need to remove judges 
and officials associated with the previous regime, leading to a loss of vital skills and 
experience.  Members of minority groups alienated by the conflict may be unable or 
unwilling to participate, and the procedural standards may not meet the minimum 
standards required by international human rights law.  All these factors may lead the 
local population to struggle to accept the criminal justice system as legitimate, 
unbiased and fair.   
 
More subtle obstacles to trials before national courts may exist in the domestic 
procedural or substantive law. For example, the applicable procedural law may not 
accord with internationally accepted fair trial standards and the resulting convictions 
or acquittals would therefore be considered suspect. In terms of substantive law, there 
may be amnesty provisions, domestic immunities or simply an underdeveloped 
                                                 
19 Rikhof, J., ‘Fewer Places to Hide? The Impact of Domestic War Crimes Prosecutions on 
International Impunity’ (2009) 20 Crim LF 1. 
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substantive law that does not criminalise the activity in question, or else considers the 
action to constitute a ‘lesser’ crime. Even where a suitable law exists, the judiciary, 
prosecution and defence may have little or no experience of trials for serious or 
systematic crimes conducted during the conflict, and limited exposure to principles of 
substantive international criminal law.  Despite the nature and complexity of the 
crimes committed, local lawyers may treat them as ordinary domestic crimes, or 
alternatively those lawyers may be uncertain about how to prove or defend such 
serious charges. 
2.3 The exercise of universal jurisdiction 
Trials before the courts of a third state may also be an option to end impunity for 
international crimes. In criminalizing conduct that has occurred outside its territory, a 
state may be exercising jurisdiction based on principles of nationality of the victim or 
offender, or the protective principle.  However, it is the exercise of universal 
jurisdiction that has attracted the most attention. Broomhall identifies both normative 
and pragmatic rationales for the existence of universal jurisdiction in international law.  
The pragmatic rationale is that other bases of jurisdiction are insufficient to ensure 
accountability, ‘as these acts are often committed by those who act from or flee to a 
foreign jurisdiction, or by those who act under the protection of the State’.20 He argues 
that this consideration is apparent in particular regarding piracy on the high seas,21 
slavery and terrorism. The normative rationale is that such crimes are of universal 
concern, ‘deserving condemnation in themselves, and deemed to affect the moral and 
even peace and security interests of the entire international community’.22  Thus 
universal jurisdiction is potentially an important tool to combat impunity. 
 
Universal jurisdiction is said to arise under both treaty and customary international 
law.23 So-called ‘true’ universal jurisdiction arises only under customary international 
law.  The category of offences in relation to which universal jurisdiction arises in 
                                                 
20 Broomhall, B., International Justice & The International Criminal Court:  Between 
Sovereignty and the Rule of Law (2003), 107-8. 
21 Note, however, the concerns of several commentators that the piracy analogy is 
inappropriate for international crimes such as war crimes, genocide and crimes against 
humanity.  For detailed discussion, see Kontorovish, E., ‘The piracy analogy:  modern 
universal jurisdiction’s hollow foundation’ (2004) 45 HILJ 183. 
22 Broomhall, note 20, 107. 
23 For a detailed discussion of universal jurisdiction, see Bassiouni, M.C., ‘Universal 
Jurisdiction for international crimes:  historical perspectives and contemporary practice’ (2002) 
42 VJIL 81; and Randall, K., ‘Universal Jurisdiction Under International Law’ (1988) 66 
TexLR 785. 
 12 
customary international law is limited.  It may include offences such as piracy,24 
genocide,25 crimes against humanity,26 grave breaches of the Geneva Conventions,27 
slavery,28 and torture,29 although it is has been argued that it may also include offences 
such as other serious violations of international humanitarian law,30 (such as acts short 
of torture such as cruel, inhuman and degrading treatment), certain acts of terrorism, 
apartheid and forced disappearances.  Several states have introduced domestic 
legislation that criminalized crimes committed abroad, based either on jurisdiction 
deriving from treaty provisions or under customary international law.31  However, 
instances of domestic courts relying upon such provisions were rare until relatively 
recently.  Since the 1990s the courts of an increasing number of mainly European 
states have commenced proceedings concerning acts committed outside the 
prosecuting state.32 States where complaints have been filed, investigations 
                                                 
24 Commentators and the majority of judges in the Arrest Warrant case agree that universal 
jurisdiction is recognised in relation to piracy, see:  Cassese, A., When May Senior State 
Officials Be Tried for International Crimes? Some Comments on the Congo v. Belgium Case’ 
(2002) 13 EJIL 853, 857. 
25 The Genocide Convention does not recognize universal jurisdiction in respect of acts of 
genocide.  However, genocide has subsequently been considered to as giving rise to universal 
jurisdiction under customary international law:  Morris, M., ‘Universal Jurisdiction in a 
Divided World’ (2001) 35 NELR 337, 347. 
26 Attorney General of the Government of Israel v Eichmann, note 11. 
27 Prosecutor v Tadic, Decision on Jurisdiction, Appeals Chamber, 2 October 1995 (the Tadic 
Jurisdiction Decision), para. 80. See also Van Elst, R., ‘Implementing Universal Jurisdiction 
Over Grave Breaches of the Geneva Conventions’ (2000) 13 LJIL 815. 
28 None of the treaties aimed at the suppression of the slave trade explicitly provide for the 
exercise of universal jurisdiction.  However, the majority view appears to support the 
possibility of the exercise of universal jurisdiction for slavery under customary international 
law:  see, Randall, K, note 23, 798.  For the contrary view see Bassiouni, note 23, 114-115. 
29 The argument that customary international law permits the exercise of universal jurisdiction 
in respect of torture can be made more forcefully since the decision of the ICTY in Prosecutor 
v Furundžija, Judgment, Trial Chamber, 10 December 1995, para. 156.  See also R v Bow 
Street Magistrate, ex parte Pinochet Ugarte [No. 3] [1999] 2 All ER 97. 
30 Meron, T., ‘International Criminalization of Internal Atrocities’ (1995) 89 AJIL 569, 568-76; 
Meron, T., ‘Is International Law Moving Towards Criminalization’ (1998) 9 EJIL 18, 23 and 
29. See also Boelaert-Suominen, S., ‘Grave Breaches, Universal Jurisdiction and Internal 
Armed Conflict: Is Customary Law Moving Towards a Uniform Enforcement Mechanism for 
All Armed Conflicts?’ (2000) 5 JCSL 63; Graditzky, T., ‘Individual Criminal Responsibility 
for Violations of International Humanitarian Law Committed in Non-International Armed 
Conflicts’ (1998) 322 IRRC 29; Dinstein, Y., ‘The Universality Principle and War Crimes’ in 
Schmitt, M.N. & Green, L. (eds) The Law of Armed Conflict:  Into the Next Millennium (1998); 
and Kamminga, M., ‘Lessons Learned from the Exercise of Universal Jurisdiction in Respect 
of Gross Human Rights Offences’ (2001) 23 HRQ 940, 947-8. 
31 For an overview of municipal legal provisions and cases concerning universal jurisdiction, 
see Reydams, L., Universal Jurisdiction:  International and Municipal Legal Perspectives 
(2003). 
32 For the role of European states in advancing the concept of universal jurisdiction, see Human 
Rights Watch, Universal Jurisdiction in Europe, June 2006.   
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commenced and / or trials conducted33 include Australia,34 Belgium,35 France,36 
Germany,37 the Netherlands,38 Spain,39 the United Kingdom40 and Senegal.41 
 
The detention of General Pinochet by the United Kingdom during a private visit to 
London in 1998 following a request for extradition from Spain and the subsequent 
legal proceedings42 were, at the time, considered to herald a new era for the 
prosecution of international crimes. Reliance on universal jurisdiction would, it was 
believed, overcome the twin difficulties of relying upon the territorial state to exercise 
its jurisdiction and the absence of a functioning international court. This initial 
optimism may have been misguided, as universal jurisdiction has not proved to be the 
                                                 
33 Note that not all of these proceedings are based on universal jurisdiction – some may also 
rely upon the principle of passive personality.  
34 See Polyukhovich v Commonwealth (1991) 172 CLR 501 (trials in respect of crimes against 
humanity and war crimes committed against Jews in Ukraine). 
35 Successful convictions include the Butare Four case and the case against Rwandan 
businessmen Etienne Nzabonimana and Samuel Ndashykirwa, both of which related to the 
commission of crimes during the Rwandan genocide in 1994.  A case is still outstanding in 
respect of former Chadian dictator, Hissene Habre.  Other cases were withdrawn following 
changes to the relevant law in 2003.  For discussion, see:  Reydams. L., Universal Criminal 
Justice:  The Belgian State of Affairs’ (2000) 11 CrimLF 183; Reydams, L., ‘Belgium’s first 
application of universal jurisdiction: the Butare Four’ (2003) 1 JICJ 428. 
36 On 1 July 2005, Ely Ould Dah was sentenced in absentia for torturing black African 
members of the military in Mauritania in 1990 and 1991.  Other cases remain ongoing. 
37 German authorities investigated and prosecuted several offences committed in the former 
Yugoslavia.  However, since the relevant legislation was modified in 2002, no complaints have 
been investigated.  This includes cases filed against former US Secretary of State for Defence, 
Donald Rumsfeld, former Chinese President, Jiang Zemin, and former Uzbek Minister of the 
Interior, Zokirjon Almatov. 
38 In 2004 a Congolese national was convicted of leading death squads in Kinshasa between 
1990 and 1995.  In 2005 two Afghans were convicted for their involvement in torture and war 
crimes. 
39 Spain has relied most frequently on universal jurisdiction in relation to international crimes.  
Cases initiated in Spain include the following: former Chilean dictator, Augusto Pinochet; 
former Peruvian President, Alberto Fujimori; Argentine military officer Adolfo Scilingo (see 
Gil Gil, A., ‘The flaws of the Scilingo judgment’ (2005) 3 JICJ 1082; Pinzauti, G., ‘An 
instance of reasonable universality:  the Scilingo case’ (2005) 3 JICJ 1092 and Tomuschat, C., 
‘Issues of universal jurisdiction in the Scilingo case’ (2005) 3 JICJ 1074); Argentine military 
officer Ricardo Miguel Cavallo; the Guatemalan Generals case (see note 44); and cases 
concerning events in Tibet (see Bakker, C., ‘Universal Jurisdiction of Spanish courts over 
genocide in Tibet: can it work?’ (2006) 4 JICJ 595). 
40 The first successful trial under universal jurisdiction legislation occurred in 2005, with the 
conviction of Faryadi Zardad, an Afghan militia leader, of acts of torture and hostage-taking in 
Afghanistan in the 1990s.  However, the legislation criminalizing the conduct was based on the 
United Kingdom’s treaty-based obligations so it was not an exercise of universal jurisdiction in 
the sense used in this thesis. 
41 The trial of former Chadian dictator, Hissene Habre will be conducted by a court in Senegal, 
after repeated requests by the African Union for Senegal to do so.  For discussion of the earlier 
stages of the proceedings, see Brody, R., ‘The Prosecution of Hissene Habre – An “African 
Pinochet”’ (2001) 35 NELR 321. 
42 For discussion of the proceedings in the United Kingdom, Spain and other European courts, 
see Roht-Arriaza, N., ‘The Pinochet Precedent and Universal Jurisdiction’ (2001) 35 NELR 
311. 
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‘cure-all’ it was hoped it would be. Instances where a state has exercised universal 
jurisdiction have highlighted the challenges involved. First, there remains division 
between states and commentators as to the exact content of the principle of universal 
jurisdiction and the crimes to which it applies, absent a specific treaty provision.43 For 
example, is a link to the prosecuting state – such as custody of the accused – required? 
Is universal jurisdiction only ever to be a jurisdiction of ‘last resort’?44 In addition, 
there are conflicting views as to whether the exercise of universal jurisdiction is 
permissive or mandatory.45  Second, trials based on universal jurisdiction have tended 
to become heavily politicized, with governments concerned that the investigation of 
foreign government officials may affect diplomatic relations with the state concerned, 
and be inconvenient or embarrassing to the state where the trial is to be conducted.46 
Such concerns have already led at least one state to revise its laws based on universal 
jurisdiction.47  Moreover, universal jurisdiction is more likely to be exercised by an 
                                                 
43 The varying views on the scope of universal jurisdiction were apparent in the opinions 
expressed by the ICJ in the Arrest Warrant case.  For discussion of the different viewpoints, 
see:  Boister, N., ‘The ICJ in the Belgian Arrest Warrant case:  arresting the development of 
international criminal law’ (2002) 7 JCSL 293; O’Keefe, note 12; and Cassese, note 24.  The 
International Court of Justice may have further opportunities to address the issue of universal 
jurisdiction in international law, with proceeding pending between the Republic of the Congo 
and France with respect to proceedings for crimes against humanity and torture commenced 
against the Congolese Minister of the Interior, Mr. Pierre Oba, in connection with which a 
warrant was issued for the witness hearing of the President of the Republic of the Congo, 
Mr. Denis Sassou Nguesso:  Certain Criminal Proceedings in France (Republic of Congo v 
France).  Proceedings are also pending relating to a dispute between Belgium and Senegal 
concerning Senegal’s obligation to extradite or prosecute Hissene Habre:  Proceedings 
instituted by the Kingdom of Belgium against the Republic of Senegal (Belgium v. Senegal). 
44 This refers to the so-called ‘subsidiarity’ of universal jurisdiction, such that universal 
jurisdiction should only be exercised where the territorial state or the state of nationality is 
unable or unwilling to exercise jurisdiction.  For discussion of the relevant decisions of the 
Spanish courts on this issue, see Ascensio, H., The Spanish decision in Guatemalan Generals: 
unconditional universality is back’ (2006) 4 JICJ 586, and Ascensio, H., ‘Are Spanish courts 
backing down on universality? The Supreme Tribunal’s decision in Guatemalan Generals’ 
(2003) 1 JICJ 690.  See also Cassese, A., ‘Is the Bell Tolling for Universality? A Plea for a 
Sensible Notion of Universal Jurisdiction’ (2003) 1 JICJ 589. 
45 For the view that universal jurisdiction is permissive only, see:  Scharf, M., ‘The Letter of 
the Law:  The Scope of the International Legal Obligation to Prosecute Human Rights Crimes’ 
(1996) 59 L&CP 41, 52-59; Meron, note 30 (1995); and Broomhall note 20, 404-6  For the 
argument that the exercise of universal jurisdiction should be mandatory in certain 
circumstances, see Bassiouni, M.C, Crimes Against Humanity in International Law (2nd ed,  
1999), 220 (on crimes against humanity) and Bassiuoni, M.C., ‘Accountability for 
International Crime and Serious Violations of Fundamental Human Rights: International 
crimes:  Jus Cogens and Obligatio Erga Omnes  (1996) 59 L&CP 63. 
46 Morris notes that, as war crimes, genocide and crimes against humanity will often involve 
official acts, trials of such acts pursuant to universal jurisdiction ‘often will constitute, in effect, 
the judgment of one state’s policies and perhaps, officials, in the courts of another state.  In 
such instances…universal jurisdiction will become a source and an instrument of interstate 
conflict’, Morris, note 25, 354.  Moreover, prosecutions may be politically motivated. 
47 In 2003 Belgium amended its laws permitting the exercise of universal jurisdiction as a 
result of direct pressure from the United States following the filing of complaints in Belgium 
against US military and political leaders. The United States threatened to have the NATO 
headquarters moved from Brussels. See: Reydams, L., ‘Belgium Reneges on Universality: The 
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established, Western state, which raises allegations of neo-colonialism.48 In 2008, the 
African Union resolved that:49 
 
(i) The abuse of the Principle of Universal Jurisdiction is a 
development that could endanger International law, order and security; 
(ii) The political nature and abuse of the principle of universal 
jurisdiction by judges from some non-African States against African 
leaders, particularly Rwanda, is a clear violation of the sovereignty and 
territorial integrity of these States; (iii) The abuse and misuse of 
indictments against African leaders have a destabilizing effect that will 
negatively impact on the political, social and economic development of 
States and their ability to conduct international relations; (iv) Those 
warrants shall not be executed in African Union Member States. 
 
This resolution was in response to the issue and in some cases execution of arrest 
warrants by France and Spain in respect of Rwandan officials.50  The African Union 
intends to bring the issue of the potential abuse of the principle of universal 
jurisdiction to the attention of the Sixth Committee of the General Assembly and has 
asked member states not to execute any warrants that may be pending.51   
 
Third, there are concerns regarding the resources required to try such cases, which are 
often complex and raise novel and difficult questions of law for domestic courts. Fears 
that a legal system may become the forum of choice, leading to great expense and 
inconvenience for national authorities, has led to some dampening of political 
enthusiasm for universal jurisdiction.  In this context it is significant that most trials 
have been initiated by complaints lodged by private individuals, including victims and 
non-governmental organisations. Fourth, the states concerned have found it difficult to 
obtain custody of the accused and to locate and produce witnesses and evidence 
because treaties on extradition and mutual legal assistance generally do not 
specifically contemplate universal jurisdiction for international crimes.52 There are 
also concerns that the defendant’s right to a fair trial may be adversely affected in a 
                                                                                                                                 
5 August 2003 Act on Grave Breaches of International Humanitarian Law’ (2003) 1 JICJ 679; 
Cassese, note 47.   
48 Cryer, note 5, 95-7. 
49 Decision On The Report Of The Commission On The Abuse Of The Principle Of Universal 
Jurisdiction, Doc. Assembly/Au/14 (Xi). 
50 An arrest warrant issued by a French judge in respect of nine Rwandan officials led to the 
arrest in Germany in November 2008 of the Director of State Protocol, Rose Kabuye. 
51 Statement By His Excellency Jakaya Mrisho Kikwete, The Outgoing African Union 
Chairman And President Of The United Republic Of Tanzania At The 12th Summit Of 
The Heads Of State And Government Of The African Union, Addis Ababa, Ethiopia, 
February 2009. 
52 For discussion, see: Broomhall, note 20, 412-416. 
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trial located outside the territorial state,53 or that the courts of other states will not 
remain impartial.54 Fifth, the relevant legal provisions may be inadequate: the relevant 
state may not have appropriate legislation,55 or defendants may rely on amnesties or 
immunities.56 Sixth, many states allow the final decision on initiating prosecutions to 
be made by the relevant prosecuting authorities, which often possess a wide degree of 
discretion as to whether such cases are pursued.57 
 
Given these challenges, it cannot be said that prosecution of international crimes 
before the courts of states other than the territorial state presents an effective or 
reliable mechanism for achieving justice in all cases. Moreover, given the political 
factors at play, it is doubtful that universal jurisdiction will prove to be the wide-
reaching tool to end impunity that was hoped.  Accordingly, as outlined in the next 
section, many states have called for greater reliance on international mechanisms to 
ensure non-impunity, in particular through the establishment of international criminal 
courts.58 
3 International criminal law and institutions 
3.1 The Post-war period 
‘Modern’ international criminal law originated from the period following the Second 
World War, with the creation of the International Military Tribunal (IMT) to prosecute 
                                                 
53 Morris, note 25, 352-3; Kissinger, H., ‘The Pitfalls of Universal Jurisdiction’ (2001) Foreign 
Affairs 86; cf Roth, K., ‘The Case for Universal Jurisdiction’ (2001) Foreign Affairs 150. 
Fletcher argues that the failure to preclude trials in violation of the principle of double jeopardy 
is a fundamental flaw: Fletcher, G., ‘Against Universal Jurisdiction’ (2003) 1 JICJ 580, 582.  
For a rebuttal, see Eser, A., ‘For Universal Jurisdiction:  Against Fletcher’s Antagonism’ 
(2004) 39 Tulsa Law Review 955 and Abi-Saab. G.,‘The Proper Role of Universal Jurisdiction’ 
(2003) 1 JICJ 596. 
54 For the contrary argument, see Cryer, note 5, 97-9. 
55 For example, the United States has been hampered in its use of universal jurisdiction by gaps 
in its own law:  Scheffer, D., ‘Opening address to the Conference on Universal Jurisdiction’ 
(2001) 35 NELR 233.  For discussion of the gaps and how to address them, see:  Cassel, D., 
‘Empowering United States courts to hear crimes within the jurisdiction of the International 
Criminal Court’ (2001) 35 NELR 421.  For further discussion, see Kamminga, note 30, 951-4. 
56 Kamminga, note 30, 955-9.  
57 For example, in the United Kingdom, the Attorney General, a government-appointed official, 
must consent to the initiation of a prosecution for an international crime based on universal 
jurisdiction:  section 135, Criminal Justice Act 1988; section 1A(3)(a), Geneva Conventions 
Act 1957; and section 53(3) ICC Act 2001. Morris argues that allowing a role for those 
responsible for foreign policy may enable the state in question to avoid undesirable 
consequences:  Morris, note 25, 356.  However, it is unlikely that such officials would accept 
such a role, as they are act independently in the exercise of these types of powers. 
58 Interestingly, the establishment of the ICC (discussed below) has had a positive effect on the 
possibility of the exercise of universal jurisdiction by national courts, with several states 
incorporating universal jurisdiction as part of the process of implementing their obligations 
under the Rome Statute:  see Arbour, L., ‘Will the ICC have an Impact on Universal 
Jurisdiction?’ (2003) 1 JICJ 585. 
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and punish major war criminals. The IMT was established at a conference following 
the conclusion of the war in Europe, pursuant to an agreement between the four world 
powers – the United States, the Soviet Union, the United Kingdom and France.59 The 
Nuremberg Agreement provided for the establishment of an international military 
tribunal for the trial ‘of war criminals whose offences have no particular geographical 
location’.60 The IMT held its first session in public on 18 October 1945 and delivered 
its judgment in October 1946, finding nineteen defendants guilty of crimes against 
humanity, war crimes and crimes against peace.61 In addition, the four occupying 
powers established courts in their own zones of operation in Germany to try 
individuals not falling within the category of ‘major war criminals’.62   
 
The allied powers also established a separate tribunal to prosecute and punish ‘major 
war criminals’ accused of crimes committed in the campaigns in the Asia-Pacific 
region, the International Military Tribunal for the Far East (Tokyo Tribunal).63 The 
Tokyo Tribunal was modelled on the IMT but was a more international body in that its 
judges were drawn from a wider range of states, including the newly independent 
states of India and the Philippines.64  It commenced operations on 3 May 1946, 
conducted trials over a period of two and a half years, and delivered its final 
judgement in November 1948 in which it convicted 25 individuals for the offence of 
crimes against peace and war crimes. ‘Lesser’ criminals were tried by military courts 
in the territory of the victorious states.65 
 
Both the IMT and the Tokyo Tribunal were criticised as imposing ‘victors’ justice’ 
over the defeated nations. The tribunals were not truly independent, in that the judges 
                                                 
59 Agreement by the Government of the United States of America, the Provisional Government 
of the French Republic, the Government of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Ireland 
and the Government of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics for the Prosecution and 
Punishment of the major war criminals of the European Axis, dated 8 August 1945 
(‘Nuremberg Agreement’). 
60 Article 1, Nuremberg Agreement. 
61 Judgment of the International Military Tribunal for the Trial of German Major War 
Criminals, 1 October 1946. 
62 Control Council for Germany, Law No. 10, Punishment of Persons Guilty of War Crimes, 
Crimes Against Peace and Against Humanity, 20 December 1945.  
63 Charter of the International Military Tribunal for the Far East, issued by an executive order 
of General MacArthur, the Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers, on 19 January 1946.  
The Tokyo Tribunal was considered necessary to give effect to the Potsdam Declaration of 26 
July 1945, which demanded that ‘stern justice shall be meted out to all war criminals’. 
64 Article 2 of the Charter of the Tokyo Tribunal provides for the appointment by the Supreme 
Commander for the Allied Powers of a maximum of eleven judges from the signatories to the 
declaration of surrender, India and the Philippines. 
65 Trials were held in The Netherlands, the United Kingdom, Australia, the United States, the 
Soviet Union, China, France and the Philippines. 
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and prosecutors were appointed by the victorious allied powers. Moreover, alleged 
offences committed by allied troops and authorities were not considered, most 
significantly the atomic bombing of Japan in 1945. Concerns were also raised that the 
substantive laws of the tribunals violated international law, in particular the principle 
of nullum crimen sine lege.  However, the tribunals are significant in that they 
represent the first occasion upon which international institutions were established to 
punish war crimes. Their constituent instruments clearly supported the principle of 
individual criminal responsibility for crimes such as crimes against humanity and 
crimes against peace and, along with the emerging jurisprudence, have contributed to 
a body of substantive and procedural rules in international criminal law. The tribunals 
also assisted in promoting the development of a universal international criminal code 
and the establishment of a permanent international criminal court. 
 
Building upon the criminal trials undertaken by the IMT and the Tokyo Tribunal, the 
United Nations was also contributing to an emerging international criminal law.  At its 
first meeting in 1946, the General Assembly adopted a resolution confirming the 
principles established by the Charter and judgment of the IMT.66 The following year 
the General Assembly requested the International Law Commission to formulate the 
principles of international law recognized in the Charter of the IMT and its judgment, 
and to prepare a draft code of offences against the peace and security of mankind.67  
Article VI of the Genocide Convention contemplated the future establishment of an 
international penal tribunal. On the same day as the text of the Genocide Convention 
was adopted, the General Assembly referred the task of drafting a statute for the 
contemplated penal tribunal to the International Law Commission.68 The Commission 
appointed a special rapporteur to the topic,69 who provided his first report in 1950.70  
Work on a draft statute for an international criminal court was subsequently assigned 
to a special committee of the General Assembly,71 which provided a first draft in 
1951, including the draft statute for the proposed court.72  A further committee 
established in 1952 issued an amended text in 1953.73 However, efforts were 
                                                 
66 Resolution 19(I), 11 December 1946. 
67 Resolution 177(II), 21 November 1947. 
68 Resolution 260(III) B, 9 December 1948. 
69 Yearbook of the International Law Commission, 30th Meeting, 31 May 1949, 221. 
70 Report on the Question of International Criminal Jurisdiction by Ricardo J. Alfaro, Special 
Rapporteur, A/CN.4/15, Yearbook of the International Law Commission 1950, Vol II, 3 March 
1950. 
71 Resolution 489(V), 12 December 1950. 
72 Official Records of the General Assembly, Seventh Session, Supplement No. 11 (A/2136). 
73 Resolution 687 (VII), 5 December 1952; Official Records of the General Assembly, Ninth 
Session, Supplement No. 12 (A/2645). 
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suspended in 1954, pending agreement as to a definition of aggression and the 
resumption of work on the draft code of offences against the peace and security of 
mankind.74 The onset of the Cold War stalled the work of many United Nations 
bodies, including the General Assembly, and the proposal for an international criminal 
court was not taken up again until 1989.75 
3.2 The ad hoc international criminal tribunals 
3.2.1 Establishing the International Criminal Tribunal for the former 
Yugoslavia 
Following the end of the Cold War, certain events led to a major step in the 
development of international criminal law. The disintegration of the Socialist Federal 
Republic of Yugoslavia (SFRY) in 1991 and subsequent declarations of independence 
by several of its constituent states led to the emergence of conflicts both between and 
within the former constituent states.  The conflict thus had aspects of both an 
international armed conflict and an internal armed conflict. Various attempts to 
resolve the conflicts failed and reports emerged of widespread violations of 
international humanitarian law. In October 1992, the Security Council acted to 
establish a Commission of Experts to examine the available evidence and to report to 
the Secretary-General as to whether it considered there was evidence that grave 
breaches of the Geneva Conventions and other violations of international humanitarian 
law had been, or were being, committed within the territory of the former 
Yugoslavia.76 The Commission of Experts started investigations in November 1992, 
provided an interim report to the Secretary-General in January 1993,77 and issued its 
final report in 1994.78 The interim report concluded that grave breaches and other 
                                                 
74 Resolution 898 (IX), 14 December 1954. The General Assembly had established a special 
committee of nineteen member states to consider the question of defining aggression: 
Resolution 895 (IX), 4 December 1954. Work on the draft code of offences against the peace 
and security of mankind was suspended pending consideration by the General Assembly of the 
report of the special committee on aggression:  Resolution 897 (IX), 4 December 1954. 
Progress on the draft code and the draft statute was suspended indefinitely in 1957: Resolutions 
1186 and 1187 (XII), 11 December 1957.  
75 Resolution 44/39, 4 December 1989. The request for the International Law Commission to 
revisit the issue of an international criminal court arose in the context of the need for a criminal 
jurisdiction to consider transnational crimes, in particular drug trafficking. Work on the Draft 
Code for Offences Against the Peace and Security of Mankind recommenced in 1981:  
Resolution 36/106, 10 December 1981. 
76 Resolution 780 (1992), para. 2. 
77 Interim Report of the Commission of Experts established pursuant to Security Council 
Resolution 780 (1992), S/25274 (Annex 1). 
78 Final Report of the Commission of Experts established pursuant to Security Council 
Resolution 780 (1992), S/1994/674.  For discussion of the work of the Commission, see 
Bassiouni, M.C., ‘The United Nations Commission of Experts established pursuant to Security 
Council Resolution 780’ (1994) 88 AJIL 784. 
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violations of international humanitarian law had been committed, including wilful 
killing, ‘ethnic cleansing’ and mass killings, rape, torture, pillage and destruction of 
civilian property, destruction of cultural and religious property and arbitrary arrests.  It 
also raised the possibility of the establishment of an international criminal tribunal to 
try those accused of war crimes, noting that, in the opinion of the Commission of 
Experts, it would be for the Security Council – or another competent body of the 
United Nations – to establish such a tribunal.79  Acting on this suggestion, the Security 
Council determined that a tribunal should be established and requested the Secretary-
General to investigate possible options for the creation of an international tribunal.80  
Based on the recommendation of the Secretary-General that the tribunal be established 
by a resolution,81 the Security Council established an international criminal tribunal 
for the prosecution of persons responsible for serious violations of international 
humanitarian law committed in the territory of the former Yugoslavia since 1 January 
1991.82 The Security Council used its powers under Chapter VII of the Charter to 
establish the ICTY, finding that the situation in the former Yugoslavia constituted a 
threat to international peace and security.83  Initial doubts from some states and 
commentators84 that the Council did not have the authority to establish such a tribunal 
were largely resolved in the Tadic case.85 
 
The ICTY may exercise jurisdiction with respect to the crimes of genocide, crimes 
against humanity and war crimes.86 It enjoys primacy over national prosecutions and 
may call for national institutions to transfer defendants being proceeded against in a 
                                                 
79 Interim report, para. 74.  This was not the first time that the possibility of an international 
criminal tribunal for atrocities in the former Yugoslavia had been raised. The Co-Chairmen of 
the Steering Committee of the International Conference on the Former Yugoslavia also 
advocated the establishment of an international penal tribunal to try individuals accused of 
violations of international humanitarian law within the former Yugoslavia:  Report of the 
Secretary-General on the Activities of the International Conference for the Former Yugoslavia, 
S/25221, 2 February 1993, see Annex 1, para. 9. For a more detailed discussion of the 
background to establishment, see Schabas, W., The UN International Criminal Tribunals 
(CUP), 13-22 and Cryer, R. et al, An Introduction to International Criminal Law and 
Procedure (2007), 102-112. 
80 Resolution 808 (1993). 
81 Report of the Secretary-General Pursuant to Security Council resolution 808 (1993), 
S/25704, annexing the draft statute of the tribunal.  The Secretary-General had recommended 
that the tribunal be established by a resolution rather than by treaty, as the treaty process would 
be too lengthy and would not guarantee that the states most affected would become parties. 
82 Resolution 827 (1993). 
83 Resolution 827 (1993).   
84 S/PV.3217.  Rubin, A., ‘An International Criminal Tribunal for Former Yugoslavia’ (1994) 6 
Pace International Law Review 7.   
85 Tadic Jurisdiction Decision.  The legal basis of the ICTY will be discussed further in 
Chapter Three. 
86 ICTY Statute, articles 2 (grave breaches), 3 (violations of the laws and customs of wars), 4 
(genocide) and 5 (crimes against humanity). 
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national system to it.87  The ICTY took well over a year to become operational, with 
judges appointed in late 1993 and the prosecutor in July 1994. The first indictments 
were issued in late 1994,88 the first trial began in May 199689 and the first judgment 
was issued on 29 November 1996.90  As at December 2008, the ICTY had indicted 
161 individuals and had convicted and sentenced 57 individuals.91  Cases concerning 
45 accused are ongoing, with two accused still at large.92 
3.2.2 Establishing the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda 
Both during and following independence in 1963, Rwanda was beset by tension 
between its two main ethnic groups, the Hutus and the Tutsis, with systematic killings 
of Tutsis documented in 1963, 1966 and 1973. In 1993, the Arusha Accords 
established a power-sharing arrangement between the Rwandan government and the 
Tutsi paramilitary group, the Rwandan Patriotic Force (RPF). The arrangement was 
supervised by the United Nations Assistance Mission for Rwanda (UNAMIR). The 
shooting-down of the aeroplane carrying President Habyarimana on 6 April 1994 
ended the period of peace that had been secured by the Arusha Accords. Members of 
the Hutu elite moved to eliminate Tutsis. The killing was not restricted to members of 
the Tutsi leading class or key opposition figures, but extended to the wider Tutsi 
population, including women and children. The RPF mounted a counter-offensive. By 
the time the massacre ended in July 1994, between 500,000 and 1,000,000 Tutsis had 
been killed, while between 10,000 and 100,000 Hutus were killed in the RPF counter-
offensive. The killings had been conducted at great speed, within a three month 
period. In addition to those killed, millions were internally displaced or became 
refugees in neighbouring countries. Systematic rape, torture and severe assaults were 
also reported.  
 
In July 1994, the Security Council requested the Secretary-General to establish a 
Commission of Experts to examine the evidence and report its conclusions concerning 
                                                 
87 Article 9, ICTY Statute. 
88 The ICTY’s first indictment was issued on 7 November 1994 in respect of Dragan Nikolić, a 
commander of Sušica camp in eastern Bosnia and Herzegovina, for crimes committed against 
non-Serbs in 1992. 
89 Prosecutor v Tadic.  The trial commenced on 7 May 1996. 
90 Prosecutor v Erdemovic, Sentencing Judgment, 29 November 1996.  The accused had 
pleaded guilty to crimes against humanity. 
91 Ten accused were acquitted, 13 accused transferred to national jurisdictions, 20 indictments 
were withdrawn and 16 individuals died either before transfer to the ICTY or while in custody. 
92 Cases concerning 10 individuals are before the Appeals Chamber, cases concerning six 
individuals are awaiting trial judgements, a further 20 individuals are currently at trial, and 
seven are at the pre-trial stage.  The two accused at large are Ratko Mladić and Goran Hadžić.  
All figures have been taken from the ICTY website and are current as at late December 2008. 
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grave violations of international humanitarian law and the possibility that acts of 
genocide had occurred in Rwanda.93 The preliminary report of the Commission of 
Experts concluded that there was overwhelming evidence that genocide and other 
widespread, systematic and flagrant violations of international humanitarian law had 
been committed in Rwanda.94 It also recommended that the Security Council take 
action so that those responsible could be brought to justice before an independent and 
impartial international criminal tribunal, preferably by amending the statute of the 
ICTY so as to include jurisdiction for crimes committed in Rwanda.95 The Special 
Rapporteur for Rwanda, appointed by the Commission on Human Rights, reached a 
similar conclusion.96 The Government of Rwanda had requested that the Security 
Council establish as soon as possible an international tribunal to prosecute those who 
had committed the genocide, noting that the continued presence of such alleged 
criminals was disrupting efforts to return refugees and was ‘diluting’ the question of 
genocide having been committed in Rwanda.97  
 
In November 1994 the Security Council established the ICTR, an international 
tribunal for the purposes of prosecuting the people responsible for genocide and other 
serious violations of international humanitarian law committed in the territory of 
Rwanda, and Rwandan citizens responsible for genocide and other such violations 
committed in the territory of neighbouring states, between 1 January 1994 and 31 
December 1994.98  Unlike the conflict(s) in the former Yugoslavia, the genocide in 
Rwanda was an internal affair. However, the Security Council recognised that the 
situation in Rwanda constituted a threat to international peace and security. As with 
Resolution 827 establishing the ICTY, the Security Council expressly relied upon its 
powers under Chapter VII of the Charter.99 Rwanda, which had originally supported 
the establishment of an international tribunal, voted against the resolution due mainly 
                                                 
93 Resolution 935 (1994). 
94 Preliminary Report of the Independent Commission of Experts established in accordance 
with Security Council resolution 935, S/1994/1125.  
95 Ibid, paras 133-142. 
96 Report on the situation of human rights in Rwanda submitted by the Special Rapporteur of 
the Commission on Human Rights, in accordance with Commission resolution S-3/1 and 
Economic and Social Council decision 1994/223, S/1994/1157. 
97 Letter dated 28 September 1994 from the Permanent Representative of Rwanda to the United 
Nations addressed to the President of the Security Council, S/1994/115. 
98 Resolution 955 (1994).  For a detailed discussion of the development of the ICTR, see 
Schabas, note 79. 
99 Resolution 955 was put to a vote in the Security Council, with 13 members voting in favour, 
one abstention (China) and one, Rwanda – which happened to be a member of the Security 
Council at the time – voting against.  
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to the exclusion of the death penalty as a possible sentencing option.100 The ICTR may 
exercise jurisdiction in relation to genocide, crimes against humanity, and violations 
of common article 3 of the Geneva Conventions and of Additional Protocol II,101 
reflecting the non-international nature of the conflict in Rwanda. Like the ICTY, it 
enjoys primacy in respect of national courts.102  The first judges were elected by the 
General Assembly in May 1995 and the first accused arrived in May 1996. The first 
indictment was issued in November 1995,103 the first trial started in January 1997104 
and the first judgment was issued in September 1998.105  As at 3 November 2008, the 
ICTR has delivered 31 judgments affecting 37 accused. Judgment is pending in five 
cases affecting eight accused.106 
3.2.3 The development of the completion strategy 
The establishment of the ICTY and the ICTR were significant steps in the 
development of international criminal law, both in terms of its substantive content and 
enforcement. For the first time since the end of the Second World War, international 
criminal tribunals were established to investigate, prosecute and try individuals 
accused of committing international crimes of the most grave and serious nature, 
including genocide. The ad hoc tribunals promised the highest standards of 
international criminal justice, being sanctioned, established and supported by the 
Security Council. Hopes and expectations were high, particularly among the people of 
Rwanda and the former Yugoslavia. Yet by the fourth or fifth year of the operation of 
the tribunals there existed a growing sense of disillusionment. Concerns were 
mounting amongst the member states of the United Nations, the Secretariat and the 
tribunals themselves about the performance and efficiency of the tribunals.107  The 
tribunals proved to be an expensive means of securing accountability.108 Member 
states were reluctant to continue paying the vast amounts required for the tribunals 
                                                 
100 S/PV.3453. 
101 ICTR Statute, articles 2 (genocide), 3 (crimes against humanity) and 4 (violations of 
common article 3 and APII). 
102 Article 8, ICTR Statute. 
103 Prosecutor v Kayishema and Ruzindana, Original Indictment, issued 22 November 1995 
and confirmed 28 November 1995. 
104 Prosecutor v Akakyesu.  The trial commenced on 9 January 1997. 
105 Prosecutor v Akakyesu, Judgment, Trial Chamber, 2 September 1998. 
106 Closing arguments were also to be heard in two cases (five accused), trials were ongoing in 
five cases (15 accused), cases concerning five accused were shortly to commence, one case had 
been submitted for retrial and thirteen accused remained at large:  Report on the Completion 
Strategy for the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda as at 3 November 2008, 
S/2008/729.  See also Mose, E., ‘Main Achievements of the ICTR’ (2005) 3 JICJ 920. 
107 See Raab, D., ‘Evaluating the ICTY and its completion strategy: Efforts to Achieve 
Accountability for War Crimes and their tribunals’, (2005) 3 JICJ 82, 96. 
108 For 2008-2009, the General Assembly approved the ICTR biennial budget of $267,356,200 
gross and the ICTY biennial budget of US$347,566,900 net. 
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from assessed contributions on an indefinite basis, at least without any improvement 
in efficiency. Perhaps more worryingly, trials before the tribunals were very long, 
beyond the ‘acceptable’ duration of trials required by international human rights 
standards and jurisprudence. Due to backlogs in reaching trial, many accused faced 
considerable delay in their case reaching trial, causing many to undergo unacceptable 
periods of pre-trial detention.109 The tribunals had delivered few final verdicts and 
several key figures in the conflicts, particularly those in the former Yugoslavia, 
remained at large, with little likelihood of apprehension.  Those trials that had 
occurred had tended to focus on lower-level or intermediate perpetrators.   
 
These concerns led to a process of evaluation and review of the tribunals’ 
performance, seeking to improve the efficiency and effectiveness of the tribunals and 
to stem the growing criticism of the delays in trials and length of detention. The 
Security Council turned its attention to the date when the open-ended mandate of the 
tribunals could (or would) end.  The Security Council asked the Secretary-General to 
submit to it a report containing an assessment and proposals regarding ‘the date 
ending the temporal jurisdiction’ of the ICTY.110 The Security Council did not make 
such a request for the ICTR, although it did refer to the need for both tribunals to 
expedite their work and to continue progress towards improving their procedures.111 In 
August 2003, the strategy to end the temporal jurisdiction of the tribunals was 
included in the operative part of a Security Council resolution, Resolution 1503, for 
the first time.112 The Resolution called upon the tribunals ‘to take all possible 
measures to complete investigations by the end of 2004, to complete all trial activities 
at first instance by the end of 2008, and to complete all work in 2010’.113 This is 
known as the ‘completion strategy’ of the tribunals. In a non-operative paragraph the 
Security Council urged the ICTR to formalise a detailed strategy (modelled on the 
ICTY strategy) to transfer cases to national jurisdictions in order to allow the ICTR to 
meet similar completion targets.114 It also requested the presidents and prosecutors of 
the tribunals to explain their plans to implement the completion strategy in their 
                                                 
109 See Bourgon, S., ‘Procedural Problems Hindering Expeditious and Fair Justice’ (2004) 2 
JICJ 526, ‘the length of the proceedings, at all stages [which] appears to be uncontrollable’, 
527. The judges have addressed the problem of pre-trial detention to some extent by adopting a 
more flexible policy, with provisional release now the presumption provided certain 
requirements are satisfied. 
110 Resolution 1329 (2000), para. 6. 
111 Ibid, preambular paras 5 and 6. 
112 Resolution 1503 (2003). 
113 Ibid, para. 7. 
114 Ibid, preambular para. 8.  This obligation was included in an operative paragraph in a 
subsequent resolution:  Resolution 1534 (2004), para. 4. 
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annual reports to the Security Council.115  In their most recent reports, both presidents 
indicated that the tribunals would not meet the deadline of end of 2008 for the 
completion of trial activities and that they would not meet the deadline of the end of 
2010 for the completion of all judicial activities.116 
3.3 Towards a permanent international criminal court 
After stalling amidst the tension of the Cold War period, efforts resumed towards 
developing the basis for a permanent international criminal court.117 The General 
Assembly invited the International Law Commission to resume its work on the Draft 
Code of Offences against the Peace and Security of Mankind in 1981,118 and the 
Commission eventually concluded the draft code in 1996.119  However, the draft code 
did not include any provision for the body that would have jurisdiction to try such 
offences. In 1989 the General Assembly requested the International Law Commission 
to address, as part of its work on the draft code, ‘the question of establishing an 
international criminal court or other international criminal trial mechanism with 
jurisdiction over persons alleged to have committed crimes which may be covered 
under such a code’.120 The International Law Commission submitted the final version 
of its draft statute for an international criminal court to the General Assembly in 
1994.121  
 
                                                 
115 A further reporting obligation was imposed by Resolution 1534 (2004), which requires each 
tribunal to provide to the Security Council every six months an assessment by its President and 
its Prosecutor, ‘setting out in detail the progress made towards implementation of the 
Completion Strategy’:  para. 6. 
116 The President of the ICTY indicated that trials should be completed in the course of 2010, 
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Robinson, President of the International Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia, provided to the 
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Report (note 106), para 65.  See also the Statement by the President of the Council issued on 
19 December 2008, S/PRST/2008/47.  For a discussion of the measures taken to achieve the 
Completion Strategy, see Williams, S., ‘The Completion Strategy of the ICTY and the ICTR’ 
in Bohlander (ed), International Criminal Justice – A Critical Analysis of Institutions and 
Procedures (2007), 153-235. 
117 For an introduction to the background to the ICC, see Schabas, W., An Introduction to the 
International Criminal Court (3rd ed, 2007). 
118 Resolution 36/106, 10 December 1981. 
119 Draft Code of Crimes against the Peace and Security of Mankind, Report of the 
International Law Commission, 48th Session, (1996) Yearbook of the International Law 
Commission, Vol II(2), 17. 
120 Resolution 44/39, 4 December 1989, para. 1. 
121 Draft Statute for an International Criminal Court, Yearbook of the International Law 
Commission, 1994, vol. II (Part Two).  See:  Crawford, J., ‘The ILC’s Draft Statute for an 
International Criminal Tribunal’ (1994) 88 AJIL 140 and Crawford, J., ‘The ILC Adopts a 
Statute for an International Criminal Court’ (1995) 89 AJIL 404. 
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Both the draft code and the draft statute were to play a significant role in the 
development of the Rome Statute some years later.  Following adoption of the draft 
statute, the General Assembly decided to establish an ad hoc committee to review the 
substantive and administrative issues arising from the draft statute and to consider 
arrangements for an international conference of plenipotentiaries.122  The ad hoc 
committee reported to the General Assembly in 1995.123 The General Assembly then 
convened a preparatory committee (known as the PrepCom),124 which met on several 
occasions from 1995 to 1998, culminating in the submission of a revised version of 
the draft statute to the Diplomatic Conference of Plenipotentiaries on the 
Establishment of an International Criminal Court convened on 15 June 1998 in Rome 
(the Rome Conference).125 The Rome Conference was attended by representatives of 
160 states and many international and non-governmental organisations. Several 
working groups slowly resolved issues arising from the draft statute, while the Bureau 
worked closely on issues of key importance, including the role of the Security Council 
in the jurisdiction and operation of the proposed court.  With consensus on several 
provisions still looking unlikely, the Chairman presented a version of the statute to the 
Rome Conference as a ‘package’.126 At the insistence of the United States, the package 
was put to a vote. The Rome Statute was adopted on 17 July 1998 by 120 states, with 
21 abstentions and seven votes against, including the United States, Israel and 
China.127 The Rome Conference also adopted a Final Act,128 which provided for the 
establishment of a Preparatory Commission charged with numerous tasks including 
the drafting of the Rules of Procedure and Evidence (RPE) and the Elements of 
Crimes (which elaborated upon the definition of offences within the jurisdiction of the 
ICC) and the drafting of a relationship agreement between the ICC and the United 
Nations.129  The Preparatory Commission completed its work in July 2002.130 
                                                 
122 Resolution 49/53, 9 December 1994, para. 2. The International Law Commission had 
recommended that an international conference of plenipotentiaries be held to study the draft 
statute and to conclude a convention on the establishment of an international criminal court: 
Resolution 49/10, 8 November 1994, paras 90-91. 
123 Report of the Ad Hoc Committee on the Establishment of an International Criminal Court, 
A/50/22. 
124 Resolution 50/46, 11 December 1995. 
125 Report of the Preparatory Committee on the Establishment of an International Criminal 
Court, see decision of 3 April 1998.  The report included the draft statute and final act 
(A/CONF.183/2/Add.1). 
126 For further discussion see, Kirsch, P. and Holmes, J., ‘The Birth of the International 
Criminal Court:  The 1998 Rome Conference’ (1998) 36 CYbIL, 3-39. 
127 There is no official record of how states voted, as the United States specified that it did not 
wish the vote to be recorded. 
128 Final Act Of The United Nations Diplomatic Conference Of Plenipotentiaries On The 
Establishment Of An International Criminal Court, 17 July 1998. 
129 Resolution F. 
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The ICC was established by a treaty, the Rome Statute. States were given until 31 
December 2000 to sign the Rome Statute as an initial step signalling their intent to 
ratify the treaty.131 By that date 139 states had signed the treaty, including some like 
the United States that had opposed the adoption of the Rome Statute at the Rome 
Conference. Article 126 of the Rome Statute required 60 ratifications or accessions for 
the Rome Statute to enter into force. This significant event occurred on 11 April 2002, 
when ten states deposited instruments of ratification simultaneously. The Rome 
Statute entered into force on 1 July 2002, the date that was the first day of the month 
following a period of 60 days after the sixtieth ratification or accession.132  This date is 
highly significant because the ICC has only prospective jurisdiction; that is, it may 
only exercise jurisdiction in respect of situations arising after the date of the entry into 
force of the Rome Statute.133  The Assembly of State Parties (ASP) convened for a 
first session in September 2002 and formally adopted the RPE and the Elements of 
Crimes.134 Judges were elected in February 2003, and the prosecutor was elected in 
April 2003. The Prosecutor opened the first investigation in June 2004,135 the first 
accused was arrested and surrendered on 17 March 2006136 and the ICC commenced 
its judicial activities shortly thereafter.137  As at 18 July 2008 there were 108 states 
parties to the Rome Statute.138 
 
Although the adoption and subsequent entry into force of the Rome Statute was a 
significant event in the development of international criminal justice and the fight 
against impunity, the final version of the Statute reflects several important 
                                                                                                                                 
130 The tenth and final session of the Preparatory Commission was held at United Nations 
headquarters from 1 to l2 July 2002.  Its work included drafts of the following documents: 
RPE; elements of crimes; a relationship agreement between the UN and the ICC; basic 
principles concerning a headquarters agreement; financial regulations and rules; an agreement 
as to the privileges and immunities of the ICC; a budget; rules of procedure for the ASP; 
proposals for defining the crime of aggression:  see PCNICC/2002/3. 
131 Article 125, Rome Statute. 
132 Article 126, Rome Statute. 
133 Article 11, Rome Statute. 
134 See ICC-ASP/1/3, Records of the First Session of the ASP, from 3-10 September 2002. 
135 The first investigation concerned grave crimes allegedly committed on the territory of the 
Democratic Republic of Congo since 1 July 2002:  See, OTP, ‘The Office of the Prosecutor of 
the International Criminal Court opens its first investigation’, 23 June 2004. 
136 Mr Thomas Lubanga Dyilo, a Congolese national and alleged founder and leader of the 
Union des Patriotes Congolais (UPC), was arrested and transferred to the ICC on 17 March 
2006.  Pre-Trial Chamber I had issued a sealed warrant of arrest against Mr Lubanga on 10 
February 2006 and also requested that the Democratic Republic of the Congo arrest and 
surrender him to the Court.  
137 On 20 March 2006, Pre-Trial Chamber I held an initial public hearing to verify the identity 
of Thomas Lubanga Dyilo. 
138 Information obtained from the ICC website. For further details, see http://www.icc-
cpi.int/statesparties.html.  
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compromises reached at the Rome Conference. The jurisdiction of the ICC is 
restricted in several ways. First, as noted above, the ICC may only exercise 
prospective jurisdiction, that is it may only exercise jurisdiction in respect of situations 
occurring after 1 July 2002.139 Second, the ICC may only exercise jurisdiction where 
the alleged crimes occurred on the territory of a state party or where the accused is a 
national of a state party.140 This requirement does not apply where the state concerned 
accepts the jurisdiction of the ICC by lodging a declaration to that effect,141 or where 
the Security Council, acting under Chapter VII, refers a situation to the ICC.142  Third, 
the ICC is bound by the principle of complementarity, which stipulates that the ICC 
may only exercise jurisdiction where the territorial state is not currently investigating 
or prosecuting the case or is unwilling or genuinely unable to do so.143  Fourth, the 
jurisdiction of the ICC is restricted to persons accused of the most serious crimes of 
international concern, that is, it is not intended that the ICC will deal with lower level 
offenders or less serious crimes.144 The crimes for which the ICC currently has 
jurisdiction are war crimes, crimes against humanity and genocide.145 It is envisaged 
that the ICC will also exercise jurisdiction in respect of the crime of aggression at a 
future stage.146 Finally, the Council, acting pursuant to its powers under Chapter VII, 
may delay or preclude the commencement of an investigation or prosecution by 
                                                 
139 Article 11, Rome Statute. Where a state becomes a party to the Rome Statute after it has 
entered into force, the ICC only has jurisdiction with respect to crimes committed after the 
entry into force of the Statute for that state. 
140 Article 12(2), Rome Statute. The ICC would also have jurisdiction if the crime was 
committed on board a vessel or aircraft and the state of registration of that vessel or aircraft is a 
party. 
141 Article 12(3), Rome Statute. 
142 Article 13(b), Rome Statute. The Council has made one such referral to date: Resolution 
1593, referring the situation in Darfur, Sudan, to the ICC. Sudan is not a party to the Rome 
Statute. See Cryer, R., ‘Sudan, Resolution 1593 and International Criminal Justice’ (2006) 19 
LJIL 195 and Happold, M., ‘Darfur, the Security Council, and the International Criminal 
Court’ (2006) 55 ICLQ 226. 
143 Complementarity is dealt with as a matter of admissibility. Where a domestic investigation 
or prosecution is proceeding, the ICC is to determine that the case is inadmissible: article 17, 
Rome Statute. The Prosecutor is also required to defer to a state’s investigation, unless the Pre-
Trial Chamber determines otherwise: article 18, Rome Statute. 
144 Article 1 provides that the ICC will only exercise jurisdiction ‘over persons for the most 
serious crimes of international concern’. Article 17(1)(d) provides that the ICC must find a 
case inadmissible where it is not of sufficient gravity to justify further action by the ICC. 
145 Articles 5, 6, 7 and 8, Rome Statute. 
146 Article 5 includes the crime of aggression as a crime within the jurisdiction of the ICC. 
However, article 5(2) states that the ICC may only exercise such jurisdiction once a provision 
defining the crime and setting out the conditions for the exercise of ICC jurisdiction has been 
agreed.  In 2003 the ASP established the Special Working Group on the Crime of Aggression 
to discuss the definition of aggression and the pre-conditions to its exercise ahead of the review 
conference scheduled to occur in early 2010. 
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sending a request to that effect to the ICC. The request for delay is to be for a 
renewable 12-month period.147 
 
Another difficulty that the ICC has encountered, albeit one that did not arise from the 
provisions of the Rome Statute and one which was largely unforeseen, is the attitude 
of the United States to the ICC. As already noted, the United States was an initial 
supporter of the concept of an international criminal court. However, at the Rome 
Conference the United States was unable to accept the package deal offered, and voted 
against the adoption of the Rome Statute.148 Despite this position, the Clinton 
administration signed the Rome Statute shortly before the 31 December 2000 
deadline. However, the successor Bush administration did not favour participating in 
the treaty and effectively ‘unsigned’ the Rome Statute on 6 May 2002.149  Not content 
with not becoming a party to the Rome Statute, the United States then sought to 
undermine the ICC by concluding bilateral immunity agreements with various states 
that purported to prevent the state concerned from surrendering United States citizens 
to the ICC, as to do so would result in a breach of an international agreement. The 
bilateral agreements were based on a controversial reading of article 98(2) of the 
Rome Statute.  Several states, many not party to the Rome Statute, agreed to sign such 
agreements. However, a majority of states, including those with a large number of 
United States residents such as Canada, Mexico and Western European states, refused 
to participate in what was widely perceived to be an attack on the ICC itself. 150 The 
                                                 
147 Article 16, Rome Statute. A request has been made on one occasion concerning jurisdiction 
regarding peacekeeping forces of non-party states, see note 151.  Article 16 has more recently 
been suggested as a response to the ICC Prosecutor’s request for an arrest warrant in respect of 
President Bashir of Sudan:  see Cryer, R., ‘The Security Council, Article 16 and Darfur’, 
Oxford Transitional Justice Research Working Paper Series, 29 October 2008 and Ciampi, A., 
‘The Proceedings against President Al Bashir and the Prospects of their Suspension under 
Article 16 ICC Statute’ (2008) 6 JICJ 885. 
148 The concerns of the United States regarding the ICC have been listed in a number of 
publications. See Bolton, J., ‘The Risks and the Weaknesses of the International Criminal 
Court from America’s perspective’ (2000) 41 VJIL 186; Scheffer, D., ‘The United States and 
the International Criminal Court’ (1999) 93 AJIL 12; the special issue of Law & Contemporary 
Problems  (Winter 2001) dedicated to the topic; Forsythe, D., ‘The United States and 
International Criminal Justice; and Sewall, S. and Kaysen, C. (eds), The United States and the 
International Criminal Court: National Security and International Law (2000). 
149 The Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties (VCLT) does not contain a mechanism for a 
state to ‘unsign’ a treaty. Instead, article 18 states that until a state gives notice of its intention 
not to become a party to the treaty, a state must not act so as to frustrate the object and purpose 
of the treaty. The communication from the United States government to the Secretary-General 
of the United Nations indicates that the United States no longer intended to become a party to 
the Rome Statute. Israel lodged a similar declaration later that year. 
150 For further discussion see: Murphy, S., ‘Efforts to Obtain Immunity from ICC for US 
Peacekeepers’ (2002) 96 AJIL 725; Dietz, J., ‘Protecting the protectors:  can the United States 
successfully exempt US persons from the International Criminal Court with US Article 98 
Agreements?’ (2004) 27 Houston Journal of International Law 137; Crawford, J. et al, ‘In the 
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United States also refused to contribute troops to peacekeeping missions unless the 
Security Council issued a request to the ICC not to investigate or prosecute members 
of such operations.151  Finally, the American Service Members’ Protection Act of 2002 
prohibits United States officials from cooperating with the ICC, authorises the use of 
force to free any American detained by or on behalf of the ICC and restricts United 
States participation in peacekeeping missions and military assistance to ICC state 
parties.152  Despite these actions, the ICC has continued to function, with many states 
believing that it has been strengthened by the hostile stance of the United States. In 
more recent years the United States has adopted a more nuanced approach to the ICC, 
including permitting the referral of the situation in Darfur by the Council to the 
ICC.153  The lack of United States support does weaken the ICC system, as the ICC 
may require the support of the United States to enforce cooperation with ICC orders 
and to secure the surrender of suspects, particularly where a situation has been referred 
to the ICC by the Security Council.  Enforcement measures may include conditionality 
of aid, diplomatic pressure, economic and targeted sanctions or possibly the use of 
military force, hopefully as sanctioned by the Security Council. 
4 Hybrid or internationalized tribunals: an alternate mechanism? 
4.1 Introduction 
While there is continued recognition that a national accountability mechanism is, in 
almost all cases, the most appropriate response, it is also clear that national 
proceedings may be problematic. States utilising universal jurisdiction also face a 
number of challenges.  Where domestic trials appear to face insurmountable obstacles, 
the alternative is usually to call for the establishment of an international criminal 
                                                                                                                                 
matter of the Statute of the International Criminal Court  and in the Matter of Bilateral 
Agreements sought by the United States under Article 98(2) of the Statute’, Joint opinion 
provided to the Lawyers’ Committee on Human Rights and the Medical Foundation for the 
Care of Victims of Torture, available at 
http://www.humanrightsfirst.org/international_justice/Art98_061403.pdf.; Barnridge, R., ‘The 
American Servicemembers’ Protection Act and Article 98 Agreements:  A Legal Analysis and 
Case for Constructive Engagement with the International Criminal Court’ (2004) 11 Journal on 
Foreign and Comparative Law 738. 
151 Resolution 1422 (2002). The resolution was adopted due to a specific United States threat to 
veto a resolution extending the mandate of the United Nations mission to BiH in 2002. The 
resolution was renewed by Resolution 1487 (2003). However, the United States did not seek its 
renewal in 2004, largely as evidence of abuse of prisoners in United States detention facilities 
in Iraq had emerged shortly before Resolution 1487 expired.  For further discussion see: El 
Zeidy, M., ‘The United States Dropped the Atomic Bomb of Article 16 of the ICC:  Security 
Council Powers of Deferral and Resolution 1422’ (2002) 35 Vanderbilt Journal of 
Transnational Law 1503. 
152 Murphy, S., ‘American Servicemembers’ Protection Act’ (2002) 96 AJIL 975. 
153 See note 142. The United States abstained in the vote on Resolution 1593. 
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tribunal, generally to deal with the most serious offenders. However, the two existing 
ad hoc tribunals have demonstrated that such tribunals have their own failings.  The 
tribunals and the ICC face the challenge of engaging the affected local populations, 
particularly as they are located away from the territorial state (and the victims).  
Moreover, purely international prosecutions do not assist in building local capacity or 
experience within the local legal system.  This has proved problematic recently as both 
the ICTR and the ICTY are now transferring cases to national jurisdictions.  
Moreover, both the ICTR and the ICTY are winding down their judicial activities and 
in the current political climate it is doubtful that the Security Council will act to create 
any further ad hoc tribunals.  As discussed above, the jurisdiction of the ICC is 
limited, and it is not intended to replace national mechanisms or to try all offenders in 
all cases. It is to be a selective justice mechanism, exercising its jurisdiction only in 
respect of the most serious crimes and the worst offenders, where national 
mechanisms are unavailable.  Therefore there exists a gap in international criminal law 
mechanisms where national mechanisms are non-existent or inadequate and the case 
does not fall within the jurisdiction of the ad hoc tribunals or the ICC, or where the 
prosecutor of those tribunals has decided not to investigate the situation in question as 
the acts in question are not of sufficient gravity.  To fill this gap, the international 
community has turned to a new model of international criminal justice; the hybrid or 
internationalized criminal tribunal.   
4.2 Defining hybrid and internationalized tribunals 
Such tribunals have been described as ‘hybrid’ or ‘internationalized’ courts as ‘both 
the institutional apparatus and the applicable law consist of a blend of the international 
and the domestic’.154  Cassese describes the term ‘internationalized’ tribunals: 155 
 
‘as encompassing judicial bodies that have a mixed 
composition, consisting of both international judges and of 
judges having the nationality of the State where trials are 
held. There may be two versions of these courts and 
tribunals. First, they may be organs of the relevant State, 
being part of its judiciary….Alternatively, the courts may be 
international in nature: they may be set up under an 
international agreement and not be part of the national 
judiciary’.  
                                                 
154 Dickinson, L., ‘The Promise of Hybrid Courts’ (2003) 97 AJIL 295, 295. 
155 Cassese, A., International Criminal Law (2003, OUP), 343. 
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A number of hybrid or internationalized tribunals have been established in recent 
years to investigate, prosecute and try individuals accused of serious violations of 
international criminal law. Five such tribunals are now operational: the Special Court 
for Sierra Leone; the international judges and prosecutors programme in Kosovo; the 
Extraordinary Chambers in the Courts of Cambodia; the War Crimes Chamber for 
Bosnia and Herzegovina; and the Iraqi High Tribunal (IHT). The Special Panels for 
Serious Crimes in East Timor156 (SPSC) suspended operations in May 2005, while the 
Special Tribunal for Lebanon (LST) was established on 1 March 2009. Suggestions 
have been made that this model of tribunal would also be appropriate for prosecution 
of atrocities committed in, among others, Burundi,157 Afghanistan,158 Israel and the 
Occupied Territories,159 Chad,160 Sudan161 and Liberia,162 and for drug related and 
terrorist crimes in other states.163   
                                                 
156 Until independence in May 2002, the territory was known as East Timor. For convenience, 
all references will be to East Timor unless the context requires otherwise. 
157 In June 2005, the Security Council requested the Secretary-General to commence 
negotiations with the Government of Burundi for the creation of a mixed truth commission and 
special chamber within the court system of Burundi:  see Resolution 1606, 20 June 2005.  The 
assessment mission recommended the establishment of a special chamber within the national 
court structure:  see Report of the assessment mission on the establishment of an international 
judicial commission of inquiry for Burundi, S/2005/158, 11 March 2005.  The United Nations 
has, as yet, been unable to finalise arrangements for the special chamber.  However, these 
proposals may now be revisited following the signing of an agreement for the establishment of 
a steering committee on transitional justice issues:  see Report of the independent expert on the 
situation in Burundi, 15 August 2008, A/HRC/9/14, para. 37. 
158 See: Dickinson, L., ‘Transitional Justice in Afghanistan: The Promise of Mixed Tribunals’ 
(2003) 31 Denver Journal of International Law & Policy 23; Cassese, A., ‘The Role of 
Internationalized Courts and Tribunals in the Fight Against International Criminality’ in 
Romano et al (eds) Internationalized Criminal Courts: Sierra Leone, East Timor, Kosovo and 
Cambodia (2004) (hereafter ‘Romano’), 10. See also Pellet, A., ‘Internationalized Courts:  
Better than nothing…’ in Romano, 441, indicating that internationalized trials could have been 
used to try Afghan war criminals and possibly also United States combatants who committed 
war crimes against the Taliban in Afghanistan.  
159 Cassese, ibid, 11. Note the contrary view of Pellet, who doubts that this model is 
appropriate where both parties to a conflict commit international crimes and where a ‘tripartite’ 
court would be required, with Israeli and Palestinian judges sitting on the same court: Pellet, 
ibid, 441. 
160 Cassese suggests that Hissene Harbe, the former dictator from Chad, could be tried before a 
mixed tribunal:  note 158, 11. Contrast the view of Pellet, note 158, 441.  This suggestion has 
been overtaken by events, with Senegal (the country where Habre has been in exile some 17 
years) establishing in 2007 a special war crimes court to try Habre, due to pressure from the 
African Union. Belgium has recently commenced proceedings before the International Court of 
Justice seeking an order that Senegal must extradite Habre to Belgium for trial:  Press Release, 
‘Belgium institutes proceedings against Senegal and requests the Court to indicate provisional 
measures’, 19 February 2009. 
161 The United States had suggested that a mixed tribunal should be established to deal with 
justice in Darfur.  This suggestion was overtaken by the referral of the situation in Darfur to the 
ICC.  The Special Criminal Chamber on the Events in Darfur, established by the Sudanese 
authorities in June 2005 is purely a national institution:  see Human Rights Watch, Lack of 
Conviction: The Special Criminal Court on the Events in Darfur, June 2006. 
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Although there is currently no universally-accepted definition of an internationalized 
tribunal, there is some agreement as to their core features. In particular, the tribunal 
must exercise a criminal judicial function, there must be a mix of international and 
national elements operating at many levels, and the tribunal must have been created as 
an ad hoc and temporary response to a specific situation.164 There are suggestions that 
the internationalized aspect requires a link to the United Nations, which is manifested 
in the pursuit of the goals of the United Nations and United Nations participation in 
the creation of the courts.165 This requirement for United Nations involvement does 
not seem borne out by practice; as both the WCC and the IHT have limited or no 
connection with the United Nations.  However, it has been observed that, while 
common characteristics may be identified, ‘the general “species” of internationalized 
tribunals is highly heterogeneous; the circumstances of their creation are extremely 
different; their degree of “internationalization” is far from uniform; the scope of their 
jurisdiction is varied; their modes of functioning are hardly comparable’.166 This 
degree of ‘ad-hocism’ makes it difficult to identify any conclusive definition or 
normative framework within which to assess existing and future internationalized 
tribunals. 
 
Despite this difficulty, it is possible to assess these mechanisms on a sliding scale by 
looking at the extent and degree of international involvement. At the top end are the 
‘true’ international criminal tribunals, the ICTY and the ICTR. Established by a 
Security Council resolution under Chapter VII of the Charter, these tribunals are 
subsidiary organs of the United Nations and represent justice designed and 
implemented by the United Nations. The ICC also belongs in this category of 
tribunals, although it is not as global in its reach. Having been created by treaty, in the 
absence of a Security Council referral, it imposes obligations only for those states 
party to the Rome Statute. Yet, the growing number of parties to the Rome Statute and 
the possibility of Security Council referrals to the ICC confer on the ICC a broader 
universal character.  The next layer of international involvement would be a so-called 
                                                                                                                                 
162 It is likely that the Truth and Reconciliation Commission established for Liberia will 
recommend the creation of a special war crimes chamber: O’Meara, N., ‘A War Crimes Court 
for Liberia?’ (2009) Bulletin of International Legal Developments 3. 
163 Cassese, note 158, 10, noting that judges and prosecutors in Colombia are reluctant to take 
action against terrorists or drug trafficking for fear of their own lives.  It is possible that this 
solution could also have been adopted in relation to terrorists and insurgents in Iraq. 
164 Condorelli, L. and Boutruche, T., ‘Internationalized Criminal Courts: Are they necessary?’ 
in Romano, 428-30. 
165 Ibid, 429. 
166 Pellet, note 158, 437. 
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hybrid tribunal. This is a blending of the national and international in one institution. 
The SCSL and the LST are possible examples of this model.  The third layer would 
include internationalized tribunals – essentially domestic institutions but with 
significant input from other states or from other international institutions such as the 
United Nations. Many of the tribunals to be studied in this thesis fall within this type 
of tribunal.  The final category would be the provision of justice ‘assistance’ by other 
states or the international community, usually on an ad hoc basis.167 This would 
include, for example, the dispatch of forensic experts to assist in an investigation, the 
secondment of staff to train judges or lawyers, or financial or material contributions 
toward the operation of a specific institution or a defined project. International 
assistance does not have to be addressed at supporting an entire court but could instead 
be targeted at a particular aspect of the process, such as investigation or prosecution.168  
It is suggested that this final category would also include sui generis arrangements 
whereby a state has agreed to host a tribunal or trial conducted by the courts of another 
state on its territory.  Other than the general introduction to the ad hoc tribunals and 
the ICC provided above, this thesis will examine the institutions falling within the 
second and third levels on the scale outlined above: hybrid tribunals and 
internationalized tribunals. The tribunals to be considered are the SCSL, the LST, the 
IJPP, the SPSC, the ECCC, the WCC and the IHT. Of these tribunals, probably the 
most controversial tribunal to include is the IHT, with several states and commentators 
considering the IHT to be a purely national institution, receiving limited international 
assistance.169 However, as will be discussed in subsequent chapters, the IHT shares 
some characteristics of an internationalized criminal tribunal.  First, there is an 
international dimension in that it was established within the context of an international 
                                                 
167 An example of international assistance is the OSCE mission to Serbia, which has a mission 
priority to support the capacity of the domestic system to conduct its own war crimes trials, 
including support to the War Crimes Chamber and the War Crimes Prosecutor.  For further 
details see:  OSCE Mission to Serbia and Montenegro, War Crimes Before Domestic Courts 
(2003); International Centre for Transitional Justice (ICTJ), Serbia and Montenegro: Selected 
Developments in Transitional Justice (2004); and ICTJ, Against the Current – War Crimes 
Prosecutions in Serbia (2007). 
168 Agreement between the United Nations and the Government of Guatemala for the 
Establishment of a Commission for the Investigation of Illegal Groups and Clandestine 
Security Organizations in Guatemala, 7 January 2004.   This agreement has not been 
implemented, as it was rejected by the Guatemalan Congress after the Constitutional Court 
found that certain elements were incompatible with the constitution.  It had proposed the 
creation of an international investigative and prosecutorial capacity, operating under national 
law.  The parties have now entered into the Agreement for the establishment of an International 
Commission Against Impunity in Guatemala, 12 December 2006. 
169 See Stahn, C., ‘The Geometry of Transitional Justice:  Choices of Institutional Design’ 
(2005) 18 LJIL 425, 441; Garraway, C., ‘The Statute of the Iraqi Special Tribunal: A 
Commentary’ in Breau, S. and Jachec-Neale, A., (eds) Testing the Boundaries of International 
Humanitarian Law (BIICL, London, 2006). 
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occupation and its design and operation have been heavily influenced by the 
occupying powers.  Second, as originally envisaged, the IHT Statute provided for the 
possible, although not mandatory, appointment of international personnel and support 
staff.  Even though this provision was never utilised, and was restricted in the 2005 
version of the IHT Statute, it was included in the initial design of the tribunal.  
Moreover, international advisors have had a significant role in advising the organs of 
the IHT.  Third, the IHT Statute incorporates crimes under international law and 
national law.  Fourth, on a practical level, the IHT has received significant assistance 
from states and international organisations, in particular the United States.  The United 
States has provided a large proportion of the tribunal’s funding, and has offered 
assistance in a number of key areas, including the provision of security to the 
tribunal’s premises, staff and witnesses and in detaining many of the accused.  
Accordingly, it is included in this study as an internationalized tribunal. 
 
Tribunals that have been excluded from the study are also significant. The trial of the 
individuals accused of committing the terrorist attack on Pan Am Flight 103 over 
Lockerbie in Scotland has on occasion been suggested as falling within the category of 
internationalized tribunals.  Following the bombing, criminal proceedings were 
commended in Scotland and the United Kingdom and the United States, acting 
individually and through the Security Council,170 sought to compel Libya, the state of 
nationality of the accused, to extradite the accused for trial. Libya refused, arguing that 
under the relevant international instrument, the 1971 Montreal Convention, it was 
entitled to try the accused itself. Only if it failed to do so was it required to extradite 
the accused. Libya referred the dispute to the International Court of Justice in 1992, 
seeking an order for provisional measures confirming that it was not required to 
extradite the accused and that the United Kingdom and the United States were in 
violation of their own obligations under the Convention in attempting to coerce the 
extradition of the accused.171  
 
                                                 
170 See Resolutions 731 (1992), 748 (1992) and 883 (1993), which condemned the bombing, 
required Libya to comply with requests from the United Kingdom, the United States and 
France (regarding the bombing of a French airliner) to cooperate fully in establishing 
responsibility for the acts and imposed a variety of sanctions when Libya failed to do so.. 
171 See Questions of Interpretation and Application of the 1971 Montreal Convention arising 
from the Aerial Incident at Lockerbie (Libyan Arab Jamahiriya v. United Kingdom); Questions 
of Interpretation and Application of the 1971 Montreal Convention arising from the Aerial 
Incident at Lockerbie (Libyan Arab Jamahiriya v. United States). 
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The dispute was ultimately resolved politically, with the Security Council and the 
Secretary General assisting to negotiate a solution to the impasse.172 An international 
agreement provided for the trial to be conducted by a panel of Scottish judges, 
operating under Scottish law, but sitting in the Netherlands, a neutral country.173  The 
agreement was forwarded to the Security Council, and measures against Libya were 
lifted following the surrender of the accused for trial. Despite the role of the United 
Nations in the resolution of the dispute, the Lockerbie tribunal is not considered here 
to be an internationalized criminal tribunal. The tribunal itself was a United Kingdom 
court. It was established pursuant to United Kingdom law,174 applied Scottish 
substantive and procedural law, with some modification to exclude a jury trial, and 
utilised Scottish judges and personnel. The only international element was the location 
of the tribunal and the nationality of the accused. The Security Council did not 
establish the tribunal or require its establishment. It is thus best considered ‘an ad hoc 
solution for a particular incident’175 and has not been included in this thesis as an 
example of an internationalized tribunal. 
4.3 Benefits and possible limitations of hybrid and internationalized 
tribunals 
These tribunals are said to offer the advantages of both national and international 
prosecutions.176  The addition of international judges and prosecutors in sensitive cases 
may bolster the capacity of the local judiciary and enhance the perception that the 
judiciary is independent and impartial. International involvement may allow minority 
groups greater participation and protection.  International judges and prosecutors 
should be familiar with the relevant international laws and standards, while local 
judges are familiar with the relevant local law and the territory.  If situated in the 
affected territory, internationalized tribunals may enable a sense of domestic 
                                                 
172 For further discussion of the background to the trial, see Plachta, M., ‘The Lockerbie Case:  
the role of the Security Council in Enforcing the Principle aut dedere aut judicare’ (2001) 12 
EJIL 125 and Andrews, D., ‘A thorn on the tulip – a Scottish trial in the Netherlands: the story 
behind the Lockerbie trial’ (2004) 36 Case Western Reserve Journal of International Law 307. 
173 Agreement between the Government of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern 
Ireland and the Government of the Netherlands concerning a Scottish Trial in the Netherlands, 
18 September 1998, UNTS Vol. 2062, I-35699.   
174 High Court of Justiciary (Proceedings in the Netherlands) Order 1998. 
175 Cryer et al, note 79. 
176 A number of commentators and non-governmental organizations have reviewed the success 
or otherwise of the hybrid and internationalized tribunals, as well as their jurisprudence.  For 
example, see Mendez, P, ‘The New Wave of Hybrid Tribunals:  A Sophisticated Approach to 
Enforcing International Humanitarian Law or an Idealistic Solution with Empty Promises?’ 
(2009) 20 Crim LF 53; Dickinson, note 154; Higonnet, E., ‘Restructuring Hybrid Courts:  
Local Empowerment and National Criminal Justice Reform’ (2006) 23 Arizona Journal of 
International and Comparative Law 347. 
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ownership of and engagement with the criminal justice process.177  Establishing an 
internationalized tribunal may enable the revision of national laws to more clearly 
incorporate international crimes and may encourage the penetration of international 
norms both within the territory affected and also, potentially, in the wider region.178  
Moreover, internationalized tribunals may lead to trials being started and completed 
more quickly than rebuilding domestic capacity, so allowing prosecution to be 
expedited, without compromising standards.179   
 
However, it is also possible that internationalized tribunals could replicate the failings 
of both international and national prosecutions.180  Incorporating dual aspects might 
lead to problems with cooperation between national and international elements.  
National and international judges may operate from different legal philosophies, 
particularly where there is a mixture of judges from civil and common law systems.  
Developing capacity amongst the local legal profession requires interaction and 
mentoring, which is not always a task for which international judges are well-prepared 
or have sufficient time to undertake.  Locating the tribunal in the territory affected 
may enable greater engagement, but if the security situation deteriorates it may 
actually threaten the ability of victims and witnesses, defence lawyers and even 
tribunal personnel to attend, let alone participate in the trials to be conducted.181  The 
appointment of international judges and prosecutors may not be sufficient to ensure 
impartiality, particularly where international judges form a minority on a judging 
panel.182  Moreover, the involvement of international actors could create its own 
concerns regarding the independence of the system and the personnel,183 or it may 
                                                 
177 As Cassese notes, the local population will be familiar with the events that led to the 
conflict and the atrocities committed.  Observing and engaging with the trial process may be a 
cathartic process for the wider community, and contribute towards long-term reconciliation: 
note 158, 6. 
178 Dickinson, note 154, 307-8. 
179 Cassese, note 155, 345. 
180 Cockayne, J., ‘The Fraying Shoestring:  Rethinking Hybrid War Crimes Tribunals’ (2005) 
28 FILJ 616. 
181 The IHT has faced an increasingly hostile security environment since its establishment in 
2003, with the situation deteriorating rapidly in 2004.  The IJJP has also experienced 
difficulties operating within the territory of Kosovo. 
182 Of all the tribunals featured in this study that utilise international judges, only the ECCC 
does not require a majority of international judges:  see Table One.   
183 One of the main criticisms of the IJPP is that ‘its structure gives to the SRSG the ultimate 
executive power to appoint international judges and prosecutors and choose cases in which 
they are to be involved’:  ICTJ, Lessons from the Deployment of International Judges and 
Prosecutors (2006), 19. 
 38 
place a veil of legitimacy on a national system that may lack independence184 or be 
corrupt.185  A suitable body of applicable law may not exist,186 or the selection of the 
applicable law may be controversial.187 Tribunals may not have a clear prosecution 
strategy and may squander valuable resources on cases concerning lower-level 
accused or ‘ordinary crimes’.188  Internationalized tribunals may even face greater 
challenges in securing international and domestic cooperation than either international 
or domestic institutions.189  Perhaps the most significant factor that has impacted upon 
the performance of all internationalized tribunals to date is the reluctance of the 
relevant international actors and, in some circumstances, of the state affected, to 
allocate a sufficient amount and reliable source of funding to the tribunal.  The former 
Secretary-General has expressed his preference for funding from assessed 
contributions on several occasions, commenting that: 190  
any future financial mechanism must provide the assured and 
continuous source of funding that is needed to appoint officials and 
staff, contract services, purchase equipment and support investigations, 
prosecutions and trials and do so expeditiously. Resort, therefore, to 
assessed contributions remains necessary in these cases. The operation 
of judicial bodies cannot be left entirely to the vagaries of voluntary 
financing.   
 
                                                 
184 There is evidence that trials before the IHT are subject to political pressure and interference: 
see Human Rights Watch, Judging Dujail: The First Trial before the Iraqi High Tribunal 
(2006), 39-43. 
185 Serious concerns exist as to the independence of the judiciary in Cambodia.  There are also 
allegations that judges, including the national judges appointed to the ECCC, are corrupt and 
received kickbacks for appointment:  Open Society Justice Initiative, Corruption Allegations at 
Khmer Rouge Court must be Investigated Thoroughly (2007).  These corruption allegations 
remain unresolved, with the findings of a recent review by the United Nations of the claims - 
that has supposedly recommended Cambodia conduct a full investigation and that the United 
Nations should withdraw from the process if the issue is not resolved– not publicly released. 
See: Hall, J., ‘Corruption Charges Threaten Khmer Rouge Tribunal’ New America Media, 
News Report, 16 August, 2008.   
186 When UNTAET and UNMIK arrived in East Timor and Kosovo respectively, they faced a 
legal system which did not incorporate many of the international crimes that had been 
committed during the conflicts:  See Hartmann, M., International Judges and Prosecutors in 
Kosovo (2003, United States Institute of Peace) and Strohmeyer, H., ‘Collapse and 
Reconstruction of a Judicial System:  The United Nations Missions in Kosovo and East Timor’ 
(2001) 95 AJIL 46.  
187  One of the problems facing UNMIK upon arrival in Kosovo was the lack of a legal 
framework.  The selection of the pre-existing law offended much of the population, in 
particular Kosovan Albanian judges and legal professionals, who refused to apply the law.  See 
Lorenz, F., ‘The Rule of Law in Kosovo:  Problems and Prospects’ (2000) 11 CrimLF 127, 
128; Strohmeyer, ibid; and ICTJ, note 183, 9-10. 
188 See discussion in Chapter Four.   
189 See the discussion in Chapter Five. 
190 Report of the Secretary-General on the rule of law and transitional justice in conflict and 
post-conflict societies, S/2004/616, para. 43. 
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All of the tribunals studied have experienced funding difficulties.191  This has led to 
the perception that such institutions are ‘justice on a shoestring’, suffering from 
chronic under-funding, severe staff and resource shortages, a failure to provide for 
adequate defence or witness and victim protection schemes, concerns that trials do not 
meet minimum standards, and many obstacles to having vital materials (including 
judgements) translated and made publicly available.  
 
The problems that have been encountered by the hybrid and internationalized tribunals 
suggest that the following guidelines as to when these models should be applied may 
be of use.  First, as these models rely in part on a functioning judiciary there should 
always be some components of the judicial system left in place, or at least the 
potential to quickly find and recruit suitable candidates.  Second, where the conflict is 
ongoing or the security situation has deteriorated, planners must assess whether trials 
within the affected territory are feasible or should be deferred or located outside the 
affected territory.  This consideration may also be relevant to a particular trial, as 
opposed to relocating the entire tribunal.192  Third, the internationalized tribunal 
should be established with the support of the relevant local actors and should not be 
viewed as ‘imposed’.  It is essential that the tribunal has the support, input and 
cooperation of local authorities.193  Fourth, it may be beneficial to place the national 
judiciary (and international personnel) under some form of international scrutiny, such 
as trial monitoring,194 and also be subject to international oversight, possibly in the 
form of a management committee or similar body.195  Fifth, where the cooperation of 
                                                 
191 In relation to Cambodia, see Linton, S., ‘Safeguarding the Independence and Impartiality of 
the Cambodian Extraordinary Chambers’ (2006) 4 JCIJ 327, 335; and Kamhi, A., ‘Private 
Funding for Public Justice: The Feasibility of Donations to the Cambodian Tribunal’ (2007) 48 
HILJ 581.  See also see Ingadottir, T., ‘Financial Challenges and their Possible Effects on 
Proceedings’ (2006) 4 JICJ 294; Ingadottir, T., ‘The Financing of Internationalized Criminal 
Courts and Tribunals’ in Romano, 271-290; Roper, S. and Barria, L., Designing Criminal 
Tribunals: Sovereignty and International Concerns in the Protection of Human Rights 
(Ashgate, 2006), Chapter Five.   
192 The SCSL has utilised the option in article 10 of the SCSL Agreement to sit away from its 
seat in Sierra Leone ‘if circumstances so require’ so as to host the trial of former Liberian 
President, Charles Taylor, in the Hague, using the premises of the ICC.  The relocation of the 
trial was justified by reference to the security situation and the concern that the trial may 
destabilise the situation within Sierra Leone and in neighbouring Liberia. 
193 Beauvais, J., ‘Benevolent Despotism: A Critique of UN State-Building in East Timor’ 
(2001) 33 NYJILP 1101. 
194 The OSCE Legal Systems Monitoring Section in Kosovo and the Judicial System 
Monitoring Project in East Timor have provided vital information on the functioning of the 
internationalized process and helped shape reforms to the operation of the tribunals. 
195 Three of the tribunals studied have a dedicated system for oversight, the SCSL, the LST and 
the WCC.  See Mochochoko, P., and Tortora, G., ‘The Management Committee for the Special 
Court for Sierra Leone’, in Romano, 141; and Agreement between the High Representative for 
Bosnia and Herzegovina and Bosnia and Herzegovina on the Establishment of the Registry for 
Section I War Crimes and Section II for Organised Crime, Economic Crime and Corruption of 
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elements of the affected society or other states is required there should be some 
possibility of securing that cooperation. In the absence of appropriate legal 
arrangements or a lack of will to fulfil legal obligations this may require the Security 
Council to take a role in securing the arrest and surrender / extradition of accused or 
the transfer of evidence.196  Sixth, an internationalized tribunal should not be able to 
utilise the death penalty because this may preclude the involvement of the United 
Nations and the wider international community.197  Finally, a tribunal should not be 
established unless there is a secure and sufficient source of funding.198 
 
It has also been suggested that a hybrid or internationalized tribunal should only be 
established where a purely international tribunal is not possible, either due to a lack of 
political will to establish the tribunal or to fund the tribunal.  However, it is submitted 
here that this is not necessarily the case, as hybrid and internationalized tribunals may 
offer many advantages over an international criminal tribunal.  It will be interesting to 
see how the relationship between the ICC and future hybrid or internationalized 
tribunals develops, as the use of such tribunals may be another facet of the 
complementarity principle, whereby an internationalized tribunal may operate where 
the ICC may otherwise have done so, thus freeing up valuable resources at the ICC. 
 
5 Conclusion 
This Chapter has outlined the available options to secure criminal accountability for 
perpetrators of international crimes.  It has highlighted that the system of enforcement 
of international criminal law is by no means comprehensive.  States are often reluctant 
or unable to bring perpetrators to trial for conduct committed by their nationals or on 
their territory.  Other states face numerous political, legal and practical challenges in 
                                                                                                                                 
the Criminal and Appellate Divisions of the Court of Bosnia and Herzegovina and the Special 
Department for War Crimes and the Special Department for Organised Crime, Economic 
Crime and Corruption of the Prosecutor’s Office of Bosnia and Herzegovina, 1 December 2004 
and Decision on Ratification of the Annex Amending and Supplementing the Registry 
Agreement, Decision PA No 318/06, 7 July 2006. Recent concerns as to financial 
mismanagement by the ECCC have led donor states and various non-governmental 
organisations to call for the creation of an oversight committee and/or a special international 
advisory position:  Heindel, A. and Ciorciari, J., ‘Possible Roles for a Special Advisor or 
Oversight Committee for the ECCC’ (2008). 
196 These issues are discussed in Chapter Five. 
197 The United Nations has stated that it cannot, as a matter of policy, establish or cooperate 
with a tribunal that permits the death penalty as a possible punishment. The availability of the 
death penalty is also one of the key reasons why members states of the European Union (which 
is opposed to the death penalty) were reluctant to lend assistance to the IHT.  For discussion as 
to whether the IHT was lawfully able to apply the death penalty, see:  Bohlander, M., ‘Can the 
Iraqi Special Tribunal sentence Saddam Hussein to Death?’ (2005) 3 JICJ 463. 
198 See the sources cited at note 191. 
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relying on the principle of universal jurisdiction to bring perpetrators to justice.  The 
two ad hoc tribunals and the ICC are subject to numerous restrictions on their 
jurisdiction and their capacity, and the ad hoc tribunals are now winding down their 
activities pursuant to the completion strategy.  The ICC will always be a court of last 
resort, and will not try a large number of cases.  Thus there is an ‘impunity gap’ in the 
international justice system.  Hybrid or internationalized tribunals represent another 
possible mechanism to secure criminal responsibility for international crimes.  
Although their establishment is ad hoc, and the tribunals have a number of different 
features, it is possible to envisage categories of such tribunals.  These categories will 
be the subject of further discussion in Chapter Three.  Hybrid and internationalized 
tribunals will not, however, fully close the impunity gap.  Due to political factors, a 
desire to preserve national sovereignty and resource constraints, these tribunals will 
not be established in every situation where states have failed to act and the ICC or an 
ad hoc tribunal is unable to act.  Moreover, the experience of the tribunals established 
to date suggests that hybrid or internationalized tribunals are not appropriate in all 
circumstances. Guidelines for when such bodies should be considered are starting to 
emerge, and will allow the mechanism to be used in a more effective manner so as to 
achieve as far as possible the principle of non-impunity. 
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CHAPTER TWO 
BACKGROUND TO THE ESTABLISHMENT OF THE HYBRID AND 
INTERNATIONALIZED TRIBUNALS 
 
1 Introduction 
The preceding chapter outlined the development of international criminal law, 
including the establishment of the ICTY, the ICTR and the ICC. It also discussed the 
difficulties faced in relying on national judicial systems, and traced the increasing 
reliance on the notion of a hybrid or internationalized tribunal. Given the jurisdictional 
restrictions and resource limitations of the international criminal tribunals, one may 
expect that hybrid or internationalized tribunals would have been established wherever 
states have not exercised or were unable to exercise jurisdiction and where the 
international criminal courts may not – or chose not – to do so.  However, this is not 
the case.  The establishment of internationalized justice mechanisms is also subject to 
the same criticism of selective enforcement as are national courts and purely 
international models of criminal justice.  
 
This chapter examines the background to the existing and former hybrid and 
internationalized tribunals that will be the subject of further study in the remaining 
chapters.  Seven such institutions have been established.  The discussion outlines the 
circumstances surrounding the violations of international humanitarian or human 
rights law, whether they are an armed conflict of an international or non-international 
nature, violations committed by a repressive regime, an act of terrorism, or a 
combination of these situations. It will assess the role of the affected state(s) in the 
negotiation process – if any – and the domestic political factors at play, as well as the 
role of other states, the United Nations - in particular the Security Council – and 
international organisations in establishing the tribunals. The discussion will serve two 
purposes. First, it will demonstrate the various contexts in which such tribunals have 
been established, and the political, legal and financial factors that have influenced 
their design and operation.  Second, it will provide the basis for the analysis in the 
following chapters, which examine how the context in which a tribunal has been 
created and political, legal and financial factors have influenced the legal and 
jurisdictional basis of the tribunals, and the conduct and individuals which may be the 
subject of investigation and trial before them. 
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2 The Special Court for Sierra Leone 
In 1967 the All People’s Congress (APC) party was successful in general elections but 
was prevented by a military coup from assuming control of the country.1  The coup 
was short-lived, with the APC regaining control through another putsch a year later.  
The APC ruled the country for almost two decades, with its policies of economic 
centralisation, marginalisation of certain ethnic groups, widespread institutional 
corruption, and interference with civil service employment serving to deepen the 
divide between socio-economic and geographical groups within Sierra Leone society.  
On 23 March 1991 an armed group comprising Sierra Leone nationals and nationals of 
other African states attacked a village in the east of Sierra Leone, triggering a civil war 
that was to claim an estimated 75,000 lives and displace one-third of the population.2 
The group was the Revolutionary United Front (RUF), and its leader, Foday Sankoh, 
announced his intention to overthrow the APC.  In 1992 the APC regime was forced 
into exile by a military coup and a military government was established.  RUF forces 
and members of the regular Sierra Leone military forces collaborated in undermining 
the government, leading the population to demand a transfer to democratic rule.  In 
March 1996 Ahmad Kabbah was elected President.  The first attempt to negotiate an 
end to the conflict took place in November 1996, with the signature of a peace 
agreement between President Kabbah’s party and the RUF.3  The agreement included 
a call for the end of hostilities and an amnesty for combatants but was never 
implemented because support for the agreement collapsed soon after its signature.  
The Kabbah government’s rule was short-lived:  it was ousted by a violent military 
coup in May 1997 that triggered a period of violence and terror that lasted for nine 
months.  The leaders of the military coup joined with the RUF to form the Armed 
Forces Revolutionary Council (AFRC), a military junta that was alleged to have been 
responsible for violations of human rights. The Civil Defence Force (CDF), consisting 
of locally-formed armed bands aligned to the Kabbah government and the regular 
                                                 
1 This brief outline of the history of the conflict is based on several sources.  See:  Anthony, 
‘Historical and Political Background to the Conflict in Sierra Leone’ in Ambos, K. and 
Othman, M. (eds) New Approaches in International Criminal Justice: Kosovo, East Timor, 
Sierra Leone and Cambodia (2003); Stafford, N., ‘A Model war Crimes Court: Sierra Leone’ 
(2004) 10 ILSA JICL 117; Fritz, N. and Smith, A., ‘Current Apathy for Coming Anarchy: 
Building the Special Court for Sierra Leone’ (2002) 25 FILJ 391; and Human Rights Watch, 
The Jury is Still Out, Briefing Paper on Sierra Leone, 11 July 2002.  For further details of the 
atrocities committed see:  Human Rights Watch, We’ll Kill You if You Cry:  Sexual Violence in 
the Sierra Leone Conflict, January 2003. 
2 International Centre for Transitional Justice, The Special Court for Sierra Leone:  The First 
Eighteen Months (2004), 1. 
3 Peace Agreement between the Government of the Republic of Sierra Leone and the 
Revolutionary United Front of Sierra Leone, 30 November 1996 (Abidjan Accord).   
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army, was also involved in the conflict in order to defend civilians against attacks by 
rebel forces. 
 
International pressure and military intervention by the Economic Community of West 
African States (ECOWAS) in early 1998 removed the AFRC and restored President 
Kabbah and the SLLP to power.4  The AFRC and the RUF fled to the northern region 
and some eastern regions from where they continued to attack government forces, 
civilians and peacekeeping forces.  In early 1999 the AFRC and the RUF attacked the 
capital, Freetown, and seized control of diamond mines, killing and maiming 
thousands of civilians before being repelled by ECOMOG troops.5  In 1999 the parties 
participated in a further peace conference in Lomé, Togo,6 with the assistance of the 
United Nations, the Government of the Togolese Republic, the Organisation for 
African Unity, ECOWAS and the Commonwealth.  The negotiations resulted in the 
Lomé Accord between the Government and the RUF, signed on 7 July 1999.  The 
Lomé Accord provided for an immediate and permanent end to the conflict between 
the parties, the establishment of monitoring commissions for violations of the 
ceasefire, the transformation of the RUF into a political party, arrangements for a 
transitional governance structure ahead of national elections, the continued 
deployment of a United Nations observer mission and a mandate for a regional 
peacekeeping force.  Its provisions were partly implemented, with a partial ceasefire, 
the establishment of an implementation committee and the dispatch of a peacekeeping 
mission by the Security Council.7 The truth and reconciliation commission envisaged 
by the Lomé Accord was established in February 2000.8  However, fighting resumed 
                                                 
4 See Berger, L., ‘State Practice Evidence of the Humanitarian Intervention Doctrine: The 
ECOWAS Intervention in Sierra Leone’ (2001) 11 Indiana International & Comparative Law 
Review 605. 
5 ECOMOG was the military arm of ECOWAS. 
6 This was the parties’ fourth attempt at peace negotiations, and the second ‘comprehensive’ 
peace agreement signed.   
7 Seventh Report of the Secretary-General on the United Nations Observer Mission in Sierra 
Leone, S/1999/836; First Report of the Secretary-General on the United Nations Mission in 
Sierra Leone (UNAMSIL), S/1999/1223; and Resolutions 1260 (1999) and 1270 (1999).  See 
also Udombana, N., ‘Globalization of Justice and the Special Court for Sierra Leone’s War 
Crimes’ (2003) 17 Emory International Law Review 55, 78-82. 
8 Article XXVI, Lome Accord; Truth and Reconciliation Commission Act 2000 (SL).  There is 
extensive literature regarding the truth and reconciliation commission and its relationship with 
the SCSL, for example:  Schabas, W., ‘Conjoined Twins of Transitional Justice? The Sierra 
Leone Truth and Reconciliation Commission and the Special Court’ (2004) 2 JICJ 1082; Hall, 
L. and Kazemi, N., ‘Prospects for Justice and Reconciliation in Sierra Leone’ (2003) HILJ 287; 
Schabas, W., ‘The Relationship Between Truth Commissions and International Courts: The 
Case of Sierra Leone’ (2003) 25 HRQ 1035; Tejan-Cole, A., ‘The Complementary and 
Conflicting Relationship between the Special Court for Sierra Leone and the Truth and 
Reconciliation Commission’ (2003) 6 Yale Human Rights & Development Law Journal 139; 
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early in 2000, hostilities against civilians continued, and the RUF seized and held 
hostage United Nations peacekeepers.9  The end of the conflict was not announced 
officially until 14 January 2002, with the surrender of approximately 45,000 rebels.10  
 
The hostilities between the warring factions were particularly horrendous and included 
the targeting of civilians.  Victims were murdered or maimed through amputation of 
limbs.11  Boys were recruited as child soldiers and women and girls were raped, 
abducted and used as sex slaves.  It is estimated that between 100,000 and 200,000 
people died during the conflict, with 100,000 more mutilated and seriously injured,12 
and up to one quarter of the population displaced.13  All parties to the conflict were 
alleged to have committed violations of international humanitarian law.14  Soldiers 
from the Nigerian-led peacekeeping force contributed by the ECOWAS also allegedly 
committed offences.15 
 
In June 2000 the President of Sierra Leone, President Kabbah, wrote to the Security 
Council requesting its assistance ‘in establishing a strong and credible court that will 
meet the objectives of bringing justice and ensuring lasting peace’.16  President 
Kabbah stated that Sierra Leone did not have the resources or expertise to conduct 
trials for crimes of the magnitude and extent of those committed.17  He attached a 
suggested legal framework for the intended court, ‘one that will meet international 
standards for the trial of criminal cases while at the same time having a mandate to 
administer a blend of international and domestic Sierra Leonean law on Sierra Leone 
soil’.18  In Resolution 1315,19 the Security Council requested the Secretary-General ‘to 
negotiate an agreement with the Government of Sierra Leone to create an independent 
                                                                                                                                 
and Evenson, E., ‘Truth and Justice in Sierra Leone:  Coordination Between Commission and 
Court’ (2004) 104 Col LR 730. 
9 See the Reports of the Secretary-General during this period:  S/2000/13 (Second Report); 
S/2000/186 (Third Report); S/2000/455 (Fourth Report); S/2000/751 (Fifth Report); 
S/2000/832 (Sixth Report); and S/2000/1055 (Seventh Report). 
10 Stafford, note 1, footnote 50. 
11 Miraldi, M., ‘Overcoming Obstacles of Justice:  The Special Court of Sierra Leone’ (2003) 
19 New York Law School Journal of Human Rights 849 
12 Stafford, note 1, footnotes 17 and 18. 
13 Human Rights Watch, note 1.  
14 See Akinrinade, B., ‘International Humanitarian Law and the Conflict in Sierra Leone’ 
(2001) 15 Notre Dame Journal of Law, Ethics and Public Policy 391. 
15 Human Rights Watch, note 1. 
16 Letter from the President of Sierra Leone to the President of the United Nations Security 
Council, dated 12 June 2000, Annex to Letter dated 9 August 2000 from the Permanent 
Representative of Sierra Leone to the United Nations addressed to the President of the Security 
Council, S/2000/786. 
17 Ibid. 
18 Ibid. 
19 Resolution 1315 (2000). 
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special court consistent with this resolution’, and to report to the Security Council on 
the result of negotiations within 30 days from the date of the resolution.20  The 
Security Council made several recommendations as to the subject matter and personal 
jurisdiction of the proposed court,21 and asked for recommendations from the 
Secretary-General on the temporal jurisdiction, the appeals process, the location of the 
court, the level of assistance required for the court, and funding alternatives.22  The 
Secretary-General submitted his report to the Security Council on 4 October 2000,23 
annexing a draft agreement for the creation of the proposed court and a draft statute.  
The Secretary-General and the Security Council then corresponded in relation to the 
proposed personal jurisdiction, composition and funding arrangements of the court, 
with the Security Council suggesting various amendments to the text of the draft 
agreement and statute. 24   
 
The Secretary-General indicated that he would not formally enter into the agreement 
until he had received assurances from states that sufficient funds would be available 
for the start-up of the court and its later operation.25  This did not occur until early 
2002, with the Secretary-General sending a planning mission to Sierra Leone in 
January 2002.26  Following the report of the planning mission,27 the Secretary-General 
instructed his representative to formally execute the agreement on behalf of the United 
                                                 
20 Paras 1 and 6. 
21 Paras 2 and 3. 
22 Paras 7 and 8. 
23 Report of the Secretary-General on the establishment of a Special Court for Sierra Leone, 
S/2000/915. 
24 Letter dated 22 December 2000 from the President of the Security Council addressed to the 
Secretary-General, S/2000/1234; Letter dated 12 January 2001 from the Secretary-General 
addressed to the President of the Security Council, S/2001/40; and Letter dated 31 January 
2001 from the President of the Security Council addressed to the Secretary-General, S/2001/95.  
The final letter from the Security Council to the Secretary-General was dated 31 January 2001 
and left only one issue upon which the Security Council and the Secretary-General were not in 
agreement:  Letter, 12 January 2001, paras 4-5.  The Security Council’s preferred text was 
adopted, and was approved by the Government of Sierra Leone by letter dated 7 February 
2001. 
25 Letter 12 January 2001, ibid, para. 12.  This was confirmed by the Security Council on 31 
January 2001: S/2001/95. In July 2001, the Secretary-General indicated that a reduced 
operating budget had been agreed for the proposed court, and that he intended to collect 
sufficient funds from donor stated before executing the agreement: Letter dated 12 July 2001 
from the Secretary-General addressed to the President of the Security Council, 13 July 2001, 
S/2001/693.  See also Letter dated 23 July 2001 from the President of the Security Council to 
the Secretary-General, S/2001/722. 
26 Press Release, Sierra Leone:  Annan despatches planning team in first step to set up special 
court, 3 January 2002. 
27 Report of the Planning Mission on the Establishment of the Special Court for Sierra Leone, 
submitted to the Security Council as Annex to Letter dated 6 March 2002 from the Secretary-
General addressed to the President of the Security Council, S/2002/246. 
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Nations.28  The decision to proceed with the SCSL was ‘approved’ by the Security 
Council on 19 March 2002, following a briefing by the United Nations Legal Counsel 
and Assistant Secretary-General for Legal Affairs, although there is no resolution or 
presidential statement documenting this approval.29 
 
The SCSL Agreement entered into force on the day after both parties notified each 
other in writing that the legal requirements for entry into force had been satisfied.30  
The SCSL functions in accordance with the SCSL Statute, attached as an annex to the 
SCSL Agreement and forming an integral part of the SCSL Agreement.31  As Sierra 
Leone is a dualist system, the SCSL Agreement needed to be implemented into the 
domestic law of Sierra Leone.32  As shown in Table One, the SCSL exists as a distinct 
institution, separate from both the United Nations and the national legal system.  It 
comprises two trial chambers and an appeals chamber, each consisting of a majority of 
international judges.  The SCSL has an international Prosecutor and an international 
Registrar.  The jurisdiction of the SCSL is outlined in more detail in Chapter Four.  
The Registrar and the Prosecutor were appointed in April 2002,33 the judges appointed 
in July 200234 and the first indictments issued in March 2003.35  Trials commenced in 
June 2004.36  The SCSL has issued 13 indictments37 and, as at 31 December 2008, has 
completed two trials, sentencing five accused to imprisonment for crimes including 
                                                 
28 Press Release, Sierra Leone: UN, Government sign historic accord to set up special war 
crimes court, 16 January 2002. 
29 Press Release, War crimes court for Sierra Leone gets Security Council go-ahead, UN 
Official says, 20 March 2002. 
30 Article 21, SCSL Agreement. 
31 Article 1(2), SCSL Agreement. 
32 This occurred in August 2002, with the promulgation of the Special Court Agreement 2002 
(Ratification) Act 2002 (the Ratification Act). 
33 Press Release, Annan names Prosecutor, Registrar of special war crimes court, 19 April 
2002. 
34 Press Release, Annan, Sierra Leone appoint experienced judges for country’s special war 
crimes court, 25 July 2002.  Judges were sworn in on 3 December 2002:  Press Release, Judges 
sworn-in for UN-backed special court for Sierra Leone, 3 December 2002.  Following a 
request from the President of the SCSL three additional judges were sworn in on 17 January 
2005, so as to enable a second trial chamber. 
35 Press Release, UN-backed Special Court for Sierra Leone indicts seven, 11 March 2003.  
The indictments were welcomed by the Security Council:  See Press Statement by Security 
Council President on Indictments by Sierra Leone Special Court, 14 March 2003, Press 
Release SC/7692. 
36 Press Release, War Crimes Trials of Three Sierra Leonean Leaders to Start June 3 June, 11 
May 2004. 
37 Indictments in respect of Sam Bockarie and Foday Sankoh were withdrawn following receipt 
of evidence of the death of the accused:  see Orders confirming Withdrawal of Indictment, both 
issued on 8 December 2003.  Sam Hinga Norman died while in the custody of the SCSL, and 
the charges against him were withdrawn:  Decision on Registrar’s submission of evidence of 
the death of Sam Hinga Norman and consequential issues, 21 May 2007.  A fourth accused, 
Johhny Paul Koroma, remains at large. 
 48 
war crimes and crimes against humanity.38 Two other trials continue.39 In April 2004 
the General Assembly invited the SCSL to develop a completion strategy,40 which it 
produced in May 2005.41 Estimates provided by the President of the SCSL to the 
Security Council in 2007 suggested that all trial activities would be concluded by the 
end of 2008, with all appeals finalised by the end of 2009.42  Due to delays in the trial 
of Charles Taylor, these revised targets will not be met.   
3 Kosovo and the International Judges and Prosecutors 
Programme 
3.1.1 The conflict in Kosovo 
Kosovo was an autonomous province of Serbia in accordance with the 1974 
constitution of the SFRY.43 In July 1990 Serbia forced amendments to the Serbian 
Constitution, effectively revoking the autonomous status of Kosovo. Kosovo 
Albanians initially responded by adopting a strategy of passive, non-violent resistance, 
supporting independence, holding elections for a new government and adopting 
parallel structures.  States showed little willingness to recognize Kosovo as 
independent and, after the conclusion of the Dayton Agreement in 1995, the status of 
Kosovo as a part of Serbia, and hence the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (FRY), was 
not contested. 
 
Due to the increasing number and gravity of human rights abuses within Kosovo and 
frustration at the perceived failure of the United Nations to address their claims for 
self-determination, Kosovo Albanians turned to more violent means.  The Kosovo 
Liberation Army (KLA) emerged to oppose Serbian authorities. Although initially 
                                                 
38 Prosecutor v Brima, Kamara and Kanu, Judgment, Trial Chamber, 20 June 2007; 
Sentencing Judgment, 19 July 2007; and Judgment, Appeals Chamber, 22 February 2008. 
Prosecutor v Fofana and Kondewa, Judgment, Trial Chamber, 2 August 2007; Sentencing 
Judgment, 9 October 2007; and Judgment, Appeals Chamber, 28 May 2008.  
39 The SCSL is yet to complete trials in the cases of Prosecutor v Taylor (trial commenced in 
June 2007) and Prosecutor v Sesay, Kallon and Gbao (Trial Chamber judgment was expected 
in early 2009). 
40 Resolution 58/284 (2004). 
41 A/59/816 and S/2005/350.  Updated versions of the Completion Strategy were provided to 
the Management Committee on 12 October 2005, 19 July 2006 and 14 December 2006.  The 
strategy was supplemented by a report by an independent expert, Antonio Cassese. 
42 Statement of President King to the Council, 8 June 2007, S/PV.5690. See updated 
Completion Strategy, S/2007/338. This strategy was approved by the Security Council:  
S/PRST/2007/23. 
43 The following discussion is drawn from a number of sources.  For further information see:  
Report of the Independent Commission on Kosovo, Kosovo:  From Crisis to Crisis (2000) and 
supplement, available at http://www.kosovocommission.org; Amnesty International country 
reports, available at http://www.amnesty.org; Campbell, G., The Road to Kosovo – A Balkan 
Diary (2000); Judah, T., Kosovo: War and Revenge (2000); Malcolm, N., Kosovo (1998); and 
O’Neill, W., Kosovo:  An Unfinished Peace (2001). 
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small, decentralised and ill-equipped for war, from 1997 the KLA grew in strength, 
coordination and support.  As it became more active, the harassment of the Kosovo 
Albanian population intensified, targeting not only KLA members, but leading 
politicians, activists and civilians.  Faced with an expanding KLA presence, the FRY 
army entered Kosovo and began large-scale operations utilising both police and 
paramilitary units.  The campaign targeted both the KLA and Kosovo Albanian 
civilian populations in rural areas, resulting in significant displacement and violations 
of human and civil rights.  The conflict escalated from early March 1998 to March 
1999 and eventually engulfed the entire province.  Efforts to secure a peaceful 
resolution of the situation failed, with the FRY refusing to sign the Rambouillet 
Accords, which would have granted Kosovo self-government within the FRY.44 On 24 
March 1999 the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO) commenced an aerial 
bombing campaign against the FRY and its forces within Kosovo.45  In response FRY 
military and paramilitary units attacked the civilian population, with devastating 
consequences.46 
 
Diplomatic efforts continued during the NATO campaign under the auspices of the 
Contact Group for Kosovo and the European Union and culminated in a peace plan 
formally approved by the Serbian parliament on 3 June 1999. The peace plan required: 
the immediate and verifiable end to the violence and repression in Kosovo; the 
withdrawal of FRY military, police and paramilitary forces; the deployment of an 
international civil and security presence pursuant to a Council resolution; and the 
return of all refugees.  On 10 June 1999 the Council adopted Resolution 1244, which 
provided the mandate and the framework for the United Nations Interim 
Administration Mission in Kosovo (UNMIK).  The Council authorized UNMIK to 
provide ‘an interim administration for Kosovo under which the people of Kosovo can 
enjoy substantial autonomy within the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia’.47 UNMIK 
                                                 
44 Agreement for Peace and Self-Government in Kosovo, UN Doc. S/1999/648.  See Weller, 
M., ‘The Rambouillet Conference on Kosovo’ (1999) 75 International Affairs 211. 
45 The legality of this action will not be considered here.  However, see:  Simma, B., ‘NATO, 
the UN and the Use of Force:  Legal Aspects’ (1999) 10 EJIL 1; Gowlland-Debbas, V., ‘The 
Limits of Unilateral Enforcement of Community Objectives in the Framework of UN Peace 
Maintenance’ (2001) 11 EJIL 361; Henkin, L., ‘Kosovo and the Law of “Humanitarian 
Intervention”’ (1999) 93 AJIL 828; Duursma, J., ‘Justifying NATO’s use of force in Kosovo?’ 
(1999) 12 LJIL 287; and Neuhold, H., ‘Collective Security after Operation Allied Force’ 
(2000) 4 Max Planck Yearbook of United Nations Law 73. 
46 The devastation inflicted upon the Kosovo Albanian population between March and June 
1999 has been well-documented (see for example reports by the OSCE, Human Rights Watch 
and Amnesty International).  It is estimated that approximately 10,000 people were killed, 
mainly Kosovo Albanians, and some 3,000 people missing. 
47 Resolution 1244 (1999), para. 10. 
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was mandated to perform a wide range of tasks, including the performance of basic 
civil administrative functions, the maintenance of law and order and the protection and 
promotion of human rights.48  UNMIK’s first legislative act was to vest itself with ‘all 
legislative and executive authority with respect to Kosovo, including the 
administration of the judiciary’.49 Legislative and executive authority was vested in 
the SRSG,50 who assumed responsibility for law-making functions and promulgated a 
series of regulations and administrative directions on a wide range of issues.51  The 
legal basis of this extensive role – equivalent to administering the territory – will be 
discussed in Chapter Three.    
 
As part of their civil administration function, UNMIK sought to reinstate the judicial 
system, which had been severely affected by the conflict in the territory.52 The 
withdrawal of the FRY army, Serbian police and paramilitary units and the Serbian 
state authorities (including the Serb judiciary), following the suspension of the 
bombing campaign, left a vacuum in law and order.  As many of the displaced 
population began to return:53 
 
An increasing number of returnees resorted to violence and intimidation as a 
means of retrieving some semblance of their previous lives. Looting, arson, 
forced expropriation of apartments belonging to Serbs and other non-Albanian 
minorities, and in some cases, killing and abductions of non-Albanians 
became daily phenomena. Moreover, organized crime, including smuggling, 
drug trafficking, and trafficking in women, soon flourished.  It was apparent, 
within the first few days, that the previous law enforcement and judicial 
system in Kosovo had collapsed. 
 
Consequently, the immediate priority was to establish an emergency justice system to 
process individuals that had been detained by KFOR and were awaiting investigation 
                                                 
48 Ibid, para. 11, sections (b), (i) and (j). 
49 Regulation 1999/1, section 1.1. 
50 Resolution 1244 (1999), para. 6. 
51 Matters the subject of such ‘legislation’ included the permitted currency, ownership of real 
property, banking arrangements and tax and customs regimes. 
52 For further discussion of the conditions facing UNMIK on arrival, and efforts to re-establish 
the judicial system(s), see: Strohmeyer, H., ‘Collapse and Reconstruction of a Judicial System: 
The United Nations Missions in Kosovo and East Timor’ (2001) 95 AJIL 46; Betts, W., 
Carlson, S. and Gisvold, G., ‘The Post-Conflict Transitional Administration of Kosovo and the 
Lessons-Learned in Efforts to Establish a Judiciary and Rule of Law’ (2001) 22 Mich JIL 372; 
Chesterman, S., ‘Justice Under International Administration: Kosovo, East Timor and 
Afghanistan’ (2001) 12 Finnish Yearbook of International Law 143; and Lorenz, F., ‘The Rule 
of Law in Kosovo: Problems and Prospects’ (2000) 11 Crim LF 127. 
53 Strohmeyer, ibid, 48 (footnotes omitted). 
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and trial.  The Special Representative of the Secretary-General appointed 55 judges 
and prosecutors to serve in the emergency justice system, operating as mobile units 
throughout the territory.54 Once the emergency justice system had commenced 
functioning, UNMIK turned its attention to establishing the regular judicial system, 
promulgating a series of regulations making provision for the structure of the court 
system and the appointment and removal of judges and prosecutors.55 In December 
1999 301 judges and public prosecutors were appointed. However, only 245 judges 
and 42 public prosecutors were sworn in, and members of minority groups constituted 
only a small fraction of these numbers.56   
3.1.2 Accountability for violations of international humanitarian law and 
human rights law 
Neither the peace plan nor Resolution 1244 made specific reference to a need to 
secure accountability for violations of international humanitarian law or human rights 
law.  Although UNMIK did not have a specific mandate to do so,57 it was considered a 
moral necessity to ensure accountability for the serious violations of international 
human rights and international humanitarian law that had occurred in the period 
immediately preceding the deployment.58 The ICTY was already operational and had 
jurisdiction in relation to serious atrocities committed within the territory of the former 
Yugoslavia, including Kosovo. The Prosecutor of the ICTY indicated that the ICTY 
would investigate and try high level leaders alleged to have committed crimes during 
the conflict in Kosovo.59 The ICTY has primacy in respect of national courts in the 
former Yugoslavia60 and has considered several charges arising from events in 
                                                 
54 See OSCE Report 1, Material Needs of the Emergency Judicial System (1999) and OSCE 
Report 2, The Development of the Kosovo Judicial System (10 June through 15 December 
1999) (1999). 
55 See, for example, Regulations 5, 6 and 7 of 1999, which provided for the appointment of a 
public prosecutor, the structure and registration of the judiciary and prosecutorial service and 
for the appointment of judges.  See Betts et al, note 52. 
56 The OSCE reports that only eight professional judges were minorities (including two Serbs), 
only 13 of the lay judges were minorities (none of which were Serb) and only two of the public 
prosecutors belonged to a minority community.  In August 2000, a further 125 judges, 309 lay-
judges and 17 public prosecutors were appointed, although an ethnic breakdown was not made 
available:  OSCE, Review of the Criminal Justice System: 1 February 2000 to 31 July 2000, 
13.  
57 Resolution 1244 demanded that ‘all concerned’, which includes UNMIK, provide full 
cooperation with the ICTY: para. 14. There was no statement as to the need to ensure that 
perpetrators were brought to justice by mechanisms other than the ICTY. 
58 See Strohmeyer, note 52. 
59 ICTY Press Release, ‘Statement by Carla Del Ponte, Prosecutor of the International Criminal 
Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia, on the Investigation and Prosecution of Crimes 
Committed in Kosovo’, September 29, 1999.  
60 Article 9, ICTY Statute. 
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Kosovo.61  It was, however, noted that UNMIK would have primary responsibility for 
investigating and prosecuting such crimes.62  It was envisaged that those violations not 
investigated or prosecuted by the ICTY would be processed within the domestic 
judicial system, to be established and operated by UNMIK. 
 
It quickly became apparent that the newly re-established domestic courts were largely 
incapable of remaining impartial and independent when trying cases concerning 
violations during the conflict, or those with an ethnic dimension. Nor was it thought 
that the national judges and prosecutors possessed the necessary experience to conduct 
trials of such complexity and importance.63  Moreover, Serbian lawyers and judges 
had refused to participate in the system, leading to a perception of, if not actual, bias 
in proceedings concerning Serb defendants.64  The international administration 
initially considered proposals for a separate internationalized criminal tribunal, the 
Kosovo War and Ethnic Crimes Court (KWECC).65  The KWECC would have 
comprised international and national personnel, including judges and prosecutors.66  
However, these plans were subsequently abandoned, due to budget restraints, delays 
and (reportedly) political concerns in various capitals.67  Instead, UNMIK instituted a 
system of appointing international judges and prosecutors to sensitive trials.  The first 
international personnel were appointed to the District Court in Mitrovica,68 following 
an attack on a bus carrying Serbs in to Serb-controlled northern Mitrovica, which 
prompted riots and inter-ethnic violence.  Demands for the International Judges and 
                                                 
61 See Prosecutor v Milosevic, ‘Kosovo, Croatia and Bosnia’; Prosecutor v Milutonovic et al; 
Prosecutor v Haradinaj et al;  Prosecutor v Dordevic; Prosecutor v Lamaj et al. 
62 ICTY Statement, note 59. 
63 See: OSCE Report 2, note 54; OSCE Background Report: The treatment of minorities by the 
judicial system, 13 April 2000; Cady, J. and Booth, N., ‘Internationalized Courts in Kosovo: 
An UNMIK Perspective’ in Romano et al (eds) Internationalized Criminal Courts: Sierra 
Leone, East Timor, Kosovo and Cambodia (2004) (‘Romano’); and Amnesty International, 
Recommendations to UNMIK on the Judicial System, February 2000. 
64 International Crisis Group, Finding the Balance: The Scales of Justice in Kosovo, September 
2002. 
65 See Gall, C., ‘UN Mission in Kosovo Proposes to Set Up a War Crimes Court’, New York 
Times, 23 June 2000. 
66 For greater detail on the KWECC and the development of the IJPP, see:  Baskin, M., Lessons 
Learned on UNMIK Judiciary, Report commissioned by the Department of Foreign Affairs and 
International Trade of the Government of Canada, Pearson Peacekeeping Centre, 5 June 2001; 
Betts et al, note 52; Bohlander, M., ‘Kosovo: The Legal Framework of the Prosecution and the 
Courts’ in Ambos & Othamn (eds), New Approaches in International Justice: Kosovo East 
Timor, Sierra Leone and Cambodia (2003), 32-34; Cerone, J. and Baldwin, C., ‘Explaining 
and Evaluating the UNMIK Court System’, in Romano; and Hartmann, M., International 
Judges and Prosecutors in Kosovo (2003). 
67 OSCE Report, note 56, 71-2; OSCE Review of the Criminal Justice System, 1 September 
2000 – 28 February 2001, section 8.  Events, in particular the development of the IJPP, also 
overtook the proposed KWECC. 
68 Regulation 2000/6, as amended by Regulation 2000/34. 
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Prosecutors Programme (IJPP) to be made available to detainees beyond Mitrovica 
quickly followed and UNMIK extended the IJPP programme to all districts within 
Kosovo.69 
 
Initially Regulation 2000/6 provided for the appointment of only one international 
judge to a trial panel.  However, it was determined that this was not sufficient to 
address the actual and perceived bias in judicial decisions, as the international judge 
was in the minority and was frequently overruled by a majority of domestic judges.70  
In December, the SRSG promulgated Regulation 2000/64, which enabled a case to be 
assigned to an international prosecutor, international investigating judge and/or a 
panel comprising a majority of international judges where the interests of justice so 
require.71  The IJPP is unique amongst the tribunals studied in that there is ‘no fixed 
internationalized court or panel.  Rather the international judges and prosecutors 
permeate the system, sitting on panels on a case-by-case basis’.72  An application for 
the allocation of an IJPP may be made at any stage of the proceedings (including on 
appeal), although it cannot be made once a trial has started. The accused, the defence 
counsel, the prosecutor or the Department of Justice itself may make the application to 
the Special Representative of the Secretary-General. In addition, the IJPP may be 
requested for any type of case, the criterion for allocation is simply that allocation of 
an international prosecutor and/or judge(s) is considered necessary to ensure the 
independence and impartiality of the judiciary or the proper administration of justice.73  
The allocation of cases under the IJPP is under international control, not that of the 
President of the relevant court.74  UNMIK also introduced a power for an international 
prosecutor to resurrect proceedings that had been abandoned by their local 
counterparts.75   
 
The intention was that all cases concerning war crimes, genocide or crimes against 
humanity would be considered by the IJPP, although this has not always been the 
practice.76  The IJPP has also been responsible for cases considered particularly 
                                                 
69 Regulation 2000/34. 
70 Amnesty International, Serbia (Kosovo): The Challenge to Fix a Failed UN Justice Mission, 
January 2008, 12. 
71 The IJPP has participated in trials alongside local counterparts, generally as the majority, 
and, in controversial cases, has sat as all international trial panels. 
72 Cerone and Baldwin, note 66, 41-2. 
73 Regulation 64/2000, section 1. 
74 Cady and Booth, note 63, 61. 
75 Regulation 2001/2, section 1.4. 
76 Amnesty International, note 70, section 4. 
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sensitive, including cases concerning serious inter-ethnic violence,77 trafficking, and 
organized crime and corruption.78  It is very difficult to obtain accurate information 
concerning the activities of the IJPP, and judgments and orders are not often publicly 
available.  The most recent report, prepared by Amnesty International, suggests that 
the IJPP has been involved in 23 cases concerning crimes under international law.79  
The IJPP has been included in this study as its legal basis has both national and 
international characteristics, the IJPP is staffed by both international and national 
personnel and its officials apply both national and international law.80 
3.1.3 Postscript:  Transition to independence 
Resolution 1244 was silent as to the final outcome of the transitional administration; 
that is, whether Kosovo would remain an integral part of Serbia or would achieve 
independence.81  On 17 February 2008 Kosovo declared its independence. This 
declaration has been recognised by 51 states, including all neighbouring states with 
the exception of Serbia.  Russia has also protested against the recognition of 
sovereignty for Kosovo.82 Many of the functions of UNMIK have been transferred to a 
European Union Rule of Law Mission in Kosovo, which will assume responsibility for 
international judges and prosecutors operating in Kosovo.  This thesis will not 
consider the position subsequent to the declaration of independence. 
4 UNTAET and the Serious Crimes Process 
4.1.1 The Indonesian occupation of East Timor, the consultation on 
independence and the introduction of international administration   
In 1975 Portugal withdrew from East Timor, a territory it had administered for 500 
years. On 7 December 1975 the Republic of Indonesia invaded the territory of East 
Timor and on 17 July 1976 Indonesia purported to annex the territory as its 27th 
province. Despite the United Nations continued condemnation of the invasion,83 no 
                                                 
77 The inter-ethnic violence that erupted as a result of riots in March 2004 has also been a focus 
of the IJPP: Human Rights Watch, Not on the Agenda:  The Continuing Failure to Address 
Accountability in Kosovo Post-March 2004, May 2006.  
78 Cady and Booth note that ‘the fight against organised crime has now become one of 
UNMIK’s highest priorities’: note 63, 67. 
79 Amnesty International, note 70, Annexe Three. Research for the report was carried out 
between early 2006 and April 2007, with material updated in late 2007. 
80 Cerone and Baldwin, note 66, 56-7. 
81 Resolution 1244 did not provide that Kosovo is being prepared for independence, nor does it 
recognise the right of self-determination for the people of Kosovo. Contrast Resolution 1272 
(1999), establishing the mandate for UNTAET (see below). 
82 Resolution 63/3 (2008), requested an advisory opinion from the International Court of 
Justice on the question ‘Is the unilateral declaration of independence by the Provisional 
Institutions of Self-Government of Kosovo in accordance with international law?’. 
83 See, for example, Resolutions 384 (1975) (calling for withdrawal by Indonesian forces and 
the exercise of the right to self-determination) and 389 (1976) (condemning the invasion). 
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action was taken for several decades,84 and the annexation of East Timor was never 
recognised by the United Nations or its member states.85 In the initial five-year period 
following the occupation, there were clashes between the Indonesian army and the 
military arm of the independence movement. This popular resistance continued, albeit 
at varying levels of intensity, throughout the Indonesian occupation.86 
 
Following a change of President in 1998, Indonesia proposed autonomy for East 
Timor, subject to the condition that East Timor accept integration into Indonesia. That 
condition was rejected by independence leaders. Indonesia subsequently entered into 
negotiations with Portugal (the de jure power) and the United Nations, resulting in an 
agreement that provided for a referendum to be held to assess whether the people of 
East Timor wished to formalise their de facto status as part of Indonesia or to move 
towards independence.87 Under the terms of the agreement the United Nations would 
conduct the ballot and certify its results while the Government of Indonesia would 
provide sufficient security to enable the referendum to take place. The Security 
Council established the United Nations Mission to East Timor (UNAMET) to organise 
and carry out the referendum,88 and indicated its understanding that Indonesia was 
responsible for ensuring a safe and secure environment for the vote.89 
 
The results of the referendum conducted on 30 August 1999 were conclusive, with 
78.5% of voters in favour of independence and rejecting the option of autonomy 
within Indonesia. Following the release of the results, Indonesian military and militia 
forces reportedly initiated and facilitated a widespread and systematic of campaign of 
violence against the civilian population of East Timor. Crimes alleged to have been 
committed included murder, rape, disappearances, assaults, torture, arson, looting and 
                                                 
84 Portugal attempted to bring the matter indirectly before the International Court of Justice by 
challenging Australia’s recognition of the Indonesian occupation. However, this attempt was 
unsuccessful: Case Concerning East Timor (Portugal v Australia), [1995] ICJ Reports 90. 
85 The exception was Australia, which entered into a treaty with Indonesia in respect of the 
Timor Gap: Treaty between Australia and the Republic of Indonesia on the Zone of 
Cooperation in an Area between the Indonesian Province of East Timor and Northern 
Australia, 11 December 1989, 29 ILM 269. 
86 The history of the territory of East Timor has been discussed in greater detail in the 
following works: Dunn, J., Timor: A People Betrayed (1983); Taylor, J., Indonesia’s Forgotten 
War: The Hidden History of East Timor (1991); Taylor, J., East Timor: The Price of Freedom 
(1999); International Law and the Question of East Timor (Catholic Institute for International 
Relations and the International Platform of Jurists for East Timor, 1995). 
87 Agreement between the Republic of Indonesia and the Portuguese Republic on the Question 
of East Timor, 5 May 1999, S/1999/513.  For discussion of the terms of the agreement, and 
East Timor’s right to self determination, see Drew, C., ‘The East Timor Story:  International 
Law on Trial’ (2001) 12 EJIL 651. 
88 Resolution 1246 (1999). 
89 Ibid, para. 9. 
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the forcible transfer of civilians into West Timor. The Security Council condemned 
the violence and ultimately deemed the situation to be a threat to international peace 
and security. Acting pursuant to its Chapter VII powers, the Security Council 
authorised a multinational force, led by Australia and known as INTERFET, to restore 
peace and security in East Timor, to protect and support UNAMET in carrying out its 
tasks and to facilitate humanitarian assistance operations.90  
 
On 25 October 1999, the Security Council again acted under powers under Chapter 
VII of the Charter to establish a United Nations Transitional Administration in East 
Timor (UNTAET).91 Like UNMIK in Kosovo, UNTAET had an extremely wide 
mandate; it was ‘endowed with overall authority for the administration’ and was 
‘empowered to exercise all legislative and executive authority, including the 
administration of the judiciary’.92  On the same day, the Indonesian parliament voted 
to accept the result of the referendum and Indonesia formally handed over 
responsibility for East Timor – in whatever capacity it was exercised - to the United 
Nations. The United Nations was to administer East Timor during a transitional period 
that would ultimately lead to independence. UNTAET was headed by the Special 
Representative of the Secretary-General (SRSG), who acted as the Transitional 
Administrator and was responsible for all aspects of the work of the United Nations in 
East Timor during the transitional period. The SRSG was also entrusted with all law-
making functions, including the power to enact new laws and regulations and to 
amend, suspend or repeal existing laws.93   
 
On 20 May 2002 East Timor became an independent nation, known as Timor-Leste, 
and was admitted as a member state of the United Nations on 27 September 2002. The 
newly adopted Constitution provided that laws and regulations in force at the time of 
transition would continue in effect unless inconsistent with the provisions of the 
Constitution.94 UNTAET’s mandate ended on 20 May 2002.95  Its successor mission, 
the United Nations Mission of Support in East Timor (UNMISET), was mandated to 
provide assistance to core administrative structures, to provide interim law 
                                                 
90 Resolution 1264 (1999). 
91 Resolution 1272 (1999). For discussion, see Kondoch, B., ‘The United Nations 
Administration of East Timor’ (2001) 6 JCSL 245; Rothert, M., ‘UN Intervention in East 
Timor’ (2000) 39 Col JTL 257; and Ruffert. M., ‘The Administration of Kosovo and East 
Timor by the International Community’ (2001) 50 ICLQ 613. 
92 Ibid, para. 1. 
93 Ibid, para. 6. 
94 Section 165, Constitution. 
95 Resolution 1392 (2002). 
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enforcement and public security, and to contribute to the internal and external security 
of East Timor.96 After independence the political climate also changed, with an 
increasing focus on restoring its relationship with Indonesia.97 
4.1.2 The quest for accountability for violations in East Timor 
In Resolution 1272 the Security Council had stressed that those responsible for acts of 
violence in East Timor should be brought to justice.98 Unlike the situation in Kosovo, 
there was not an international tribunal with jurisdiction to try the alleged crimes in 
East Timor. Various inquiries had concluded that human rights violations and crimes 
were perpetrated before and after the 30 August referendum.99  Moreover, there was 
significant evidence that such violations were either directly perpetrated or supported 
and assisted by the Indonesian armed forces and police, thus potentially engaging the 
responsibility of Indonesia.100  The Commission of Inquiry noted that the United 
Nations had a special responsibility to respond to these violations, which had been 
committed contrary to a decision of the Council acting under Chapter VII of the 
Charter, and were in breach of the terms of agreements between the United Nations 
and Indonesia.101 Given the culture of impunity that existed in East Timor towards the 
Indonesian military and supporting militia, and the state of the judiciary within East 
Timor, it was considered that the appropriate mechanism was to establish an 
international ad hoc criminal tribunal, preferably – but not necessarily – with the 
consent of Indonesia.102  Indonesia dismissed the report of the Commission of Inquiry 
as biased and rejected the establishment of an international criminal tribunal for 
several reasons. In particular, Indonesia asserted that it was entitled and willing to 
exercise jurisdiction, as the violations had occurred at a time when East Timor was 
part of the territory of Indonesia and subject to Indonesian laws.  It confirmed that, 
where it was established that individual personnel of the TNI and the Indonesian 
police had committed acts of violence and destruction, ‘the Indonesian Government is 
determined to bring these individuals to justice through the national judicial 
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97 Reiger, C., The Serious Crimes Process in Timor-Leste: In Retrospect (2006), 8. 
98 Para. 16. 
99 Report on the joint mission of the special rapporteurs and representatives, Situation of 
human rights in East Timor, A/54/660; Report of the International Commission of Inquiry on 
East Timor, S/2000/59, A/54/726. 
100 Rapporteurs’ report, ibid, paras 135-141; Report of the Commission of Inquiry, ibid, paras 
135-141. 
101 Report of the Commission of Inquiry, note 99, para. 147 and 153 
102 Rapporteurs’ report, note 99, para. 74(6); Report of the Commission of Inquiry, note 99, 
para.153. 
 58 
mechanism’.103  In the face of significant Indonesian opposition the Security Council 
did not move to establish an international tribunal. Instead the Security Council 
welcomed Indonesia’s commitment to bring those responsible to justice through 
domestic means,104 and continued to reiterate its call for Indonesia to act upon this 
commitment and to cooperate with East Timorese officials and UNTAET.105  
 
The responsibility for the prosecution and trial of suspected perpetrators was therefore 
shared between the domestic judicial process of East Timor and the process in the 
Indonesian system.  The Indonesian system focused on the National Commission of 
Inquiry on Human Rights Violations in East Timor (KPP-HAM) and the Ad Hoc 
Human Rights Court.  The KPP-HAM issued a report in early 2000, recommending 
the prosecution of 33 individuals, including senior officials.  The KPP-HAM report 
was widely recognised as having been conducted in a ‘comprehensive, credible and 
objective manner, in compliance with international standards’.106  In contrast, 
valuations of the process before the Ad Hoc Human Rights Court have been almost 
uniformly negative.  As Bertodano concludes, it is ‘impossible to resist the conclusion 
… that these trials have not been conducted in good faith, and their principal purpose 
is to placate international donors rather than to provide justice’.107   
 
In terms of the East Timorese system, when UNTAET deployed to East Timor in 
November 1999 it encountered a dire state of affairs.  The legal and judicial system 
was in a state of collapse, with no courts or law enforcement institutions operating.  
As East Timorese lawyers had not been permitted to hold office under the Indonesian 
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regime, there were no East Timorese judges, prosecutors or defenders able to fill the 
vacuum.  Although some East Timorese had legal qualifications, they generally had 
no, or very limited, practical experience.  Court buildings, records and other physical 
infrastructure had been destroyed or severely damaged.  UNTAET realised that it 
would have to construct a functioning judicial system largely from scratch.108 
UNTAET quickly moved to re-establish the judicial system, appointing judges and 
prosecutors in January 2000.  Regulation 2000/11 was promulgated in March 2000 
and established a series of district courts.  Resolution 1272 did not contain any 
specific reference to establishing an accountability mechanism for those accused of 
serious violations of human rights and international humanitarian law.  Yet key legal 
advisers saw the creation of such a mechanism as important.109  UNTAET established 
a system of dedicated panels to try individuals accused of committing ‘serious 
crimes’, known as the Special Panels for Serious Crimes (SPSC).110 The SPSC were 
supported by a Serious Crimes Unit (SCU) staffed almost exclusively by international 
personnel.111  The SPSC also operated alongside a truth and reconciliation 
commission.112 
 
Following the termination of the mandate of UNTAET, the SPSC process was legally 
within the purview of the Timorese Department of Justice. UNMISET did include a 
serious crimes unit, which assumed responsibility for funding and effective control of 
the SCU and the SPSC process. The Security Council effectively introduced a 
completion strategy for the serious crimes process in May 2004, determining that the 
SCU should complete all investigations by November 2004 and that it should 
conclude its activities by no later than 20 May 2005.113 The implementation of such a 
strategy ‘had no relation whatsoever to the progress of the proceedings’ and was 
instead linked to the desire of the Security Council to terminate the mission supporting 
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the trial process.114  The SCU issued its last indictments in December 2004 and then 
engaged in a handover process from February to May 2005.  After UNMISET’s 
mandate ended, its successor mission had no mandate for justice-related activities. 
Without United Nations support and personnel, the SPSC were unable to continue and 
functions were suspended on 20 May 2005, pending any legislative amendment that 
would enable trials to occur before solely Timorese panels.115  By April 2005 a total of 
95 indictments had been issued, relating to 440 defendants.  The SPSC had completed 
55 trials of 87 defendants, with the verdict in the last trial announced on 22 April 
2005.116  84 defendants had been convicted, three had been acquitted, 13 had had their 
cases withdrawn or dismissed, and one defendant had been declared unfit to stand 
trial.  A total of 339 indicted people remained beyond the jurisdiction of the SPSC.117 
 
The SPSC and the trials held in Indonesia have not satisfied calls for accountability for 
violations committed in East Timor.  In 2005, the Secretary-General, with the support 
of the Security Council, decided to establish a commission of experts to conduct a 
review of the progress made by the Indonesian judicial process, and the SCU and 
SPSC process in East Timor.118  The report of the commission of experts was 
forwarded to the Security Council in July 2005.119  While it found that the serious 
crimes process in East Timor had provided some accountability, it noted that the 
domestic processes could not be expected to continue without international support 
and that the Security Council should ensure continued funding and international 
staffing of the serious crimes process.120 Moreover, if this and its other 
recommendations in relation to Indonesian performance were not followed, the 
commission recommended the creation of an ad hoc tribunal by the Security Council 
acting under its powers under Chapter VII of the Charter, to be located in a third state, 
or, failing this, that the Security Council consider utilizing the ICC.121  To date, the 
Security Council has not acted upon these recommendations.  In addition, a bilateral 
commission on truth and friendship was formed by the governments of Indonesia and 
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East Timor, to provide an alternative to the prosecutorial process.122  The commission 
submitted its final report in July 2008, finding that the Indonesian military, police and 
civilian government bear institutional responsibility for widespread and systematic 
gross violations of human rights, including crimes against humanity, during the period 
surrounding the referendum.123   
5 Extraordinary Chambers in the Courts of Cambodia 
The period of Cambodian history from 1975 to 1979 is considered one of the darkest 
periods of human rights violations in modern history, being ‘marked by abuses of 
individual and group human rights on an immense and brutal scale’.124  Historians 
estimate that the Khmer Rouge killed between 1.5 and 1.7 million people during this 
period, equivalent to approximately 20 percent of the initial population.125  In 1953 
Cambodia emerged from French colonial control as an independent state under the 
control of the hereditary monarch, Prince Norodom Sihanouk. 126  The country existed 
relatively peacefully until the escalation of the Vietnam War in the late 1960s, which 
resulted in Cambodia’s borders becoming vulnerable and subjected its population to 
bombing raids by US forces.  In 1970, while abroad, Prince Sihanouk was overthrown 
in a bloodless coup, and a new government, named the Khmer Republic was 
established.  The Khmer Republic maintained strong links to the United States, which 
stirred up anti-Western sentiments and gave new credibility to the Communist Party of 
Kampuchea, or the Khmer Rouge.  With the withdrawal of United States support to 
the Khmer Republic, the Khmer Rouge achieved victory in the decade-long power 
struggle.  The regime was only brought to an end following the occupation of 
Cambodia by Vietnamese forces in 1978/79, which lead to the establishment of a 
puppet government and the declaration of Cambodia as the People’s Republic of 
Kampuchea.  The Khmer Rouge retreated into zones over which it retained control, 
and continued a civil conflict against the People’s Republic of Kampuchea and 
Vietnamese forces throughout the 1980s.  The conflict ended following a peace 
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process in 1991, although smaller-scale acts of violence continued throughout the 
transitional phases.127 
 
The atrocities committed by the Khmer Rouge in Cambodia during the period 1975 to 
1979 were largely driven by a political philosophy of achieving a sovereign Cambodia 
free of interference and domination by foreign interests, in particular Vietnam, and the 
interests of various social classes within Cambodia.  This new social system required a 
reorganization of Cambodian society, first by the restructuring of the economic and 
social order of Cambodia and the ‘persecution and physical elimination’ of those 
elements of society regarded as enemies of the new sovereign state.128  In order to 
exercise its control over Cambodian territory, the Khmer Rouge divided Cambodia 
into seven zones, themselves divided again into 32 administrative regions.  The 
population was organised into co-operatives, supervised by a committee of party 
members.  The atrocities alleged to have been committed included the following acts: 
forced evacuation of the cities and towns; forced labour and inhumane living 
conditions; persecution and elimination of enemies; and purges of party members. In 
achieving their objectives, the Khmer Rouge authorized specific executions, engaged 
in the practice of ‘disappearing’ their targets, tricked people into confessions, and 
often tortured their victims.  In addition, the Khmer Rouge’s policies of forced 
relocation and labour and economic restructuring resulted in massive human rights 
abuses.  Due to the absence of comprehensive records, it is impossible to identify the 
exact number of victims.   
 
There had been little prospect of bringing the leaders of the Khmer Rouge to justice 
for their role in such atrocities until recently.129  The process to create the ECCC began 
in 1997130 following a request for assistance from the Cambodian government to the 
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United Nations to establish a tribunal to prosecute the senior leaders of the Khmer 
Rouge for the offences committed from 1975 to 1979.131 A group of experts, convened 
at the request of the General Assembly,132 recommended establishing an ad hoc 
international tribunal to be situated in the Asia-Pacific region, but not in Cambodia.133 
The Cambodian government rejected that proposal, instead requesting assistance in 
drafting domestic legislation to establish a specialized national court with international 
participation.134  Opposition to the proposal increased following developments in 
internal politics, with Prime Minister Hun Sen taking control of the nation following a 
coup in 1997.  This coincided with the effective end of the Khmer Rouge 
insurgency.135  There were also legal, political and financial concerns at the 
international level regarding establishing an international tribunal.  Following 
negotiations regarding the proposed structure and functions of the tribunal, the 
Cambodian government introduced the Law on the Establishment of Extraordinary 
Chambers in the Courts of Cambodia for the prosecution of crimes committed during 
the period of Democratic Kampuchea (the Special Law).136  However, in February 
2002, after two and a half years of negotiations, the United Nations withdrew from the 
process, citing a ‘lack of commitment’ to the process on the part of the Cambodian 
government.137 
 
Negotiations for a Cambodian tribunal only resumed following a General Assembly 
request for the Secretary-General to conclude an agreement on the establishment of 
the Extraordinary Chambers.138  During the course of negotiations, the Cambodian 
                                                                                                                                 
Trial’ (2003) 44 HILJ 551; Etcheson, C., ‘Accountability Beckons During a Year of Worries 
for the Khmer Rouge Leadership’ (2000) 6 ILSA JICL 507; Linton, S., ‘New Approaches to 
international justice in Cambodia and East Timor’ (2002) 84 IRRC 93; and Williams, S., ‘The 
Cambodian Extraordinary Chambers – A Dangerous Precedent for International Justice? 
(2004) 53 ICLQ 227. 
131 Letter from the First and Second Prime Ministers of Cambodia addressed to the Secretary-
General, 21 June 1997, A/51/930, S/1997/488. 
132 Resolution 52/135 (1997), para. 16. 
133 Report of the Group of Experts for Cambodia established pursuant to General Assembly 
resolution 52/135, A/53/850, para. 219. See: Ratner, S., ‘The United Nations Group of Experts 
on Cambodia’ (1999) 93 AJIL 947. 
134 Letter from Hun Sen, Prime Minister of Cambodia to H.E. Thomas Hammarberg, Special 
Representative of the UN Secretary-General for Human Rights in Cambodia dated 17 July 
1999. 
135 Boyle, note 130. 
136 A Memorandum of Understanding was reached in May 2000, although there is some 
dispute as to the intended effect of this document and the extent to which it was incorporated 
into the Special Law:  Lynch, C, ‘UN Warns Cambodia on War Crimes Tribunal’ Washington 
Post, 3 February 2001.  The Special Law was introduced in December 2000, but was referred 
to the Cambodian Constitutional Court for approval:  ‘Cambodia set for Khmer Rouge Trials’ 
BBC Online 7 August 2001. 
137 Report of the Secretary-General on Khmer Rouge trials, A/57/769, para. 14. 
138 Resolution 57/228 (2003). 
 64 
government rejected the majority of amendments sought by the United Nations and 
resisted any changes to the Special Law.  Consequently, the Secretary-General 
concluded that the only option acceptable to the Cambodian government was for a 
national court with the structure and organization envisaged in the Special Law.139  An 
agreement, based on the provisions of the Special Law, was finalised and initialled by 
both parties on 17 March 2003, approved by the General Assembly on 13 May 2003, 
and signed on 6 June 2003 (the ECCC Agreement).140  The ECCC Agreement entered 
into force in October 2004.  Preparations for the ECCC started in 2006, and judicial 
activities commenced in late 2007.  
6 War Crimes Chamber for Bosnia-Herzegovina 
6.1.1 The conflict in Bosnia and Herzegovina 
The conflict in Bosnia arose from the disintegration of the SFRY during the early 
1990s. The SFRY comprised six constituent states and two autonomous provinces.141  
Bosnia faced the choice of remaining in ‘a much smaller Yugoslavia that would be 
overwhelmingly dominated by Serbia and by implication its own large Serb minority’ 
or leaving the federation.142 Bosnia asserted its independence in October 1991,143 
achieving recognition as an independent state by the European Community on 6 April 
1992 and by the United States the following day. Despite this international support, 
for the next three and a half years the fledgling state faced conflict on two fronts.  
First, its own Serb population, supported by Serbia, sought to establish a separate 
Bosnian Serb state. Second, the Croat population of Bosnia, supported by Croatia, 
attempted to gain territory by a campaign of ethnically motivated violence and 
intimidation. The resultant conflict was the worst in Europe since World War Two.  
Estimates suggest that close to 100,000 people were killed or remain unaccounted for, 
including 16,000 children.144  Civilian populations were deliberately targeted.  There 
were mass executions, many incidents of rape, detention in concentration camps, 
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forced displacement and discriminatory acts, which came to be known as ethnic 
cleansing. In the most heinous episode of the conflict some 8,000 Bosniak men and 
boys were killed in Srebrenica, in an act widely recognized as genocide. 
 
The initial response of the United Nations was limited.  NATO threats produced 
limited withdrawal of Serb troops from Bosnia in 1994. However, Serb forces and 
paramilitary groups continued to attack Bosnian civilians and external peacekeepers, 
taking hundreds prisoner and using the peacekeepers as human shields.  On 30 August 
1995 the United States led a NATO air strike against strategic Serb positions 
throughout Bosnia.  In the face of the NATO military action and sustained 
international pressure, on 21 November 1995 Serbia agreed to a comprehensive peace 
agreement between the three warring factions.  The Dayton Agreement145 provides for 
the state of Bosnia and Herzegovina to consist of two separate entities, the mainly 
Serb Republika Sprska and the Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina, consisting of 
mainly Croats and Bosniaks. It also authorized the deployment of an international 
peacekeeping force to maintain the peace.  Several organizations were charged with 
implementing the civilian aspects of the peace agreement, with their efforts being 
coordinated and overseen by an international appointment, the High Representative 
for Bosnia and Herzegovina (OHR).  In 1997 the OHR was endowed with further 
powers, to the extent that Bosnia and Herzegovina has been called a ‘de facto 
protectorate’.146  From 2004, the European Union has been the lead organization in 
BiH, with the Special Representative of the European Union also serving as the OHR 
on behalf of the international community. 
6.1.2 Accountability for violations 
Around 279,000 people were reported dead or missing during the armed conflict.  
There was evidence of atrocities having been committed on all sides.  The ICTY had 
been established by the Security Council in 1993 to investigate and try those suspected 
of committing international crimes. Annex 6 to the Dayton Agreement required the 
competent authorities in Bosnia and Herzegovina to co-operate with the ICTY,147 and 
the ICTY also enjoyed primacy in relation to national courts.148  However, it was 
always clear that the ICTY would only try a limited number of suspects and that 
remaining cases would be tried by courts at the entity level.  Under the so-called ‘rules 
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of the road’ it was agreed that the OTP of the ICTY would review case files of war 
crimes suspects to determine whether the files contained sufficient and credible 
evidence to support the issue of an arrest warrant.149 The ICTY performed this 
function from 1996 to 2004, reviewing 1419 cases against 4985 persons, with 
approval given for 898 persons to be arrested on war crimes charges.150  This function 
was transferred to the Prosecution Office in Bosnia and Herzegovina in October 2004.   
 
While the Dayton Agreement established the Constitutional Court and the Human 
Rights Chamber, it did not establish other federal level judicial institutions.151  There 
were considerable concerns that the judicial systems of the states in the former 
Yugoslavia lacked the capacity to conduct complex trials.  There was also a risk that 
courts were incapable of providing impartial and unbiased justice in respect of trials 
arising from the conflict, particularly regarding either defendants or victims of other 
ethnic groups.  As Burke-White notes, the existence of the ICTY and the requirement 
for the rules of the road procedure impacted upon the development of the Bosnian 
judicial system and the conduct of national trials.152  By January 2005, only 54 
domestic war crimes prosecutions had reached trial, and of these, only two trials had 
commenced in the Republika Sprska.153  The study revealed ‘a number of well-
founded allegations of arbitrary arrests and unfair trials’.154 
 
The WCC was created in 2005, with its establishment closely linked to the completion 
strategy of the ICTY. The Security Council recognized that the transfer of cases of 
lesser importance from the ICTY to the courts of states of the former Yugoslavia was 
a measure vital to achieving the completion strategy of the ICTY. In the absence of 
appropriate national mechanisms, the ICTY and the OHR proposed the establishment 
of an internationalized chamber to operate within the existing court structure of 
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Bosnia, to be supported by a war crimes department.155  The President of the ICTY 
reported to the Security Council in June 2002, recommending this model and 
discussing some of the perceived problems with referring cases to Bosnia.156  There 
was concern that the judicial system was not yet functioning with sufficient 
impartiality, at least in relation to crimes arising from the armed conflict, and in 
accordance with applicable human rights norms. The Security Council endorsed this 
strategy.157  Amendments were made to Rule 11bis of the ICTY RPE to address the 
concerns of the judges that any referred trials must comply fully with internationally 
recognised standards of due process and human rights.158  The Security Council 
subsequently supported the ‘expeditious establishment’ and ‘early functioning’ of the 
WCC and encouraged donations from interested states.159   
 
The OHR drafted the necessary legislation to establish the WCC within the structure 
of the federal-level State Court.  Unlike the creation of the State Court itself, the OHR 
did not utilize the powers conferred on him by the DPA,160 preferring instead to refer 
the required legislation to the domestic legislatures. However, the Bosnian authorities 
and the Parliament did not act as swiftly as had been hoped, and the package of 
legislation required to allow the WCC to receive referrals from the ICTY was not 
adopted until October 2004.161 The WCC may try three types of cases: cases referred 
from the ICTY under Rule 11bis; cases referred by the ICTY prosecutor, for which no 
indictment has been issued; and cases pending before domestic courts that are 
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Proceedings before the Courts in Bosnia and Herzegovina; the Law on Protection of Witnesses 
Under Threat and Vulnerable Witnesses; and the Law on Amendments to the Criminal Code of 
Bosnia and Herzegovina.  
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considered sufficiently sensitive so as to require trial at a federal level institution.162  
The WCC commenced operations in January 2005, and the WCC issued several 
indictments that year.  Its first judgment was delivered in July 2005.163 The ICTY 
referred the first case to Bosnia in May 2005, with the Referral Bench noting that it 
‘considers that the legal structure of Bosnia & Herzegovina, as it now stands, is 
sufficient to safeguard the right of the Accused to a fair trial’.164   Six cases, involving 
ten accused, have been referred to the WCC.165 The WCC has been an active 
institution, issuing indictments in over 80 cases, including indictments in relation to 
the cases referred by the ICTY.  
7 Iraqi High Tribunal 
7.1.1 Hussein’s reign in Iraq 
Saddam Hussein seized power in Iraq in 1979.  Upon taking power, Hussein initiated a 
purge of opposition from within his own party, denouncing many senior officials and 
party members as traitors. It signalled the start of a bloody and brutal reign.  In 
addition to politically-motivated killings and torture, Hussein violated the rights of 
Iraq’s citizens, targeting in particular minority groups such as the Kurds and those 
perceived as disloyal.  Killings, torture, disappearances and rape became a feature of 
Iraqi existence.  Externally, Hussein conducted an aggressive and violent foreign 
policy, with Iraq engaged in three international conflicts: the 1980-88 Iran-Iraq war; 
the 1990-1 invasion and occupation of Kuwait, leading to the use of force by a 
multinational coalition in defence of Kuwait, authorized by the Security Council under 
Chapter VII;166 and the controversial invasion and occupation of Iraq by a coalition of 
states led by the United States and the United Kingdom in 2003.167  The final conflict 
led ultimately to the fall of the Government of Iraq, with coalition troops occupying 
Baghdad on 9 April 2003.  Hussein was arrested and detained by coalition forces in 
December 2003. 
 
                                                 
162 Mundis, D., ‘The Judicial Effects of the “Completion Strategies” on the Ad Hoc 
International Criminal Tribunals’ (2005) 99 AJIL 142, 153-4. 
163 Prosecutor v Maktouf Abduladhim, First Instance Decision, 1 July 2005. 
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Referral Bench, 27 May 2005, para. 68.  This decision was confirmed on appeal.  For further 
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National Jurisdictions:  A Fair Trial or a Fair Price?’ (2006) 17 Crim LF 177. 
165 S/2008/729. 
166 Resolution 678 (1991).   
167 In the interest of space, it is not possible to discuss the background to or legal justifications 
for the invasion and occupation of Iraq in 2003. 
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The Hussein regime was brutal towards its own population.  While no actual figures 
are known, estimates suggest that the regime killed more than 500,000 citizens from 
1968 to 2003.168 The regime was characterised by ‘widespread and systematic 
disappearances, extrajudicial executions, torture, arbitrary arrests, and detentions’.169  
The more well-known incidents are the forcible removal of the Shia population from 
the Marshland region and the draining of the marshland area, the Anfal campaign 
conducted against the Kurds in 1987-88, and the gassing of between 4000 to 5000 
Kurds in Halabja.  The regime also drained Iraq’s natural resources and was known to 
be corrupt and to condone embezzlement of public assets by senior officials, including 
Hussein.170 
7.1.2 Occupation of Iraq – May 2003- June 2004 
On 1 May 2003, the United States announced that major military operations had ended 
in Iraq. In the absence of any successor government, the United States and the United 
Kingdom established the Coalition Provisional Authority (CPA).171  The Security 
Council promulgated Resolution 1483, which noted the letters to the Security Council 
from the United States and the United Kingdom, and recognized the obligations of the 
two states as occupying powers under applicable international law.172 After 
determining that the situation in Iraq continued to constitute a threat to international 
peace and security,173 the Security Council, acting under Chapter VII of the Charter, 
called upon all concerned to comply with obligations under international law, in 
particular the Geneva Conventions of 1949 and the Hague Regulations of 1907.174  
The Security Council also indicated its support for the formation of an Iraqi interim 
administration, to be run by Iraqis until an internationally-recognized representative 
government is established and assumes the responsibilities of the CPA.175   
 
In order to exercise authority in Iraq, the Administrator of the CPA promulgated 
Regulation Number 1,176 which provided that the CPA shall exercise the powers of 
                                                 
168 Bassioni, M.C., ‘Post-Conflict Justice in Iraq:  An Appraisal of the Iraq Special Tribunal’ 
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171 The United States and United Kingdom notified the United Nations Security Council of the 
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2003 from the Permanent Representatives of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and 
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President of the Security Council, S/2003/538. 
172 Resolution 1483 (2003), preambular para. 13. 
173 Preambular para. 17. 
174 Para. 5. 
175 Para. 6. 
176 Regulation 1, 16 May 2003. 
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government during a transitional administration period, and that all legislative, 
executive and judicial authority necessary to achieve its objectives is vested in the 
CPA, to be exercised by the CPA Administrator.177  The authority for this action was 
stated to be the authority of the CPA as occupying power, relevant Security Council 
resolutions (including Resolution 1483) and the laws and usages of war.178  To meet 
the Security Council’s request for the establishment of an interim Iraqi 
administration,179 the CPA appointed 25 Iraqis to the Iraqi Governing Council.180  
Although the Iraqi Governing Council was recognized as ‘the principal body of the 
Iraqi interim administration’,181 in practice the body exercised virtually no real 
authority in Iraq, with the CPA retaining overall authority.182  Ahead of the transfer of 
power to Iraq in June 2004, the Iraqi Governing Council passed the Law of 
Administration for the State of Iraq for the Transitional Period, known as the 
Transitional Administration Law (TAL).  The TAL operated as an interim constitution 
and set out the provisional structures of the Iraqi system for the transitional period, 
defined as beginning on 30 June 2004, and ending on 31 December 2005.  In 
accordance with the schedule, the CPA transferred authority to the Interim Iraqi 
Administration on 28 June 2004.183   
7.1.3 Establishing the Iraqi High Tribunal 
Even before the Iraq invasion, the United States had been considering options to 
investigate the Iraqi regime’s violation of international humanitarian law and human 
rights law.184 Resolution 1483 affirmed the need to promote accountability for crimes 
and atrocities committed by the previous Iraqi regime.185  The question was which 
forum should be used.  Three alternatives were reportedly considered:186 (1) an 
international ad hoc criminal tribunal; (2) a mixed international and national tribunal 
similar to that of the SCSL; and (3) a national Iraqi tribunal with international 
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178 Preamble to CPA Regulation 1. 
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assistance.187  In summary, two conflicting views emerged.188 Many legal experts and 
non-governmental organisations felt that the nature of the crimes committed and the 
fragile state of the Iraqi judiciary required the creation of a specialized international or 
internationalized criminal tribunal.189  However, the United States did not support the 
idea of a tribunal established by the Security Council, fearing that such a body would 
be as costly and time-consuming as the ICTY and the ICTR.  It is also likely that this 
position was influenced by United States concerns regarding the ICC.  France, China 
and Russia also made known their intention to veto a tribunal for Iraq, as they 
considered the initial invasion to be unlawful.190  Moreover, the desire of the Iraqi 
authorities to retain the death penalty presented a significant barrier to the 
participation of the United Nations in a hybrid or internationalized option.191  The 
Bush Administration considered that an Iraqi tribunal was preferable as: (1) it would 
allow Iraq to assume responsibility for conducting trials of senior officials from the 
previous regime; (2) it would provide a basis for developing domestic legal capacity 
and the rule of law; and (3) it would send a powerful message that systematic 
repression of civilian populations would no longer be tolerated.192 The Iraqi Governing 
Council was also in favour of a national tribunal with international assistance, and 
research showed that a majority of the Iraqi population also supported that outcome.193 
 
A statute for the proposed national tribunal was drafted from September to December 
2003.  Contrary to early suggestions, there was extensive Iraqi involvement in the 
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drafting of the IHT Statute.194  In December 2003 the CPA made a specific delegation 
of authority to the Iraqi Governing Council, authorizing it to establish the Iraqi Special 
Tribunal (as it was then known) by promulgating the statute of the tribunal, which was 
annexed to the order.195  The delegation of authority was made conditional upon 
several terms and conditions, namely: (a) the Iraqi Governing Council was to 
promulgate a description of the elements of crimes to be applied to the crimes within 
the tribunal’s jurisdiction;  (b) the Iraqi Governing Council was to ensure that the IHT 
met, as a minimum, international standards of justice;  (c) in the event that there was a 
conflict between any promulgation by the Iraqi Governing Council or judgment of the 
IHT and any promulgation of the CPA, the latter would prevail; and (d) non-Iraqis 
may be appointed as judges.196  The Iraqi Governing Council established the IHT by 
decree on 9 December 2003, and the CPA Administrator signed the order into force on 
12 December 2003.  The authority of the CPA to establish the IHT is discussed in 
Chapter Three.  Following Hussein’s capture a few days later, the CPA announced 
that he would be tried by the IHT.197  
 
The IHT Statute was confirmed by the Iraqi Governing Council when it promulgated 
the TAL in March 2004.198  As one of its last legislative acts, the CPA provided for the 
transition of laws, regulations, orders and directives issued by it.199  In addition to 
making general rules for the continuation of legal instruments adopted by the CPA, 
Order 100 also made specific provision for the IHT,200 deleting the powers of the 
Administrator to alter the statute or the elements of crime or rules of procedure and 
evidence developed for the tribunal201 and to rescind the order establishing the 
tribunal.202 The Iraqi Constitution adopted in October 2005 preserves the role of the 
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IHT, and provides that the Council of Representatives may dissolve it after completion 
of its work.203 
 
An amended version of the IHT Statute was issued on 9 October 2005,204 which 
renamed the tribunal the ‘Iraqi High Tribunal’.205 The reasons appended to the 
amending legislation shed little light on the need for the amendments, although one 
suggestion is that the name was changed so as to avoid the characterisation of the IHT 
as an exception to the ‘normal’ legal system.206 The timing of the amendments, a 
matter of days before the commencement of the first trial, was also controversial.207   
 
One of the most significant features of the amended IHT Statute was the shift from the 
internationalization of the original IHT Statute towards a much greater Iraqi national 
institution.208  In particular, while the original IHT Statute provided that the ICG or 
Iraqi Government may appoint international judges ‘if it deems necessary’, this is now 
limited to situations where a state is a party to a complaint before the IHT.209  
Moreover, the original IHT Statute required the appointment of foreign experts to 
provide assistance to judges as to international law and the experience of other 
tribunals.210  It also required the appointment of foreign experts to provide assistance 
to the investigative judges with respect to the investigation and prosecution of cases.211  
The adviser in both cases was also required to monitor the protection by the 
investigating judges and judges of the IHT of due process standards.212  The IHT 
Statute now provides that the President of the IHT ‘shall have the right to appoint’ 
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foreign experts to provide assistance to the judges, that is, it is no longer mandatory 
for the President to do so.213 The requirement for foreign experts to monitor 
compliance with due process standards was omitted from the amended IHT Statute 
altogether. 
8 The Special Tribunal for Lebanon 
8.1.1 The assassination of Rafik Hariri and the establishment of the 
UNIIIC 
On 14 February 2005, former Prime Minister Hariri and 22 others were killed when a 
massive bomb detonated as his motorcade drove through a seafront area in central 
Beirut. Hariri had close ties with the West, in particular with the United States, France 
and Saudi Arabia.  These links were influential in the adoption by the Security 
Council of Resolution 1559, which called for the withdrawal of ‘foreign forces’ from 
Lebanon and for strict respect for the sovereignty, territorial integrity, unity and 
political independence of Lebanon.214  Tensions between Hariri, pro-Syrian groups 
and Syria had been high, following a controversial extension of the term of the term of 
appointment of pro-Syrian President Lahoud.  Elections had also been scheduled for 
May 2005, in which it was widely believed that the opposition, guided by Hariri, 
would win a clear majority.  Syria denied any involvement in the assassination.  The 
assassination prompted mass demonstrations within Lebanon calling for Syrian 
withdrawal from Lebanese territory, the creation of an international tribunal to 
investigate the assassination, the resignation of key security officials and free and 
democratic elections.  As a result of these protests and due to increased international 
pressure, Syria withdrew its forces from Lebanon in April 2005, ending some thirty 
years of Syrian military presence.  
 
On 15 February 2005 the Security Council labelled the assassination a terrorist attack, 
and requested the Secretary-General ‘to follow closely the situation in Lebanon and to 
report urgently on the circumstances, causes and consequences of this terrorist act’.215  
The Secretary-General deployed a fact-finding mission to Lebanon in late February 
2005, which reported to the Security Council at the end of March.216  The mission 
conducted a review of the Lebanese investigations and legal proceedings, examined 
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the crime scene and locally-collected evidence, spoke to several witnesses and met a 
number of Lebanese officials and political groups.  A key finding of the mission was 
that the Lebanese investigation process ‘suffered from serious flaws’217 and had 
neither the capacity nor the commitment to reach a satisfactory and credible 
conclusion.218  The mission’s report recommended that the investigation be entrusted 
to an international independent commission.219  
 
By Resolution 1595, adopted on 7 April 2005, the Security Council condemned the 
terrorist attack and reiterated its call for the strict respect of Lebanese sovereignty, 
independence, territorial integrity and unity.220  It noted the findings of the fact-finding 
mission and, in particular, the recommendation of that body that an international 
independent investigation should be established to discover the truth.221  Resolution 
1595 authorised the establishment of the United Nations International Independent 
Investigation Commission (UNIIIC).222  It also called on all states and all parties to 
cooperate fully with the UNIIIC.223  The Government of Lebanon welcomed the 
resolution and pledged to co-operate with the UNIIIC.224  Originally established for a 
three-month period,225 the UNIIIC became operational in June 2005. It is mandated to 
assist the Lebanese judicial and police authorities in the investigation of all aspects of 
the terrorist act226 and reports to the Security Council on a regular basis.227 It is 
expected that, once the LST commences operations, the mandate of the UNIIIC will 
be allowed to lapse.228 
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The initial report of the UNIIIC implicated Syrian state agents and Lebanese security 
officials in the assassination of Hariri.229  The UNIIIC suggested that Syrian 
cooperation had been ‘cooperation in form, not substance’230 and that several Syrian 
officials interviewed had attempted to mislead the UNIIIC.231  In response, the 
Security Council adopted Resolution 1636, by which it determined that the 
assassination and its implications constituted a threat to international peace and 
security.232  Noting the issue of potential Syrian involvement in the assassination, and 
the lack of substantive cooperation to date, 233 the Security Council, acting under 
Chapter VII, decided that the UNIIIC shall have vis-à-vis Syria the same rights and 
authorities as it enjoys against Lebanon, and that Syria must cooperate fully and 
unconditionally with the UNIIIC.234  Resolution 1636 also introduced restrictions on 
travel for, and the freezing of assets of, individuals suspected of being involved.235   
8.1.2 Further attacks and the establishment of the Special Tribunal 
Several other terrorist attacks were conducted during the course of 2005.  These 
included targeted assassinations of anti-Syrian political figures and non-targeted 
terrorist attacks aimed at civilians in general.  Following the assassination of a 
prominent member of parliament and a journalist in December 2005, the Government 
wrote to the Security Council requesting the establishment of a tribunal of an 
international character to try all those found responsible for the assassination of Hariri.  
The Government also requested the extension of the mandate of the UNIIIC, or the 
creation of a second independent commission, to investigate other terrorist attacks 
since 1 October 2004.236  In Resolution 1644, acting under Chapter VII,  the Security 
Council requested the Secretary-General to ‘negotiate an agreement with the 
Government of Lebanon aimed at establishing a tribunal of an international character 
based on the highest international standards of criminal justice’ to try individuals 
responsible for the assassination of Hariri.237  The Security Council also authorised the 
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UNIIIC to extend assistance in relation to terrorist attacks since 1 October 2004.238  
The mandate of the UNIIIC has been expanded on several occasions, such that it 
currently assists Lebanese officials in twenty other investigations into terrorist attacks 
occurring from 1 October 2004 up to the most recent reporting period in December 
2008.239 
 
The Secretary-General issued a preliminary report on the nature and scope of the 
international assistance required on 21 March 2006.240 It rejected the notion of an 
exclusively international tribunal, finding that this ‘would remove Lebanese 
responsibility for seeing justice done regarding a crime that primarily and significantly 
affected Lebanon’.241  Instead the report suggested a mixed tribunal, based on an 
agreement between the United Nations and the Government of Lebanon.242  The 
Security Council endorsed this conclusion and requested the Secretary-General to 
negotiate the agreement with the Government of Lebanon.243 The Secretary-General 
issued his Report on the Establishment of a Special Tribunal for Lebanon to the 
Security Council on 15 November 2006.244  Attached to the report were a draft 
agreement (largely based on the SCSL Agreement) and the proposed statute.  The 
President of the Security Council wrote to the Secretary-General on 21 November 
2006 endorsing the report and the text of the draft agreement and statute.  The 
President invited the Secretary-General to proceed, in cooperation with the 
Government of Lebanon, with the final steps for the conclusion of the LST 
Agreement.245   
 
The LST Agreement was signed by the Government of Lebanon on 23 January 2007 
and forwarded to the Lebanese parliament for approval and ratification.  The United 
Nations signed the agreement on 6 February 2007.  The LST Agreement was stated 
not to enter into force until the Lebanese authorities had taken the necessary steps 
required by the Lebanese Constitution for the agreement to be approved and 
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ratified.246  However, while the agreement was approved by the Lebanese cabinet, the 
pro-Syrian parliamentary speaker refused to convene parliament, thus essentially 
precluding ratification of the agreement.  Diplomatic efforts, including the 
intervention of the United Nations Legal Counsel, were unable to resolve the 
deadlock.247  The Prime Minister wrote to the Security Council, requesting it to 
establish the tribunal unilaterally.248  On 30 May 2007 the Security Council adopted 
Resolution 1757, recalling the provisions of the agreement and determining that the 
terrorist act – the assassination of Hariri – continued to constitute a threat to 
international peace and security.249  Acting under Chapter VII of the Charter, the 
Security Council decided that the LST Agreement would enter into force on 10 June 
2007 unless the Government of Lebanon confirmed that it had ratified the agreement 
prior to that date.250  This did not occur and on 11 June 2007 the Secretary-General 
announced that the United Nations had begun taking steps to formally establish the 
LST.251  The legal implications of this action will be considered in Chapter Three.  On 
30 November 2008, following a meeting with Prime Minister Siniora of Lebanon, the 
Secretary-General announced that the LST was on track to commence functioning on 
1 March 2009.252  The Prosecutor has stated that there will be a two-stage process, 
with an initial investigatory stage to be followed by a trial stage at a date to be 
determined.253 
9 Conclusion 
This chapter has outlined the background to the seven hybrid or internationalized 
tribunals to be studied.  All were established in difficult and very different 
circumstances.  The IJPP and the SPSC were developed in the midst of an 
international territorial administration, shortly after the end of an armed conflict.  In 
each situation, the United Nations mission was authorised by the Security Council and 
exercised complete legislative and executive control of the territory.  Both missions 
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also faced a decision as to whether to provide accountability for the actions of a 
previous repressive regime, to concentrate on violations of international humanitarian 
law and human rights law committed during the armed conflict, or whether to expend 
resources on re-establishing a failed judiciary so as to enable accountability for future, 
‘ordinary’ crimes committed during the period of administration and beyond.  There 
was no real process of consultation or negotiation with local actors in either territory; 
instead the decisions reached and the priorities decided by the United Nations 
missions were imposed on the territory.254 
 
The SCSL, the ECCC and the LST represent a more balanced, negotiated process.  All 
three were established in response to a request from the affected state for assistance in 
providing accountability for crimes alleged to have been committed, yet the situation 
leading to the request was different in each case.  Sierra Leone had suffered a violent 
armed conflict since 1991, a conflict that was on-going during the negotiation process 
and which had rendered Sierra Leone one of the poorest states in the world, with a 
virtually non-existent judicial system.  Cambodia sought assistance to provide 
accountability in relation to the violations of human rights law – and possibly 
international humanitarian law – committed by a former repressive regime some 
twenty years prior to the request.  However, supporters of the Khmer Rouge were still 
active, with former members holding senior posts in the then current government, and 
an insurgency led by the Khmer Rouge coming to an end only during the negotiation 
process.  Cambodia’s courts were functioning, yet were subject to allegations of 
corruption, partiality and political interference with the judicial process.  Lebanon 
required assistance, at least initially, in response to a single act of violence, the 
assassination of former Prime Minister Hariri.  Yet the politically-motivated violence 
in Lebanon was ongoing and, as negotiations for a tribunal continued, assistance was 
also requested for the investigation and trial of those believed to be responsible for 
further attacks.  The Lebanese judicial system was operational, yet there were 
concerns that it lacked the independence to conduct trials of this nature, which would 
likely be subject to pressure from key actors in Lebanon and the region. 
 
Despite the affected state exercising the initiative in requesting international 
assistance, the negotiations revealed varying degrees of willingness on the part of the 
affected state to cede jurisdiction to the institution to be established.  Both the SCSL 
and the LST were a joint negotiation process, leading to a large degree of United 
                                                 
254 Beauvais, J., ‘Benevolent Despotism: A Critique of UN State-Building in East Timor’ 
(2001) 33 NYJILP 1101; Dickinson, note 106, 338-9. 
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Nations involvement in the design and eventual operation of each tribunal.  The 
establishment of the tribunal had the support of the Security Council in both cases.  
This support extended, in the case of Lebanon, to establishing the LST by a binding 
resolution pursuant to its powers under Chapter VII of the Charter when domestic 
political factors in Lebanon precluded the ratification of the LST Agreement.  In 
contrast, the Cambodian government was less willing to cede sovereignty to the 
United Nations and refused to allow the United Nations greater control of the ECCC.  
Negotiations were protracted, and often tense, with the United Nations withdrawing at 
one stage.  The process was conducted without the support of the Security Council, 
although certain permanent members, in particular the United States, were involved at 
various stages.  Although the General Assembly supported the negotiation process – 
and requested the Secretary-General to resume talks with Cambodia – it did not 
present to Cambodia the same political and legal threat as a possible Chapter VII 
resolution imposing a tribunal would have done. 
 
The IHT was established following a controversial international armed conflict and 
occupation. Decision-makers also faced the issue of whether a future tribunal should 
address the violations of the previous regime, which stretched over a thirty-year 
period.  Although the IHT was designed in the context of an occupation, with 
considerable input and support from the occupying powers, there appears to have been 
consultation with the relevant national actors in its design, in particular the retention of 
the death penalty as a sentencing option. 
 
The impetus for the creation of the WCC was the completion strategy of the ICTY and 
the need for that tribunal to transfer cases to national jurisdictions.  The cases to be 
referred had arisen during a violent armed conflict, with both international and internal 
elements, some ten years before the creation of the WCC.  Designing and establishing 
the WCC was a negotiated process between the ICTY, the OHR in Bosnia and, to a 
more limited extent, national actors.  The process was supported by the Security 
Council as an essential component of the completion strategy of the ICTY.   
 
The different circumstances in the design and creation of each tribunal are reflected in 
their key features. One of the defining characteristics of a hybrid or internationalized 
tribunal is that it must have international aspects in its structure, personnel and 
applicable law.  These features are summarised in Table One.  The following two 
chapters will discuss other key features that have been affected by the context and 
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negotiation process: their legal basis and the nature and scope of the jurisdiction 
conferred upon them. 
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TABLE ONE:  KEY FEATURES (OTHER THAN JURISDICTION) 
 
 
Regulation 64 
Panels 
SPSC SCSL ECCC WCC IHT LST 
Structure        
Trial 
Chambers 
Special panels 
forming part of 
the District Court 
of Dili with 
exclusive 
jurisdiction over 
“serious crimes”. 
Two trial 
chambers. 
One trial 
chamber. 
Section I of the 
Criminal Division 
of the State Court. 
One felony court. 
One trial 
chamber. 
Appellate 
Chamber? 
Yes—special 
panels forming 
part of the Court 
of Appeal in Dili. 
Yes. 
Yes—the 
Supreme Court 
Chamber. 
Yes—Section I of 
the Appellate 
Division of the 
State Court. 
Yes—the 
Cassation panel. 
Yes—the Appeals 
Chamber. 
Investigative 
judges? 
Panels may 
conduct “any” 
stage of criminal 
proceedings 
(investigative, 
trial, appeal), 
unless already in 
session. 
Jurisdiction is ad 
hoc: there is no 
separate structure 
with original 
jurisdiction. 
 
From 2001, all 
District Courts 
must include at 
least one 
‘investigating 
judge’, charged 
with ensuring 
respect for the 
rights of all 
suspects and all 
victims. They 
shall issue 
warrants for 
search or seizure 
but may not 
No—but judges 
may sit alone for 
pre-trial matters. 
Yes—two Co-
Investigating 
Judges, one 
international and 
one national, with 
responsibility for 
“all 
investigations”. 
No—but judges 
may sit alone for 
pre-trial matters. 
Yes. Investigative 
judges are 
independent, may 
collect evidence 
from any source 
they deem 
appropriate, and 
initiate 
proceedings. 
Provision is made 
for one 
international pre-
trial judge, 
appointed by the 
UN Secretary-
General. They 
shall confirm 
indictments, issue 
warrants for 
search or seizure, 
and make other 
such orders as 
necessary for a 
fair trial. 
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interfere with the 
Public 
Prosecution 
Service (PPS). 
Prosecution 
An international 
prosecutor may 
be appointed at 
“any” stage of 
proceedings. 
The Deputy 
General 
Prosecutor for 
Serious Crimes of 
the PPS has 
“exclusive 
prosecutorial 
authority” for 
serious crimes 
under the 
jurisdiction of the 
special panels. 
OTP headed by 
an international 
prosecutor, with a 
national deputy 
prosecutor. 
Two Co-
Prosecutors, one 
international and 
one national 
prosecutor. 
Special 
Department for 
War Crimes, 
within the 
Prosecutor’s 
Office of BiH. 
During the 
transitional 
period, the section 
is headed by an 
international 
prosecutor. 
The Public 
Prosecution, led 
by a Chief 
Prosecutor and 
deputy elected 
internally. 
OTP headed by 
an international 
prosecutor, with a 
national deputy 
prosecutor. 
Registry 
No separate 
registry to support 
international 
judges and 
prosecutors. 
Yes, as part of the 
District 
Court/Court of 
Appeal in Dili. 
Yes—headed by 
an international 
appointee and UN 
staff member. 
Office of 
Administration, 
serving both 
judges and 
prosecution, 
headed by a 
national 
appointee, with an 
international 
deputy. 
A separate 
Registry exists for 
Section I of the 
Court, shared 
with Section II 
(organised crime). 
For the 
transitional 
period, this shall 
be headed by an 
international 
appointment. 
Administration 
Department, 
shared by the 
Court, Public 
Prosecution, and 
Defence Office. 
Yes—headed by 
an international 
appointee and UN 
staff member. 
Defence 
No special 
provision. Legal 
aid made 
generally 
available from 
No special 
provision. Legal 
aid/public defence 
made generally 
available from 
No reference in 
the Statute, but 
Defence Office 
established within 
the Registry. 
No legislative 
reference, but 
Defence Support 
Section operative 
in practice. 
No special 
provision. 
The RPE require 
the establishment 
of a Defence 
Office within the 
Administration 
Yes—Defence 
Office created by 
Statute, with 
independent 
Head. 
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mid-2006.  mid-2001. Department. 
 
Composition        
Trial bench 
Each panel of 
three comprises 
two international 
judges (one 
presiding) and 
one national 
judge. 
Each panel of 
three comprises  
two international 
judges and one 
national judge. 
The judge to 
whom the case 
was originally 
assigned presides. 
Each chamber 
comprises two 
international 
judges and one 
national judge. 
President is 
elected by judges. 
Each trial 
chamber has three 
national judges 
(one presiding) 
and two 
international 
judges. 
Each panel 
comprises three 
judges. For the 
initial transitional 
period two 
international 
judges and one 
national judge 
(always the 
President)  
The felony court 
comprises five 
national judges. 
President is 
elected by judges. 
The trial chamber 
comprises two 
international 
judges and one 
national judge. 
President is 
elected by judges. 
Appellate 
bench 
Each panel of 
three comprises 
two international 
judges (one 
presiding) and 
one national 
judge. 
Each panel of 
three comprises 
two international 
judges and one 
national judge (as 
for trials). In 
cases of “special 
importance or 
gravity”, panels 
of five may sit, 
with three 
international 
judges and two 
national judges. 
The chamber 
comprises three 
international 
judges and two 
national judges. 
The President of 
the SCSL 
presides. 
The chamber 
comprises four 
national judges 
(one presiding) 
and three 
international 
judges. 
Each panel 
comprises three 
judges, both 
national and 
international. 
The Cassation 
panel comprises 
nine national 
judges. President 
is elected by 
judges. 
The chamber 
comprises three 
international 
judges and two 
national judges. 
President is 
elected by judges, 
and also presides 
over the Tribunal 
as a whole. 
Concurrence of 
international 
judge required 
to form a 
Yes. Yes. Yes. 
Yes—judges must 
attempt unanimity 
but otherwise a 
supermajority is 
required. 
No. No. Yes. 
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majority 
 
Organisation        
Funding 
Assessed 
contributions via 
UNMIK budget, 
and through 
DoJA. 
Assessed 
contributions, via 
UNTAET (and 
successor 
mission) budget, 
and through 
Ministry of 
Justice. 
Voluntary 
contributions, 
subvention from 
assessed funds in 
2004. 
Mixed 
approach—UN 
75% from 
voluntary 
contributions, 
Cambodia 25%.  
In practice, 
international 
community has 
been required to 
provide the 
majority of the 
Cambodian share. 
Drawn from the 
state budget of 
BiH and from 
contributions 
from international 
donors. 
Drawn from the 
state budget of 
Iraq. The IHT has 
received 
assistance from 
international 
donors, mainly 
the US. 
Mixed 
mechanism. 51% 
to be provided by 
the UN from 
voluntary 
contributions. 
49% to be 
provided by the 
Government of 
Lebanon. 
Management / 
Oversight 
Reports to 
UNMIK on 
administrative 
matters. No direct 
reporting line to 
Council. SRSG 
controls exercise 
of jurisdiction. 
Reports to 
Transitional 
Administration on 
administrative 
matters. No direct 
reporting line to 
Council. 
Management 
Committee, 
comprising 
contributing 
states. 
No. Recent calls 
for an oversight 
mechanism due to 
concerns 
regarding 
financial 
mismanagement. 
Oversight 
Committee 
established in 
2004 to oversee 
the operation of 
the Registry. It 
consists of 
international 
experts, not 
contributing 
states. 
Judges and Public 
Prosecutors’ 
Affairs 
Committee with 
respect to ethical 
and disciplinary 
matters. The 
President of the 
Court must report 
to the Council of 
Ministers 
annually. The 
Presidency 
Council has 
considerable 
informal powers 
A Management 
Committee may 
be established by 
the UN and 
Lebanon in 
consultation. 
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of oversight. 
Seat of 
Tribunal 
International 
judges and 
prosecutors may 
be appointed to 
courts operating 
in all districts of 
Kosovo. 
Dili, East Timor. 
Freetown, Sierra 
Leone. 
Phnom Penh, 
Cambodia. 
Sarajevo, BiH. 
Baghdad, Iraq. 
May hold 
sessions 
throughout Iraq. 
Outside Lebanon 
(The Hague, The 
Netherlands). 
 
Procedure        
 
Applicable 
Law 
Law applicable in 
Kosovo, provided 
that it is non-
discriminatory, 
does not conflict 
with international 
human rights 
standards, the 
fulfilment of 
Council Res. 
1244 (1999), or 
any other 
UNMIK  
Existing law of 
East Timor, 
provided that it is 
non-
discriminatory, 
does not conflict 
with international 
human rights 
standards, the 
fulfilment of 
Council Res. 
1272 (1999), or 
any other 
UNTAET 
regulation (e.g. 
Transitional Rules 
of Criminal 
Procedure). 
RPE of the SCSL. 
 
Cambodian law, 
with lacunae 
resolved by 
reference to 
international 
procedural rules. 
National law—
Criminal 
Procedure Code 
of BiH. 
Criminal 
Procedure Law 
No 23 of 1971 
and RPE; 
otherwise, resort 
to general 
principles of Iraqi 
criminal law. 
RPE of the LST. 
Rights of the 
accused 
Rights should be 
consistent with 
major 
international 
Enumerated fair 
trial rights. 
Enumerated fair 
trial rights. 
Enumerated fair 
trial rights, and 
general reference 
to articles 14 and 
Enumerated fair 
trial rights. 
Enumerated fair 
trial rights. 
Enumerated fair 
trial rights. 
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human rights 
instruments. 
15 of the ICCPR. 
Death Penalty 
available as a 
sentencing 
option 
No. No. No. No. No. 
Yes. Death 
penalty imposed 
and carried out on 
several occasions. 
No. 
Trials in 
absentia 
No—but accused 
may be removed 
if disrupting 
proceedings. 
No—but trials 
may proceed 
where the 
accused, having 
made an initial 
appearance, flees, 
is voluntarily 
absent, or is 
removed as a 
consequence of 
their conduct. 
No—but trials 
may proceed 
where, the 
accused having 
made an initial 
appearance, the 
judge is satisfied 
that they 
expressly or 
impliedly waive 
their right to be 
present. 
No—but trials 
may proceed 
where, the  
accused having 
made an initial 
appearance, 
absconds or is 
removed for 
disruptive 
conduct. 
No—but accused 
may be removed 
if disrupting 
proceedings and 
counsel is present. 
No—but accused 
may be removed 
if disrupting 
proceedings. 
Yes, if the 
accused has 
waived in writing 
their right to be 
present, if they 
have not been 
surrendered by 
the authorities 
concerned, or if 
they have 
absconded and 
their 
apprehension 
cannot be secured 
by all reasonable 
steps. 
Provisions on 
the rights of 
victims 
Yes. Injured 
parties or their 
representatives 
may make 
submissions in 
court, including a 
closing statement. 
Criminal 
proceedings may 
incorporate 
Yes. Victims may 
seek leave from 
the court to make 
submissions in 
criminal 
proceedings. As 
of right, they may 
intervene in 
reviews 
conducted by the 
No. (Victims may 
be able to claim 
compensation 
under relevant 
national 
legislation.) 
Not provided for 
in the Special 
Law, but RPE 
provide for a civil 
party action. The 
ECCC can order 
collective and 
moral reparations 
to civil parties. 
No. 
Yes. Iraqi victims 
and families may 
file a civil suit 
before the Court. 
Yes. Victims or 
their 
representatives 
may make 
submissions on 
matters affecting 
their personal 
interests, at any 
stages of the 
proceedings 
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victims’ property 
claims, including 
for damages. 
investigating 
judge, and 
applications for 
parole. 
Victims of serious 
crimes may 
benefit from a 
trust fund. 
which the 
Chambers deem 
appropriate and 
which do not 
prejudice the 
interests of the 
parties. Victims 
may also be able 
to claim 
compensation 
under relevant 
national 
legislation. 
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CHAPTER THREE 
LEGAL BASIS AND NATURE OF JURISDICTION 
1 Introduction 
Chapter Two described the background to the seven tribunals studied.  It highlighted 
that the different contexts within which these tribunals have been established, and in 
particular the manner in which questions of sovereignty and legal, political and 
financial factors influence the negotiation process – if any – and the design, structure 
and operation of a tribunal.  Table One sets out the key features of these tribunals and 
highlights the differences between them in terms of structure, composition and 
funding. The varying circumstances surrounding their creation and design are used to 
justify considering each tribunal as unique; each tribunal is sui generis or an ad hoc 
response.  To utilise the generic term ‘internationalized’ or ‘hybrid’ potentially masks 
a number of significant differences between such tribunals. For instance, the tribunals 
may apply, and be governed by, different legal regimes. Some may have the power to 
compel compliance with court orders by third states and international organisations, 
including the power to secure the surrender of suspects, while others are restricted to 
requesting international cooperation utilising existing domestic arrangements as to 
extradition and mutual legal cooperation. Tribunals may have varying relationships 
with the domestic legal regime.  Certain tribunals may be able to override domestic 
and international immunities or amnesties, whilst others may not. The unique nature of 
each tribunal, in turn, arguably precludes the development of a framework or common 
approach to the legal questions facing the tribunals.   
 
However, this thesis does not accept that position.  Given the increasing reliance on 
such tribunals, it is necessary to examine further the features of these tribunals so as to 
identify more specific categories, or sub-species, of tribunals. It is submitted here that 
the most relevant criterion upon which to base any categorization of such tribunals is 
the legal basis for the creation and operation of the tribunal. Examining the legal basis 
for each tribunal permits an examination of the key powers and competences of the 
tribunal and the applicable legal regime. It is directly relevant to the issues outlined 
above and is one of the most significant indicators of how effective the tribunal will be 
in the quest to achieve the principle of non-impunity. Accordingly, the first section of 
this chapter will assess the differing legal bases of the hybrid and internationalized 
tribunals.  It finds that, using the legal basis as the key criterion, three categories of 
such tribunals can be identified. The second section of this Chapter builds upon these 
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three categories and examines the related issue of the nature of the jurisdiction that has 
been conferred on each tribunal by states, and how such authority has been conferred.  
This thesis considers four possible bases for the jurisdiction of the tribunals: the 
principle of territorial jurisdiction conferred on a court acting as a national institution 
of the territorial state; the delegation of jurisdiction from a state – normally the 
territorial state – to an international tribunal; jurisdiction conferred on the tribunal by 
the international community, as the crimes within its subject matter jurisdiction are 
considered to give rise to universal jurisdiction (so-called ‘floating’ universal 
jurisdiction); and jurisdiction conferred on an international tribunal by the Security 
Council acting under Chapter VII of the Charter.  It concludes, however, that the 
notion of ‘floating’ universal jurisdiction is not yet an accepted basis of jurisdiction 
for an international criminal tribunal. An analysis of the nature of the jurisdiction 
conferred on a tribunal, and the mechanism by which it was conferred, may assist in 
determining key legal questions, such as whether an amnesty or immunity is 
applicable. 
 
2 Legal Basis 
2.1.1 The Special Court for Sierra Leone 
The Secretary-General has commented that ‘the Special Court, as foreseen, is 
established by an Agreement between the United Nations and the Government of 
Sierra Leone and is therefore a treaty-based sui generis court of mixed jurisdiction and 
composition’.1 The legal status of the SCSL is determined by its constituent 
instrument, the SCSL Agreement.  Article 1 of the SCSL Agreement clearly states 
‘There is hereby established a Special Court for Sierra Leone…’. Moreover, the 
preamble to the SCSL Statute provides ‘Having been established by an Agreement 
between the United Nations and the Government of Sierra Leone…’.  The Security 
Council has referred to the SCSL as having been established by the SCSL 
Agreement.2  The Appeals Chamber has confirmed this status on several occasions.  
The SCSL is thus a treaty-based institution.3 In this sense, the SCSL has more in 
                                                 
1 Report of the Secretary-General on the establishment of a Special Court for Sierra Leone, 
S/2000/915, para. 9. 
2 Resolution 1688 (2006), preambular para. 2 – ‘Recalling that the Special Court for Sierra 
Leone (“the Special Court”) was established by Agreement between the United Nations and the 
Government of Sierra Leone on 16 January 2002 (“the Agreement”) pursuant to its resolution 
1315 (2000) of 14 August 2000’. 
3 This legal status is widely recognized by commentators:  see Beresford, S. and Muller, A., 
‘The Special Court for Sierra Leone: An Initial Comment’ (2001) 14 LJIL 635, 636; Cerone, J., 
‘The Special Court for Sierra Leone:  Establishing a New Approach to International Criminal 
Justice’ (2002) 8 ILSA JICL 379, 381; Frulli, M., ‘The Special Court for Sierra Leone:  Some 
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common with the ICC than the ICTY and the ICTR. It possesses distinct legal 
personality under international law4 and is an international – and not a national - 
institution.   
 
The nature and legal basis of the SCSL has been raised several times in preliminary 
motions before the Appeals Chambers.  It has been suggested that Resolution 1315 
and the involvement of the Security Council in the creation of the SCSL indicate that 
the SCSL was instead established by the Security Council acting pursuant to Chapter 
VII of the Charter.  According to this view, the mere involvement of the Council with 
the establishment of the SCSL, in combination with its previous role in relation to 
Sierra Leone and its reference to the situation in Sierra Leone as continuing to 
constitute a threat to international peace and security, renders the establishment of the 
SCSL an exercise of the powers of the Security Council acting under Chapter VII of 
the Charter. However, this assertion is flawed. The Security Council did not establish 
the SCSL, nor do the orders of the SCSL bind third states.5  Before acting under 
Chapter VII of the Charter, the Security Council must make a determination as to 
whether the situation in question represents a threat to the restoration or maintenance 
of international peace and security.6  It had previously determined that the situation in 
Sierra Leone constituted a threat to international peace and security,7 and this 
determination was reiterated in Resolution 1315.8  The jurisdictional threshold for the 
operation of Chapter VII of the Charter was satisfied.  Therefore, it was open to the 
Security Council to utilize its powers under article 41 of the Charter to establish an 
international tribunal as a measure to restore international peace and security.  
Alternatively, the Security Council could have relied upon its general power for 
international peace and security under article 24 of the Charter.9  However, the 
                                                                                                                                 
Preliminary Comments’ (2000) 11 EJIL 857, 858; Jallow, H., ‘The Legal Framework of the 
Special Court for Sierra Leone’ in Ambos & Othamn (eds) New Approaches in International 
Justice: Kosovo East Timor, Sierra Leone and Cambodia (2003); Scharf, M., ‘The Special 
Court for Sierra Leone’, ASIL Insights, 2000. 
4 Article 11, SCSL Agreement. 
5 Both the United Nations and the SCSL do not consider Resolution 1315 to delegate Chapter 
VII powers to the SCSL:  Secretary-General’s Report, note 1, para. 10.  The Appeals Chamber 
has stated that the SCSL does not possess the mandatory powers of the Security Council under 
Chapter VII of the Charter:  Prosecutor v Taylor, Decision on Immunity from Jurisdiction, 
Appeals Chamber, 31 May 2004 (Taylor Immunity Decision), confirming that Ghana did not 
have a legal obligation to comply with an arrest warrant issued by the SCSL. 
6 Article 39, Charter. 
7 Resolution 1270 (1999) and Resolution 1132 (1997). 
8 Resolution 1315 (2000), preamble. 
9 The Appeals Chamber has determined that the question of which exact article of the Charter 
could have formed the basis for the SCSL Agreement was irrelevant: Prosecutor v Fofana, 
Decision on Preliminary Motion on Lack of Jurisdiction Materiae:  Illegal Delegation of 
Powers by the United Nations, Appeals Chamber, 25 May 2004, para. 19.  It noted that ‘there 
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Security Council did not act under Chapter VII; it merely requested the Secretary-
General to negotiate an agreement with Sierra Leone for the establishment of a 
tribunal. Resolution 1315 can be contrasted with Resolutions 955 and 827, which 
include the words ‘Acting under Chapter VII of the Charter of the United Nations’.  
While the inclusion of the term ‘acting under Chapter VII’ is a matter of custom or 
practice only, the absence of these words in Resolution 1315 creates a strong 
presumption that the Security Council was not relying upon its powers under Chapter 
VII of the Charter.  Moreover, the Security Council did not establish the SCSL by 
Resolution 1315.  There is not a decision of the Security Council with which Sierra 
Leone - or other states - could be required to co-operate.10  At most, Resolution 1315 
is a non-binding recommendation from the Security Council acting under article 39 of 
the Charter.  Having been established by a treaty and not by one of the principal 
organs of the United Nations, the SCSL cannot be, and has not been, considered a 
subsidiary organ of the United Nations.  The assertion that the SCSL is a ‘Chapter 
VII’ body relies on an overly expansive interpretation of Resolution 1315 and the 
Council’s powers for international peace and security. This approach is inconsistent 
with the practice of the Council, which generally requires mandatory language and 
reference to the Council acting under Chapter VII, to engage the Council’s powers. 
Moreover, it is highly unlikely that states would be willing to accept that any action of 
the Council that may have a link to international peace and security is an exercise of 
the Council’s powers under Chapter VII of the Charter and hence potentially binding 
on member states. While it is certainly possible that the practice of the Council may 
develop further to permit such an expansive interpretation, it certainly does not do so 
yet.  
 
The Appeals Chamber has also rejected suggestions that the request from the Security 
Council represented an unlawful delegation of powers by the United Nations.11  It 
concluded that the question of whether the Security Council has the power to delegate 
its powers to the Secretary-General was not in issue.  Resolution 1315 was clearly a 
request from the Security Council to the Secretary-General, which he was empowered 
to perform pursuant to articles 97 and 98 of the Charter.  The United Nations is 
generally accepted to have treaty-making powers so as to enable it to enter into 
                                                                                                                                 
is no reason why the Security Council could not have established an international criminal 
tribunal in a non-coercive way’: para. 21. 
10 Article 25, Charter. 
11 Fofana, note 9.  See also Prosecutor v Gbao, Decision on the Invalidity of the Agreement 
Between the United Nations and the Government of Sierra Leone on the Establishment of the 
Special Court, Appeals Chamber, 15 May 2004. 
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agreements with states and other international organizations, this power being implied 
as necessary for the performance of its functions and as a feature of its legal 
personality.12  Fulfilling the request did not require a delegation of power from the 
Security Council.13  Similarly, the issue of whether the Secretary-General had the 
power to conclude the SCSL Agreement of his own volition was also considered 
irrelevant, as he was requested to do so by the Security Council.14  Nor did the United 
Nations act ultra vires in entering into the SCSL Agreement, as the Security Council 
is not required to maintain control of an institution that is not a subsidiary organ15 and 
the existence and activities of the SCSL do not restrain the Security Council in the 
performance of its functions under Chapter VII of the Charter.16 
 
Several defendants have challenged the lawfulness of the tribunal’s establishment 
based on an alleged violation of the Constitution of Sierra Leone.  Section 120 of the 
Constitution vests the judicial power of Sierra Leone in the judiciary, established 
under Chapter VII of the Constitution.  Any bill altering the structure of the judicial 
system may not become law until after it has been passed by parliament and approved 
at a referendum.17 It has been suggested that the SCSL Agreement altered the judicial 
system of Sierra Leone through the creation of a parallel jurisdiction not contemplated 
by the Constitution and ousting the supervisory jurisdiction of the Supreme Court.18  
These changes arguably required confirmation at a referendum, which did not occur.  
Instead, the Ratification Act was promulgated pursuant to the general power of the 
President to enter into treaties, subject to ratification by Parliament.19 The Appeals 
Chamber rejected this argument, labelling these submissions as ‘erroneous, if not 
fallacious’.20  It advanced four reasons for its conclusion.21  First, the Ratification Act 
states that the SCSL is not to form part of the judiciary of Sierra Leone.22 Second, the 
                                                 
12 Reparations for Injuries suffered in the Service of the United Nations (1949) ICJ Reports 
174.   
13 Fofana, note 9, para. 16. 
14 Fofana, note 9, para. 17. 
15 Fofana, note 9, para. 26. 
16 Fofana, note 9, paras 27-9. 
17 Section 108(3), Constitution. 
18 Tejan-Cole notes that incorporating the SCSL Agreement into Sierra Leone required 
‘substantial amendments to entrenched provisions of the Constitution’:  Tejan-Cole, A., ‘The 
Special Court for Sierra Leone: Conceptual concerns and alternatives’ (2001) 1 African Human 
Rights Law Journal 107, 114.  See also Bohlander, M., ‘The Transfer of Cases from 
International Criminal Tribunals to National Courts’, working paper, November 2004 (copy on 
file with author), 28; and Beresford, note 1, 641. 
19 Section 40(4), Constitution. 
20 Prosecutor v Kallon, Norman and Kamara, Decision on Constitutionality and Lack of 
Jurisdiction, Appeals Chamber, 13 March 2004, para. 48. 
21 Ibid, paras 49-52. 
22 Section 11(2), Ratification Act. 
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SCSL has separate judicial capacity, including the power to enter into treaties, a power 
which national courts do not have.23  Third, as a treaty-based organ, the SCSL does 
not operate within an existing legal system.  Finally, the SCSL is clearly established 
outside the national court system.  The Appeals Chamber concluded that ‘[T]he 
establishment of the Special Court under Article 1 of the Special Court Agreement 
fulfils the relevant constitutional requirements and the appropriate procedures were 
certainly followed.’24 The Appeals Chambers findings on this issue are worrying for 
several reasons.  The first, third and fourth reasons are effectively the same, and the 
second reason does not resolve the issue of whether constitutional provisions have 
been complied with.  It is also debatable as to whether it is appropriate for the SCSL to 
review compliance with domestic constitutional provisions, particularly where the 
states parties have not raised any objection and clearly consider that they are bound by 
the SCSL Agreement.  Although the Appeals Chamber of the ICTY considered that it 
had the jurisdiction to consider the legality of its establishment in the Tadic case,25 the 
legal basis of the ICTY is different to that of the SCSL and is based on the authority of 
the Security Council acting under Chapter VII of the Charter.  Where a tribunal is 
established by a treaty, the power of review should not extend to confirming that states 
parties have complied with domestic constitutional or other provisions.  If this 
argument was extended to the Rome Statute, it would require the ICC to consider 
challenges to its authority based on a possible violation of constitutional law by any 
one of its member states.  The Appeals Chamber itself reached this conclusion in a 
separate decision, where it had been asked to review the legality of article 10 of the 
SCSL Statute, the provision concerning the applicability of amnesties.  It commented 
that:26 
 
[t]he decision in Tadic upon which Kallon’s counsel relied as authority for the 
submission that this Court can pronounce on the lawfulness of its own 
establishment is not apt.  The ICTY is not a treaty-based Tribunal, nor did the 
Tadic case involve the validity of the provisions of a treaty but rather the 
extent of the powers of the Security Council, an authority established by the 
UN Charter. 
 
                                                 
23 Article 11, SCSL Agreement. 
24 Kallon, note 20, para. 53. 
25 Prosecutor v Tadic, Decision on Jurisdiction, Appeals Chamber, 2 October 2005.  The 
Appeals Chamber relied upon the SCSL Agreement, its RPE and the decision in Tadic to 
‘provide that basic and indispensable mandate’ to determine the legality of its own creation: 
Kallon, note 20, para. 37. 
26 Prosecutor v Kallon and Kamara, Decision on Challenge to Jurisdiction: Lomé Accord 
Amnesty, Appeals Chamber, 13 March 2004, para. 62. 
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Even if entering into the SCSL Agreement did violate the Constitution, the violation 
would not render the SCSL Agreement void unless the violation was ‘manifest and 
concerned a rule of fundamental importance’.27 While constitutional rules are 
generally considered to be of fundamental importance, it is certainly not demonstrable 
that the violation was manifest.  The position can also be contrasted with the situation 
in relation to the LST, where constitutional procedures were clearly not complied 
with, and looked unlikely to be satisfied in the future.  The Security Council addressed 
the possible violation in that situation by establishing the tribunal pursuant to its 
powers under Chapter VII of the Charter.   
 
Defendants have also submitted that the SCSL is not an international institution but a 
court within the judicial system of Sierra Leone.   This would require proceedings in 
the SCSL to comply with the Constitution, including permitting a defendant to make 
habeas corpus applications to the Supreme Court.28  The argument that the SCSL is a 
national judicial institution rests on two grounds.  First, on the hybrid nature of the 
SCSL, which, it is submitted, distinguishes the tribunal from the ICC, the ICTY and 
the ICTR.29 Second, it is argued that although the SCSL Agreement established the 
SCSL, the Ratification Act imported the SCSL into the judicial structure of Sierra 
Leone, rendering the SCSL a national court.30  This argument may be quickly 
dispelled. Section 11(2) of the Ratification Act states that ‘the Special Court shall not 
form part of the Judiciary of Sierra Leone’, and section 13 provides that ‘offences 
prosecuted before the Special Court are not prosecuted in the name of the Republic of 
Sierra Leone’.  The memorandum of objects and reasons attached to the Ratification 
Act stresses that the Ratification Act is ‘to make provision for the ratification and 
implementation of the Agreement’ and to provide ‘the details needed to effectuate the 
exercise of jurisdiction by the Court’. The Ratification Act functions as implementing 
legislation only; it does not establish a domestic criminal tribunal with international 
assistance, nor can it convert an otherwise international institution into a domestic 
                                                 
27 Article 46, Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties.  Technically it is the Vienna 
Convention on the Law of Treaties between States and International Organisations and 
between International Organisations (1986) which would apply.  While this convention has not 
yet entered into force, many of its provisions are considered to reflect customary international 
law.   
28 The Supreme Court of Sierra Leone has supervisory jurisdiction over all other courts in 
Sierra Leone, which includes the power to issue writs of habeas corpus: section 125, 
Constitution. 
29 Oral submissions on behalf of defendant Kamara: Kallon, note 20, para. 22. 
30 Various provisions of the Ratification Act were relied upon in support of this argument, 
including section 2, which grants the SCSL legal capacity in Sierra Leone, and section 20, 
which provides that orders of the SCSL will have the same effect as an order of a Sierra Leone 
court.   
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court.  The SCSL has consistently, and correctly, rejected this argument.  In 
Prosecutor v Brima, the Appeals Chamber held that, as the SCSL Agreement was 
created pursuant to international instruments, it could not come into force without an 
instrument of ratification.  However, this instrument of ratification did not transform 
the SCSL into a domestic court. 31  In conclusion, the SCSL is a treaty-based 
institution.  It is an international tribunal, and operates outside the domestic legal 
system of Sierra Leone. 
2.1.2 The legal basis of UNMIK and UNTAET, and the serious crimes 
processes  
Although there had been precedents for the involvement of the United Nations in 
governance tasks,32 the mandates of the civilian components of both UNMIK and 
UNTAET were considered ‘unprecedented in scope and complexity’.33 Debate ensued 
as to whether the Security Council was competent to establish missions with such 
wide-ranging mandates and, if so, where the legal basis for that competence lay.34  
One suggestion was that both the former Yugoslavia and Indonesia had either 
consented to or acquiesced in the establishment of an international territorial 
administration in a territory they had formerly controlled.35 The Security Council 
hinted at the presence of consent in both Resolutions 1244 and 1272.36  However, the 
Security Council did not rely on consent alone as the basis for the territorial 
administration as to do so would have tied the continued operation of the missions to 
                                                 
31 Prosecutor v Brima, Ruling on the Application for the Issue of a Writ of Habeas Corpus 
Filed by the Applicant, Trial Chamber, 22 July 2003.  See also Prosecutor v Allieu Kondewa, 
Decision on the Urgent Defence Application for Release from Provisional Detention, Appeals 
Chamber, 21 November 2003 and Prosecutor v Fofana, Decision on the Urgent Defence 
Application for Release from Provisional Detention, 21 November 2003. 
32 Stahn. C., ‘The United Nations Transitional Administrations in Kosovo and East Timor: A 
First Analysis’ (2001) 5 Max Planck Year Book of United Nations Law 105; and Wilde, R., 
‘From Danzig to East Timor and Beyond: The Role of International Territorial Administration’ 
(2001) 95 AJIL 583. 
33 Matheson, M., ‘United Nations Governance of Postconflict Societies’ (2001) 95 AJIL 76, 79. 
34 See: Matheson, ibid, Wilde, note 32; Stahn, note 32; Kirgis, F., ‘Security Council 
Governance of Postconflict Societies: A Plea for Good Faith and Informed Decision Making’ 
(2001) 95 AJIL 579; Ruffert, M., ‘The Administration of Kosovo and East Timor by the 
International Community’ (2001) 50 ICLQ 613; Rothert, M., ‘UN Intervention in East Timor’ 
(2001) 39 Col JTL 257; and Kondoch, B., ‘The United Nations Administration of East Timor’ 
(2001) 6 JCSL 145. 
35 The consent of the former Yugoslavia was said to be found in the acceptance of the basic 
principles of the administration, as set out in Annex 2 to Resolution 1244. The consent of 
Indonesia (de facto authority) and Portugal (de jure) authority were to be found in the 
agreement providing for the popular consultation and acceptance of the general principles of 
the administration at a meeting in September 1999. 
36 See Resolution 1244 (1999), preambular paras 9 and 10; Resolution 1272 (1999), 
preambular paras 2, 12 and 13. 
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ongoing consent. For political reasons also, relying on consent was unacceptable.37 
Moreover, a consent-based mission would not ensure that other states would recognize 
the authority of the mission and cooperate so as to enable the mission to function. 
Thus the Security Council invoked its powers under Chapter VII of the Charter to 
establish both missions.38  It now appears generally accepted that both resolutions 
were a valid exercise of the Security Council’s powers under Chapter VII of the 
Charter, and that article 41 of the Charter was sufficiently wide so as to support the 
imposition of international territorial administration as a measure to restore or 
maintain international peace and security.39   
 
The effect of the resolutions was to suspend for the duration of the transitional period 
the residual powers of the former Yugoslavia in respect of Kosovo and whatever 
authority Indonesia had exercised in relation to East Timor. During the period of 
administration, the United Nations assumed full responsibility for the administration 
of the territories and was effectively to act as the government of each territory. 
However, the United Nations did not become the sovereign; instead sovereignty was 
suspended and the United Nations administered the territory on behalf of the local 
population and the international community.40 As peacekeeping missions established 
pursuant to the powers of the Security Council under Chapter VII, UNMIK and 
UNTAET were subsidiary organs of the Security Council under article 29. As such, 
the missions were required to report to the Security Council on a regular basis and 
their mandate was subject to review, modification and termination by the parent organ, 
the Security Council.41  
 
Given the context of their creation, the legal basis of the IJPP and the SPSC during the 
period of territorial administration is somewhat unclear.42 As noted in Chapter Two, 
both the IJPP and the SPSC were established by regulations promulgated by the 
respective Special Representative of the Secretary-General. It has been observed that 
                                                 
37 The validity of the consent of the former Yugoslavia was questioned due to the military air 
strikes and other measures. To rely on consent alone in East Timor would have validated 
Indonesia’s annexation of the territory as lawful. 
38 Resolutions 1244 and 1272 both provide that the Security Council acted under Chapter VII. 
39 This is the conclusion drawn by the majority of the commentators listed above.  
40 Yannis, A., ‘The Concept of Suspended Sovereignty in International Law and Its 
Implications in International Politics’ (2002) 13 EJIL 1037, 1048. 
41 Sarooshi, D., ‘The Legal Framework Governing United Nations Subsidiary Organs’ (1996) 
67 BYbIL 413. 
42 The legal basis of the SPSC varied after the independence of East Timor in May 2002. This 
period subsequent to independence will not be considered here. 
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such regulations have a dual character.43 The regulations are based on, and their 
authority flows from, the provisions of the Charter and the powers of the Security 
Council under Chapter VII of the Charter.44 In this sense, the regulations are 
international instruments. However, the regulations are addressed to a specific 
territory and, in this other sense, constitute domestic laws of that territory. This 
reflects the dual functions of the Special Representative of the Secretary-General and 
the missions themselves. At least during the transitional period the missions operated 
not only as a subsidiary organ of the Security Council but also as the effective 
government of the territory concerned.   
 
What does this duality mean for the legal basis of the IJPP and the SPSC? At least in 
theory, these internationalized tribunals may also enjoy the same duality, that is they 
operate both as instruments of the Council under article 41 of the Charter and as 
domestic judicial processes. If the tribunals were considered ‘Chapter VII’ tribunals in 
this sense, this would suggest that they should be subject to and apply international 
law, could compel cooperation with their orders and could override immunity both at a 
national and international level.45  However, Wilde argues that the correct method of 
assessing the legal basis of such a regulation potentially possessing a dual character is 
to consider which role the international organization is fulfilling when it promulgates 
the regulation and to ask whether the regulation is an exercise of international legal 
capacity, or a governmental act.46  Applying this approach, it would appear from the 
text of the regulations in question that in each case, the Special Representative of the 
Secretary-General acted in his national, domestic capacity, and did not act to establish 
the IJPP or the SPSC as international legislative acts. This would base the legal 
authority of these bodies in domestic law. This conclusion appears to be supported by 
the practice of the IJPP and the SPSC, which have operated as domestic tribunals. 
Each tribunal applies the law stipulated by the relevant regulations as the law of the 
territory concerned, and not as an international tribunal or a domestic court applying 
international law.  Neither the IJPP nor the SPSC have asserted any binding authority 
based on the Charter in order to enforce their orders or to obtain the cooperation of 
states, including the former Yugoslavia and Indonesia.  
                                                 
43 See discussion in the following sources: Stahn, note 32; Ruffert, note 35; and Wilde, R., 
‘The Complex Role of the Legal Adviser when International Organizations Administer 
Territory’ (2001) ASIL Proceedings 251. 
44 See Cerone, J. and Baldwin, C., ‘Explaining and Evaluating the UNMIK Court System’ in 
Romano et al (eds) Internationalized Criminal Courts: Sierra Leone, East Timor, Kosovo and 
Cambodia (2004), 41. 
45 See Chapter Five. 
46 Wilde, note 43. 
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This conclusion is also supported by the action - or inaction - of the Security Council 
regarding the serious crimes process in each territory. The Security Council did not 
display any sense of ‘ownership’ of the SPSC or the IJPP.  Key decisions, including 
the creation of the processes themselves, were made within the mission hierarchy, and 
were not instigated by the Security Council. Although the processes operate within 
restraints set by the Security Council, particularly  with regard to the relationship 
between these processes and other international courts (ICTY in Kosovo) and national 
courts (accountability process in Indonesia for East Timor), there was not a system of 
reporting to the Security Council on serious crimes issues outside the normal mission 
reporting structure. This limited the possibility of obtaining Security Council support 
for enforcement of orders and issues of cooperation.  Even where flaws in the system 
were identified, for example when the failings in the trials before the Indonesian 
national mechanism became apparent, the Security Council did not take action to 
reinforce the serious crimes process in a territory which the United Nations 
administered under its authority. Thus it appears that the Security Council itself did 
not consider the tribunals to possess international character or to have a legal basis in 
Chapter VII of the Charter. 
 
The conclusion that the SPSC and the IJPP are domestic institutions is logical, 
particularly when one considers other actions taken by the missions. Both UNTAET 
and UNMIK created transitional governmental institutions and were responsible for 
establishing institutions to draft interim constitutions.47 The transitional institutions 
established by the missions were staffed at least in part by international personnel.48 
There has been no suggestion that the transitional governments or institutions were 
international in character, or that they drew their authority from the Council’s powers 
under the Charter. Instead, all transitional institutions are considered to be domestic in 
nature, albeit institutions which receive significant international assistance.  There is 
no justification for conferring upon the SPSC and the IJPP international character and 
authority where other governmental institutions are national in nature. Accordingly, 
the legal basis of these tribunals lies in domestic law and the tribunals operated as 
national courts with international participation and assistance.  
                                                 
47 For East Timor, see Regulation 2001/2 and Regulation 2001/21. For Kosovo, see Regulation 
2001/9. 
48 Regulation 2000/1 provided that each administrative department established was to be 
managed by two Co-heads, one a national, the other a member of UNMIK. Regulation 2000/23 
appointed Timorese Cabinet Officers to manage transitional administrative departments. 
However, all officers were appointed by and reported to the Transitional Administrator.  
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2.1.3 Extraordinary Chambers in the Courts of Cambodia 
The ECCC is a national judicial institution, albeit one that is operating with significant 
assistance from the United Nations.49  Personnel at the ECCC indicate that ‘This idea 
of Cambodian “ownership” is widely accepted by the UN side of the court 
administration, which views its role as, in essence, one of support for the process, in 
accordance with international standards’.50  Having been established by domestic 
law,51 the ECCC operates within the existing court structure of Cambodia and forms 
part of the Cambodian legal order. Other than in limited circumstances, the ECCC is 
to apply Cambodian, not international, procedural law.52  Unlike the SCSL, the ECCC 
does not enjoy separate legal personality under international law.53   
 
What then is the significance of the ECCC Agreement for the legal basis of the 
ECCC?  Though the ECCC is the subject of the ECCC Agreement, this does not make 
it a treaty-based organ; the Special Law and not the ECCC Agreement is the 
constitutive instrument of the tribunal.54  The ECCC Agreement is only ‘to regulate 
the cooperation’ between the United Nations and Cambodia, and to provide ‘the legal 
basis and the principles and modalities for such cooperation’.55  Furthermore, although 
the General Assembly provided the authority for the Secretary-General to negotiate 
the ECCC Agreement and approved its terms before the United Nations signed the 
instrument, Resolution 57/225B does not form the legal basis of the ECCC.56 The 
Security Council was not involved in the establishment of the ECCC, and it is 
doubtful that it could have acted to establish a tribunal where there is no threat to 
international peace and security, the violations in question having been committed 
some 20 years previously.57 Thus the ECCC is not a subsidiary organ of either the 
General Assembly or the Security Council. 
                                                 
49 There is general consensus that the ECCC is a national institution: for example, Acquaviva, 
G., ‘New Paths in International Criminal Justice? The Internal Rules of the Cambodian 
Extraordinary Chambers’ (2008) 6 JICJ 129, 130, and sources cited. 
50 Cohen, D., ‘“Hybrid” Justice in East Timor, Sierra Leone and Cambodia: “Lessons Learned” 
and Prospects for the Future’ (2007) 43 Stan JIL 1, 28, quoting an interview with Michelle Lee. 
51 Article 2 of the Special Law provides that the ECCC ‘shall be established’ by the law. 
52 Article 12, ECCC Agreement, provides that international procedural rules may be referred to 
only where Cambodian law does not deal with a particular matter, there is uncertainty 
regarding the interpretation or application of a relevant rule, or a rule may not comply with 
international standards. 
53 There is no provision equivalent to Article 11 of the SCSL Agreement. 
54 For the contrary view see Cohen, note 50, 27. 
55 Article 1, ECCC Agreement. 
56 Williams, S., ‘The Cambodian Extraordinary Chambers – A Dangerous Precedent for 
International Justice? (2004) 53 ICLQ 227. 
57 Orentlicher, D., ‘International Criminal Law and the Cambodian Killing Fields’ (1997) 3 
ILSA JICL 705, 710. Boyle, D. ‘Establishing the Responsibility of the Khmer Rouge 
Leadership for International Crimes’ (2002) YbIHL 167, 181, states that a draft Chapter VII 
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However, the ECCC Agreement is important, and represents a significant 
improvement on the arrangements initially proposed.58  The United Nations was 
concerned with ensuring that the ECCC would satisfy international human rights and 
fair trials standards, and with safeguarding the institution from external influences to 
the greatest extent possible.59  These concerns are reflected in the ECCC Agreement. 
The Cambodian government must consult the United Nations prior to any amendment 
to the Special Law,60 which will provide an opportunity for input into any 
amendments required due to inconsistency with the Special Law. However, the 
Cambodian government is not obliged to incorporate changes requested by the United 
Nations. Article 2(2) of the ECCC Agreement confirms that it is an international 
treaty, which is to be interpreted in accordance with the Vienna Convention on the 
Law of Treaties. As such, Cambodia must perform its obligations under the ECCC 
Agreement in good faith, and cannot rely on domestic legal provisions to avoid its 
obligations.  As Boyle notes: [T]he 2003 Agreement thus provides a legal guarantee 
that the Extraordinary Chambers will function and exercise their powers as envisaged 
in the Agreement, as well as providing an indisputable basis for determining breaches 
by Cambodia’.61   
 
In practical terms, though, it is difficult to see what pressure the United Nations could 
exert if Cambodia does not fulfil its obligations under the ECCC Agreement. Linton 
has commented that Cambodia has not fulfilled its obligations under other 
international instruments, in particular the human rights instruments to which it is a 
party, thus the prospects for compliance with the ECCC Agreement may be low.62  
Article 28 of the ECCC Agreement provides that where the Cambodian government 
amends the structure or organisation of the ECCC, or causes them to function in a 
manner that does not accord with the ECCC Agreement, the United Nations may cease 
to provide assistance.  Thus the withdrawal of funding and other assistance is the only 
sanction for non-performance by Cambodia. Article 28 reflects the weakness of the 
United Nations position in the negotiations for the ECCC and that this is primarily a 
                                                                                                                                 
resolution supporting the establishment of an international tribunal was circulated to the 
Security Council by the United States delegation in May 1998. 
58 See the terms of the draft Memorandum of Understanding, drafted in July 2000 and 
discussed in Boyle, ibid. 
59 Linton, S., ‘Safeguarding the Independence and Impartiality of the Cambodian Extraordinary 
Chambers’ (2006) 4 JICJ 327. 
60 Article 2(3), ECCC Agreement. 
61 Boyle, note 57, 113. 
62 Linton, note 59, 340. 
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Cambodian process.  As Bertodano notes: ‘The negotiations had been conducted in an 
atmosphere of suspicion and mistrust…Article 28 reflects a queasy lack of confidence 
with which the Agreement is viewed by the UN.’63 Any dispute as to the interpretation 
or application of the ECCC Agreement is to be resolved by negotiation, or another 
agreed mode of settlement.64  It is also possible that, as the assistance of the United 
Nations is offered under the authority of the General Assembly, any dispute that could 
not be resolved by negotiation would be referred to that body, resulting in a political 
rather than legal determination of the situation.65  The opposition of several influential 
states may prevent the General Assembly from taking the drastic action of 
withdrawing support, even though such action may be justified.  The absence of strict 
legal criteria for the withdrawal of assistance, the lack of a monitoring or reporting 
mechanism, and the potential exposure of the decision to withdraw to political factors 
weakens the effectiveness of the enforcement mechanism.66 
2.1.4 War Crimes Chamber for Bosnia and Herzegovina 
The establishment of the WCC was closely linked to the completion strategy of the 
ICTY. In the absence of appropriate impartial national mechanisms, the Security 
Council supported the ‘expeditious establishment’ and ‘early functioning’ of the 
WCC.67  However, the Security Council did not take any action to establish the WCC 
beyond encouraging donations from interested states. Instead, the WCC was 
established within the structure of an existing national court, the federal-level State 
Court, by the Office of the High Representative (OHR).68  The powers of the OHR 
derive from the Dayton Peace Agreement (DPA),69 which provided for the 
appointment of the OHR to carry out the implementation of the civil administration 
aspects of the peace agreement. 70  It also provided that the OHR shall have the final 
authority ‘regarding interpretation of this Agreement on the civilian implementation of 
the peace settlement’.71 The OHR has interpreted this power as authorising the 
promulgation of laws for the civil administration of the territory, including the 
                                                 
63 Bertodano, S., ‘Problems Arising from the Mixed Composition and Structure of the 
Cambodian Extraordinary Chambers’ (2006) 4 JICJ 285, 289. 
64 Article 29, ECCC Agreement. 
65 Linton, note 59, 340; Williams, note 56, 233. 
66 Williams, note 56, 233. 
67 Resolution 1503 (2003), preambular para 11. 
68 Decision imposing the Law on the State Court of BiH, 12 November 2000.   
69 The General Framework Agreement for Peace in Bosnia and Herzegovina, 14 December 
1995. 
70 Article I of Annex 10, DPA. 
71 Article V, DPA. 
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judiciary.  Although the Security Council has supported the operations of the OHR72 
and has monitored implementation of the DPA, the institution of the OHR was not 
established by the United Nations, but by the DPA itself. Thus, unlike UNMIK and 
UNTAET, the OHR is not a subsidiary organ of the United Nations. 
 
What then is the legal basis of the WCC? The OHR had previously established the 
State Court of Bosnia and Herzegovina by a decision,73 which was subsequently 
confirmed by federal and entity level legislation.74  The creation of the State Court was 
considered to flow from the powers of the OHR in respect of the judiciary. However, 
the same legal basis was not used to establish the WCC. Instead, this was achieved by 
an amendment to the existing law on the State Court, using national procedures and 
approved by the parliaments of both entities and the federal parliament.75 Despite the 
support of the Security Council for the creation of the WCC and its connection to the 
ICTY completion strategy, it is clear that the Security Council did not establish the 
WCC by resolution under Chapter VII or otherwise. Whilst the Security Council 
receives information on the WCC in the reports submitted by the ICTY as part of the 
completion strategy, that information is focused on the number of referrals from the 
ICTY.  Moreover, the Security Council takes no role in enforcing compliance with the 
orders of the WCC, which is left to normal domestic mechanisms and international 
and regional agreements. Thus it is clear that the WCC operates as a national judicial 
institution, with international assistance for the transitional period of five years.   
2.1.5 Iraqi High Tribunal 
The legal status of the IHT is connected to the status and powers of the Coalition 
Provisional Authority (CPA), as the occupying power, and the powers of the Iraqi 
Governing Council. As Roberts writes ‘[T]here is no dispute about the fact that 
between April 2003 and 28 June 2004 there was a foreign military occupation in 
Iraq’.76  The Security Council recognised the legal status of the occupation in 
                                                 
72 For example, Resolution 1035 (1995), authorizing the involvement of the United Nations in 
the implementation of the DPA, and Resolution 1088 (1996), reaffirming support for the DPA 
and calling upon all parties to comply with their obligations. 
73 Decision Imposing the Law on the State Court of Bosnia and Herzegovina, 12 November 
2000. 
74 Law on the Court of Bosnia and Herzegovina, Official Gazette BiH 29/00.  In 2002 the 
jurisdiction of the State Court was expanded to include panels for Organized Crime, Economic 
Crime and Corruption: Law on Amendments to the Law on the State Court of Bosnia and 
Herzegovina, Official Gazette BiH 24/02. 
75 Law on Amendments to the Law on the State Court of Bosnia and Herzegovina, Official 
Gazette BiH 9/04. 
76 Roberts, A., ‘The End of Occupation: Iraq 2004’ (2005) 54 ICLQ 27, 30.  The existence of 
an occupation is a question of fact.  Article 42 of the Hague Regulations provides that ‘territory 
is considered occupied when it is actually placed under the authority of the hostile army’.  The 
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Resolution 1483.77  It is permissible for an occupying power to enact legislative 
measures ‘in order to restore, and ensure, as far as possible, public order and safety’.78  
The assumption is that ‘occupying powers should respect the existing laws and 
economic arrangements within the occupied territory, and should generally make as 
few changes as possible’.79  However, in relation to Iraq, Resolution 1483 and 
subsequent resolutions advanced wider aims for the occupation, including the 
restoration of institutions for representative governance and a process leading to an 
internationally recognised representative government of Iraq.80  The CPA ‘embarked 
upon a programme of action involving an extensive transformation in the way Iraq is 
governed’.81  It has been suggested that several of the legislative reforms introduced 
by the CPA exceeded its authority under international law, in particular the reform of 
the Iraqi economy.82 
 
                                                                                                                                 
more widely accepted view is that the ongoing violence between coalition forces and 
insurgents did not affect the status of the occupation:  Roberts, 33-34; Bantekas, I., ‘The Iraqi 
Special Tribunal for Crimes Against Humanity’ (2004) 54 ICLQ 237, 238. 
77 The preamble noted the ‘specific authorities, responsibilities, and obligations under 
applicable international law of these states as occupying powers’.  As discussed in Chapter 
Two, the CPA also recognised its status as an occupying power in promulgating CPA 
Regulation 1. 
78 Article 43, Hague Regulations.  In so doing, the occupying power ‘must respect, unless 
absolutely prevented, the laws in force in the country’.  See also article 64 of the fourth Geneva 
Convention.  For a discussion of these provisions in the context of Iraq, see Sassoli, M., 
‘Legislation and Maintenance of Public Order and Civil Life by Occupying Powers’ (2005) 16 
EJIL 661. 
79 Roberts, note 76, 36.  Contrast the view of Schwenk, who argued that ‘[E]ven though the 
legislative power of the military occupant is theoretically limited, practically it includes 
jurisdiction over the entire civilian life of the enemy population if the occupation extends over 
a considerable period of time’:  Schwenk, E., ‘Legislative Power of the Military Occupant 
Under Article 43, Hague Regulations’ (1945) 54 YLJ 393, 415.   
80 Resolution 1483 (2003), para. 8. 
81 Kaikobad, K., ‘Problems of Belligerent Occupation:  The Scope of Powers Exercised by the 
Coalition Provisional Authority in Iraq, April/May 2003-June 2004’ (2005) 54 ICLQ 253, 254.  
The breadth of the aims of the CPA have led various commentators to suggest that the law of 
occupation should not apply to Iraq, arguing that it is ill-suited to the tasks undertaken in Iraq:  
Scheffer, D., ‘Beyond Occupation Law’ (2003) 98 AJIL 842; and arguing for a United Nations 
governance, as in Kosovo and East Timor:  Ottonlenghi, M., ‘The Stars and Stripes in Al-
Fardos Square:  The Implications for the International Law of Belligerent Occupation’ (2004) 
72 Fordham Law Review 2177, 2214. For the contrary view, see Benvenisiti, E., ‘The Security 
Council and the Law on Occupation:  Resolution 1483 on Iraq in Historical Perspective’ (2003) 
23 Israeli Defence Forces Law Review 1, 17. 
82 See Murphy, M., ‘A “World Occupation” of the Iraqi Economy? How Order 39 will create a 
semi-sovereign state’ (2004) Connecticut Journal of International Law 445; Bali, A., ‘Justice 
Under Occupation:  Rule of Law and the Ethics of Nation-Building in Iraq’ (2005) 30 YJIL 
347; McCarthy, C., ‘The Paradox of the International Law of Military Occupation:  
Sovereignty and the Reformation of Iraq’ (2005) 10 JCSL 43; Fox, G., ‘The Occupation of 
Iraq’ (2005) 36 Geo JIL 195. 
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In terms of the establishment of the IHT, the IHT Statute was annexed to an order of 
the CPA delegating authority to the Iraqi Governing Council. 83   This delegation of 
authority was subject to certain terms and conditions,84 and the CPA Administrator 
reserved the right to amend the IHT Statute – or any elements of crime or rules of 
procedure developed for the IHT – where required in the interest of security.85  
Therefore, while the IHT was established notionally by the Iraqi Governing Council, 
the authority to do so flowed from the CPA.   This suggests that the Iraqi Governing 
Council did not establish the IHT as the representative body of a sovereign state, but 
as a body operating as a ‘puppet’ of the occupying powers.86 In this sense, the IHT is a 
body established by the CPA, on behalf of the occupying powers while the 
sovereignty of Iraq was suspended during the period of occupation.87  
 
The power of an occupying power to establish criminal tribunals is limited by the 
fourth Geneva Convention,88 which presumes that the legal system of the occupied 
territory should continue.89 Existing penal laws are to remain in force, other than 
where they constitute a threat to security or an obstacle to the operation of the 
convention. The occupying power may introduce penal provisions only where 
essential to fulfil its obligations under the convention, to maintain orderly government 
and to ensure its own security.90 Similar to a state party to the Geneva Conventions, an 
occupying power is obliged to detain and to prosecute persons alleged to have 
committed grave breaches.  This would include the obligation to enact the necessary 
                                                 
83 Commentators have suggested that the CPA attempted to bypass the laws of occupation 
through establishing the Iraqi Governing Council: see Bantekas, note 76. Similarly Paust has 
argued that ‘the UN Security Council and the occupying powers cannot lawfully dictate that an 
unelected occupying-power-appointed body, however prestigious, actually represents the 
authority and sovereignty of the Iraqi people’: Paust, J., ‘The United States as Occupying 
Power over Portions of Iraq and Special Responsibilities Under the Laws of War’ (2004) 27 
Suffolk Transnational Law Review 1, 19. 
84 Chapter Two. 
85 Section 1(6), CPA Order 48. 
86 As Zolo states: ‘No one imagines that the Governing Council, which has neither legislative 
authority nor independent financial resources at its disposal, is actually the power that willed 
this special Tribunal into existence, and can maintain and finance it’:  Zolo, D., ‘The Iraqi 
Special Tribunal:  Back to the Nuremberg Paradigm?’ (2004) 2 JICJ 313, 315. See also Scharf, 
M., ‘Is it International Enough? A Critique of the Iraqi Special Tribunal in Light of the Goals 
of International Justice’ (2002) 2 JICJ 330, 331. 
87 Sovereignty is not exercised by the occupying power during the period of occupation.  
Instead, there is is recognition that the legitimate authority is ‘temporarily displaced’ or 
suspended:  Ottonlenghi, note 81, 2184; Bothe, M., ‘Occupation, Belligerent’ in 4 
Encyclopedia of Public International Law 64, 65. 
88 Geneva Convention Relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of War, 12 
August 1949, 75 UNTS (1950) 287-417 (GCIV). 
89 Article 64, GCIV 
90 Article 64(2), GCIV. 
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legislation, should it not exist under the laws of the occupied territory. 91 Where it has 
done so, the occupying power may utilise its own military courts to enforce its penal 
provisions,92 provided those courts comply with specified procedural safeguards.93  
Alternatively, the occupying power may allow enforcement before existing national 
tribunals.94  The IHT adopts neither of these options.  Instead, it is a new tribunal, 
established under domestic law, an option that is neither provided for in the fourth 
Geneva Convention nor required in order to respect international humanitarian law.95   
Moreover, the temporal jurisdiction of the IHT predates the armed conflict, and 
permits the IHT to try offences committed by the previous regime from 17 July 
1968.96  The material jurisdiction of the IHT is also more extensive than is required by 
international humanitarian law, as it includes jurisdiction in respect of genocide and 
crimes against humanity, as well as a number of crimes under domestic law.97  It is 
therefore questionable whether the establishment of the IHT as a ‘special tribunal’ was 
within the scope of international humanitarian law. 98  However, any doubts as to the 
legality of the IHT were removed following the transfer of authority from the CPA to 
the Iraqi Interim Government in June 2004.  The IHT has subsequently been endorsed 
by the Iraqi authorities and was confirmed in the 2005 Constitution.99 
 
Assuming, for present purposes, that the IHT was lawfully established by the 
occupying powers, this would suggest that its legal basis lies in domestic law, as the 
occupying power acts in place of the sovereign authorities in the occupied territory 
during the period of occupation.  In establishing the IHT, the occupying powers were 
functioning as a domestic actor and accordingly the IHT is a domestic institution, with 
its authority based in national, and not international, law.  It should therefore have the 
                                                 
91 This flows from the reference to enact legislation considered essential to ensure for respect 
for GCIV, see article 64. Article 146 imposes an obligation to detain and to prosecute persons 
suspected of committing grave breaches of the conventions. See the United Kingdom Manual 
on the Law of Armed Conflict, para. 11.26, note 54.  Moreover, each state that is acting as an 
occupying power has this obligation under both treaty and customary international law:  Paust, 
note 83, 15. 
92 Article 66, GCIV. 
93 Article 67, GCIV. 
94 Commentators generally agree as to the availability of these two options.  For example, 
Sassoli, note 78, 675.  Several commentators also mention a third option, requesting the 
Security Council to establish an international criminal tribunal: Tarin, D., ‘Prosecuting Saddam 
and Bungling Transitional Justice in Iraq’ (2005) 45 VJIL 467, 473. 
95 Sassoli, note 78, 675. 
96 Article 1, IHT Statute. 
97 See Chapter Four. 
98 For example, Doebbler, C., ‘An Intentionally Unfair Trial’ (2007) 5 JICJ 264 – ‘the creation 
of the IST by an occupying power violated international humanitarian law’, 268; Bantekas, 
note 76. 
99 See Chapter Two. 
 107 
same status as a national court.  This conclusion is even clearer for the period 
following the transfer of power from the CPA to local Iraqi authorities on 28 June 
2004.  From the date of transition, the IHT was evidently a national institution, albeit 
operating with international assistance. 
2.1.6 Special Tribunal for Lebanon 
As originally envisioned, the legal basis of the LST was to be the LST Agreement, to 
which the LST Statute would have been attached. This would have meant that the LST 
was established with the same legal basis as the SCSL: that is, an international treaty. 
The LST Agreement would have been the source of all legal obligations and the LST 
Statute the constituent instrument of the LST. As such, the LST Agreement would 
only have been binding on Lebanon, not third states such as Syria. Moreover, there 
would be no obligation arising under the LST Agreement for states other than 
Lebanon to cooperate with the LST.100 However, the LST Agreement provided that it 
shall enter into force the day after the Government of Lebanon notified the United 
Nations that the legal requirements for entry into force have been complied with.101 
This included ratification of the agreement by the Lebanese parliament.102 Ratification 
was never secured, and the LST was unilaterally established by Resolution 1757. 
What then is the effect of Resolution 1757 on the legal basis of the LST?  
 
There are two options.  According to the first option, the Security Council brought into 
force the LST Agreement by virtue of a resolution binding under Chapter VII of the 
Charter.   In this circumstance, the LST Agreement, together with the LST Statute, 
would remain the constituent instrument of the LST, which is, consequently, a treaty-
based institution, similar to the SCSL and the ICC.  Alternatively, the second option is 
that Resolution 1757 incorporated the LST Agreement and the LST Statute and thus it 
is the resolution itself that provided the legal basis for the LST.  As such, the LST 
would be closer to the ICTY and the ICTR than the SCSL.  On either view, what is 
clear is that Lebanese domestic law does not form the legal basis for the LST. 
Therefore the LST may be distinguished from the ECCC, the IHT, the IJJP, the SPSC 
and the WCC, which are all based in national legislation. 
 
Both options depend upon the Security Council’s use of its binding Chapter VII 
powers, as they require a coercive action by the Security Council, namely, the 
                                                 
100 Lebanon is subject to a specific obligation to cooperate with the LST: article 15, LST 
Agreement. 
101 Article 19, LST Agreement. 
102 Article 52, Lebanese Constitution. 
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imposition of arrangements for the LST in the absence of the consent of Lebanon.  
The Security Council has determined that terrorist acts,103 and this terrorist act in 
particular,104 are threats to international peace and security, thus satisfying the 
threshold for the use of its Chapter VII powers.  The Security Council had previously 
issued directions to states under Chapter VII in respect of the United Nations 
International Independent Investigation Commission.105  Establishment of an 
international criminal tribunal has been accepted as a valid measure for the 
maintenance or restoration of international peace and security under article 41 of the 
Charter.106  Thus, at least on a preliminary examination, it appears that the Security 
Council was entitled to take action under Chapter VII with regards to the situation in 
Lebanon following the assassination of former Prime Minister Hariri. 
 
The first option poses several interesting questions.  Resolution 1757 purports to bring 
unilaterally into force a treaty negotiated between a member state and the United 
Nations, and then to amend key provisions of that treaty without the formal consent of 
one of the parties, Lebanon.107 The Security Council has thus in effect overridden the 
requirement for the ratification of the LST Agreement by Lebanon or has substituted 
its own approval for the consent of Lebanon. As Fassbender notes ‘the Council could 
be said to have substituted a binding decision made under Chapter VII of the UN 
Charter for the missing ratification of the [LST] Agreement by Lebanon’.108  The first 
question to be asked then is, is Resolution 1757 consistent with the powers of the 
Security Council, even when the Security Council is acting under Chapter VII of the 
                                                 
103 See, for example, Resolution 1373 (2001); Resolution 1566 (2004); Resolution 1805 (2008) 
preambular para. 1; and, in the context of Lebanon, Resolution 1636 (2005) – ‘terrorism in all 
its forms and manifestations constitutes one of the most serious threats to international peace 
and security’, preambular para. 3. 
104 Resolution 1757 (2007), preambular para. 13; Resolution 1644 (2005) preambular para. 9; 
and Resolution 1636 (2005), preambular para. 19. 
105 In particular, Resolution 1636 (2005) requires Syria to ‘detain those Syrian officials or 
individuals whom the Commission considers as suspected of involvement in the planning, 
sponsoring or perpetrating of this terrorist act’ and imposes the same obligations to cooperate 
with the UNIIIC as are placed upon the Government of Lebanon pursuant to Resolution 1595:  
para. 11. 
106 Tadic jurisdiction decision, note 25. 
107 Resolution 1757 amends two provisions of the LST Agreement.  First, paragraph 1(b) of 
Resolution 1757 amends article 8 of the LST Agreement, which provides for the negotiation 
and agreement of a headquarters agreement between the Government of Lebanon, the United 
Nations and the government of the state to host the LST.  This was amended to allow for the 
headquarters agreement to be concluded between the United Nations and the host state only, 
although negotiations are to be in consultation with the Government.  Second, paragraph 1(c) 
of Resolution 1757 amends the funding mechanism in article 5(b) of the LST Agreement, such 
that the Secretary-General may accept voluntary contributions to address any shortfall in the 
funds to be provided by the Government of Lebanon. 
108 Fassbender, B., “Reflections on the International Legality of the Special Tribunal for 
Lebanon’ (2007) 5 JICJ 1091, 1096. 
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Charter? Imposing and amending treaty obligations is not one of the measures 
available to the Council as listed in article 41 of the Charter. However, this is a non-
exhaustive list. Security Council resolutions concerning the ICC have been suggested 
as a possible precedent for the Security Council overriding the terms of a negotiated 
treaty.109 Yet, in this case, the possibility of such a Security Council resolution is 
contemplated by the Rome Statute itself.110 The resolutions in question arguably fell 
within the scope of Article 16 of the Rome Statute and did not result in a suspension 
of the treaty regime.111 The Security Council has on several occasions invited states to 
become parties to multilateral agreements,112 to return to treaty arrangements,113 or to 
reaffirm its obligations under treaties to which they are already a party.114  It has also 
acted to exclude the application of certain treaty obligations.115  Moreover, the 
Security Council has incorporated the substance of treaty provisions into its own 
binding resolutions.116  In Resolution 1718, perhaps the most extreme instance of the 
imposition of obligations to date, the Security Council decided that the Democratic 
People’s Republic of Korea ‘shall act strictly in accordance with the obligations 
applicable to parties under the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons 
and the terms and conditions of its International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) 
                                                 
109 Ibid, 1100, footnote 35, referring to Resolutions 1422 (2002) and 1487 (2003). 
110 Article 16, Rome Statute. 
111 There was some debate as to whether the resolutions, which requested the ICC not to 
investigate or prosecute any alleged violations by nationals of non-party states to the Rome 
Statute participating in peacekeeping operations, were of a type that was contemplated by 
article 16.  For further discussion, see Chapter One. 
112 In Resolution 687 (1991), the Security Council invited Iraq to ratify the Convention on the 
Prohibition of the Development, Production and Stockpiling of Bacteriological (Biological) 
and Toxin Weapons and their Destruction: para. 7.   
113 In Resolution 1718 (2006), the Security Council demanded that the Democratic People’s 
Republic of Korea retract its withdrawal from the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear 
Weapons (para. 3) and return to the treaty and the safeguards agreement (para. 4). 
114 In Resolution 687 (1991), the Security Council invited Iraq to ‘reaffirm unconditionally its 
obligations’ under the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons and the Protocol 
for the Prohibition of the Use in War of Asphyxiating, Poisonous or Other Gases, and of 
Bacteriological Methods of Warfare: paras 11 and 7. 
115 In Resolution 1483 (2003), the Security Council arguably excluded certain aspects of 
international humanitarian law that would otherwise have been applicable to the situation in 
Iraq. See: Cryer, R., “The Security Council and International Humanitarian Law” in Breau, S. 
and Jachec-Neale, A., (ed.), Testing the Boundaries of International Humanitarian Law (2006) 
245, 268-73. 
116 This recent practice of the Security Council has been described as ‘international legislation’, 
in that it imposes obligations of a ‘general and abstract character’ and is not directed at a single 
state, individual or organisation: see Talmon, S., ‘The Security Council as World Legislature’, 
(2005) 99 AJIL 175, 175-7. The most notable example of Security Council legislation is 
Resolution 1373 (2001), in which the Security Council incorporated several of the substantive 
obligations contained in the International Convention for the Suppression of the Financing of 
Terrorism, which at the time was not in force. For further discussion see: Szasz, P., ‘The 
Security Council Starts Legislating’ (2002) 96 AJIL 901; and Rosand, E., ‘Security Council 
Resolution 1373, the Counter-Terrorism Committee, and the Fight Against Terrorism’ (2003) 
97 AJIL 333. 
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Safeguards Agreement’.117  However, on no occasion has the Security Council 
indicated that these obligations apply as a matter of treaty law; that is that the state has 
become a party to the treaty itself by virtue of a Security Council resolution.  It is 
certainly not generally accepted that the Security Council could impose a treaty 
regime on a state.118 Talmon suggests that while the Security Council may impose 
certain obligations found in a treaty on states, ‘it cannot, as a rule, impose whole 
treaties, since they contain not just substantive obligations, but also purely technical or 
administrative provisions whose imposition will not be necessary to address a threat to 
international peace and security’.119 It would thus be an unprecedented step for the 
Council to have acted using its powers under Chapter VII to create the LST as a 
treaty-based body. 
 
Second, does Resolution 1757 violate provisions of the Vienna Convention on the 
Law of Treaties?120 It has been suggested that the Security Council may have acted in 
violation of specific provisions of the law of treaties through ‘coercing’ the 
participation of Lebanon.121  The Security Council must act in conformity with 
international law, even in pursuance of its objectives of maintaining international 
peace and security.122 Articles 51 and 52 of the VCLT provide that a treaty is void 
where the consent to be bound or conclusion of the treaty has been procured by 
coercion. However, article 51 relates to coercion of the representative of a state, not 
coercion of the state itself. Similarly, although article 52 does apply to coercion of the 
State itself, it refers only to coercion by the use or the threat of the use of force. Thus 
neither article applies to the situation found in Resolution 1757.  Yet, while the 
                                                 
117 Resolution 1718 (2006), para. 6 
118 For a contrary view, see Szsaz, note 116, 903 (suggesting that, in principle, Resolution 1373 
could have made the Convention binding by making participation in the convention obligatory 
or by providing that all provisions, rather than the final clauses were binding on all states); and 
Lopez, L., ‘Uncivil Wars: The Challenge of Applying International Humanitarian Law to 
Internal Armed Conflicts’ (1994) 69 NYULR 916, 954-7 (suggesting that the Security Council 
could make the provisions of the Geneva Conventions and their Protocols applicable to 
specified conflicts or states, including through modifying the provisions in the Conventions 
concerning applicability). 
119 Talmon, note 116, 186. 
120 Technically, the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties between States and 
International Organisations 1986 would apply, see footnote 27.  
121 See the discussion in Fassbender, note 108, 1101-04. 
122 The Security Council must act in accordance with the provisions of its constituent 
instrument, the Charter.  In particular, under article 24(2) of the Charter, the Security Council 
must act in accordance with the Purposes and Principles of the Charter, which declare that one 
of the aims of the United Nations is to resolve international disputes by peaceful means and ‘in 
conformity with the principles of justice and international law’.  For judicial recognition of this 
limit, see Questions of Interpretation and Application of the 1971 Montreal Convention Arising 
from the Aerial Incident at Lockerbie (Libyan Arab Jamahiriya v United States) (Provisional 
Measures) ICJ Reps (1992) 234, the dissenting opinions of Judge Weeramantry (65) and of 
Judge Bedjaoui (46). 
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Security Council may not have violated specific provisions of the law on treaties, it is 
questionable whether the Security Council can, or should, interfere with such a 
fundamental principle of international law as the requirement for consent to be bound 
by treaty obligations.123  Article 103 of the Charter confers on the Charter - and any 
binding Security Council resolutions derived from it - priority over the provisions of 
other agreements. However, this is usually considered to suspend treaty obligations 
and to ‘replace’ them by Chapter VII obligations, rather than amending the terms of 
the treaty itself or to create new treaty-based obligations.124  While this act of 
‘coercion’ by the Security Council may be damaging to both the integrity of the law of 
treaties and to the Security Council’s credibility, only the Russian Federation appears 
to have questioned directly the legal basis for unilaterally imposing a treaty.125 
 
Third, does Resolution 1757 represent an unauthorised intrusion into the domestic 
legal and political affairs of a member state in contravention of article 2(7) of the 
Charter? The resolution intervenes in an internal political disagreement and overrides 
provisions of the Lebanese constitution and domestic legal procedure. Several 
members of the Security Council raised this concern during the debate concerning the 
resolution.126 For example, China stated that invoking Chapter VII to override internal 
legislative organs will ‘create a precedent of Security Council interference in the 
domestic affairs and legislative independence of a sovereign state. Such actions are 
likely to undermine the authority of the Council’.127 Even Security Council members 
supporting the resolution appeared to appreciate the gravity of the Council’s action, 
stressing that the action was only taken due to the impasse within Lebanon and with 
the consent of the Prime Minister and a majority of the Lebanese parliament.128 
                                                 
123 Fassbender, note 108.  See also Shehadi, N. and Wilmshurst, E., The Special Tribunal for 
Lebanon: The UN on Trial? (2007), 9. 
124 Fassbender, note 108, 1100 – ‘The Council can break treaties but it cannot make treaties’. 
125 The representative of the Russian Federation commented that: ‘The arrangement chosen by 
the sponsors [of the resolution] is dubious from the point of view of international law.  The 
treaty between the two entities – Lebanon and the United Nations – by definition cannot enter 
into force on the basis of a decision by only one party.’: S/PV.5685. 
126 Indonesia noted that the resolution bypassed constitutional procedures and national 
processes, and that the Security Council should not be involved in an exercise of interpreting, 
let alone assuming control of a state’s constitutional requirements. South Africa indicated its 
opinion that the Security Council cannot bypass a state’s constitutional procedures. China 
considered that domestic constitutional procedures should be followed. Russia viewed 
Resolution 1757 as ‘an encroachment upon the sovereignty of Lebanon’:  S/PV.5685. 
127 S/PV.5865, 4. 
128 The United Kingdom noted that the resolution was a response to a request from the 
Lebanese Government. Slovakia and the United States emphasised that all other means had 
been exhausted.  Peru commented that the resolution took into account the position of the 
majority of the Lebanese parliament, reflected ‘exceptional political circumstances’ and must 
not constitute a precedent beyond this case:  S/PV.5865. 
 112 
However, while Resolution 1757 may be damaging politically, and is arguably 
inconsistent with the Security Council’s own demands for respect for the territorial 
sovereignty and independence of Lebanon,129 article 2(7) does not limit the 
enforcement powers of the Security Council under Chapter VII of the Charter. Thus, 
once the Security Council has indicated that a situation constitutes a threat to 
international peace and security and that it is utilising its powers under Chapter VII of 
the Charter, the resulting action cannot, at least legally speaking, be considered an 
undue interference in domestic affairs.130  
 
The second option for the legal basis of the LST is that Resolution 1757, rather than 
the LST Agreement, provides the legal basis of the LST.  Resolution 1757 refers to the 
‘annexed document, including its attachment’, rather than naming the LST 
Agreement. According to this option, the Security Council has incorporated the 
obligations set out in the LST Agreement into the binding provisions of the resolution, 
and thus those obligations apply not by virtue of the LST Agreement and the law of 
treaties, but as directions from the Security Council.  In this sense the LST is a tribunal 
established by the Security Council acting under Chapter VII of the Charter.  While it 
is now accepted that the Security Council has the power to establish an international 
tribunal under its powers for international peace and security, to date it has established 
‘purely’ international tribunals and only in relation to a small category of crimes, 
namely genocide, crimes against humanity and war crimes.  Can the Security Council 
establish hybrid tribunals utilising its powers pursuant to Chapter VII of the Charter? 
It would appear that, provided utilising an internationalized or hybrid tribunal is a 
measure for the maintenance or restoration of international peace and security, the 
Security Council may take such action.  In addition, the LST may exercise jurisdiction 
only in relation to specified acts of terrorism under domestic Lebanese law.  At least 
one permanent member of the Security Council has suggested that international 
tribunals cannot be established for the crime of terrorism, particularly where that 
crime is prosecuted under national law only.131 However, as long as the Security 
                                                 
129 This demand has been included in several Security Council resolutions concerning 
Lebanon, for example, Resolution 1595 (2005), preambular para. 1. 
130 Shehadi and Wilmshurst suggest that resolutions in relation to the Lockerbie trial and the 
conflict in Cote d’Iviore are also instances of the Council overriding constitutional or 
legislative arrangements:  note 112.  However, as is noted, in the Lockerbie case, the resolution 
was passed with the consent and cooperation of the United Kingdom and the United States.  
Moreover, the resolutions concerning Cote d’Iviore were passed as part of an ongoing peace 
process. 
131 The representative of the Russian Federation stated ‘United Nations practice in establishing 
tribunals shows that Chapter VII has been invoked only for the International Criminal Tribunal 
for the Former Yugoslavia and for the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda, which deal 
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Council has recognised terrorism as a threat to international peace and security, there 
does not appear to be any legal impediment that would preclude the Security Council 
from establishing a tribunal to prosecute individuals accused of terrorism.132  Of 
course, as a practical matter, unilaterally establishing a hybrid or internationalized 
tribunal, which rely to a far greater extent on national involvement and support, may 
prove to be a futile exercise.133   
 
It is difficult to determine which option the Security Council intended. The relevant 
paragraph of Resolution 1757 provides that ‘The provisions of the annexed document, 
including its attachment, on the establishment of a Special Tribunal for Lebanon shall 
enter into force on 10 June 2007, unless…’  In support of option one, while Resolution 
1757 does not refer to the LST Agreement by name, the language used replicates that 
of the law of treaties, using terms such as ‘enters into force’, referring to article 19 of 
the LST Agreement and leaving the text of the LST Agreement intact, rather than 
incorporating key provisions into the text. Moreover, it is difficult to detect an 
intention to ‘establish’ the LST by Resolution 1757. When the Security Council 
established the ICTY and the ICTR, it included clear wording to that effect – ‘decides 
hereby to establish an international tribunal’ – in resolutions 827 and 855. This 
language is missing from Resolution 1757. In fact the debate surrounding the adoption 
of the resolution suggests that it was not the intention of the Security Council to 
establish the LST as a Chapter VII body. For example, the United Kingdom stated that 
while Resolution 1757 was intended to be binding, the use of Chapter VII powers 
‘carries no other connotations’.134 Was the United Kingdom suggesting that the 
resolution was not intended to establish the tribunal?  Several other states referred to 
the application of principles of the law of treaties, which would be inapplicable if the 
LST was established by the Security Council using its Chapter VII powers.  States 
also emphasized the consent to the treaty by some parts of the Lebanese political 
structure and society. Moreover, Resolution 1757 does not contain the language on 
state co-operation found in the resolutions establishing the ICTY and the ICTR, and 
there are key differences between the LST and those tribunals.135 These factors 
                                                                                                                                 
with crimes of genocide, crimes against humanity and war crimes – that is international crimes.  
The jurisdiction of the Special Tribunal for Lebanon would not cover such crimes’:  
S/PV.5865, 5. 
132 This is assuming that issues such as an agreed definition of the offence can be resolved. For 
further discussion see Chapter Four. 
133 The representative of South Africa made this point, noting that Lebanese ownership was 
essential to the success of the LST:  S/PV.5865, 4. 
134 S/PV.5865. 
135 The implications of these differences will be considered in Chapter Five. 
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suggest that option one was the alternative intended by the Council.  Yet, while states 
did consider the implications of the resolution for the domestic sovereignty of 
Lebanon, none mentioned the serious concerns that this option raises for the law of 
treaties. In support of alternative two, as noted above, some of the wording of 
Resolution 1757 could support the incorporation of the LST Agreement into the 
provisions of Resolution 1757. The resolution and the debate surrounding its adoption 
are ambiguous. Given the difficult legal questions the resolution presents, this 
ambiguity may well be deliberate. It is submitted here that option two should be 
preferred, as it avoids the possible implications for the law of treaties and the principle 
of consent to be bound by treaty-based obligations.  
 
What is clear is that without Resolution 1757 and the binding powers of the Security 
Council, the LST would not exist. Thus it must be said the LST cannot be considered a 
‘true’ treaty-based institution.  Instead, its legal basis must lie in Resolution 1757.  
Either the Council has bound Lebanon as a party to the LST Agreement without its 
consent or it has bound Lebanon to the terms of the agreement by incorporating those 
terms into the text of a resolution binding upon Lebanon. Both actions require the 
Council to be acting pursuant to its powers under Chapter VII of the Charter. 
Therefore, under either option, the LST should be considered a ‘Chapter VII tribunal’, 
and also a subsidiary organ of the Security Council.136  The main implication of this 
approach is to distinguish the LST from the treaty-based tribunals, currently the SCSL 
and the ICC and to place it into the same category as the ICTY and the ICTR. 
However, it is submitted that, provided this distinction is recognized, whether option 
one or option two is preferred makes little difference to resolving the legal issues the 
LST will face. For example, as is discussed in Chapter Five, issues such as immunity 
and state cooperation will be determined by reference to the text of resolution 1757 
and the LST Agreement (however adopted), with due consideration of the significance 
of the role of the Council in establishing the tribunal. 
2.1.7 Conclusion:  Three ‘types’ of hybrid and internationalized 
tribunals 
This section has assessed the legal basis of the tribunals studied so as to determine 
whether a framework for categorising such tribunals exists. Using the criterion of legal 
basis, three sub-species of tribunals may be identified. The first category comprises 
                                                 
136 Sarooshi suggests that the test that has emerged ‘to determine whether an entity is a 
subsidiary organ is that it will depend on whether the entity is exercising powers and functions 
in a manner which is distinct from the internal workings of the principal organ.  An additional 
element is whether the subsidiary organ is performing functions which the principal organ does 
not itself possess’:  Sarooshi, note 41, 417. 
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national courts, with varying degrees and forms of international involvement in their 
establishment and operation. Such assistance may be provided under the auspices of 
the United Nations, or by an international organisation, associations of states, or an 
individual state. This category would include the SPSC, the IJPP, the WCC, the ECCC 
and the IHT. These courts should be considered as primarily national institutions. The 
second category comprises such courts as are established by a treaty, usually, but not 
necessarily, between the United Nations and the government of the territorial state. 
Such courts tend to operate outside the ‘ordinary’ domestic system and outside the 
United Nations system. The only current example of this model is the SCSL. Courts 
falling within this category are international in nature, although their establishment by 
treaty is important when determining whether immunity applies to state officials of 
third states and other key questions, such as the applicability of an amnesty. The third 
category includes internationalized tribunals established by the Security Council using 
its coercive powers under Chapter VII of the Charter.  These tribunals are closer in 
nature to the ICTY and the ICTR, although there may be key differences in their 
constituent instruments and mandate.  As discussed above, the LST is the first and so 
far the only example of this type of tribunal.  
 
3 The nature of jurisdiction conferred on hybrid and 
internationalized tribunals 
3.1.1 Introduction 
The first section of this Chapter has assessed the legal basis of each of the tribunals 
studied.  In this second section, this chapter will examine a related issue: the basis of 
the jurisdiction conferred on these tribunals.  The legal basis and the type of 
jurisdiction conferred on a tribunal should determine the approach the tribunal should 
adopt to determining the application of any legal barriers to the exercise of 
jurisdiction, such as immunity and amnesties, and will also govern the regime for the 
enforcement of the tribunal’s orders.137  There are several accepted bases for a state’s 
jurisdiction to prescribe in international law.138  This section considers which basis or 
bases of jurisdiction provide(s) the source of the jurisdiction conferred on the 
internationalized and hybrid tribunals, and the means by which such jurisdiction is 
conferred.   The study considers four possible sources of such jurisdiction:  the 
principle of territorial jurisdiction conferred on a court acting as a national institution 
of the territorial state; the delegation of jurisdiction from a state – normally the 
                                                 
137 These issues are considered in Chapter Five. 
138 Chapter One, section 2.1. 
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territorial state – to an international tribunal; jurisdiction conferred on the tribunal by 
the international community as the crimes within its subject matter jurisdiction are 
considered to give rise to universal jurisdiction; and jurisdiction conferred on a 
international tribunal by the Security Council acting under Chapter VII of the Charter.    
However, it concludes that the third option, so called ‘floating’ universal jurisdiction 
is presently not supported as a principle of international law.  Thus, given the current 
state of development of international law, jurisdiction for an international or 
internationalized tribunal must be found either in accepted bases for the exercise of 
jurisdiction by a state, or in an exercise of authority by the Security Council.  
3.1.2 Territorial jurisdiction 
A state may exercise jurisdiction in respect of criminal conduct drawing upon a 
number of accepted bases of jurisdiction, of which jurisdiction based on the territorial 
and nationality principles are the most widely accepted.  Domestic law may then 
provide that ordinary national courts shall try any resulting cases.  Alternatively the 
state may also establish specialised courts in relation to particular categories of 
conduct, such as crimes related to a recent conflict, drug-related offences, terrorist 
offences, or organised crime.  States may also draw on international law in defining 
the crimes and in designing the procedure to be followed.  While principles of 
sovereignty, in particular that of non-intervention, would normally render unlawful the 
imposition of international assistance, whether from one or more states or from an 
international organisation, nothing in international law precludes a state from 
requesting and receiving such assistance.  The provision of international assistance to 
an otherwise national institution does not affect the nature of the tribunal or the source 
of the jurisdiction that has been conferred; it remains based in the jurisdiction of the 
host state.  In most situations this will be the territorial state, although it may also 
incorporate jurisdiction resting on other bases.  The previous section concluded that 
five of the tribunals studied operate as national institutions:  the IHT, IJPP, SPSC, 
WCC, and ECCC.  These tribunals therefore represent the exercise of jurisdiction 
based on the territorial principle by the state concerned and, in limited circumstances, 
extraterritorial jurisdiction.139  Jurisdiction based on the territorial principle is not 
controversial and will not be considered further.  More complex issues are raised by 
the type of jurisdiction that has been conferred on tribunals of a more international 
nature, in particular the SCSL and the LST, which will be the subject of discussion in 
the following sections. 
                                                 
139 As discussed in Chapter Four. 
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3.1.3 Delegation of jurisdiction from the (normally) territorial state 
As noted in section 2.1, the SCSL is not a national court.  Nor is it an international 
court established by the Security Council.  Instead, it is an international tribunal, 
established by an agreement between the United Nations and Sierra Leone, supported 
by domestic implementing legislation.  This thesis argues that the SCSL Agreement 
represents a delegation140 of territorial jurisdiction from Sierra Leone to the SCSL.  
Sierra Leone as the territorial state had jurisdiction to criminalize the crimes that are 
within the material jurisdiction of the SCSL where they occur on its territory.  To the 
extent that such acts were not already crimes under domestic law, the SCSL 
Agreement, combined with the Ratification Act, can thus be viewed as an exercise of 
Sierra Leone’s prescriptive jurisdiction in that it criminalizes this conduct in 
substantive criminal law.  Sierra Leone’s courts would ordinarily have had jurisdiction 
to try breaches of the substantive criminal law.  However, Sierra Leone has opted to 
delegate its jurisdiction to prescribe to the SCSL in limited circumstances; in 
particular where the offender is a ‘high-level’ instigator of the offences or the crimes 
are of a serious nature.141  The delegation of jurisdiction is not absolute, as the national 
courts of Sierra Leone retain concurrent, but subsidiary, jurisdiction.142   
 
Before examining the issues raised by this transfer of jurisdiction approach, it is also 
necessary to consider possible alternative bases for the jurisdiction conferred on the 
SCSL. One such alternative is that Resolution 1315 delegated the powers of the 
Council to the Secretary General, and that the jurisdictional of the SCSL lies in the 
powers of the Security Council and the Charter. However, as was concluded above, 
the Security Council did not establish the SCSL by Resolution 1315. Moreover, the 
Appeals Chamber has also found, it is submitted correctly, that the Secretary General 
had not exercised powers delegated to him by the Security Council: ‘[A]s an executive 
organ the Secretary-General has to fulfil the orders of the Security Council and does 
not therefore need a delegation of power to become active as his mandate consists in 
executing the orders given by the power-bearer, in this case the Security Council’.143  
 
                                                 
140 The term used in this section is ‘delegation’ based on the typology developed by Sarooshi, 
which notes that a delegation of power is one that generally satisfies three criteria:  the State 
does not have the competence to exert direct control over the way in which the power is 
exercised by the international organization; the delegation of power is revocable by the State 
(although not necessarily lawfully); and the State retains the right to exercise the powers 
concurrently with, and independent of, the organisations exercise of the powers.  See Sarooshi, 
International Organizations and Their Exercise of Sovereign Powers (2007), 54. 
141 Chapter Four. 
142 Article 8, SCSL Statute, and the discussion in Chapter Five. 
143 Fofana, note 9, para. 16. 
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There are several reasons to support the conclusion reached in this thesis that the most 
appropriate jurisdictional basis for the SCSL is a transfer of jurisdiction from Sierra 
Leone, and not from the Security Council.  First, the wording of Resolution 1315 
suggests that the SCSL is to be established on a consensual basis, that is, with the 
consent of Sierra Leone. The relevant paragraph addressed to the Secretary General is 
not an order to establish a tribunal, but a request to enter into negotiations for an 
agreement to establish the tribunal. It clearly contemplates that it is the agreement and 
not any action of the Council, or even of the Secretary General acting on its behalf that 
is to establish the SCSL.  This is supported by various paragraphs in the preamble, 
which note the request from Sierra Leone for assistance from the United Nations. 
Second, there is nothing to indicate any delegation of power to the Secretary General, 
which is consistent with the conclusion reached by the Appeals Chamber that there 
was no need for such a delegation. Third, although Resolution 1315 reiterates that the 
situation in Sierra Leone continues to constitute a threat to international peace and 
security, it does not refer to Chapter VII of the Charter in its operative part. While this 
is not necessarily conclusive as to the legal basis for the resolution, it generally does 
indicate that the resolution is not relying on the Council’s powers under Chapter VII 
of the Charter. This distinguishes Resolution 1315 from those resolutions where the 
Council has acted to establish an international or internationalized criminal tribunal 
based on its powers under Chapter VII of the Charter. These situations are discussed 
in more detail below. Therefore, the better view is that Resolution 1315 did not 
delegate the powers of the Security Council to the Secretary General and that, while 
the United Nations is a party to the SCSL Agreement, the jurisdictional basis of the 
SCSL does not depend on the competence of the Council or the Secretary General 
under the Charter. 
 
The delegation of jurisdiction from Sierra Leone to the SCSL raises several questions, 
in particular whether international law permits a state to delegate its jurisdiction to 
another state or to an international tribunal.  The following section considers these 
issues, and examines the ICC as a valuable precedent for the delegation of jurisdiction 
from a state to an international criminal court.  It then considers whether there are any 
fundamental differences between the ICC and the SCSL that would render the 
delegation of jurisdiction from Sierra Leone to the SCSL unlawful. 
3.1.3.1 Lawfulness of a delegation of jurisdiction 
The first question is whether a state may lawfully delegate jurisdiction to another state.  
For example, could State X request State Y to hold trials in respect of alleged criminal 
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conduct occurring within State X?  It would appear to be accepted that State X could 
do so and that State Y would be entitled to act upon this request.  Precedents for such 
a delegation include treaties that permit the delegation of criminal proceedings from 
one state to another.144  Such instruments provide ‘jurisdiction to prosecute any 
offence to which the law of another Contracting State is applicable’.145  Another 
precedent is the Council Framework on Combating Terrorism, pursuant to which a 
member state of the European Union may exercise jurisdiction in relation to a terrorist 
act committed on the territory of any member state.146  Akande argues that the anti-
terrorism treaties are a further example of the delegation of jurisdiction, in this case ‘a 
delegation of jurisdiction by the states of primary jurisdiction to the state of 
custody’.147  While the ability to delegate jurisdiction from one state to another does 
not appear to be controversial, what has stimulated debate is whether such a delegation 
must be conditional on the consent of the state of nationality of the accused.  The 
better view is that it need not.  A state exercising jurisdiction on the basis of 
territoriality (or any other basis) does not require the consent of the state of 
nationality. Neither do any of the instruments suggested as examples require such 
consent. To date, there has been no protest by the state of nationality regarding the 
delegation of jurisdiction to another state or at the exercise of jurisdiction by states of 
custody under the anti-terrorism treaties.   
 
If it is accepted that a state may delegate jurisdiction to another state, is it also 
accepted that a state – or states – may delegate jurisdiction to an international criminal 
tribunal? The most pertinent precedent, and the instance in which this question has 
been most clearly debated, is the establishment of the ICC.  The ICC may exercise its 
jurisdiction only where the crime occurred on the territory of a state party, or where 
                                                 
144 Council of Europe, European Convention on the Transfer of Criminal Proceedings in 
Criminal Matters; UN Model Treaty on the Transfer of Proceedings in Criminal Matters 
(adopted by Resolution 45/118 of 14 December 1990); and the Agreement between the 
Member States on the Transfer of Proceedings in Criminal Matters, concluded under the 
European Political Cooperation arrangements on 6 November 1990. 
145 Explanatory Report to the European Convention on the Transfer of Criminal Proceedings in 
Criminal Matters, 14. 
146 Article (1)(a), Council Framework Decision of 13 June 2002 on combating terrorism 
(2002/475/JHA). 
147 Akande, D., ‘The Jurisdiction of the ICC over Nationals of Non-Parties:  Legal Basis and 
Limits’ (2003) 1 JICJ 618, 623.  Akande’s interpretation is the most appropriate, however see 
also the exchange between Professors Scharf and Morris as to whether the anti-terrorism 
treaties represent universal jurisdiction:   Scharf, M., ‘The ICC’s Jurisdiction over the 
Nationals of Non-Party States:  A Critique of the US Position’ (2001) 64 L&CP 67; and 
Morris, M., ‘High Crimes and Misconceptions:  The ICC and Non-Party States’ (2001) 64 
L&CP 13. 
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the accused is a national of a state party.148  Controversy arose surrounding the 
territorial basis of the ICC’s jurisdiction which, it was suggested, permitted the ICC to 
exercise jurisdiction in respect of nationals of non-state parties where the alleged 
crime had occurred on the territory of a state party.149  This possible jurisdiction in 
respect of nationals of states not party to the Rome Statute was, and remains, one of 
the main hurdles to the ratification by the United States of the Rome Statute.150 In 
seeking to resolve the issue, it has been suggested that the Rome Statute represents a 
delegation by each state party of territorial jurisdiction to the ICC.151  However, the 
legality of the delegation of territorial jurisdiction to an international criminal tribunal 
is contested by the United States and certain academics.  While critics accept that 
there is some support for the notion that a state may delegate its territorial jurisdiction 
to another state,152 they argue that a delegation of territorial jurisdiction by a state to an 
international tribunal would be impermissible under customary international law,153 as 
such a delegation would ‘fundamentally alter the consequences of that jurisdiction’.154   
 
Critics raised several concerns regarding the possible delegation of jurisdiction to the 
ICC.  The first relates to the dual nature of the ICC’s jurisdiction: not only does it 
exercise criminal jurisdiction in relation to individuals, it will also, incidental to its 
jurisdiction in respect of individuals, be required to adjudicate on issues relating to 
state responsibility for alleged crimes falling within its subject matter jurisdiction.155  
                                                 
148 Article 12(2), Rome Statute, see Chapter One, section 3.3.  This limitation does not apply 
where the Security Council refers a situation to the Prosecutor acting under Chapter VII of the 
Charter:  Articles 12(2) and 13, Rome Statute. 
149 Several commentators have debated this issue, for example, see:  Akande, Scharf and 
Morris, all at note 147. 
150 The concerns of the United States have been outlined on several occasions.  In particular, 
see Scheffer, D., ‘The International Criminal Court:  The Challenge of Jurisdiction’ (1999) 
ASIL Proceedings 68; Bolton, J., ‘The Risks and Weaknesses of the International Criminal 
Court from America’s Perspective’ (2001) 41 Vanderbilt Journal of Transnational Law 186; 
Leigh, M., ‘The United States and the Statute of Rome’ (2001) 95 AJIL 124; and Brown, B., 
‘US Objections to the Statute of the International Criminal Court:  A Response’ (1999) 31 
NYJILP 855. 
151 It has also been suggested that state parties have transferred nationality jurisdiction to the 
ICC.  As similar issues arise as with the transfer of territorial jurisdiction, this is not discussed 
separately here. 
152 Both Professor Morris and Ambassador Scheffer accept this proposition, despite rejecting 
territorial jurisdiction as the basis for the ICC:  Morris, note 147, 44; Scheffer, note 150, 71.  
They argue that consent of the state of nationality is required. 
153 Morris, note 147, 51. 
154 Morris, note 147, 29. 
155 This incidental jurisdiction arises due to the nature of the crimes within its subject matter 
jurisdiction:  many of the crimes, such as genocide and crimes against humanity, have a state or 
official element and a determination of individual guilt or innocence will necessarily reflect 
upon the State(s) concerned.  Further, when the ICC eventually acquires jurisdiction in respect 
of the crime of aggression, it is argued that it will be required to directly pronounce upon the 
lawfulness of state action. 
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Second, it is argued that to permit the ICC to exercise its jurisdiction without the 
consent of the state of nationality is contrary to the VCLT in that it will ‘abrogate the 
pre-existing rights of non-parties’.156  Third, prosecution before an international court 
is said to restrict the availability of compromise options in interstate disputes, as a 
finding that implies state responsibility will restrain diplomatic options.  Fourth, 
international prosecution will increase the political impact of the decision for the 
state(s) concerned, as well as potentially providing impediments to the diplomatic 
protection of nationals.  Fifth, an international court has greater influence in shaping 
the development of customary international law, as the decisions of international 
tribunals generally have wider exposure and significance than those of national courts.  
Finally, the delegation of jurisdiction to an international criminal tribunal breaks ‘the 
crucial linkage between territorial jurisdiction and the legitimate prosecutorial 
interests of the territorial state’157 and exposes the trial to the risk of abuse.  Moreover, 
Professor Morris considered that there was no precedent for such delegation of 
jurisdiction, which together with the cumulative effect of these concerns, led her to 
conclude that ‘delegability to an international court is not entailed in the existing 
customary law of territorial jurisdiction’.158  Nor was the delegation of territorial 
jurisdiction to an international tribunal permissible as an innovation in customary 
international law, as it would ‘materially alter the legal relationships constituting the 
customary law of jurisdiction, and would do so to the detriment of non-party states 
without their consent’.159 
 
Some of these concerns certainly have merit:  the nature and consequences of 
prosecution before international courts does differ from prosecution before national 
courts.  However, do these concerns warrant the outright rejection of the capacity of 
states to delegate territorial jurisdiction to international courts in all circumstances?  
States do not require the consent of the state of nationality in order to exercise 
territorial jurisdiction, and, as Professor Scharf asserts, ‘there are no special features of 
territorial jurisdiction that would as a matter of policy preclude the delegation of 
territorial jurisdiction to an international court’.160  Akande concludes that ‘there are 
important reasons of principle and sufficient precedents to suggest that delegations of 
national jurisdiction to international courts, in general, and to the ICC, in particular, 
                                                 
156 Morris, note 147, 26. 
157 Morris, note 147, 45. 
158 Morris, note 147, 47. 
159 Morris, note 147, 51-52. 
160 Scharf, note 147, 113. 
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are lawful’.161  Danilenko points to the provisions in the Genocide Convention and the 
Apartheid Convention which call for an international penal tribunal to be created as 
evidence that the state parties to those conventions ‘agreed that they have a sovereign 
right to combine their jurisdictions and to cede this combined jurisdiction to a future 
criminal court’.162  Professor Orentlicher also notes that certain hybrid tribunals, 
including the SCSL, ‘rely principally on territorial jurisdiction’, suggesting that a 
delegation of territorial jurisdiction is the main jurisdictional basis for such 
tribunals.163  It is therefore submitted that academic opinion and state practice support 
the lawfulness of the delegation of territorial jurisdiction from state parties to the ICC.   
3.1.3.2 Do the differences between the ICC and the SCSL preclude a delegation of 
jurisdiction to the SCSL? 
The next issue is whether the differences between the SCSL and the ICC would 
preclude a similar delegation of jurisdiction from Sierra Leone to the SCSL.  The 
SCSL Prosecutor has asserted that ‘[T]he creation of the Special Court is analogous to 
the creation of the International Criminal Court’.164  However, although both the SCSL 
and the ICC are established by treaty, there are many differences between the two 
tribunals.  An obvious point of distinction is the bilateral nature of the SCSL 
Agreement as compared to the multilateral basis of the Rome Statute.  The main 
consequence of the bilateral basis of the SCSL is that it will have limited influence 
over third states, as it creates legal obligations in respect of Sierra Leone only.165  The 
SCSL Statute is also unlikely to generate a ‘norm-creating’ effect as the Rome Statute 
will do, as a result of the wide ratification of the Rome Statute and its implementation 
into national law.  The influence of the judicial decisions of the SCSL will be more 
limited than decisions of the ICC, as the SCSL has neither a wide consensual basis nor 
a general mandate for the creation of customary international law.166  The SCSL 
Agreement is between the United Nations and a single state, and is not an agreement 
                                                 
161 Akande, note 147, 625. 
162 Danilenko, G., ‘The Statute of the International Criminal Court and Third States’ (2000) 21 
Mich JIL 445, 465.  Danilenko also cites the Nuremberg Tribunal as ‘the most important 
precedent supporting the legitimacy of the principle of “ceded jurisdiction”’, 464-5, as does 
Professor Scharf, note 147, 103-106.  The author distinguishes the Nuremberg Tribunal as a 
precedent on the same basis as Professor Morris, Ambassador Scheffer and Mr Akande:  the 
four powers establishing the Nuremberg Tribunal exercised sovereign power at the time:  see 
Morris, note 147, 37-40; Scheffer, note 150, 71; and Akande, note 147, 627-8. 
163 Orentlicher, D., ‘Striking a Balance:  Mixed Law Tribunals and Conflicts of Jurisdiction’, in 
Lattimer and Sands (eds), Justice for Crimes Against Humanity (2003), 213 – 235, at note 1. 
164 Kallon, note 20, para 9(d). 
165 States other than Sierra Leone may choose whether or not to co-operate with orders of the 
Special Court.  See this chapter, footnote 6, and the discussion in Chapter Five.   
166 This is not to suggest that the SCSL does not have some role to play in the formation of 
international criminal law, just that the acceptance of decisions of the SCSL as a source of law 
may not be as wide as the acceptance of the jurisprudence of the ICTY and the ICC. 
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between several states as with the Rome Statute.167  Arguably, this distinction has no 
legal effect other than to preclude any reciprocity arising from the delegation of 
jurisdiction.  There cannot be an identical delegation of jurisdiction as to that 
contained in the Rome Statute, as the United Nations does not have the same territorial 
jurisdiction as a state.   
 
A second distinction between the ICC and the SCSL is the concurrent jurisdiction 
with, and primacy in respect of, the national courts of Sierra Leone.168  This distinction 
has been relied upon by at least one defendant to challenge the legality of the SCSL’s 
establishment.169  In contrast, the jurisdiction of the ICC is subject to the principle of 
complementarity, requiring the ICC to defer to national prosecutions unless the state 
concerned fails to act or is unwilling or unable genuinely to carry out the investigation 
or prosecution.170  However, this is best viewed as a difference in the terms of the 
delegation of jurisdiction:  it was certainly possible legally, if not politically, that the 
state parties to the Rome Statute could have agreed to the ICC having primacy in 
respect of national courts.171   
 
The mixed applicable law of the SCSL is a third distinction between the SCSL and the 
ICC.  The Rome Statute does not confer jurisdiction to prosecute persons under 
national laws, whereas the SCSL has competence to prosecute persons under domestic 
law.172  However, there appears to be no rule precluding this position, and it should be 
available to international courts to apply domestic laws of an affected state.  In fact, 
international courts are frequently called upon to apply national legislation in various 
areas, for example nationality.  The main concern is ensuring that equally favourable 
legal and procedural standards apply to the accused as a consequence of prosecuting 
                                                 
167 The relationship between the United Nations and the ICC is governed by a separate 
agreement, the Negotiated Relationship Agreement between the International Criminal Court 
and the United Nations, 4 October 2004, ICC-ASP/3/Res.1. 
168 Article 8(1) provides that ‘The Special Court and the national courts of Sierra Leone shall 
have concurrent jurisdiction’, while Article 8(2) provides that ‘The Special Court shall have 
primacy over the national courts of Sierra Leone’. 
169 This issue was raised by the defendant Norman in the Kallon, note 20, paras 63 to 71.  Both 
the Trial Chamber and the Appeals Chamber of the ICTY in the Tadic Jurisdiction decision 
rejected a challenge to the jurisdiction of the ICTY based on the primacy in relation to national 
courts enjoyed by the ICTY by virtue of article 9 of the ICTY Statute.  The Appeals Chamber 
held that the primacy accorded did not violate the sovereignty of the states concerned (which 
had in fact co-operated with and consented to the exercise of jurisdiction by the ICTY).  Nor 
was there a right under international law to be tried exclusively by national courts:  see Tadic 
Jurisdiction Decision, note 25, 25-34. 
170 Article 17, Rome Statute. 
171 See Sadat, L. and Carden, R., ‘The New International Criminal Court:  An Uneasy 
Revolution’ (2000) 88 Georgetown Law Journal 381, 408-9. 
172 See Chapter Four, section 3.3. 
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the act as an international or domestic crime.  Thus the mixed nature of the applicable 
law and material jurisdiction of the SCSL does not preclude the delegation of 
jurisdiction.  Indeed, it is submitted that the hybrid nature of the applicable law of the 
SCSL supports the delegation of jurisdiction approach, as there is a more direct link 
between the SCSL and the state delegating jurisdiction.173     
 
The differences between the SCSL and the ICC actually reduce, although do not 
eliminate, the concerns raised by Professor Morris.  The SCSL retains a link with the 
territorial state, as it is established partly by the government of the state concerned, 
and sits within the territory of Sierra Leone.  Thus it has proximity to the affected 
population and the evidence.  As the result of a treaty between the United Nations and 
a single state, it has a more restricted basis, and is less likely to generate or shape 
customary international law.  However, the bilateral basis of the SCSL Agreement 
may increase the potential for abuse,174 a risk that will be minimal provided that the 
SCSL continues to remain immune from pressure by Sierra Leone as to how the 
delegated jurisdiction is to be exercised.175  In any event, the exercise of jurisdiction 
by the SCSL is less open to abuse and political pressures than a trial of a foreign 
national by a domestic court due to the involvement of international personnel.176  
However, the delegation of territorial jurisdiction approach risks ignoring the hybrid 
nature of the SCSL.  The Secretary-General considered the SCSL to be a sui generis 
institution,177 a blend of the national and international and a partnership between 
Sierra Leone and the United Nations.  The delegation of jurisdiction approach reduces 
the role of the United Nations in ratifying the SCSL Agreement to little more than 
providing funding and co-operation, although the SCSL Agreement clearly extends 
                                                 
173 This does not mean that an international criminal court’s jurisdiction in respect of crimes 
under domestic law is dependent upon adopting the transfer of jurisdiction approach, rather that 
in these circumstances, the mixed law supports the transfer of jurisdiction approach. 
174 Morris, note 147, 45.  Professor Morris suggests that a transfer of territorial jurisdiction by 
one state to another could result in abuse, as states may use the prosecution for political 
reasons.  However the potential for abuse may be reduced where ‘the jurisdiction is transferred 
not to an individual state but, rather, to an international court.  Where that international court is 
controlled by a large number of states, the various states parties may provide checks and 
balances against abuse being perpetrated in the interests of one state or a small group of states’. 
175 The Government of Sierra Leone participates in the Management Committee established by 
article 7 of the SCSL Agreement, and receives a report from the President of the SCSL on an 
annual basis (Article 25, Statute).  It also has obligations under the Agreement to cooperate 
with the SCSL:  article 17, SCSL Agreement.  Other than this involvement, the SCSL is 
intended to operate independently of the Government:  Secretary-General’s Report, note 1, 
para 9. 
176 See Table One. 
177 Secretary-General’s Report, note 1, para 9. 
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beyond the provision of assistance.  Moreover, the SCSL is established by the United 
Nations and Sierra Leone acting jointly.178   
 
Although it is suggested here that the better view is that the SCSL exercises delegated 
territorial jurisdiction, the SCSL has itself explicitly rejected such a delegation of 
jurisdiction as its jurisdictional basis.  In a challenge to the validity of the SCSL, the 
defence asserted that an international criminal court has jurisdiction only when the 
state delegating power to it has the sovereign power to prosecute.  By granting an 
amnesty to combatants in the Lome Accord, Sierra Leone had restricted its personal 
jurisdiction to prosecute the defendants, and thus could not transfer jurisdiction in 
respect of affected individuals to the SCSL.  The Appeals Chamber held that:179 
[t]he establishment of the Special Court did not involve a transfer 
of jurisdiction or sovereignty by Sierra Leone.  The Special Court 
is a completely new organisation established by an international 
treaty…It does not operate on the basis of transferred jurisdiction 
but is a new jurisdiction operating in the sphere of international 
law.   
 
Consequently, the jurisdiction of the Court was not dependent upon the personal 
jurisdiction of Sierra Leone for the crimes within the Statute, and the amnesty 
provision did not preclude prosecution by the Court.180  This categorical rejection of 
the transfer of territorial jurisdiction as a basis for jurisdiction is regrettable.  The 
decision was driven by the need to avoid the application of the amnesty in question. 
The Appeals Chamber did not consider the academic views of the jurisdictional basis 
of the ICC outlined above, and its judgment on this issue is somewhat cursory, a 
response to the immediate assertions raised by the defence rather than a considered 
analysis of the merits of transfer of jurisdiction as a possible basis of jurisdiction.  In 
focussing on the issue of the amnesty, the Appeals Chamber was examining the terms 
of the transfer of jurisdiction and whether Sierra Leone’s ability to transfer jurisdiction 
was limited by the amnesty it had previously granted under national law. It did not 
give proper consideration as to whether the concept of transfer of jurisdiction was an 
appropriate way of characterising the jurisdictional basis of the SCSL. As will be 
                                                 
178 Article 1, SCSL Statute. 
179 Gbao, note 11, para 6. 
180 This decision was subsequently confirmed in another preliminary motion in which the 
defence asserted, again based on the amnesty provision, that there had been an unlawful 
delegation of power from Sierra Leone to the Special Court:  See Fofana, note 9. 
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discussed in Chapter Five, it was not necessary to dismiss the delegation of 
jurisdiction argument to avoid the application of the amnesty provision.      
3.1.3.3 Specific concerns regarding possible delegation of universal jurisdiction 
One area of confusion that arose in the context of the debate of the jurisdictional basis 
of the ICC was whether the ICC would be exercising universal jurisdiction.  While 
this suggestion was clearly misguided, universal jurisdiction having been explicitly 
rejected as a basis for jurisdiction in the Rome Statute,181 it did lead to discussion as to 
whether states could delegate universal jurisdiction to another state or to an 
international criminal tribunal.  Professor Scharf has suggested the delegation of 
universal jurisdiction from states as one possible basis of the jurisdiction of the ICC.182  
Whilst recognising that delegates to the Rome Conference rejected a broad notion of 
universal jurisdiction for the ICC, Professor Scharf notes that:183 
where the territorial state gives its consent (as expressed by 
ratifying or acceding to the Rome Treaty or by special consent on 
a case-by-case basis), in addition to the principle of territoriality, 
the ICC has a legitimate interest on the basis of the universal 
jurisdiction of the crimes to prosecute the nationals of non-party 
states. In this limited context, the jurisdiction of the ICC can be 
deemed to be based concurrently on the universal and territorial 
bases of jurisdiction. 
 
Professors Sadat and Carden also consider the ICC to exercise a new form of universal 
jurisdiction.  They describe the ICC as operating upon the universality principle where 
the Council has referred the complaint, noting that, where the Prosecutor or a state 
refers the complaint ‘although the universality principle does not disappear, layered 
upon it is a State consent regime based on two additional principles (which are 
                                                 
181 The German delegation at the Rome Conference introduced a proposal to grant wide 
universal jurisdiction to the ICC, that is jurisdiction over any offence committed anywhere, 
irrespective of whether the suspect was present in the territory of a state party to the Rome 
Statute.  This proposal was rejected, in the face of harsh criticism, in particular from the United 
States:  Wilmshurst, E., ‘Jurisdiction of the Court’ in Lee (ed) The International Criminal 
Court:  Issues, Negotiations, Results (1999, Kluwer), 127; and Kaul, H. and Kress, C., 
‘Jurisdiction and Cooperation in the Statute of the International Criminal Court: Principles and 
Compromises’ (1999) 2 YbIHL 143. 
182 Scharf, note 147, 76.  This also appears to have been the view of Ambassador Scheffer, the 
head of the United States delegation to the Rome Conference, see:  Scheffer “US Policy and 
the International Criminal Court”, (1999) 32 CILJ 529 at 532 (asserting “the universal 
jurisdiction created by the Rome Conference would mean something new, at least for US 
troops stationed abroad”) and Scheffer, “The United States and the International Criminal 
Court” (1999) 93 AJIL 12, at 20 (‘the dangerous drift of Article 12 toward universal 
jurisdiction over nonparty states’). 
183 Scharf, note 147, 76. 
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disjunctive) of jurisdiction:  the territoriality principle and the nationality principle’.184  
This argument relies upon the precedent of the IMT, which it is suggested asserted 
universal jurisdiction based on the notion that where crimes give rise to universal 
jurisdiction, states may create international tribunals ‘to do together what any one of 
them could have done separately’.185  Professor Scharf also argues that the ICTY and 
ICTR ‘represent a collective exercise of universal jurisdiction of states’ based on the 
underlying authority of the Charter.  As the ICTY purported to bind a Serbian national 
at a time when the FRY was not considered a member state of the United Nations, 
Professor Scharf argues that the tribunals must exercise universal jurisdiction in order 
to bind nationals of non-party states.186 
 
This issue does not arise in relation to the SCSL, as all crimes within its jurisdiction 
must have been committed within the territory of Sierra Leone, thus it is clear that 
territorial jurisdiction only has been delegated.  However, it may arise in respect of 
future tribunals. There are a number of difficulties concerning this possible basis of 
jurisdiction.  The value of the IMT as a precedent for an international criminal tribunal 
exercising universal jurisdiction is doubtful, given that the tribunal was most likely 
operating in the capacity of the territorial state, not on the basis of universal 
jurisdiction.  Further, the ICTY and the ICTR do not operate on the basis of universal 
jurisdiction:  their universality flows from the extensive powers of the Security 
Council acting under Chapter VII of the Charter to restore international peace and 
security and from the obligation of members to comply with decisions of the Security 
Council under Chapter VII, not from universal jurisdiction.187  To equate the powers 
of a court established by the Security Council under Chapter VII with universal 
jurisdiction is to conflate two distinct concepts: the enforcement jurisdiction of the 
Security Council (as an institution that can compel all member states to comply with 
its decisions) with the prescriptive universal jurisdiction of states.  Moreover, 
                                                 
184 Sadat & Carden, note 171, 412-413. See also Paust, J., ‘The Reach of ICC Jurisdiction over 
Non-Signatory Nationals’ (2000) 33 Vanderbilt Journal of Transnational Law 1, 7 (arguing 
that ‘the ICC will be able to exercise a form of limited universal jurisdiction’ and ‘it would be 
improper to assume that Article 12 obviates any universal jurisdictional competence that 
signatory states have under customary international law and can delegate to a newly created 
institution’). 
185 Trial of the Major War Criminals Before the International Military Tribunal, 461, 466.  For 
a discussion of Nuremberg and universal jurisdiction, see:  King, H., ‘Universal Jurisdiction:  
Myths, Realities, Prospects, War Crimes and Crimes Against Humanity:  The Nuremberg 
Precedent’ (2001) 35 NELR 281. 
186 Scharf, note 147.  For a critique of this analysis see Akande, note 147. 
187 Morris, note 147, 35-6.  It is also arguable that as a growing number of states ratify or 
accede to the Rome Statute, the ICC may have close to universal application:  Olasolo, H., 
‘Reflections on the International Criminal Court’s Jurisdictional Reach’ (2005) 16 Crim LF 
279.  However, this is different to exercising universal jurisdiction. 
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Professor Morris has commented that ‘the delegation of states’ universal jurisdiction 
to an international court would fundamentally alter the consequences of that 
jurisdiction.  The exercise of delegated universal jurisdiction by an international court 
would have very different implications, involving a different set of state interests, than 
would the exercise of universal jurisdiction by a state’.188    
 
Perhaps the greatest objection to the delegation of universal jurisdiction from states is 
the absence of any custom supporting such a delegation.  States rejected such a 
proposal when drafting the Rome Statute.  The principle of prescriptive universal 
jurisdiction for states is relatively embryonic, a principle that is still emerging and 
remains relatively undefined.  There is disagreement as to which international crimes 
give rise to universal jurisdiction, and uncertainty as to the circumstances in which 
universal jurisdiction may be exercised, including whether there is a requirement to 
defer to the territorial state or whether custody is a precursor to the exercise of 
universal jurisdiction.189  Arguably, while customary international law has accepted 
universal jurisdiction existing in some form for states, it has not developed to the point 
that states may delegate universal jurisdiction to international criminal tribunals.190  
Moreover, even if such a principle did exist, it is suggested that states may only 
delegate jurisdiction in relation to crimes giving rise to universal jurisdiction.  This 
was not problematic regarding the ICC, as the majority of crimes within the ICC’s 
jurisdiction are, for the most part, crimes giving rise to universal jurisdiction.191 
However, it may have been an issue for tribunals such as the LST (assuming for 
present purposes that it relied on a delegation of universal jurisdiction) as it has 
jurisdiction only in respect of a domestic law offence and it is not clear that terrorist 
acts give rise to universal jurisdiction under customary international law.   
                                                 
188 Morris, note 147, 29. 
189 Chapter One, section 2.3. 
190 For the contrary view, see Akande, arguing that the rationale behind the exercise of 
universal jurisdiction by states is that the prosecuting state ‘is in effect acting on behalf of the 
international community as a whole’.  This is because customary international confers 
universal jurisdiction only in respect of those crimes judged to be detrimental to the values of 
the international community as a whole.  As Akande concludes ‘it would be extraordinary and 
incoherent if the rule permitting prosecution of crimes against the collective interest by 
individual states – acting as agents of the community – simultaneously prevented those states 
from acting collectively in the prosecution of these crimes’: Akande, note 147, 626. Bekou and 
Cryer also consider that states would be entitled to transfer universal jurisdiction:  Bekou, O. 
and Cryer, R., ‘The International Criminal Court and Universal Jurisdiction:  A Close 
Encounter?’ (2007) 56 ICLQ 49, 50-51.   
191 Ambassador Scheffer has argued that ‘not all of the crimes within the subject-matter 
jurisdiction of the Court are in fact exposed to universal jurisdiction under customary 
international law’.  He uses as an example, the provisions in article 8 of the Rome Statute that 
are based on the Hague Regulations or from the laws and customs of war:  Scheffer, note 150, 
70. 
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3.1.4 Universal jurisdiction arising from the nature of the crimes 
In the Lome Amnesty Decision, the Appeals Chamber considered whether the crimes 
arising under the SCSL Statute gave rise to universal jurisdiction, as the amnesty 
would not be ‘universally effective’ in relation to ‘grave international crimes for 
which there exists universal jurisdiction’.192  It concluded that ‘The crimes mentioned 
in Articles 2-4 of the Statute are international crimes and crimes against 
humanity…One consequence of the nature of grave international crimes against 
humanity is that States can, under international law, exercise universal jurisdiction 
over such crimes’.193  This statement is not of itself controversial, although it may not 
be accurate in relation to all of the international crimes within the material jurisdiction 
of the SCSL.  However, the Appeals Chamber then extrapolated from the universal 
jurisdiction possessed by states a similar power for international criminal tribunals 
such as the SCSL where the crimes within the substantive jurisdiction of the court give 
rise to universal jurisdiction.  Based upon this extension, the Appeals Chamber 
concluded that the amnesty provision is ‘ineffective in removing the universal 
jurisdiction to prosecute persons accused of such crimes that other states have by 
reason of the nature of such crimes.  It is also ineffective in depriving an international 
court such as the Court of jurisdiction’.194  In another decision considering the amnesty 
provision the Appeals Chamber stated that ‘Article IX of the Lome Agreement cannot 
constitute a legal bar to the exercise of jurisdiction over international crimes by an 
international court asserting universal jurisdiction’.195  Thus the Appeals Chamber 
clearly considered that it exercised universal jurisdiction.  However, it did not fully 
articulate how this universal jurisdiction arose.  Sierra Leone, as both the territorial 
state and the state of nationality of the majority of the accused and victims, has 
superior bases of jurisdiction and need not rely on universal jurisdiction.   
 
There are two remaining possibilities.  First, the SCSL Agreement delegated universal 
jurisdiction from member states of the United Nations to the SCSL.  Second, universal 
jurisdiction arises solely from the nature and gravity of the crimes within the 
jurisdiction of the SCSL.  The first possibility is to say that member states, through 
their membership of the United Nations and their acceptance of the Charter, have 
delegated universal jurisdiction to the United Nations, and that that organization may 
then delegate universal jurisdiction to an international tribunal.  This argument is too 
                                                 
192 Kallon, note 26, para. 67. 
193 Kallon, note 26, paras 69-70. 
194 Kallon, note 26, para. 88. 
195 Gbao, note 11, para. 8. 
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great a stretch, particularly where other, stronger, bases of jurisdiction are available.196  
Moreover, as is discussed below, the ‘universality’ of courts created by the Security 
Council derives from the obligation of member states to co-operate with decisions of 
the Security Council,197 and not from any delegation of universal jurisdiction by 
member states. 
 
The SCSL, in the comments quoted previously, has hinted that it considers universal 
jurisdiction to exist without the need for a delegation of jurisdiction:  universal 
jurisdiction is automatically conferred on a tribunal purely due to the nature of the 
crimes and regardless of how the tribunal has been established.  If this is what the 
SCSL was suggesting, it is highly problematic.  This conjures the image of a ‘floating’ 
universal jurisdiction, once a tribunal is created to try crimes giving rise to universal 
jurisdiction under customary international law, that jurisdiction simply exists and is 
vested in the tribunal, with no need for a delegation of jurisdiction from states.  This 
simply cannot be the case:  universal jurisdiction is exercised by states.  States may 
delegate their own competencies for crimes subject to universal jurisdiction to an 
international or internationalized tribunal.  Alternatively, the United Nations may 
establish a tribunal to try crimes subject to universal jurisdiction.  However, these 
tribunals derive their jurisdiction either from delegation of jurisdiction of some sort or 
from the competence of the United Nations for international peace and security:  there 
is no independent basis of universal jurisdiction.  To take this argument to its extreme, 
if two non-governmental organizations combined to create an international court to try 
individuals accused of genocide, could this court be said to possess universal 
jurisdiction due only to the fact that genocide is a crime giving rise to universal 
jurisdiction?  As was discussed in Chapter One, the boundaries of the concept of 
universal jurisdiction are uncertain, even in relation to the exercise of universal 
jurisdiction by states. Given that the international legal system is still largely governed 
by the notion of state sovereignty, it is highly unlikely that states would accept that an 
international criminal jurisdiction could exist in the absence of either a delegation of 
authority from a state with an accepted jurisdictional nexus or the exercise of the 
Council’s powers for international peace and security. This is not to say that such a 
principle will not develop in the future; rather that it is not yet found as a matter of 
contemporary international law. Thus, in conclusion, although several crimes giving 
rise to universal jurisdiction under customary international law fall within the remit of 
the SCSL, this does not of itself mean that the SCSL exercises universal jurisdiction.   
                                                 
196 This argument is discussed further in the next section. 
197 Article 25, Charter. 
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3.1.5 Jurisdiction based on the powers of the Security Council under 
Chapter VII 
This thesis submits that the final basis of jurisdiction is the appropriate jurisdictional 
basis for the LST, as the tribunal was established by the Council acting pursuant to its 
powers under Chapter VII of the Charter.  However, Chapter VII of the Charter is also 
the source of the jurisdiction conferred on the ICTY and the ICTR.  What then is the 
nature and source of this jurisdiction? The debate as to the jurisdictional basis of the 
ICC also revealed two conflicting views as to the jurisdictional basis of the ICTY and 
the ICTR.  In considering whether the ICTY and the ICTR were a precedent for the 
exercise of delegated universal jurisdiction by an international court, Professor Morris 
concluded that ‘the tribunals’ jurisdiction is more properly viewed as arising from the 
powers of the Security Council to take such steps as are necessary to restore or 
maintain international peace and security’.  The ICTY and the ICTR could therefore 
be distinguished from the ICC.198  Professor Scharf and Mr Akande disagreed with this 
conclusion, arguing that, while the tribunals were established pursuant to a resolution 
under Chapter VII of the Charter, the ‘underlying authority for the Council’s action 
was a treaty – the UN Charter’.199  The Security Council, when exercising its authority 
under Chapter VII, exercises powers delegated to it by the member states of the 
United Nations collectively.  Thus, Akande concludes, the tribunals ‘constitute 
examples of the delegation by states of criminal jurisdiction to international 
tribunals’.200  While this thesis does not dispute that the Security Council exercises 
delegated powers under the Charter, it is submitted that this argument does not 
consider sufficiently the nature of the authority conferred on the Security Council by 
member states.  Member states, acting collectively, have conferred upon the Security 
Council via the Charter powers for the maintenance and restoration of international 
peace and security, as set out in Chapter VII of the Charter.201  This meaning is 
confirmed by article 24(1) of the Charter, which provides that the member states 
‘agree that in carrying out its duties under this responsibility, the Security Council acts 
on their behalf’.202  As Sarooshi notes, member states delegated to the Security 
Council ‘not sovereignty per se but an international police power of States’.203  Thus it 
is inappropriate to refer to member states delegating jurisdiction (based on 
sovereignty) to the Security Council, jurisdiction which is then delegated to the 
                                                 
198 Morris, note 147, 36. 
199 Scharf, note 147, 108; See also Akande, note 146, 628 – ‘the ultimate legal basis for their 
creation is the UN Charter (Article 25)’. 
200 Akande, note 147, 628. 
201 See discussion in Sarooshi, D., The United Nations and the Development of Collective 
Security (1999), 25-32. 
202 Article 24(1), Charter, emphasis added.  See Sarooshi, ibid, sources cited at footnote 107. 
203 Sarooshi, note 201, 28. 
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tribunals.  The better view is that the Security Council was exercising this 
‘international police power’ when it established the tribunals.  Moreover, the Security 
Council is not restrained by the jurisdictional bases relied upon by states to justify 
prescriptive jurisdiction, nor is it restrained by the limits as to the exercise of 
enforcement jurisdiction.   
 
That something more than a delegation of jurisdiction has occurred is evident, if it is 
accepted that ‘the powers which can be exercised by the collective totality of 
sovereign States is greater than the sum of the individual powers of these States’.204  
The ICTY has recognised that the Security Council can confer powers on a subsidiary 
organ which it could not exercise itself.  The Security Council may not exercise a 
judicial function determining individual criminal responsibility, yet it has established 
two institutions that may do so.205 Moreover, the tribunals may take steps that a state 
acting individually could not, such as lifting the immunity of a head of state of another 
state or requiring cooperation in the absence of an agreement.206  Thus the Security 
Council is not exercising jurisdiction delegated by member states in the traditional 
sense.  Therefore, it can be concluded that the jurisdiction of the LST is based on the 
powers for the maintenance of international peace and security delegated to the 
Security Council by member states. 
 
4 Conclusion 
This Chapter has considered the legal basis of the tribunals studied as the most 
appropriate criterion for a comparison of the tribunals, with the object of determining 
whether categories of such tribunals can be established, or whether the tribunals truly 
are sui generis. Three categories of hybrid or internationalized tribunals were 
identified, while the notion of a tribunal established by means of floating universal 
jurisdiction was rejected. The first category concerns tribunals operating primarily as 
national institutions with international assistance, and with varying degrees of reliance 
on international law, both procedural and substantive.  These tribunals rely 
predominantly upon the territorial jurisdiction of the affected state, as well 
extraterritorial jurisdiction in limited circumstances.  The IHT, ECCC, WCC, SPSC 
and IJPP fall within this category.  When the legal basis is considered in light of the 
discussion in Chapter Two, it is evident that this mechanism is adopted in one of two 
circumstances.  First, where either the United Nations or certain states are acting 
                                                 
204 Sarooshi, note 201, 29. 
205 Tadic Jurisdiction Decision, note 25, paras 37-8. 
206 See Chapter Five. 
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effectively as the governing authority within the affected territory, as is the case with 
the IJPP, the SPSC and the IHT.  The process leading to the establishment of the WCC 
may also fall within this first situation, as it was decided by the OHR and the ICTY 
that a new chamber in Bosnia was desirable so as to enable transfer of cases from the 
ICTY.  Although the process was done with some collaboration with national actors 
and relied on domestic law-making procedures, the OHR directed the process within 
Bosnia, and always had the option of establishing the WCC using the powers under 
the Dayton Agreement. Second, the mechanism may be appropriate where the affected 
state is reluctant to relinquish state sovereignty to the United Nations (or other 
‘partner’) and where it is unlikely, for political or legal reasons, that the Security 
Council will impose an international tribunal on the state concerned.  This latter 
situation is illustrated by the history of the negotiations for the creation of the ECCC. 
 
The second category of tribunals is the treaty-based model.  A treaty between the 
territorial state and the United Nations, or possibly another international organisation 
or a number of states acting collectively, forms the legal basis for the institution.  The 
SCSL is the only example of this model to date, although the LST would also have 
fallen within this category had the ratification of the LST Agreement not been affected 
by domestic factors.  This suggests that the model is appropriate where the affected 
state is likely to provide the cooperation required by the tribunal, and is not opposed to 
conferring its jurisdiction on a tribunal that will operate outside its judicial system or 
preoccupied with preserving its sovereignty.  The agreement will set out the structure 
and key features of the tribunal, including the cases it may try.  The better view is that 
the basis of the jurisdiction conferred on the tribunal is that of the territorial state, and 
is normally jurisdiction based on the territorial principle. Nationality could also form 
the basis of a transfer of jurisdiction, depending on the terms of the agreement.  The 
agreement will also regulate the terms of the conferral of jurisdiction on the tribunal, 
for example, whether jurisdiction to be conferred exclusively on the tribunal, so that 
the state itself may no longer exercise that jurisdiction through its national courts.  The 
agreement is also vital in determining the scope of the jurisdiction conferred on the 
tribunal:  which crimes may be tried, and is the conferral of jurisdiction subject to 
legal restrictions on the exercise of jurisdiction by that state, such as head of state 
immunity or domestic amnesties.  These issues will be considered in greater detail in 
Chapters Four and Five. 
 
The third, and final, category of tribunals is a hybrid or internationalized tribunal 
established by the Security Council utilizing its powers under Chapter VII of the 
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Charter.  It is the Security Council resolution - and any documents incorporated into 
the resolution - that forms the legal basis of the tribunal.  In establishing a tribunal in 
this category, the Security Council is conferring jurisdiction based on its powers for 
the maintenance of international peace and security.  It is submitted that the use of this 
legal and jurisdictional basis is not available or appropriate in all circumstances.  First, 
the Security Council may only act where there is a threat to international peace and 
security, and the creation of a tribunal would be a means to maintain or restore 
international peace and security.  Thus, it is submitted that this model would not have 
been available in relation to Cambodia, where there was no longer an armed conflict 
or insurgency, and the violations in question had occurred some 20 years previously.  
Second, as a practical matter, the Security Council will only act in this manner where 
there is the requisite level of political support for the establishment of a tribunal using 
this method.  A situation will only lead to a tribunal based on this model where it is 
considered ‘important’ by Council members, in particular the permanent members.  
However, the situation must not be too important and directly impact upon national 
interests of the permanent members or significant member states.  For example, the 
reluctance to impose a tribunal of this model in relation to East Timor is attributed to 
the importance to the United States of Indonesia’s participation in its counter-
terrorism operations.  In addition, this model will only be used where the Security 
Council considers that sufficient resources are available to support the establishment 
of the tribunal.  Finally, it is submitted that imposition of a hybrid or internationalized 
criminal tribunal may raise greater practical issues than imposition of an ad hoc 
international criminal tribunal, as the tribunal will depend to a greater extent on the 
assistance and cooperation of the state concerned.  Accordingly, the consequences of 
the imposition for the effective operation of the tribunal should be considered. 
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CHAPTER FOUR 
THE SELECTION OF TEMPORAL, PERSONAL, TERRITORIAL AND 
MATERIAL JURISDICTION 
 
1 Introduction 
The previous chapter outlined the legal bases for the tribunals studied and examined 
the source of the jurisdiction conferred on the tribunals.  The decision as to the legal 
basis and the source of the jurisdiction of a tribunal is an important one.  The legal 
basis upon which a tribunal is established is a key indicator as to how effective the 
tribunal is likely to be in achieving accountability.  The jurisdictional reach of a 
tribunal refers to jurisdiction in a different sense to that studied in the previous 
chapter.  Here, the term refers to the competence of a specific tribunal to adjudicate 
cases brought before it.  Tribunals ‘cannot prosecute cases involving individuals, 
territories and crimes that are not either explicitly or implicitly within their powers, 
that is, their jurisdiction’.1  The jurisdiction of a tribunal comprises four elements:  
ratione personae (personal jurisdiction); ratione loci (territorial jurisdiction); ratione 
temporis (temporal jurisdiction); and ratione materiae (substantive or material 
jurisdiction).   
 
If a tribunal is to end impunity, it is necessary to consider carefully the conduct and 
individuals that may be examined by the tribunal.  Defining the ‘jurisdictional reach’ 
of a criminal tribunal is also significant as this can affect the legitimacy and 
effectiveness of the tribunal.  Restrictions as to the temporal, territorial and material 
jurisdiction of a tribunal will limit the conduct that may be the subject of proceedings 
before the tribunal.  Similarly, a limited personal jurisdiction may exclude key 
individuals or groups from the tribunal’s reach, while choice of the material 
jurisdiction will dictate the conduct that is to be criminalized and how that conduct is 
classified, whether as an international or ‘serious’ crime, or as an ‘ordinary’ crime 
under domestic law.  For example, a tribunal that is to concentrate on offences 
committed by only one party to a conflict may give rise to allegations of bias or, 
where the tribunal is established by or with the support of the victorious party, the 
suggestion that the tribunal is dispensing ‘victor’s justice’.  Focussing on a certain 
time period, geographical location or type of crime may mean that the tribunal does 
                                                 
1 Schabas, W., The UN International Criminal Tribunals: The former Yugoslavia, Rwanda and 
Sierra Leone (2006), 123. 
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not provide a comprehensive examination of the conflict or its context and may 
preclude from consideration significant incidents or offences committed against or by 
certain groups.  This may alienate some elements of the affected society and detract 
from the tribunal’s contribution to reconciliation. 
 
To achieve the principle of non-impunity, ideally the tribunal’s jurisdictional reach 
should be as wide as possible and cover all relevant time periods, geographical 
locations, conduct and individuals.  However, the tribunals studied do not operate in 
an ideal context, and the designers of the internationalized and hybrid tribunals have 
had to make many compromises.  The aim of achieving accountability for serious 
crimes has had to be balanced against other important considerations.  First, the 
tribunals are faced with limited financial and material resources, and it would not be 
feasible for the tribunal to try each individual and each offence committed during an 
armed conflict.  The alleged perpetrators may number in the hundreds, or even the 
thousands, and any legal institution would struggle to resolve such a large number of 
cases.  This necessitates difficult choices as to which conduct and individuals should 
be the focus of the tribunal’s activities so as not to overstretch the available resources.  
Second, the tribunals depend on the political will of the United Nations and member 
states. They also depend on the support of the territorial state, in which much of the 
evidence will be found, and the majority of the victims, witnesses and perpetrators are 
located.  Domestic politics and sensitivities, and assertions of state sovereignty, will 
also impact upon the jurisdictional regime that is adopted.  Finally, the selection of the 
jurisdictional regime will be determined in part by the applicable legal framework.  
This requires designers to consider the following issues. Do the conduct and its 
context satisfy the required elements of relevant international crimes? If not, can 
crimes under domestic law be utilised?  Was the conduct in question criminalised 
under international law (either treaty-based or customary international law) at the 
relevant time, and is the affected state a party to the relevant legal instruments?  
Alternatively, was the conduct criminalised under domestic law? Have the 
international crimes been incorporated into domestic law, or do international crimes 
apply directly in the legal system of the affected state?  Are the required theories of 
criminal responsibility available?  Which body should resolve uncertainties as to the 
legal framework – the tribunal or its designers? This Chapter examines the issues 
concerning the selection of the jurisdictional reach of the tribunals studied. For ease of 
reference, Table Two summarises the temporal, territorial, personal and material 
jurisdiction of the tribunals. 
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2 Temporal jurisdiction 
Temporal jurisdiction refers to the period of time in respect of which a tribunal may 
exercise its jurisdiction. The decision as to the temporal jurisdiction of a tribunal 
demonstrates how the extent of the tribunal’s jurisdiction must be balanced against 
competing considerations, such as resources, the applicable legal framework and the 
political will to support the tribunal.  The designers of the tribunals studied have 
adopted different approaches to this issue, often reflecting different priorities.  The 
IHT has the most extensive temporal jurisdiction, ranging from 17 July 1998 to 1 May 
2003.  While this time period will capture many of the main incidents that occurred 
during the regime, it excludes consideration of events during the occupation of Iraq.  
The extensive jurisdiction raises concerns as to the resource implications and the risk 
of overloading the IHT.  Recognising this, the prosecution has decided to concentrate 
on a limited number of mini-trials concerning significant events during the regime.  
The ECCC has a restricted temporal jurisdiction, limited to the period from 17 April 
1975 to 6 January 1979. This period coincides exactly with the duration of the Khmer 
Rouge regime. It does however, exclude from the jurisdiction of the tribunal acts of 
the Khmer Rouge up to and after the regime seized power, including the insurgency 
that was conducted for several decades after the regime was ousted.  It also excludes 
potential examination of acts of other states in relation to Cambodia, for example the 
bombing of Cambodia by the United States in 1962, and crimes alleged to have been 
committed by Vietnamese nationals during the Vietnamese occupation of Cambodia.2  
The temporal jurisdiction of the IHT and the ECCC has led to criticism that the crimes 
included in the material jurisdiction may violate the nullum crimen sine lege principle, 
as the conduct in question was not criminalised at the relevant times.3  Both tribunals 
may also encounter difficulties regarding the availability and reliability of evidence. 4 
 
The WCC and the IJPP are not subject to restrictions as to temporal jurisdiction.  The 
WCC is a permanent national structure and as such will continue to operate after the 
five year transitional period. The IJPP has considered cases concerning events 
                                                 
2 Prime Minister Hun Sen had suggested a wide temporal jurisdiction from 1970 to the present.  
This was, however, considered to be a negotiating ploy:  Boyle, D., ‘Establishing the 
Responsibility of the Khmer Rouge Leadership for International Crimes’ (2002) YbIHL 167. 
3 See Material Jurisdiction, this chapter, section 5. 
4 See Ali Lejmi, M., ‘Prosecuting Cambodian Genocide, Problems Caused by the Passage of 
Time since the Alleged Commission of Crimes’ (2006) 4 JICJ 300. 
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occurring after the conflict,5 although it has not tried cases concerning violations 
committed during the previous Serbian regime. There was no restriction as to the 
commencement date of the jurisdiction of the SPSC in relation to international 
crimes,6 and the SPSC could have exercised jurisdiction in respect of offences 
committed before the international administration, including acts committed during 
the Indonesian occupation of East Timor. However, although the Serious Crimes Unit 
did investigate some earlier incidents,7 it decided to focus on the events of 1999 so as 
to best utilise scarce resources.8  While this strategy has been criticized as leaving the 
period from 1975 to 1998 un-investigated and outside the historical record provided 
by the serious crimes process, it was perhaps the only choice practically available in 
East Timor due to the limited resources allocated to the Serious Crimes Unit and the 
SPSC. 
 
Selecting the commencement date of the temporal jurisdiction of the SCSL was 
controversial.  Four possible dates were considered: 23 March 1991 (the date the 
conflict is generally accepted to have commenced); 30 November 1996 (the date of 
the Abidjan Agreement); 25 May 1997 (the date of the coup d’état by the AFRC 
against the Government); and 7 January 1999 (the date the offensive against Freetown 
was launched by the RUF/AFRC).  The first date was rejected as it ‘would create a 
heavy burden for the prosecution and the Court’.9 The third possibility was considered 
to have a political connotation and would suggest that the SCSL was aimed at the 
coup d’état. Similarly, the last option would concentrate efforts on the attack on 
Freetown and would exclude from consideration attacks on rural areas and the 
                                                 
5 Cases have been heard or are currently pending for alleged crimes committed during the 
March 2004 riots (see the Esmin Hamza and minor AK case, and the Kurteshi and Sylejmani 
case), serious criminal offences  (the Ejupi case), terrorism and terrorist related offences (the 
Morina case) and criminal acts committed during the self-determination / independence 
demonstrations in February 2007 (the Kurti case).  For further details of individual cases, see 
Humanitarian Law Centre, Trials for ethnically motivated crimes and war crimes in Kosovo, 
2007. 
6 The District Court in Dili has exclusive jurisdiction in respect of the domestic crimes of 
murder and sexual offences only where those crimes committed in the period between 1 
January 1999 and 25 October 1999:  Regulation 2000/11, section 10.2; Regulation 2000/15, 
section 2.3.  This restriction was also applied to the crime of torture in Regulation 2000/11, but 
was not duplicated in Regulation 2000/15, so presumably torture was not subject to the same 
restriction. 
7 The Serious Crimes Unit abandoned an investigation of the Santa Cruz massacre of 1991. It 
also investigated instances occurring in late 1998 that were closely related to the later violence: 
Reiger, C., The Serious Crimes Process in Timor-Leste: In Retrospect (2006, ICTJ), 8. 
8 All indictments issued related to events occurring between 1 January 1999 and October 1999. 
Events occurring after October 1999 were left to be dealt with by the ordinary criminal justice 
system: ibid. 
9 Report of the Secretary-General on the establishment of a Special Court for Sierra Leone, 
S/2000/915, para. 26. 
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countryside.  Accordingly, the temporal jurisdiction of the SCSL commenced on 30 
November 1996 as it was felt that this date ‘had the benefit of putting the Sierra Leone 
conflict in perspective without unnecessarily extending the temporal jurisdiction of the 
Special Court. It would also ensure that the most serious crimes committed by all 
parties and armed groups would be encompassed’.10  However, the selection of the 
commencement date ‘represents a significant limitation’,11 as it excludes from the 
reach of the SCSL perpetrators of crimes committed in the five year period from the 
commencement of the conflict to the signing of the Abidjan Agreement.12  Moreover, 
it creates the perception that Freetown is more important than attacks on rural areas.13 
As the conflict was ongoing when the SCSL was established, the end date for the 
temporal jurisdiction of the SCSL was left unspecified, although the prosecution has 
not issued indictments for acts committed beyond the end of the conflict.  
Furthermore, as the SCSL upheld the Lomé Accord amnesty,14 there was - in theory - 
a dual start date for the temporal jurisdiction of the SCSL.  In respect of the 
international crimes, jurisdiction commences on 30 November 1996, whereas 
jurisdiction in respect of national crimes commences on 7 July 1999, the date the 
amnesty was granted.15 However, this was never a practical issue, as the prosecutor 
did not include charges under domestic law in any indictment. 
 
The LST is intended to investigate a single event, the assassination of Prime Minister 
Hariri.16 Its temporal jurisdiction is theoretically restricted to a single date, 14 
February 2005.  However, the Security Council recognized that its mandate should 
extend also to related attacks, and consequently, the LST Statute provides for the 
tribunal to exercise jurisdiction for ‘connected attacks’ occurring in Lebanon between 
1 October 2004 and 12 December 2005 which are of a similar nature and gravity. In 
considering whether an incident is connected, the LST is to take into account, among 
other factors, the motive for the attacks, the purpose behind the attacks, the nature of 
the victims targeted, the pattern of the attacks and whether they involve the same or 
                                                 
10 Ibid, para. 27. 
11 Stafford, N., ‘A Model war Crimes Court: Sierra Leone’ (2004) 10 ILSA JICL 117, 127. 
12 See Fritz, N. and Smith, A., ‘Current Apathy for Coming Anarchy: Building the Special 
Court for Sierra Leone’ (2002) 25 FILJ 391, 411-12. 
13 Ibid, 411-2. 
14 Prosecutor v Kallon and Kamara, Decision on Challenge to Jurisdiction: Lomé Accord 
Amnesty, Appeals Chamber, 13 March 2004.  See discussion of this decision in Chapter Five. 
15 Article 5 is omitted from the list of offences to be covered by the exclusion of the amnesty in 
article 10 of the SCSL Statute.  See:  Fritz and Smith, note 11, 412; Frulli, M., ‘The Special 
Court for Sierra Leone:  Some Preliminary Comments’ (2000) 11 EJIL 857, 859; and Tejan-
Cole, A., ‘The Special Court for Sierra Leone: Conceptual concerns and alternatives’ (2001) 1 
African Human Rights Law Journal 107, 116.   
16 Article 1, LST Statute. 
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related perpetrators.17 The tribunal’s jurisdiction may also extend to attacks committed 
after 12 December 2005 and up to any later date that may be agreed between the 
United Nations and the Government of Lebanon, with the consent of the Security 
Council.18  
3 Territorial jurisdiction 
As discussed in the previous chapter, territorial jurisdiction is most frequently relied 
upon as a basis for the exercise of jurisdiction by states, and is reflected in the 
constituent instruments of the SCSL19 and the IHT.20  The territorial jurisdiction of the 
SCSL has been criticised given the suggested involvement of persons from 
neighbouring countries in the conflict and ‘the reality of modern day conflicts that are 
not neatly contained within the territorial confines of one particular State’.21  
However, the indictment in respect of Charles Taylor, former President of Liberia, is 
based on the objective territorial approach, as Taylor has been charged with acts 
committed in Liberia, but carried out in Sierra Leone.22 
 
Two of the tribunals are authorized expressly to try crimes alleged to have been 
committed outside the territorial state. The SPSC held that it was limited to exercising 
territorial jurisdiction in relation to the national crimes within its material 
jurisdiction.23 Although the SPSC was able to exercise universal jurisdiction in 
relation to the crimes under international law, no indictments were issued on this 
basis.24 The IHT may exercise extra-territorial jurisdiction on the bases of nationality 
                                                 
17 Article 1(1), LST Agreement; Article 1, LST Statute.  The Secretary-General annexed a list 
of 14 other attacks, identified by the UNIIIC, that it accepts would satisfy these criteria, which 
includes six targeted attacks and eight ‘general’ terrorist bombing incidents:  Report of the 
Secretary-General on the establishment of a special tribunal for Lebanon, S/2006/893. 
18 Article 1, LST Statute.  This may include several incidents that have occurred after the 
adoption of Resolution 1757, which were included in the mandate of the UNIIIC. 
19 Article 1(1), SCSL Statute requires that the crimes must have been committed within the 
territory of Sierra Leone. 
20 Article 1(b), IHT Statute. 
21 Fritz & Smith, note 12, 417. 
22 Prosecutor v Charles Ghankay Taylor, Indictment, 7 March 2003.  The indictment was 
subsequently reduced to 11 counts:  Prosecutor’s Second Amended Indictment, 29 May 2007.  
See Cerone, J., ‘The Special Court for Sierra Leone: Establishing a New Approach to 
International Criminal Justice’ (2002) 8 ILSA JICL 379, 383. 
23 Regulation 2000/11, section 7.3; Regulation 2000/15, section 2.5.  The SPSC has held that it 
had no jurisdiction to try an accused alleged to have raped a woman in West Timor: Prosecutor 
v Leonardus Kasa, 9 May 2001. 
24 Regulation 2000/15, section 2.1.  The regulation defines ‘universal jurisdiction’ as 
‘jurisdiction irrespective of whether: (a) the serious criminal offence was committed within the 
territory of East Timor; (b) the serious criminal offence was committed by an East Timorese 
citizen; or (c) the victim of the serious criminal offence was an East Timorese citizen’: section 
2.2. 
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and permanent residency.25 Extraterritorial jurisdiction was included so as to enable 
the investigation of crimes committed by Iraqis outside Iraqi territory as part of the 
wars against Iran and Kuwait. However, to date no indictments have relied on extra-
territorial jurisdiction. 
 
For the remaining tribunals, their territorial application is unclear. The LST Statute 
focuses on acts, in particular the assassination of Hariri.  However, the acts in question 
occurred in the territory of Lebanon.  Moreover, the LST may only expand its 
jurisdiction in relation to connected terrorist attacks where such acts occurred in 
Lebanon.26 The LST could rely upon the objective territoriality principle to try those 
accused of committing preparatory acts outside Lebanese territory, adopting a similar 
approach to the SCSL in relation to Taylor.  As UNMIK may only issue regulations in 
respect of the territory of Kosovo, the territorial jurisdiction of the IJPP should be 
restricted to conduct committed within Kosovo itself.27  The Law on the State Court is 
silent as to the territorial reach of the WCC.  As a national institution, territorial 
jurisdiction would be resolved by relevant domestic provisions, which include extra-
territorial jurisdiction in limited circumstances.28 Similarly, the ECCC Agreement and 
the Special Law do not contain a provision as to the territorial jurisdiction of the 
ECCC, and jurisdiction is presumably restricted to events occurring within the 
territory of Cambodia. 
4 Personal Jurisdiction 
Restrictions as to the individuals within a tribunal’s jurisdiction may include the 
exclusion of corporate defendants,29 prohibitions against the prosecution of minors and 
juveniles, a requirement as to the nationality of the accused, and a stipulation that the 
accused must have, or has had, a particular political allegiance.  These restrictions are 
not without controversy, and may have the effect of excluding - or including - an 
                                                 
25 Article 1(b), IHT Statute.  See the next section for the nationality requirement. 
26 Article 1, LST Statute 
27 Resolution 1244 (1999), see Bohlander, M., ‘The Legal Framework of the Prosecution and 
the Courts’ in Ambos & Othman (eds), New Approaches in Transitional Justice: Kosovo, East 
Timor, Sierra Leone and Cambodia (2003). 
28 For example, Article 12 of the Criminal Code of Bosnia and Herzegovina provides for the 
exercise of extra-territorial jurisdiction in a number of circumstances, in particular where the 
accused is alleged to have committed an offence that Bosnia is obliged to punish in accordance 
with the provisions of international law or international agreements. 
29 This may preclude consideration of the actions of private military and security companies 
utilised in a conflict, for example, Executive Outcomes, a private company engaged by the 
Government of Sierra Leone at various stages of the conflict. See:  Webster, J., ‘Sierra Leone – 
Responding to the Crisis, Planning for the Future:  The Role of International Justice in the 
Quest for National and Global Security’ (2001) 11 Indiana International and Comparative 
Law Review 731, 766-9. 
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important group of offenders.  For example, the restriction of the personal jurisdiction 
of the IHT to Iraqi nationals or residents of Iraq excludes several groups of potential 
defendants.30  These include members of coalition forces alleged to have committed 
crimes during the Gulf wars and the subsequent occupation of Iraq,31 and nationals of 
any state involved in international armed conflicts with Iraq, for example nationals of 
Iran or Kuwait.  It would also exclude members of Al Q’aeda or other terrorist 
organisations that may have assisted in the commission of crimes within the 
jurisdiction of the tribunal,32 and nationals of western powers who are alleged to have 
acted in support of the previous regime and to have been complicit in the crimes 
committed by the regime.  Alvarez notes that the exclusion of such individuals will 
provide ‘a skewed historical account’ of the period of the regime,33 while Bassiouni 
suggests that the exclusion of the acts of coalition troops ‘adds to the perception of 
politicized justice’.34  
 
The inclusion of jurisdiction in respect of individuals aged between 15 and 18 years at 
the time of commission of the offence in the SCSL Statute triggered a vigorous 
debate.35  The issue arose due to the large numbers of children forcibly recruited as 
child soldiers, many of whom then committed crimes potentially within the 
jurisdiction of the SCSL.  The inclusion of juveniles within the personal jurisdiction of 
the SCSL raised a moral dilemma for designers of the tribunal. On the one hand, 
critics argued that children should not be punished as they were also victims of the 
conflict.36 On the other hand, other interest groups, particularly within Sierra Leone 
itself, considered that all perpetrators of serious crimes should be held to account, 
even if they were minors at the time of the offence.37  Ultimately this provision was 
not relied upon, as the Prosecutor announced that the prosecution would not prosecute 
                                                 
30 Article 1(2), IHT Statute. 
31 Consider, however, CPA Order 17 (2003).    
32 Other tribunals in Iraq may consider such conduct: Frank, M., ‘Trying Times: The 
Prosecution of Terrorists in the Central Criminal Court of Iraq’ (2006) 18 Florida Journal of 
International Law 1. 
33 Alvarez, J., ‘Trying Hussein: Between Hubris and Hegemony’ (2004) 2 JICJ 319, 321. 
34 Bassiouni, M.C., ‘Post-conflict Justice in Iraq: An appraisal of the Iraqi Special Tribunal’ 
(2005) Cornell International Law Journal 327, 359. 
35 Article 7, SCSL Statute.  While the SCSL may try juvenile defendants, it may not sentence 
convicted offenders to a term of imprisonment:  article 19. For further discussion, see Amann, 
D., ‘Calling Children to Account: The Proposal for a Juvenile Justice Chamber in the Special 
Court for Sierra Leone’ (2002) 29 Pepperdine Law Review 167; Bald, S., ‘Searching for a Lost 
Childhood:  Will the Special Court for Sierra Leone Find Justice for Its Children?’ (2003) 18 
American University International Law Review537; Stafford, note 11; McDonald, A., ‘Sierra 
Leone’s shoestring Special Court’ (2002) 84 IRRC 121, 133-6. 
36 Report, note 9, para. 32.  The Secretary-General referred to the issue as a ‘terrible dilemma’, 
para. 33. 
37 Report, note 9, para. 35. 
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individuals younger than 18 years at the time of commission of the offence, as 
children cannot be considered to be among those who bear the greatest responsibility 
from crimes and thus did not satisfy the seniority criterion.38  Instead, any information 
on offences committed by minors was passed to the Truth and Reconciliation 
Commission.   
 
The SCSL is the only tribunal to include a provision concerning jurisdiction with 
respect to conduct by peacekeepers.  Criminal acts allegedly committed by 
peacekeepers remain within the primary jurisdiction of the sending state, unless that 
state is unwilling or unable to prosecute, in which case the SCSL, with the 
authorization of the Security Council, may do so.39  The Security Council reinforced 
the primary jurisdiction of the sending state by stating that it is the sending state that is 
responsible for investigating and prosecuting any crimes that may have been 
committed.40 This provision in the SCSL Statute has not been utilised.  Other tribunals 
have been excluded from investigating acts of peacekeeping forces, either by 
restrictions as to their personal jurisdiction (for example a nationality requirement as 
in the IHT Statute) or by the provisions of the applicable status of forces agreement or 
relevant national law.41 
 
A further form of restriction on the personal jurisdiction of a tribunal is the criterion of 
seniority and/or the requirement that the accused bears the ‘greatest responsibility’ for 
the crimes committed.  This criterion requires the prosecutor to focus on commanders, 
rather than direct perpetrators, and enables a targeted strategy, which allows more 
effective use of limited resources.  It is also suggested to provide a better sense of the 
overall extent of and context to the conflict. In circumstances where available 
resources dictate that not all perpetrators can be punished, this approach requires that 
the ‘masterminds’ of the crimes should be the focus of trials, often leaving mid-level 
and low-level offenders to be considered by other accountability mechanisms, such as 
the ordinary courts or a truth and reconciliation commission.    However, victims may 
                                                 
38 Press Release, Special Prosecutor says he will not Prosecute Children, 2 November 2002.  
See also Tejan-Cole, note 15, 118; and Schabas, W., ‘Conjoined Twins of Transitional Justice? 
The Sierra Leone Truth and Reconciliation Commission and the Special Court’ (2004) 2 JICJ 
1082, 1090. 
39 Cerone, note 22, 384. 
40 Letter dated 22 December 2000 from the President of the Security Council addressed to the 
Secretary-General, S/2000/1234.  For further discussion, see Cryer, R., ‘A “Special Court” for 
Sierra Leone?’ (2001) 50 ICLQ 435, 440-1; and McDonald, note 35, 132-3. 
41 For example, CPA Order 17 (2003) excluded all personnel of the Coalition Provisional 
Authority and the multinational force from the exercise of jurisdiction by the Iraqi courts.  
UNMIK Regulation 47 (2000) similarly excluded UNMIK, KFOR and their personnel from the 
jurisdiction of the courts in Kosovo. 
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struggle to understand why only senior perpetrators are being tried.  Often it is the 
direct perpetrator that victims wish to see punished, particularly as the perpetrator may 
remain at liberty and be encountered by the victim on a regular basis.42  Moreover, the 
limited number of trials and accused result in limited coverage of incidents or certain 
crimes,43 and may lead to the concern that too few individuals are being tried.44   A 
seniority requirement also demands greater reliance on theories of criminal 
responsibility, such as joint criminal enterprise and command responsibility, and the 
use of indirect evidence.  This may be problematic where the applicable law is not 
adequately developed, or give rise to questions of legality where international theories 
of responsibility are to be relied upon.  To illustrate, as the SFRY Criminal Code did 
not include a comparable theory of command responsibility, both the WCC and the 
IJPP have had to consider whether customary international law on this issue has been 
incorporated into domestic law.  In Kosovo,  the Supreme Court determined that ‘in 
the application of Article 142 of the CC FRY it would not be legitimate to resort to 
international customary law in such areas as defining prohibited conduct, defining 
basis of individual responsibility and the punishment’.45 The incorporation of 
international theories of responsibility in relation to a crime defined in domestic law in 
the LST Statute may also raise legality issues.46 
 
The development of the seniority criterion can be traced to the early stages of the 
ICTY.  Neither the ICTY nor the ICTR was subjected originally to any limit as to the 
level of offender that may be prosecuted and initial efforts were concentrated on low-
level offenders.47 As part of the completion strategy, the Security Council imposed a 
                                                 
42 Siriam, C., ‘Wrong-sizing International Justice? The Hybrid Tribunal in Sierra Leone’ 
(2006) 29 FILJ 472, 492-3. 
43 A survey of the jurisprudence of the hybrid tribunals suggests that sexual offences may not 
have received adequate attention in certain tribunals, for example the IHT and the SPSC. 
44 ICTJ, The Special Court for Sierra Leone Under Scrutiny, March 2006, 28-9. 
45 Kolasinac case, Supreme Court of Kosovo, Decision of 9 January 2004, para. 21, quoted 
from Hartmann, M., ‘Kosovo’ (2004) 7 YbIHL 514.  In contrast, the WCC appears to have 
relied upon the concepts of joint criminal enterprise and command responsibility, although the 
basis for doing so is not clear:  see, for example, Prosecutor v Pekez et al, Judgment, 15 April 
2008.  The applicability of these principles in Bosnia was also discussed in several decision of 
the ICTY Referral Bench, as discussed in Williams, S., ‘ICTY referrals to national jurisdictions 
: A fair trial or a fair price?’ (2006) 17 Crim LF 177-222. 
46 The applicable law, the Lebanese Criminal Code, does not include international theories of 
criminal responsibility:  Milanovic, M., ‘An Odd Couple: Domestic Crimes and International 
Responsibility in the Special Tribunal for Lebanon’ (2007) 5 JICJ 1139. 
47 See Johnson, L., ‘Closing an International Criminal Tribunal While Maintaining 
International Human Rights Standards and Excluding Impunity’ (2005) 99 AJIL 158, 162-3; 
Wald, P., ‘ICTY Proceedings: An Appraisal from Within’ (2004) 2 JICJ 466; Cassese, A., 
‘The ICTY: A Living and Vivid Reality’ (2004) 2 JICJ 585. For a defence of the strategy, see 
Piacente, N., ‘Importance of the Joint Criminal Enterprise Doctrine for the ICTY Prosecutorial 
Policy’ (2004) 2 JICJ 446, 447-8. 
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seniority criterion, which called upon the tribunals to ensure that any new indictments 
‘concentrate on the most senior leaders suspected of being most responsible for crimes 
within the jurisdiction of the relevant Tribunal’.48  Despite the experience of the ICTY, 
the SCSL and the ECCC are the only tribunals studied that are subject to a seniority 
requirement.  The personal jurisdiction of the SCSL is limited to those ‘persons who 
bear the greatest responsibility for serious violations of international humanitarian law 
and Sierra Leone law’,49 which includes ‘those leaders who, in committing such 
crimes, have threatened the establishment of and implementation of the peace process 
in Sierra Leone’.50 The phrasing of this provision generated several exchanges 
between the Secretary-General and the Security Council, with the Secretary-General 
calling for the term ‘persons most responsible’, which, he suggested, would allow the 
Prosecutor greater discretion in determining who to prosecute.  The Security Council 
preferred the formulation eventually adopted, arguing that this provided a clearer 
mandate for the tribunal.  The SCSL has issued indictments involving 13 individuals, 
all of whom were considered to be senior leaders or commanders.51   
 
The personal jurisdiction of the ECCC was ‘one of the most persistent sources of 
disagreement between Cambodia and the United Nations’ during negotiations.52 
Cambodia’s initial request for assistance indicated Cambodia’s preference that only 
senior leaders and the United Nations eventually accepted this limitation in order to 
reach agreement for the tribunal.53  The personal jurisdiction of the ECCC is restricted 
to senior leaders of Democratic Kampuchea and those most responsible for the crimes 
falling within the ECCC subject matter and temporal jurisdiction.54  This seniority 
requirement is set out in the Special Law and is reflected in the guidance provided to 
                                                 
48 Resolution 1534 (2004), para. 5. Previous resolutions recognized the importance of 
concentrating on the prosecution and trial of the most senior leaders, but had only done so in 
non-operative paragraphs: see Resolution 1503 (2003), preambular para. 7. 
49 Article 1, SCSL Agreement. 
50 The Security Council had indicated its preference that the SCSL have a limited personal 
jurisdiction – to those ‘who bear the greatest responsibility’:  Resolution 1315, para. 3. 
51 See Crane, D., ‘Dancing with the Devil: Prosecuting West Africa’s Warlords: Building 
Initial Prosecution Strategy for an International Tribunal after Third World Armed Conflicts’ 
(2006) 37 Case Western Reserve Journal of International Law 1. 
52 Boyle, note 4. 
53 Prime Minister Hun Sen reportedly wished to exclude middle and lower level former 
officials, many of whom performed important roles in the government.  The United Nations 
was also keen to restrict the funds required for the ECCC:  Cohen, D., ‘“Hybrid” Justice in East 
Timor, Sierra Leone and Cambodia: “Lessons Learned” and Prospects for the Future’ (2007) 
43 Stan JIL 1, 30. 
54 Article 2, Special Law.  This phrasing was suggested by the Group of Experts, which 
accepted that the term would not cover all persons at the senior levels, but only those senior 
leaders with the most responsibility for the violations, as well as lower-level perpetrators 
directly implicated in the most serious atrocities: Report of the Group of Experts established 
pursuant to General Assembly Resolution 52/135, A/53/850, S/1999/231, para. 110. 
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the co-investigating judges and the co-prosecutors in the ECCC Agreement.55 
Suggestions that a wider personal jurisdiction should be granted, allowing greater 
prosecutorial discretion in deciding which individuals to investigate, were rejected by 
Cambodia.56 The five accused currently in the custody of the ECCC were all senior 
leaders of the Khmer Rouge.57  However, the delay in establishing the tribunal has 
meant that other key leaders have died, in particular Pol Pot, while those defendants 
facing trial are very old and in poor health.58 
 
The experience of the SPSC replicated the early stages of the ICTY.  Lacking a 
restriction as to the level of accused, most persons indicted were lower level offenders, 
often charged with single crimes unrelated to the political violence. The General 
Prosecutor concentrated on instances of murder, identifying ten priority cases.59 The 
arrival of an international deputy-prosecutor general facilitated a more selective 
strategy with increased resources dedicated to investigating more serious offenders 
and those with the greatest responsibility.  However, although many of the East 
Timorese accused held positions of authority within the militia organisations, the 
majority were low in the overall chain of command.  From 2003 onwards, the 
prosecution moved to indict more senior figures within the Indonesian military and 
police structures, including several of those not indicted by the Ad Hoc Court in 
Indonesia.60  
 
The personal jurisdiction of the IHT is not restricted to persons most responsible or the 
most serious offenders.  The prosecutorial strategy has focused on several mini-trials, 
each examining a major incident or campaign. The IHT has tried and convicted 
several senior and high-profile officials, most notably the former President, Saddam 
Hussein, the former head of the General Intelligence Directorate, the former Vice-
President, the Chief Judge of the Revolutionary Court, the former defence minister 
and the former deputy Prime Minister.  While the intention was that only the highest-
                                                 
55 Articles 5(3) and 6(3), ECCC Agreement. 
56 Boyle, note 4. 
57 The Statement of the Co-Prosecutors of 18 July 2007 identified five suspects, although, 
reportedly, the ECCC may charge a maximum of eight individuals, all considered senior 
leaders:  Associated Press, 13 February 2008, ‘Cambodian genocide tribunal to try up to 8 
defendants, hire more staff’.  For discussion of the leadership structure of the Khmer Rouge 
and possible defendants, see Bunyanunda, M., ‘The Khmer Rouge on Trial: Whither the 
Defence’ (2001) 74 Southern California Law Review 1581. 
58 Darcy, S., ‘Dilemmas of Delayed Justice for the Crimes of the Khmer Rouge’, Oxford 
Transitional Justice Research Working Paper Series, 4 November 2008. 
59 The Serious Crime Unit applied the following criteria: the number and type of victims; the 
seriousness of the crimes and their political significance; and the availability of evidence.  
60 See discussion in Chapter Two, in particular sources cited at note 108. 
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level perpetrators were to be prosecuted,61 with intermediate and lower level offenders 
to be prosecuted before the ordinary Iraqi courts, some ‘low-level’ accused have been 
tried and convicted by the IHT.62  
 
The LST Statute does not contain a seniority criterion. However, as it is assumed that 
the actual assassin was killed in the explosion, the investigation and prosecution 
strategy will be focused on those who planned and ordered the attack, rather than the 
actual perpetrators.  This will include individuals participating in the criminal network 
identified by the UNIIIC.63   
 
Neither the WCC nor the IJPP are restricted as to the level of the offender.  This 
reflects the role that the ICTY exercises in the region.  The WCC hears only the most 
sensitive war crimes cases, including cases of intermediate level accused referred by 
the ICTY.64 Before granting a request for referral, the Referral Bench must consider 
the gravity of the crimes charged and the level of responsibility of the accused.65  The 
Referral Bench has interpreted the phrase ‘most senior leaders’ to cover individuals 
‘who, by virtue of their position and function in the relevant hierarchy, both de jure  
and de facto, are alleged to have exercised such a degree of authority that it is 
appropriate to describe them as among the “most senior” rather than “intermediate”’.66  
The Referral Bench considered criteria such as the permanence and duration of the 
leadership role, the levels of superior leadership (if any), any political positions of 
responsibility of the accused (for example negotiating with international elements), 
and the number of individuals under the command and control of the accused. Cases 
concerning senior level accused must not be referred  to national jurisdictions and will 
remain at the ICTY for trial.  Thus the cases transferred to the WCC are not the most 
serious cases arising from the conflict. However, this does not mean that the offences 
                                                 
61 Coalition Provisional Authority advisers recommended that the IHT should follow the lead 
of the SCSL and concentrate on high-level offenders, limiting numbers to no more than 20 to 
25 offenders.  The Iraqi Governing Council had originally suggested hearing some 6,000 cases 
before the IHT:  Parker, T., ‘Prosecuting Saddam:  The Coalition Provisional Authority and the 
Evolution of the Iraqi Special Tribunal’ (2005) 38 Cornell International Law Journal 899, 903. 
62 For example, the ‘lesser accused’ in the Dujail trial were Ba’th Party officials from Dujail, 
and did not hold significant rank or office in the Hussein regime. 
63 Evidence collected by the UNIIIC confirms that the assassination of Hariri was carried out 
by a network of individuals acting in concert and that this criminal network, or part of it, 
remains active and is connected to other more recent attacks within Lebanon. The UNIIIC is 
concentrating its efforts on gathering information about this network, its scope, the identity of 
its participants, their links with outsiders and their role in other attacks. 
64 The ICTY has referred six cases involving ten accused to Bosnia to be tried before the WCC.  
No more requests for referral will be made. 
65 Rule 11bis(C), ICTY RPE. 
66 Prosecutor v Dragomir Milošović, Decision on Referral of Case Pursuant to Rule 11bis, 
Referral Bench, 8 July 2005, para. 22. See further, Williams, note 47. 
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are not serious, or that the accused did not hold any position of responsibility or 
command; rather the accused are not the senior commanders.  Similarly, the majority 
of the defendants before the IJPP in cases connected to the conflict have not held any 
position of seniority or command, with trials concerning senior leaders conducted by 
the ICTY.67 
 
For the tribunals that are subject to a seniority criterion, an interesting question is 
whether the requirement is a jurisdictional restriction or mere guidance as to how 
prosecutorial discretion is to be exercised.  In a preliminary motion, a Trial Chamber 
of the SCSL determined that ‘the issue of personal jurisdiction is a jurisdictional 
requirement, and while it does of course guide the prosecutorial strategy, it does not 
exclusively articulate prosecutorial discretion…’. 68 The Appeals Chamber rejected 
this approach, and held that the only workable interpretation of article 1(1) of the 
SCSL Statute is that it merely guides the prosecutor.69  Moreover, the Appeals 
Chamber held it to be ‘inconceivable’ that an indictment could be struck out on this 
basis ‘after a long and expensive trial’.70  A similar controversy developed in the 
ICTY in April 2004, following an amendment to Rule 28(A) of the RPE that required 
the Bureau to confirm that every indictment issued by the Prosecutor satisfied the 
seniority criterion.71 It is submitted that the requirement in article 1(1) of the SCSL 
Statute is a jurisdictional requirement that may be considered by the SCSL.  This is 
supported by the drafting history of the SCSL Statute itself.72  The test concerning the 
seniority criterion should be that, prima facie, the individual in question falls within 
the category of the most senior accused (or those most responsible, if this is the 
                                                 
67 For example, Prosecutor v Slobodan Milosevic, Second Amended Indictment – ‘Kosovo’, 16 
October 2001; Prosecutor v Limaj et al,  Judgment, Trial Chamber, 30 November 2005; 
Prosecutor v Haradinaj et al, Judgment, Trial Chamber, 3 April 2008; and Prosecutor v 
Milutinovic et al, Third Amended Joinder Indictment, 21 June 2006. 
68 Prosecutor v Fofana, Decision on the Preliminary Defence Motion on the Lack of Personal 
Jurisdiction Filed on behalf of Accused Fofana, Trial Chamber, 3 March 2004, para. 27. This 
finding was restated by the Trial Chamber in its final judgment in the CDF case:  Prosecutor v 
Fofana and Kondewa, Judgment, Trial Chamber, 2 August 2007, para. 91. 
69 Prosecutor v Brima, Kamara and Kanu, Appeals Chamber, Judgment, Appeals Chamber, 22 
February 2008, para 282.  The Trial Chamber in that case had reached the same conclusion:  
Prosecutor v Brima, Kamara and Kanu, Judgment, Trial Chamber, 20 June 2007, para. 653 
70 Ibid, para. 283.   
71 For more detailed discussion see Williams, S., ‘The Completion Strategy of the ICTY and 
the ICTR’ in Bohlander, M. (ed.) International Criminal Justice: A Critical Analysis of 
Institutions and Procedures (Cameron May, 2007), 170-3; Johnson, note 49, 167; and Mundis, 
D., ‘The Judicial Effects of the “Completion Strategies” on the Ad Hoc International Criminal 
Tribunals’ (2005) 99 AJIL 142. 
72 Various exchanges between the Security Council and the Secretary-General demonstrate that 
the Council was concerned to limit the jurisdiction of the SCSL to those who played a 
leadership role, and ultimately led to the inclusion of the words ‘persons who bear the greatest 
responsibility’: see S/2001/40; S/2001/85; and S/2001/693. 
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applicable standard). The court should take into account the facts as pleaded in the 
indictment sought or the request for confirmation of charges and should not require 
additional evidence.73  Discretion should be allowed to the prosecution to establish 
those facts during the trial phase. Only where the seniority criterion can not be 
satisfied on a prima facie basis should the Court intervene, including, if necessary, 
referring the case back to the prosecutor for reconsideration. Concerns as to the stage 
at which such a review may occur may be resolved by providing that any review of the 
seniority of an accused must occur at a preliminary stage, before the confirmation of 
an indictment. Any challenge to admissibility on this ground must be made and heard 
before the confirmation of charges. This is the case with Rule 28(A) of the ICTY RPE, 
which requires the Bureau to review the indictment for seniority when the indictment 
is submitted by the Prosecutor. It is also be consistent with the requirement in the 
Rome Statute that the pre-trial chamber must confirm the admissibility of any case for 
which an indictment is sought, including a review of whether the case is of sufficient 
gravity.74 A trial chamber has indicated that any challenges to an indictment on the 
basis of gravity must take place before the decision on the confirmation of charges is 
filed, other than in exceptional circumstances.75 Moreover, there is an obligation on a 
State wishing to challenge the admissibility of a case to do so at the earliest 
opportunity.76  
5 Material jurisdiction 
The following section examines the difficult decisions involved in determining which 
individuals are to be included within the personal jurisdiction of an internationalized 
or hybrid criminal tribunal.  Cryer notes that ‘selectivity bubbles to the surface in a 
more subtle way, in the parameters of criminal responsibility’.77  Choosing which law 
is to be enforced is an important step in the design of an internationalized or hybrid 
tribunal.  It requires deciding first which conduct is to be subjected to criminal 
                                                 
73 This is the approach adopted by the ICTY in referral cases under Rule 11bis, see:  
Prosecutor v Stankovic, Decision on Referral of Case Under Rule 11bis, 17 May 2005. 
74 Articles 17 and 18, Rome Statute. See also article 19, which enables the ICC to satisfy itself 
as to its jurisdiction in any case brought before it and to determine the admissibility of a case in 
accordance with article 17. 
75 Prosecutor v Katanga and Chui, Reasons for the Oral Decision on the Motion Challenging 
the Admissibility of the Case (Article 19 of the Statute), Trial Chamber II, 16 June 2009, in 
particular para. 49. This finding was not disturbed upon appeal, although the Appeals Chamber 
stressed that in refraining to comment on the finding of the Trial Chamber on this issue, it did 
not necessarily mean that it agreed with the Trial Chamber’s interpretation: Prosecutor v 
Katanga and Chui, Judgment on the Appeal of Mr Germain Katanga against the Oral Decision 
of Trial Chamber II of 12 June 2009 on the Admissibility of the Case, Appeals Chamber, 25 
September 2009, para. 38. 
76 Article 19(5), Rome Statute. 
77 Cryer, R., Prosecuting International Crimes: Selectivity and the International Criminal Law 
Regime (2005), 232. 
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enforcement and, second, which law(s) will be used.  In many ways, the latter task is 
more complex in an internationalized or hybrid tribunal, as both domestic and 
international legal provisions must be considered.  However, the ability to rely on 
domestic legal provisions aids the selection process, as it enables recourse to domestic 
law where international law is insufficient, uncertain or fails to criminalize the 
conduct in question.   
 
This section will consider these issues.  It suggests that the following questions are 
relevant, although they need not necessarily be addressed in the order presented here.  
First, is the conduct in question likely to satisfy the key elements of the crimes that 
drafters would like to be included in the material jurisdiction of the tribunal?  Second, 
what is the available legal framework?  This entails considering whether the conduct 
is criminalized by customary international law, by a treaty to which the affected state 
is a party or by the domestic law of the affected state.  If conduct is not criminalized at 
the time of commission of the offence, its inclusion within the material jurisdiction of 
the tribunal risks violating the nullum crimen sine lege principle.  The available legal 
framework will, in many cases, dictate the balance between international and domestic 
crimes included in the legal instruments of the tribunal. Third, where the crime is 
criminalized by international law only, does international law as it pertains to 
international crimes have direct application in domestic law?  Finally, where there is 
any doubt as to whether the responses to these questions justify the inclusion of a 
particular crime, which entity is able to make the final decision as to its inclusion?  Is 
it the drafters of the constituent instruments, or is the question left to the prosecution 
or the tribunal itself?  These issues are all worthy of study, and will be considered by 
reference to the legal instruments and practice of the tribunals featured in this thesis.  
However, it has not been possible within the constraints of this study to provide a 
comprehensive assessment of the substantive jurisprudence of the tribunals. 
 
It should also be recalled that the legal issues discussed below are not the sole 
consideration in determining the balance of national and international crimes to be 
included within the material jurisdiction of a particular tribunal. As noted above, 
domestic and international politics and sensitivities, and assertions of national 
sovereignty, will also impact upon the regime adopted. For example, a state may 
consider it an assertion of its national sovereignty for an act to be tried in accordance 
with its own domestic law, rather than international law that has been imposed by the 
international community and may extend beyond the obligations that state has 
accepted as a matter of treaty law. This may be important to secure domestic support 
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for the tribunal, particularly where there is a sense that the government, in agreeing to 
a tribunal, has conceded too much authority to the United Nations or other states. Of 
course, it may also be a condition of the provision of assistance by the United Nations 
or states that the crimes committed be recognised as international crimes and tried as 
such, thus precluding the use of domestic legal provisions. Linked to this is the 
perception that characterising acts as international crimes is somehow superior to 
characterising the same behaviour as a crime under domestic law, even though from a 
legal and practical perspective, using national criminal provisions may offer important 
advantages in terms of likelihood of successfully establishing the crime in question, as 
well as shorter, less complex and ultimately less costly trials.  
5.1 Whether the conduct in question is likely to satisfy the key 
elements of the offence  
Chapter Two demonstrated that the tribunals studied were established in very different 
contexts.  In designing the substantive jurisdiction of a tribunal, it is necessary to 
consider what evidence is likely to be available to the tribunal, and whether that 
evidence suggests that the conduct in question will satisfy the key elements of the 
crime that may be included.  It should be recalled that, in making this decision, those 
designing the tribunal will not have all the evidence available to them, and will need to 
be satisfied that there is sufficient evidence to suggest that the crimes in question were 
possibly committed.  Designers may be assisted in this regard – but are not bound - by 
the reports of previous investigative commissions, expert groups or rapporteurs, or by 
information made available by the United Nations, states, and other organisations.78  
In relation to international crimes, this decision requires examining whether the 
evidence would satisfy the so-called ‘threshold’ or context elements of the crimes.  
Here we will examine the approaches adopted by the drafters of the tribunals and the 
practice of the tribunals in relation to three international crimes: genocide, war crimes 
and crimes against humanity.   
5.1.1 Genocide 
Five of the seven tribunals studied may try defendants in respect of acts of genocide. 
Problematic elements are establishing that the group targeted was a protected group 
and that the prohibited acts were committed with the necessary special intent.  
Genocide was not included within the material jurisdiction of the SCSL due to the 
‘lack of evidence that the massive, large-scale killing in Sierra Leone was at any time 
perpetrated against an identified national, ethnic, racial or religious group with an 
                                                 
78 For example, designers of the LST were assisted by the evidence collected by the UNIIIC.  
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intent to annihilate the group as such’.79  Similarly, it is unlikely that genocide was 
committed in Cambodia, as the crimes committed by the Khmer Rouge were directed 
at political or economic groups, which are not groups protected by the definition of 
genocide found in the Genocide Convention.80  However, it may be possible to 
establish genocide in respect of acts committed against specific groups, such as the 
Cham, Chinese and Vietnamese and Buddhist monks.81  In addition, the element of 
intention to destroy a particular national, ethnic, racial or religious group may be 
difficult to establish in relation to the Khmer Rouge.   
 
While it has been suggested that genocide occurred in East Timor during the period of 
Indonesian occupation, there is some doubt as to the legal basis for such claims. 
Attacks against the civilian population were mainly targeted at the independence 
movement and those in political opposition to the occupation, and did not target the 
East Timorese as a national, ethnic, racial or religious group as such.82 It may also be 
difficult to establish the special intent to commit genocide on the part of the 
Indonesian government or military, as the acts in question could have been ‘justified’ 
by military or security objectives.83  As Saul notes, ‘[T]he immediate military 
objective throughout the period was to secure territorial and political control of East 
Timor.  The continuing Indonesian military presence was arguably a response to the 
resistance of the FALINTIL intended to suppress the East Timorese opposition to 
Indonesian rule, but not intended physically to destroy the population’.84  It is also 
unlikely that the conduct of the Indonesian forces and militia in the aftermath of the 
referendum constituted genocide.85   
 
                                                 
79 Report, note 9, para. 13.  The Security Council did not include the crime of genocide in its 
recommendation to the Secretary-General in Resolution 1315. 
80 For further discussion, see Schabas, W., ‘Problems of International Codification – Were the 
Atrocities in Cambodia and Kosovo Genocide?’ (2001) 35 NELR 287; Abrams, J., ‘The 
Atrocities in Cambodia and Kosovo:  Observations on the Codification of Genocide’ (2000-01) 
35 NELR 303, 307; Williams, S., ‘Genocide:  The Cambodian Experience’ (2005) 5 
International Criminal Law Review 447; and Hurst, H., ‘International Law and Cambodian 
Genocide: The Sounds of Silence’ (1989) 11 HRQ 82; Bunyanunda, note 59. 
81 See also Ratner, S. and Abrams, J., Accountability for Human Rights Atrocities in 
International Law (2nd ed, 2001), 284–288; Linton, S., ‘Cambodia, East Timor and Sierra 
Leone:  Experiments in International Justice’ (2001) 12 Crim LF 185, 194; and Abrams, ibid, 
305-6.  
82 Saul notes that the one exception to this was the ethnic Chinese population, which was 
targeted for systematic destruction: Saul, B., ‘Was the Conflict in East Timor “Genocide” and 
Why Does It Matter?’ (2001) 2 Melb ULR 477, 502. 
83 See Clark, R., Does the Genocide Convention Go Far Enough?  Some Thoughts on the 
Nature of Criminal Genocide in the Context of Indonesia’s Invasion of East Timor’ (1981) 8 
Ohio Northern University Law Review 321 and discussion in Saul, ibid. 
84 Saul, note 79, 513.  Emphasis in original. 
85 Ibid. 
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It is also now accepted that genocide did not occur in Kosovo, despite initial reports to 
the contrary.  While the Kosovo Albanians would constitute a national or ethnic group 
protected by the Genocide Convention, and many of the acts committed against the 
Albanian population would have been prohibited acts, it is questionable whether the 
Serb forces or the Serb government possessed the necessary special intent.  As 
Abrams concludes, ‘[t]he intent of the Serb attacks appears, for the most part, to have 
been to root out the KLA and to drive the Albanian population from the areas they 
inhabited – in other words, ethnic cleansing’.86  This conclusion is supported by the 
practice of the IJPP.  In the seven years of UNMIK’s operation, the national courts in 
Kosovo issued four indictments for genocide.87  None resulted in convictions.  In the 
Vuckovic case, two Kosovo Serbs were indicted for genocide for events from 22 
March 1999 to the beginning of May 1999.88 While the accused were convicted of 
genocide at first instance by a panel comprising a majority of national judges, the 
Supreme Court, with a majority of international judges, reversed the verdict on the 
basis that the facts established at trial did not support a conviction for genocide.  It 
stated that ‘the exactions committed by the Milosevic’s [sic] regime in 1999 cannot be 
qualified as criminal acts of genocide, since their purpose was not the destruction of 
the Albanian ethnic group in whole or in part, but its forceful departure from Kosovo 
as a result of [sic] systematic campaign of terror including murders, rapes, arsons and 
severe maltreatments’.89 The international prosecutor substituted a charge of war 
crimes for the retrial. In Jokic, the panel convicted the accused of war crimes.90 
Charges of genocide were amended91 or abandoned92 in two other cases. The OSCE 
trial monitoring section noted that ‘[t]he initial charges were, in light of the trial 
                                                 
86 Abrams, note 80, 308.  See also Schabas, note 80. 
87 Given that indictments and judgments are not made a matter of public record, it is very 
difficult to obtain accurate information concerning cases before local courts and the IJPP. 
UNMIK does not maintain a comprehensive list of cases involving international judges and 
prosecutors, nor is there a database detailing cases concerning acts committed during the 
conflict. The information in this thesis is taken from Annex Three to the report by Amnesty 
International, Serbia (Kosovo):  The Challenge to Fix a Failed UN Justice Mission, February 
2008. Research for the report was conducted in 2006 and 2007. This report details 26 cases. 
However, other sources, such as the United States State Department, indicate that there may be 
as many as 40 cases:  State Department, Country Report on Human Rights Practices 2005: 
Serbia and Montenegro, March 2006. 
88 Prosecutor v Miroslav Vuckovic and Bozur Bisevac, Indictment, 29 November 1999. 
89 Prosecutor v Vuckovic, Supreme Court of Kosovo, 31 August 2001, quoted from Schabas, 
W., ‘National Courts Finally Begin to Prosecute Genocide, the “Crime of Crimes”’ (2003) 1 
JICJ 39 at 63. See also OSCE Mission in Kosovo, Kosovo War Crimes Trials: A Review, 
September 2002, 50. 
90 Prosecutor v Jokic. The prosecutor had submitted the case based on a charge of genocide. 
91 Prosecutor v Juvenile X, the international prosecutor amended to the charge of causing 
general danger and grave acts against general security. 
92 Prosecutor v Igor Simic et al, the international prosecutor abandoned the genocide 
prosecution for lack of evidence. 
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evidence, inflated, not grounded by serious legal considerations and solid analysis’.93  
It is also supported by the charging practice of the ICTY, where the prosecution has 
characterised the acts committed in Kosovo as war crimes or crimes against 
humanity.94 
 
In contrast, in Iraq and Bosnia, evidence supported the inclusion of the crime of 
genocide. The ICTY had determined that events in Srebrenica constituted genocide.95  
The International Court of Justice concurred with the finding that the mass killing in 
Srebrenica constituted genocide,96 determining that while Serbia had not been 
complicit in the acts of genocide, it had violated the obligation to prevent and to 
punish the commission of acts of genocide.97  As at 31 December 2008, six 
indictments including charges of genocide had been issued by the WCC in relation to 
the atrocities committed at Srebrenica: one was included in a case referred by the 
ICTY,98 while the remaining indictments were issued by the national Prosecutor.99  
The Trial Chamber delivered judgment in one of the latter cases on 29 July 2008, 
finding the accused guilty of acts of genocide in relation to the killing of more than 
1,000 Bosniak men in Kravica on 13 July 1995.100  
 
There was also sufficient evidence to support the inclusion of the crime of genocide in 
the IHT Statute.  The second major trial held before the IHT, the Anfal trial, charged 
seven defendants with genocide.  The charges focused on a series of coordinated 
attacks by Iraqi forces in 1988-1989, which targeted the Kurdish population in 
northern Iraq and included the use of chemical weapons. It is estimated that between 
                                                 
93 OSCE Mission in Kosovo, Kosovo War Crimes Trials: A Review, September 2002, 34. 
94 See the cases and indictments referred to in note 70. 
95 Prosecutor v Kristic, Judgment, Trial Chamber, 2 August 2001, para 595.  This finding was 
confirmed by the Appeals Chamber in April 2004.  For discussion of this decision, see 
Schabas, W., ‘Was Genocide Committed in Bosnia and Herzegovina? First Judgments of the 
International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia’ (2002) 25 FILJ 23 and Southwick, 
K., ‘Srebrenica as Genocide? The Krstic Decision and the Language of the Unspeakable’ 8 
Yale Human Rights & Development Law Journal 188. 
96 The Application of the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of 
Genocide (Bosnia and Herzegovina v. Serbia and Montenegro), Judgment, 26 February 2007, 
para. 297. 
97 Ibid, para. 438 (prevention) and para. 449 (punishment).   
98 Prosecutor v Milorad Trbic, Indictment issued 25 July 2007. 
99 Prosecutor v Mitrovic et al. The indictment was subsequently amended into three separate 
indictments, in the cases of Prosecutor v Mitrovic, Prosecutor v Stevanovic, and Prosecutor v 
Stupar et al. Prosecutor v Vukovic, Indictment issued 2 September 2008.  Prosecutor v Gavic, 
Indictment issued 11 June 2008; Prosecutor v Tomic, indictment issued 25 August 2008; 
Prosecutor v Todorovic, amended indictment issued 13 October 2008, the accused pleaded 
guilty to aiding and abetting crimes against humanity and violations of international 
humanitarian law and the genocide charge was withdrawn; and Prosecutor v Pelimis and 
another, Indictment issued 28 November 2008. 
100 Prosecutor v Stupar et al, First Instance Decision, 29 July 2008. 
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50,000 and 100,000 Kurds were killed, 1.5 million Kurds were resettled and 60,000 
Kurds fled to Turkey as refugees.101 The IHT convicted five of the defendants for 
genocide.102 The Trial Chamber held that the Kurds were a national and ethnic group, 
targeted for their ethnicity.103  The accused committed or instigated prohibited acts 
against the Kurds in Anfal, in particular killings, causing severe mental or physical 
damage and subjecting the community to harsh conditions of living.  These acts were 
committed with the necessary special intent.104  Of the other atrocities committed 
during the Hussein regime, two instances may constitute genocide and could form the 
basis of future trials for genocide:  the campaign against the Marsh Arabs in southern 
Iraq105 and the attacks against the town of Halabja.106  
5.1.2 War Crimes 
The main determinant in the inclusion of war crimes in the material jurisdiction of a 
tribunal is the existence of an armed conflict, as all war crimes must have been 
committed in connection with an armed conflict.  The nature of that armed conflict, 
whether international or non-international, will govern the type of war crime that is 
                                                 
101 For further details see Human Rights Watch, Genocide in Iraq: The Anfal Campaign 
Against the Kurds (1993). 
102 Charges against one defendant were dropped for lack of evidence. Saddam Hussein was 
removed from the indictment following his execution on 30 December 2006.  For criticism of 
the decision to remove Hussein from the proceedings, see Kelly, M., ‘The Anfal trial against 
Saddam Hussein’ (2007) 9 Journal of Genocide Research 235. The judgment confirmed 
widely held opinion that the acts against the Kurds in Anfal constituted genocide:  Kelly, M., 
‘The Tricky Nature of Proving Genocide Against Saddam Hussein Before the Iraqi Special 
Tribunal’ (2005) 38 Cornell International Law Journal 983.  Unlike the first judgment of the 
IHT in the Dujail trial, the Anfal judgment, despite its significance as the first genocide 
conviction to be given in the Middle East and to be presented in Arabic, has attracted little 
attention from the media or commentators. 
103 Special Verdict Pertaining to Case No 1/ CSecond/2006, Al Anfal, 24 June 2007 (Unofficial 
English translation), (Anfal judgment) 489-90. 
104 The Trial Chamber rejected submissions on behalf of the accused that the special intent was 
lacking.  The genocidal intent was inferred from the acts committed, the systematic manner in 
which they were conducted, and evidence produced by witnesses and in official documents 
from the period. 
105 Several commentators consider that this may have constituted genocide:  see Schwabach, 
A., ‘Ecocide and Genocide in Iraq: International Law, the Marsh Arabs, and Environmental 
Damage in Non-International Armed Conflicts’ (2004) 15 Colorado Journal of International 
Environmental Law & Policy 1, 8; Nesiah, V., ‘From Berlin to Bonn to Baghdad: A Space for 
Infinite Justice’ (2004) 17 HHRJ 75, 97; and Nicholson, E., Case for Genocide:  The 
Decimation of the Marsh Arabs, (available at http://www.emmanicholson.org.uk).  However, 
as Kelly notes, the case for the genocide of the Marsh Arabs will be difficult for the 
prosecution to establish, particularly as the act was the result of a more indirect method – 
draining the marshes – and there are other possible justifications for the policy against the 
Marsh Arabs. 
106 This charge would concern the use of multiple chemical weapons by the Iraqi military 
against the Kurdish town of Halabja in March 1988.  Up to 7,000 Kurds perished in the attack. 
See:  Kelly, note 99, 237 and Kelly, M., Ghosts of Halabja:  Saddam Hussein’s Trial for the 
Kurdish Massacre (2008, Praeger Security International).  It appears that the IHT has not 
charged genocide in this case:  Jurist, ‘Court begins new trial for “Chemical Ali”’ 22 December 
2008. 
 156 
included in the statute. The conflict in Sierra Leone was generally considered to be a 
non-international armed conflict, despite the suggested involvement of foreign 
elements.107  Accordingly, the SCSL Statute includes jurisdiction only in respect of 
serious violations of Common Article 3 and Additional Protocol II to the Geneva 
Conventions, which regulate internal armed conflicts.108  Sierra Leone was a party to 
these instruments at the relevant time.109  The SCSL Statute also confers jurisdiction in 
respect of three specific offences as serious violations of international humanitarian 
law:110  intentionally directing attacks against the civilian population as such or against 
civilians not taking direct part in hostilities;111 intentionally directing attacks against 
protected personnel, installations, material, units or vehicles involved in a 
humanitarian assistance or peacekeeping mission in accordance with the Charter of the 
United Nations;112 and conscripting or enlisting children under the age of 15 into 
armed forces or groups or using them to participate actively in hostilities.113  The final 
provision addresses the issue of the recruitment and use of child soldiers, which was 
widespread in Sierra Leone. Charges under this article have been included in all 
indictments issued by the SCSL. However, there were concerns that this provision did 
not represent customary international law.114  The Appeals Chamber has confirmed 
                                                 
107 The conflict in Sierra Leone has been linked with the conflict in Liberia.  Charles Taylor, 
the former President of Liberia, was alleged to have been a principle supporter of the conflict 
in Sierra Leone.  It has also been suggested that Burkina Faso provided military assistance to 
the RUF:  see Akinrinade, B., ‘International Humanitarian Law and the Conflict in Sierra 
Leone’ (2001) 15 Notre Dame Journal of Law, Ethics and Public Policy 391, 406.  
108 The Appeals Chamber and both Trial Chambers have held that ‘it is immaterial whether the 
conflict is internal or international in nature’ for the application of articles 3 and 4 of the SCSL 
Statute:  Prosecutor v Norman, Fofana and Kondewa, Decision on Motions for Judgment of 
Acquittal Pursuant to Rule 98, 21 October 2005, para. 68; Prosecutor v Fofana, Appeals 
Chamber, Decision on Preliminary Motion on Lack of Jurisdiction Materiae:  Nature of the 
Armed Conflict, 25 May 2004, para. 31; Prosecutor v Brima, Kamara and Kanu, Judgment, 20 
June 2007, para. 249; and Prosecutor v Norman, Fofana and Kondewa, Judgment, 2 August 
2007, para. 696. 
109 See Table Three. 
110 Article 4. Contrast Article 3 of the ICTY Statute, which has been held to give residual 
jurisdiction in respect of other violations of international humanitarian law not contained in the 
other provisions of the ICTY Statute.    
111 This provision is identical to Article 8(b)(i) of the Rome Statute in relation to international 
armed conflict and to Article 8(e)(i) for non-international armed conflicts.   
112 The provision is drawn from Article 8(b)(iii) of the Rome Statute for international armed 
conflict and 8(e)(iii) for non-international armed conflicts.  For discussion see Frulli, note 15, 
864-5. 
113 This duplicates Article 8(b)(xxvi) of the Rome Statute which is applicable to international 
armed conflict and is largely the same as Article 8(e)(vii) for non-international armed conflicts. 
114 The provision as included in the SCSL Statute was not the original proposal. Concerned that 
the provision in the Rome Statute did not reflect customary international law, the Secretary 
General had recommended that the offence be restricted to ‘abduction and forced recruitment 
of children under the age of 15 years into armed forces or groups for the purpose of using them 
to participate actively in hostilities’:  Report, note 9, paras 17-18.  It was the Security Council 
that insisted that the provision be amended so as to conform to the text of the Rome Statute: see 
S/2000/1234. 
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that the prohibition against the recruitment of child soldiers had customary 
international law status before 30 November 1996, the date the SCSL’s temporal 
jurisdiction commenced.115 Moreover, the Appeals Chamber held that child 
recruitment was criminalized under customary international law before it was set out 
as a criminal provision in treaty law, and certainly by November 1996, thus there was 
no issue concerning the retroactive application of article 4(c).116 
 
The IHT has jurisdiction in respect of crimes committed in connection with both 
international armed conflicts and non-international armed conflicts.  There are three 
international armed conflicts within the temporal jurisdiction to which the grave 
breaches provisions of the Geneva Conventions would apply: the Iran-Iraq war;117 the 
invasion of Kuwait and the first Gulf War,118 and the 2003 invasion of Iraq. However, 
there have been no trials in relation to these armed conflicts, although it appears that 
the IHT may be investigating possible war crimes committed during the invasion and 
occupation of Kuwait.  There have been charges and convictions in relation to non-
international armed conflicts.  In the Anfal judgment, the Trial Chamber determined 
that there was a non-international armed conflict between the Government of Iraq and 
Pishmarga forces during the relevant time119 and that the campaign in Anfal was 
connected with that armed conflict and was directed against the civilian population.120  
The accused were convicted of various crimes under article 13(4) of the IHT, 
characterised as other serious violations of the laws and customs of war applicable in a 
non-international armed conflict.  
 
                                                 
115 Prosecutor v Sam Hinga Norman, Decision on Preliminary Motion Based on Lack of 
Jurisdiction (Child Recruitment), Appeals Chamber, 31 May 2004, paras 17 to 23.  For 
discussion, see Happold, M., ‘International Humanitarian Law, War Criminality and Child 
Recruitment:  The Special Court for Sierra Leone’s Decision in Prosecutor v Samuel Hinga 
Norman’ (2005) 18 LJIL 283; Smith, A., ‘Child Recruitment and the Special Court for Sierra 
Leone’ (2004) 2 JICJ 1141; La Haye, E., War Crimes in Internal Armed Conflicts (2008), 145-
6.  Both trial chambers have subsequently relied upon the decision of the Appeals Chamber on 
the customary status of this provision. 
116 Ibid, para. 53.  Judge Robertson issued a strongly-worded dissenting opinion and was the 
only judge to address the hesitant position taken by the Secretary General during the drafting of 
the SCSL Statute: Dissenting opinion of Justice Robertson, 31 May 2004, paras 4 to 6.  
117 Iran became a party to the Geneva Conventions on 20 February 1957.  Neither Iran nor Iraq 
is a party to Additional Protocols I or II.  
118 Kuwait became a party to the Geneva Conventions on 2 September 1967. It is also a party 
to Additional Protocol I (as at 17 January 1985). 
119 Although the trial chamber did not refer to the decision in Tadic, it appeared to adopt its 
criteria, noting that the Pishmarga forces were organised in military units having their own 
command and that ‘the situation in Northern Iraq must not be considered an internal 
disturbance’:  Anfal judgment, 579. 
120 Ibid, 579.  
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Determining whether the threshold requirement of an armed conflict has been satisfied 
and the nature of the armed conflict was particularly difficult in East Timor.  As Kress 
notes, ‘this threshold issue cannot be satisfactorily explored without touching upon the 
question of the international legal status of Indonesia’s presence in East Timor since 7 
December 1975’.121  East Timor became an occupied territory when it was ‘placed 
under the authority of the hostile army’.122  The International Court of Justice has 
found that, following the departure of the Portuguese authorities from East Timor, 
‘Indonesia has occupied the Territory, and the Parties acknowledge that the Territory 
has remained under the effective control of that state’.123  From December 1975, East 
Timor was under Indonesian occupation, as provided for in common article 2 to the 
Geneva Conventions124 and in customary international law.125  The Geneva 
Conventions, in particular the grave breaches provisions set out in the fourth Geneva 
Convention, applied.126  The Indonesian occupation subsisted until the withdrawal of 
Indonesian forces from East Timor sometime after 20 September 1999,127 as did the 
application of the conventions.128  The situation constituted one of international armed 
conflict.  Evidence suggests that the majority of the violence during the relevant 
period was carried out by pro-integration militia.  It is probable that the actions of such 
groups could be attributed to Indonesia and would be connected with the occupation, 
thus may have formed the basis of war crimes charges.  There have also been 
suggestions that a non-international armed conflict existed in East Timor, between the 
pro-independence militia and pro-integration militia, acting with or under the control 
of the Indonesian military.  Such a finding would have been controversial, as it would 
suggest that the Indonesian occupation was lawful, and that East Timor had become 
part of Indonesian territory.  Alternatively, it would require a determination that the 
pro-integration forces were not attributable to Indonesia, that the militia were 
                                                 
121 Kress, C., ‘The 1999 Crisis in East Timor and the Threshold of the Law on War Crimes’ 
(2002) 13 Crim LF 409, 421. 
122 Article 42, Regulations to Hague Convention IV, 1907. 
123 East Timor (Portugal v Australia) ICJ Reports (1995), para. 13. 
124 Article 2, Fourth Geneva Convention indicates that the convention applies ‘to all cases of 
partial or total occupation of the territory of a High Contracting Party, even if the said 
occupation meets with no armed resistance’.   
125 Kress, note 121, 426.  See also Linton, S., ‘Prosecuting Atrocities at the District Court of 
Dili’ (2001) 2 Melb JIL 414, 441.   
126 For discussion, see Kress, note 121, 429-434; Linton, ibid, 444. 
127 The status of occupation ends when the occupying power withdraws its forces from the 
occupied territory.  Kress notes that in Indonesia this occurred sometime between 20 
September 1999 (the date of deployment of INTERFET) and 4 October 1999, by which time 
Indonesian had substantially reduced the number and role of its forces:  Kress, note 121, 445-
447.  
128 Arguably, the full protection of the fourth Geneva Convention would have lapsed one year 
after the close of military operations, although key provisions would have continued to apply: 
article 6, Fourth Geneva Convention. 
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organised and that the instances of violence between the two groups was of a 
sufficient intensity so as to constitute a non-international armed conflict.  The 
available evidence suggests that it is unlikely that these elements would be satisfied.  
If they were, the provisions of Common Article 3 would have applied, violations of 
which give rise to criminal responsibility.129   
 
The Commission of Inquiry report did not refer to the inclusion of war crimes in the 
material jurisdiction of the proposed tribunal.  The SPSC have not been required to 
determine whether an armed conflict existed, and the nature of that conflict, as no 
indictments were issued including charges of war crimes.  Interestingly, the SPSC did 
determine, in obiter, that:130 
 
[D]uring 24 years of Indonesian rule in East Timor, there was an armed 
conflict between paramilitary groups openly supported by Jakarta and others 
dedicated to the independence of this half-island territory since the Portuguese 
colonial period. That conflict heightened in the second half of late 1990’s with 
the persecution against civilian population when the international community 
addressed its concerns about the autonomy or independence of this 
territory….The Panel notes that the parties agreed that, at least some months 
before and after the popular consultation on 30 August 1999, there was an 
armed conflict in East Timor.’ 
 
This finding has been criticised, as it demonstrates a misunderstanding of the elements 
required to establish crimes against humanity, with the panel indicating – incorrectly - 
that a connection to an armed conflict was required.131  Moreover, the conclusion as to 
the existence of an armed conflict was reached without any reference to the applicable 
jurisprudence of the ICTY, including the test developed in Tadic.  The finding also 
does not consider the effect of Indonesia’s unlawful occupation of East Timor, nor the 
implications of the peace agreement between the Indonesian military and FALINTIL 
on 21 April 1999. 
 
The ICTY has held that there existed an international armed conflict in Bosnia from 
1992 to 1995 and that a situation of armed conflict existed from 1992 to the signing of 
                                                 
129 See Amnesty International, East Timor: Demand for Justice, 28 October 1999, 13-4.  As 
Indonesia is not a party to Additional Protocol II, the provisions of Additional Protocol II 
would apply only to the extent they were considered to be reflected in customary international 
law: Greenwood, C., ‘Customary Law Status of the 1977 Additional Protocols’ in Delissen & 
Tanja (eds) Humanitarian Law of Armed Conflict:  Challenges Ahead, Essays in Honour of 
Frits Kalshoven (1991) 93. 
130 General Prosecutor v Joni Marques and 9 others (The Los Palos Case), Judgment, 11 
December 2001, paras 680-1 (footnotes omitted). 
131 For further discussion, see JSMP Trial Report, The Los Palos Case, March 2002. 
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the Dayton Agreement in 1995.132  The ICTY generally does not specify the nature of 
the armed conflict, due to its finding that violations of Common Article 3 gave rise to 
individual criminal liability in both international and non-international armed 
conflicts.  The Criminal Code of Bosnia and Herzegovina criminalises war crimes 
against civilians (Article 173), war crimes against the wounded and sick (Article 174) 
and war crimes against prisoners of war (Article 175).   These provisions are based on 
those found in the SFRY Criminal Code and partially implement Bosnia’s obligations 
arising from the Geneva Conventions and the first and second Additional Protocols.  
The WCC has issued a number of indictments and rendered several convictions for 
war crimes, in particular violations of Articles 173 and 175.   
 
It is generally accepted that the period in Kosovo from 24 March to 10 June 1999 (the 
NATO bombing campaign) constituted an international armed conflict. The ICTY has 
held that a non-international armed conflict existed in Kosovo between the Kosovo 
Liberation Army (KLA) and the armed forces of the FRY133 and continued until at 
least the commencement of the bombing campaign.134  This is reflected in the charging 
practice of the ICTY, where all indictments concerning Kosovo have charged acts as 
war crimes pursuant to Article 3 of the ICTY statute, rather than under Article 2, the 
grave breaches provision.  As with the genocide cases discussed above, many of the 
earlier cases in Kosovo to consider war crimes charges reflected apparent 
overcharging in relation to alleged acts by Serbs, resulting in several convictions being 
overturned by the Supreme Court.135 The Supreme Court has determined that ‘the 
armed conflict in Kosovo between March 24 1999 and June 1999 consisted of an 
                                                 
132 Prosecutor v Tadic, Judgment, Appeals Chamber, 2 October 1995, paras. 84-86 and 
Prosecutor v Kordic, Judgment, Trial Chamber, 26 February 2001, para. 66 (between the FRY 
- having ‘overall control’ of the Army of the Bosnian Serb military and paramilitary units - and 
the Army of Bosnia) and Prosecutor v Furundzija, Judgment, Trial Chamber, 10 December 
1998, paras 51-59 (between the Croatian Defence Council and the Army of BiH); Prosecutor v 
Rajic, Review of the Indictment pursuant to Rule 61 of the RPE, Trial Chamber, 13 September 
1996, paras. 13, 26, 32 and Prosecutor v Blaskic, Judgment, Trial Chamber, 3 March 2000, 
paras 83-123 (Croatian control over Bosnian Croats). See also the discussion in Schabas, note 
1, 243-246. 
133 Prosecutor v Limaj, Judgment, Trial Chamber, 30 November 2005, para. 171 (‘before the 
end of May 1998 an armed conflict existed in Kosovo between the Serbian forces and the 
KLA’); Prosecutor v Haradinaj et al, Judgment, Trial Chamber, 3 April 2008, para. 100 
(armed conflict existed from and including 22 April 1998).  For discussion of the analysis of 
the ICTY in the Limaj case, see La Haye, note 115, 11-12. 
134 Prosecutor v Slobodan Milosevic, Decision on Motion of Acquittal, 16 June 2004, paras 14-
40.  The Trial Chamber determined that there was sufficient evidence of an armed conflict in 
Kosovo between 1 January 1999 and 24 March 1999. 
135 For example, in the Apostolovic case, four Serbs were charged with war crimes under article 
142 of the FRYCC.  An international prosecutor amended the indictment, dropping the war 
crimes charges and including instead a charge of causing general danger.  The accused was 
acquitted. See Hartmann, M., ‘Kosovo’ (2003) 4 YbIHL 514. 
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international armed conflict [ie FRY-NATO] alongside an internal one [ie FRY-
LKA]’.136  The Court rejected the suggestion that the NATO intervention had 
transformed the character of the conflict from a non-international armed conflict to an 
international armed conflict, finding that there was no evidence that NATO had 
overall control of the KLA ‘even applying the most lax “overall control” test’.137  
5.1.3 Crimes against humanity 
Perhaps the most difficult element to establish in relation to crimes against humanity 
is that the attack against the civilian population must have been widespread or 
systematic. It is now generally accepted that a connection to an armed conflict is not 
an element of a crime against humanity and that customary international law does not 
require a discriminatory motive other than for the offence of persecution. The offence 
of crimes against humanity is included in the material jurisdiction of all the tribunals 
studied, with the exception of the LST. Article 2 of the SCSL Statute incorporated 
crimes against humanity.138  All indictments issued by the SCSL included counts of 
crimes against humanity. The Appeals Chamber has held that the general elements of 
crimes against humanity had been established in relation to the activities of the CDF in 
Sierra Leone.139 Similarly, the Trial Chamber in the AFRC trial found that a 
widespread or systematic attack by AFRC/RUF forces was directed against the 
civilian population of Sierra Leone at all times relevant to the indictment.140  It also 
found evidence that preconceived plans or policies for the execution of the attack 
existed both in the period were the AFRC/RUF were the government and in the post-
intervention period.141   
 
The Special Law includes crimes against humanity in the material jurisdiction of the 
ECCC.  All individuals subject to investigation will most likely be charged with crimes 
against humanity.  On the evidence that was available to the Group of Experts, it 
appears that the most difficult element of the crime to establish would be the 
systematic nature of the attacks, as it has been argued that many atrocities ‘lacked 
                                                 
136 Kolasinac case, Supreme Court of Kosovo, Decision of 9 January 2004, para. 21, quoted 
from Hartmann, M., ‘Kosovo’ (2004) 7 YbIHL 568, 561.  In so doing, the Court endorsed the 
approach of pairing of conflicts, as opposed to the so-called global view, whereby the 
intervention of a foreign state changes the overall nature of the existing conflict. 
137 Ibid. 
138 See Udombana, N., ‘Globalization of Justice and the Special Court for Sierra Leone’s War 
Crimes’ (2003) 17 Em ILR 55. 
139 Prosecutor v Fofana and Kondewa, Judgment, Appeals Chamber, 28 May 2008, paras 232-
322 
140 Prosecutor v Brima, Kamara and Kanu, Judgment, Trial Chamber, 20 June 2007, paras 232 
and 237. 
141 Ibid, paras 230-2 and para. 238. 
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direction and amounted effectively to random cruelty’.142  Assuming that state action 
was required as of 1975, the Group of Experts also noted that ‘many of the acts 
appeared part of a deliberate, widely known governmental policy’143 and the State 
must have been involved as ‘only the Government … had the control of the country 
needed to engage in these acts’.144  
 
The reports of the Commission of Inquiry and the Special Rapporteurs highlighted that 
the violence committed in East Timor during 1999 was on a large scale, one that was 
widespread or systematic or both.145 Given the difficulties with establishing genocide 
and war crimes, most acts in East Timor were charged as crimes against humanity or 
as crimes under domestic law.  Section 5 of Regulation 2000/15 largely adopts the 
definition of crimes against humanity found in the Rome Statute,146 including the 
requirement to establish the policy element of the crime.  The first trial including 
charges of crimes against humanity commenced in July 2001.147 Notably, the SPSC 
found that it was ‘satisfied beyond reasonable doubt that there was an extensive attack 
by pro-autonomy groups supported by Indonesian authorities targeting the civilian 
population in the area, namely those linked with political movements for self-
determination in East Timor’.148 In reaching this finding, the SPSC relied upon the 
conclusions of the Commission of Inquiry, which had been admitted without 
challenge, and witness testimony. Subsequent decisions before the SPSC have 
confirmed the existence of a widespread and systematic attack.149  However, as all of 
the members of the Indonesian military and its command indicted by the SPSC 
                                                 
142 Report of the Group of Experts, note 54, para. 68. 
143 Report, note 54, para. 68. 
144 Report, note 54, para. 70. For a discussion of the prospects of a conviction for crimes 
against humanity, see Bunyanunda, note 57, 1591-1601. 
145 Report on the joint mission of the special rapporteurs and representatives, Situation of 
human rights in East Timor, A/54/660, 10 December 1999, para. 71; Report of the International 
Commission of Inquiry on East Timor, S/2000/59, A/54/726, para. 123. 
146 For a discussion of the textual differences between section 5 and article 7 of the Rome 
Statute, see Ambos, K. and Wirth, S., ‘The Current law of Crimes Against Humanity: an 
analysis of UNTAET Regulation 15/2000’ (2002) 13 Crim LF 1. 
147 The Los Palos case, filed in December 2000, comprised seven charges of crimes against 
humanity, including murder, torture, persecution and forced deportation.  The indictment 
related to ten East Timorese men, alleged to have been members or supporters of a militia 
group. 
148 The General Prosecutor v Joni Marques et al (the Los Palos case), Judgment, 11 December 
2001, para. 686. 
149 For example, see Prosecutor v Jose Cardoso, Judgment 5 April 2003, paras 314-321, ‘the 
events that took place in Lolotoe were a systematic attack against the civilian population’, 314. 
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remained at large, it was not possible to scrutinise the relationship between the East 
Timorese militia and the TNI and the role of the TNI in the violence.150 
 
Article 172 of the Criminal Code of Bosnia and Herzegovina largely duplicates the 
definition of crimes against humanity found in the Rome Statute.151 The WCC may, at 
the request of a party or proprio motu, accept as proven facts that have been 
established by legally binding decisions in proceedings before the ICTY or 
documentary evidence from proceedings of the ICTY.152  The WCC has relied upon 
the jurisprudence of the ICTY to establish the existence of a widespread and 
systematic attack on the civilian population in Bosnia.153  There was initial confusion 
as to the requirement for a nexus to an armed conflict, which is not required by Article 
172, although it is a requirement under Article 7 of the ICTY Statute. Early decisions 
of the WCC referred to the existence of an armed conflict and the fact that the attack 
occurred within this context. This confusion may have been created by the reliance by 
various panels on the jurisprudence of the ICTY.  Subsequent decisions have largely 
recognised this confusion.154 
 
While the IJPP has been conferred jurisdiction in respect of crimes against humanity, 
no indictments have been issued that include charges of crimes against humanity.  A 
public justification for the omission of charges of crimes against humanity has not 
been provided.  It may be that the reluctance to utilise the crimes against humanity 
provision stems from the difficulties the ICTY has faced in proving the existence of 
                                                 
150 This was one criticism that the JSMP directed at the decision in Cardoso (above).  While 
the three East Timorese accused were convicted, the Indonesian officer also indicted remained 
at large, thus there was no opportunity to document the relationship between the TNI and 
militia:  JSMP, The Lolotoe Case: A Small Step Forward, July 2004, 32-3. 
151 There is a slight difference in the provision concerning sexual violence, with article 172 
attempting to define rape:  see article 172(1)(g). 
152 Article 4, Law on the Transfer of Cases from the ICTY to the Prosecutor’s Office of Bosnia 
and Herzegovina and the Use of Evidence Collected by ICTY in Proceedings before the Courts 
in Bosnia and Herzegovina. 
153 For example, in the first judgment concerning crimes against humanity, the WCC accepted 
judgments of the Trial Chambers and Appeal Chamber in the Kunarac and Krnojelac cases, 
referring specifically to the findings of the ICTY in those judgments referring to ‘the existence 
of a widespread and systematic attack of the Army of Bosnian Serbs against civilian Bosniak 
population in the territory of the Municipalities of Foca, Kalinovik and Gacko’:  Prosecutor v 
Samardzic, Judgment, 7 April 2006, 14 
154 Prosecutor v Kovacevic, Judgment, 3 November 2006.  This finding has been repeated in 
several subsequent cases. See:  Prosecutor v Todorovic, note 98, 24-26; Prosecutor v 
Mihaljevic, Judgment, 16 April 2008, 15; Prosecutor v Fustar, Judgment, 21 April 2008, 10; 
Prosecutor v Vukovic, Judgment, 4 February 2008, 11; and Prosecutor v Jankovic, Judgment, 
16 February 2007, 31. 
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the general elements of the crime. 155  To date it has not found the existence of a 
widespread and systematic attack against a civilian population, at least in relation to 
the crimes alleged to have been committed by the KLA.156  
 
The LST Statute is the first constituent instrument of an internationalized or 
international criminal tribunal not to include jurisdiction in respect of crimes against 
humanity.  The Security Council did consider including crimes against humanity 
within the substantive jurisdiction of the LST and early drafts of the LST Statute had 
included crimes against humanity in Article 3.  The decision to remove this provision 
reflected a lack of support amongst Security Council members, concerned that it 
would be too difficult for the prosecution to demonstrate the general elements required 
to establish the assassination of Hariri as a crime against humanity.157 The failure to 
include crimes against humanity has also been attributed to specific requests from 
Russia and China.158  However, it is certainly arguable that the assassination and 
related attacks could constitute a crime against humanity.159  
5.2 Applicable legal framework 
In addition to whether the evidence could potentially satisfy the elements of the crimes 
to be included within the material jurisdiction of a tribunal, it is also necessary to 
examine the applicable legal framework.  First, was the conduct in question a crime 
under international law at the relevant time?  Conduct may be criminalised either by a 
treaty to which the state in question is a party, or under customary international law.  
Table Three details the treaties to which the states relevant to this study are party.  All 
states, with the exception of Sierra Leone, were at the relevant time party to the 
Genocide Convention. Genocide is also recognized as a crime under customary 
international law.160  All affected states were parties to the Geneva Conventions at the 
                                                 
155 However, the jurisdiction of the ICTY in respect of crimes against humanity in Kosovo is 
more restricted due to the requirement for a connection to armed conflict. This may make it 
problematic to charge crimes against humanity in relation to events occurring before the 
commencement of the armed conflict in Kosovo. 
156 Prosecutor v Limaj et al, Judgment, 30 November 2005, para. 228; Prosecutor v Haradinaj 
et al, Judgment, 3 April 2008, para. 122.  An appeal from this decision is pending as at 31 
December 2008, although it is not clear whether the Prosecutor will challenge the finding as to 
the failure to establish a widespread and systematic attack against the civilian population. 
157 Report, note 17, para. 23 
158 See Naharnet, ‘UN to Finalize Hariri International Tribunal Monday’, 24 October 2006 and 
Raghida Dergham, ‘Talks of Deals between Washington, Damascus and Tehran’, Dar Al 
Hayat, 3 November 2006. 
159 Report, note 17, para. 24; Jurdi, N., ‘The Subject-Matter Jurisdiction of the Special Tribunal 
for Lebanon’ (2007) 5 JICJ 1125, 1127, footnote 11. 
160 Reservations to the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of 
Genocide, Advisory Opinion, ICJ Reports (1951), para. 24; Application of the Convention on the 
Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide (Bosnia and Herzegovina v Serbia and 
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relevant time, so the inclusion of grave breaches is also consistent with treaty-based 
obligations.  However, the inclusion of provisions imposing individual criminal 
responsibility for violations of international humanitarian law in internal armed 
conflicts is more difficult.  Cambodia was not a party to Additional Protocol II during 
the relevant period, thus inclusion of crimes committed during a non-international 
armed conflict during this period would rely upon violations of Common Article 3 
giving rise to individual criminal responsibility.  The extension of war crimes to 
situations not involving an international armed conflict has been a relatively recent 
development, and the date from which war crimes in an internal armed conflict formed 
part of customary international law is uncertain. As the Group of Experts concluded, it 
is very difficult to argue that customary international law recognised such criminality 
by 1975.161  Thus the Special Law does not confer subject matter jurisdiction on the 
ECCC in relation to violations of international humanitarian law committed in a non-
armed conflict.162   
 
Similarly, Iraq is not a party to Additional Protocol II and there is some concern as to 
the application of article 13(4) of the IHT Statute to the situation in Anfal in 1987-88 
and to other situations in Iraq.  The provision criminalizes serious violations of the 
laws and customs of war applicable in a non-international armed conflict.  Several 
commentators have criticised the basis for the inclusion of war crimes in non-
international armed conflicts within the subject matter jurisdiction for this reason.163  
The IHT has rejected submissions that this violates the nullum crimen principle, 
                                                                                                                                 
Montenegro), Preliminary Objections, ICJ Reports (1996), 616; Armed Activities on the Territory of 
the Congo (New Application 2002) (Democratic Republic of the Congo v Rwanda), Jurisdiction 
of the Court and Admissibility of the Application, ICJ Reports (2006), para. 64; Case 
Concerning the application of the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime 
of Genocide (Bosnia and Herzegovina v Serbia and Montenegro), ICJ Reports (2007), para. 
161 
161 Report, note 54, para. 75.  This was two years before the International Committee of the 
Red Cross elaborated the laws of internal armed conflict in Additional Protocol II, which does 
not include any provisions on criminality.  Moreover, although the ICTY has recognised that 
criminal responsibility for violations of Common Article 3 existed by the time of the Yugoslav 
war, this statement was most likely premature, and did not reflect the existing state practice:  
La Haye, note 1125 170-172; Schabas, note 1, 231-236. In any event, this recognition is still 
some 15 years after the events in Cambodia. 
162 Even if criminality could be established, it is arguable that the rebellion and other acts of 
violence in Cambodia may not have crossed the threshold of intensity required: see Ratner and 
Abrams, note 81, 293-4. 
163 Bantekas, I., ‘The Iraqi special tribunal for crimes against humanity’ (2004) 54 ICLQ 237-
53, 242; Shany, Y., ‘Does One Size Fit All?’ (2004) 2 JICJ 338; and Olusanya, O., ‘The 
Statute of the Iraqi Special Tribunal for Crimes Against Humanity – Progressive or 
Regressive?’ (2004) 5 Geo LJ 859, 868-7 and 874. 
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finding that these crimes constituted customary international law.164  However, the 
discussion was in general terms, and did not address this particular issue. 
 
Until the adoption of the Rome Statute, there has not been a treaty-based definition of 
crimes against humanity.  However, all of the tribunals other than the LST have 
included crimes against humanity within their substantive jurisdiction.  The Special 
Law and the IHT Statute adopt the definition of crimes against humanity found in 
Article 7 of the Rome Statute.165  The inclusion of crimes against humanity based on 
the Rome Statute may potentially have breached the nullum crimen principle.  The 
ECCC will be considering acts committed in the period from 1975 to 1979, during 
which time Cambodian law did not criminalise crimes against humanity as such.  In 
particular, if the nexus to an armed conflict was required in customary international 
law as at 1975, ‘the vast majority of the Khmer Rouge’s atrocities would not be crimes 
against humanity; historians have not linked the bulk of the atrocities of the Khmer 
Rouge to the armed conflicts in which it engaged’.166  However, the Group of Experts 
concluded that the inclusion of crimes against humanity was ‘legally justified’, finding 
that the nexus to an armed conflict appeared to have been severed by 1975.167  
Moreover, many of the acts the Khmer Rouge is accused of committing clearly gave 
rise to individual criminal responsibility under international law by 1975.168   
 
Article 12 of the IHT Statute incorporates most of the definition of crimes against 
humanity found in Article 7 of the Rome Statute.  The use of this definition raises 
several issues.  First, Iraq is not a party to the Rome Statute, thus reliance on Article 7 
of the Rome Statute implies the imposition of a definition it has not accepted, let alone 
incorporated into domestic law.  Second, Iraqi law did not criminalise crimes against 
humanity before the promulgation of the IHT Statute.  This raises the possible 
retroactive nature of the inclusion of crimes against humanity in the IHT Statute, due 
                                                 
164 Al-Dujail Lawsuit, Case No. 1/9 First/2005, Judgment Decision, 5 November 2006, 
unofficial English translation, 35-44 (Al-Dujail Case). 
165 For criticism of using the Rome Statute definition in the Cambodian context, see 
Horsington, H., The Cambodian Khmer Rouge Tribunal: The Promise of a Hybrid Tribunal’ 
(2004) 5 MJIL 462, 473-4. 
166 Report, note 54, para. 71. 
167 Ibid.  The Group of Experts relied upon the 1968 Convention on the Non-Applicability of 
Statutory Limitations to War Crimes and Crimes Against Humanity and the 1954 International 
Law Commission Draft Code.  For the contrary view: Bunyanunda, note 57, 1591-2; Luftglass, 
S., ‘Crossroads in Cambodia: The United Nations Responsibility to Withdraw Involvement 
from the Establishment of a Cambodian Tribunal to Prosecute the Khmer Rouge’ (2004) 90 
Virginia Law Review 893, 922-4. 
168 Ratner and Abrams note murder, forced labour, torture, imprisonment and other inhumane 
acts:  note 81, 290.  The inclusion of other acts (such as enslavement, extermination and 
deportation) in the likely charges may be more problematic. 
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to the application of principles that may not have crystallised as part of customary 
international law until the 1990’s to acts and events from Iraq occurring several 
decades previously.169  In particular, Article 12 does not require a nexus to an armed 
conflict for crimes against humanity, yet this link was arguably a requirement for a 
crime against humanity under customary international law prior to the 1990’s.170   All 
trials to date have included charges of crimes against humanity.  The first decision of 
the IHT - the Dujail trial - addressed the issue of the possible retroactive application of 
the IHT Statute, finding that the inclusion of crimes against humanity did not violate 
the nullum crimen principle.171 In particular, the Trial Chamber concluded that crimes 
against humanity committed during peacetime were a crime under customary 
international law sometime before 1982.172 
 
In Bosnia and Kosovo, one issue was whether crimes against humanity have direct 
application in domestic law, as the criminal codes of the SFRY and the FRY did not 
criminalise this offence. Several accused before the WCC have argued that the use of 
Article 172 of the Criminal Code of Bosnia and Herzegovina violates the nullum 
crimen principle.173  The accused have suggested that conduct alleged to be a crime 
against humanity may only be prosecuted before the WCC if the acts in question 
would have constituted the offence of war crimes against civilians, criminalised by 
Article 142 of the SFRY Criminal Code.174  The WCC has consistently rejected this 
argument, finding that crimes against humanity had been criminalised under 
customary international law at the time of commission.175 The WCC’s reasoning has 
                                                 
169 Several commentators have raised this concern.  See, for example, Swift, R., ‘Occupational 
Jurisdiction:  A Critical Analysis of the Iraqi Special Tribunal’ (2006) 19 New York 
International Law Review 1, 6-7; Bassiouni, note 34, 373-74; Olusanya, note 160, 868.  As 
Bassiouni observes, this concern can be overcome with respect to genocide and war crimes (at 
least in relation to international armed conflicts) as Iraq was a party to the relevant treaties 
during this period and possibly in relation to crimes against humanity as many of the offences 
are found as ordinary crimes within domestic law: Bassiouni, note 34, 376-7. 
170 See the criticism of the IHT Statute on this ground in Shany, note 160, 344. 
171 Al-Dujail Case, 35-44.  This finding was confirmed by the Appeals Chamber and followed 
in the Anfal case. 
172 Ibid, 43-4.  The IHT relied upon numerous sources, including the 1950 report of the 
International Law Commission and article 2 of the Convention on the non-applicability of 
statutory limitations to war crimes and crimes against humanity 1968. It also noted that many 
of the acts in question had also been criminalised under Iraqi law. 
173 This principle is incorporated in the law of Bosnia by article 3 of the Criminal Code.  
Article 4(1) of provides that the applicable law is the law in force at the time of commission of 
the offence. Where that law has been amended, the WCC is to apply the provisions most 
favourable to the accused. 
174 This argument was made on behalf of the accused in Samardzic, note 150. 
175 See, for example, Samardzic, note 150, 28-30.  This aspect of the decision was confirmed 
by the Appeals Chamber, which noted that, in addition to forming part of customary 
international law, the conduct itself had been criminalised under the SRFY Criminal Code, 
 168 
been based on customary international law, relevant treaties and general principles of 
international law.176  Consequently, the WCC has held that use of Article 172 as the 
applicable law does not constitute a violation of the nullum crimen principle.177 In 
Kosovo, Article 117 of the Kosovo Provisional Criminal Code criminalises crimes 
against humanity, based on the definition in the Rome Statute.  A panel of District 
Court at Gjilan, which included an international judge, convicted the accused of 
crimes against humanity, although he had been indicted for war crimes and attempted 
murder.178  The court found that Article 142 of the SFRYCC incorporated the 
customary international law crime of crimes against humanity into Kosovo’s legal 
framework.  The conviction was cancelled by the Supreme Court of Kosovo, 
comprising a majority of international judges, following a submission by the 
international prosecutor that the charges were not supported by the facts and that there 
had been violations of the applicable procedural law.179  The case was referred for 
retrial, which did not include charges of crimes against humanity.180  The decision of 
the District Court and, by implication, the approach adopted by the WCC has been 
criticised as violating the nullum crimen principle.  Bohlander argues that the 
provisions in the constitutional orders of both Bosnia and Kosovo would take 
precedence over clauses that purport to incorporate customary international law.  
Where an offence is to be tried before a national court, it is essential that any crimes 
found in customary international law, in this case crimes against humanity, have been 
incorporated into domestic law.181  It appears that the issue has not been raised before 
the IJPP since this decision, as no indictments have been issued including charges of 
crimes against humanity. 
 
                                                                                                                                 
albeit not as a crime against humanity:  Samardzic, Appeal Chamber, note 150, page number 
not identifiable. 
176 Arguably the most detailed discussion of this issue is found in Prosecutor v Palija, 
Judgment, 28 November 2007, 18-21 and Prosecutor v Damjanovic, Judgment, 15 December 
2006, 55-59. 
177 This is consistent with the jurisprudence of the ICTY on this point, with the Referral Bench 
concluding that, while the question of the applicable law was one for the national court, the 
possible options for the applicable law in Bosnia satisfied the requirements of Rule 11bis and 
would not violate the nullum crimen principle. See Williams, note 45. 
178 Prosecutor v Trajkovic, Decision, District Court of Gjilan, 6 March 2001, (2001) 4 YbIHL 
12. 
179 Prosecutor v Trajkovic, Supreme Court of Kosovo, 30 November 2001, (2001) 4 YbIHL 12.  
The Supreme Court was not required to address the issue of direct application as it reversed the 
conviction on other grounds. 
180 Hartmann, M., (2002) 5 YbIHL 408 
181 Bohlander, M., ‘The Direct Application of International Criminal Law in Kosovo’ (2001) 1 
Kosovo Legal Studies 7; Bohlander, note 27. 
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5.3 Crimes under domestic law 
Much of the conduct criminalised by international law is also criminalised as an 
ordinary crime under domestic law, for example murder, torture, rape and assault.  
There are a number of reasons that may justify including crimes under national law 
within the jurisdiction of an internationalized or hybrid tribunal.  First, the inclusion of 
offences under domestic law enables the tribunal to exercise jurisdiction where 
international law does not fully criminalize the conduct in question.  Jurisdiction under 
domestic law was included in the SCSL Statute as the conduct in question was 
identified as ‘a specific situation or aspect of it was considered to be either 
unregulated or inadequately regulated under international law’.182  The SCSL has 
jurisdiction in respect of two specific types of offences, the abuse of girls under the 
Prevention of Cruelty to Children Act 1926 and the wanton destruction of property 
under the Malicious Damage Act 1861, including arson.183  However, the Prosecutor 
has elected not to issue any charges based on the national legal provisions, instead 
charging the conduct as international crimes.184  This strategy has resulted in acquittals 
on some charges.  For example, in the CDF trial, the accused were charged with 
pillage as a war crime.  However the Trial Chamber held that ‘an essential element of 
pillage is the unlawful appropriation of property’ and that the destruction by burning 
of property does not constitute pillage’.185 The Appeals Chamber confirmed this 
finding, noting that if pillage included wanton destruction, there would have been no 
need to include jurisdiction in respect of the Malicious Damage Act 1861.186 
 
Second, drafters may include an offence as defined under national law where there is 
no consensus as to whether the crime, or an accepted definition of the crime, exists at 
the international level.  This was perhaps the main reason justifying the use of the 
definition of terrorism under the Lebanese Criminal Code in the LST Statute.  The 
Security Council may have adopted this approach due to the current disagreement 
amongst member states as to whether a definition of the international crime of 
                                                 
182 Report, note 9, para. 19.  This is also the intent of the provision expanding the jurisdiction 
of the IHT in respect of offences under international law where international criminal law does 
not fully cover the situation or the conduct in question. 
183 Fritz and Smith suggest that the inclusion of domestic crimes was not essential, as both of 
these offences ‘fall within the ambit of CDF international crimes included in the Statute’, note 
12, 409. 
184 The Prosecution has not provided any explanation of the reasons supporting this strategy.  It 
is possible that the strategy may reflect concerns that crimes under national law may be 
covered by the terms of the amnesty included in the Lome Accord, which is discussed in more 
detail in the next chapter. 
185 Prosecutor v Fofana and Kondewa, Judgment, Trial Chamber, 2 August 2007, para. 166. 
186 Judgment, note 136, para. 408. 
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terrorism exists.187 Relying on the domestic definition of the crime avoids the use of a 
definition of terrorism or terrorist acts as found in the various terrorism conventions188 
or a definition based on custom.189  A reference to the definition of terrorism in Article 
1 of the Arab Convention for the Suppression of Terrorism 1998, to which Lebanon is 
a party,190 was included in a preliminary draft of the LST Statute but was later deleted, 
reportedly at the request of a permanent member of the Security Council.191  As a 
result, the accused will be tried pursuant to the definition of terrorism under domestic 
law.  
 
In relation to Iraq, Kress has criticised the inclusion of the domestic offence of ‘the 
abuse of position and the pursuit of policies that were about to lead to the threat of war 
or the use of the armed forces of Iraq against an Arab country’ in the IHT Statute.192  
He argues that this provision represents a failure to include the crime of aggression as 
an international crime within the jurisdiction of the IHT.  Whilst this provision 
presumably does incorporate the domestic crime of using force against an Arab 
country, Kress asserts that this provision is not a codification of international 
principles on the crime of aggression, but a more limited provision aimed at 
criminalizing conduct that may threaten the security of other Arab states. 193  As such, 
it would not extend to the use of force against Iran, a non-Arab state, or attacks against 
Israel during the Gulf War and complicity in Palestinian violence against Israeli 
civilians.194  Further, Kress laments the ‘downgrading’ of waging a war of aggression 
into a domestic crime.195  However, as is demonstrated by the experience of the ICC, a 
generally accepted definition of aggression may not yet exist as a matter of customary 
international law.196  Thus, as the experience of the LST with regard to terrorism 
                                                 
187 Member states have been engaged in debate for several decades as to whether there is a 
common definition of terrorism, with the main cause for division the issue of whether the 
actions of ‘freedom fighters’ should be included in the definition of terrorism, or whether the 
definition should require an examination of the underlying cause of the attack. While this 
dispute remains unresolved, states have been reluctant to accept that a generally accepted 
definition of terrorism exists. 
188 Few treaties contain a comprehensive definition of terrorism, avoiding the political 
difficulties by instead listing specific acts that are considered terrorist acts. 
189 For the argument that a definition of terrorism exists as a matter of customary international 
law, see Cassese, A., ‘The Multifaceted Criminal Notion of Terrorism in International Law’ 
(2006) 4 JCIJ 933; and Saul, B., Defining Terrorism in International Law (2006). 
190 Lebanon ratified this convention on 31 March 1999. 
191 Jurdi, note 156, 1128, in particular footnote 18. 
192 Kress, C., ‘The Iraqi Special Tribunal and the Crime of Aggression’ (2004) 2 JICJ 347. 
193 Ibid, 348. 
194 Alvarez, ‘Trying Hussein: Between Hubris and Hegemony’ (2004) 2 JICJ 319, 321. 
195 Kress, note 192, 348. 
196 While the crime of aggression was included in the subject matter jurisdiction of the ICC, the 
court’s jurisdiction in respect of the crime of aggression has been deferred until agreement can 
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shows, it may have been very difficult to incorporate the crime of aggression as an 
international crime into the IHT Statute. 
 
Reliance on national provisions may eliminate a possible violation of the nullum 
crimen principle, which is particularly important when the temporal jurisdiction was a 
number of years ago or the applicable criminal law did not criminalise the conduct in 
question as an international crime.  As we have seen, several of the tribunals studied, 
in particular the IHT and the ECCC, have heard arguments in respect of possible 
violations of this principle. 
 
The inclusion of offences under national law may enable a full record of the context 
and range of crimes that have been committed during the conflict.  The original 
approach towards the IHT Statute was criticised for minimising the emphasis placed 
on ‘everyday’ crimes committed by the Hussein regime against its own people, 
focusing instead on the armed conflicts in which Iraq engaged during the regime.  
Many of these crimes would not meet the threshold or the specific intent required for 
genocide, or would lack the ‘widespread or systematic’ attack element required for 
crimes against humanity.  Yet, if one of the objectives of the IHT is to create a full 
record of the abuses perpetrated by the previous regime, exclusion of these everyday 
crimes would obscure the true nature of the crimes committed by the regime.  Shany, 
commenting on the original version of the IHT Statute, argued that to include more 
domestic crimes within the jurisdiction of the IHT would have ‘produced a more 
complete picture of the criminal practices allegedly committed by the Ba’ath 
regime’.197  In particular, he noted that the domestic offences of murder, sexual 
offences, torture198 and destruction of and damage to property should have been 
included, given the apparent frequent commission of these crimes during the Hussein 
regime.199  Shany also suggested that utilizing more provisions from domestic criminal 
law, subject to modifications, to fill gaps and to render the law compliant with 
international human rights standards, would have been more consistent with the 
                                                                                                                                 
be reached on a definition of the crime.  The issue will be considered at a meeting of the ASP 
in 2010.  For further discussion, see, Gaja, G., ‘The Long Journey towards Repressing 
Aggression’ in Cassese et al (eds) The Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court:  A 
Commentary, Volume I (2003, OUP), 431.  
197 Shany, note 163, 343. 
198 Note, however, that as Iraq has not ratified the Convention Against Torture, it may have 
been considered that the offence did not form part of Iraqi law or customary international law 
at the relevant times, thus presenting a possible nullum crimen issue. 
199 Shany, note 164, 343. 
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domestic staffing and constitution of the IHT.200  The revised jurisdiction of the IHT 
appears to have partly addressed these concerns. 
 
Finally, there is often a perception, justified or otherwise, that offences under domestic 
law will be easier for the prosecution to establish than international crimes.  Proving 
an isolated instance of murder under domestic law does not require the prosecution to 
prove the existence of a widespread or systematic attack against the civilian 
population, as would be required to establish a crime against humanity.  This has the 
advantages of ensuring successful convictions, more ‘easily’ and, most likely, more 
quickly, and with less expense, and may explain why the SCU and the SPSC 
concentrated on charging lower-level offenders with single incidents under the 
Indonesian Penal Code in the initial phases.  The ability to avoid the evidentiary 
burdens of proving some of the international crimes has also been advanced as 
justifying the inclusion of a greater number of offences under national law in the 
jurisdiction of the IHT.201  Similarly, the national approach to the subject matter 
jurisdiction of the LST may have been warranted by the nature of the attack and its 
circumstances rendering it difficult to categorise the act as falling within the definition 
of any recognised international crimes. 
 
Against these possible advantages must be balanced certain risks.  First, a too-great 
reliance on national crimes risks minimising the impact of events and a failure to 
present the wider context, such as the systematic nature of the incidents and the 
involvement of the state or senior leaders.  The prosecution strategy of the SCU was 
questioned, including by certain members of the SPSC, as risking trial records being 
focused on individual acts and failing to place the act within the wider context of the 
violence in East Timor.  As noted above, after the first indictment for murder as a 
crime against humanity was issued in the Los Palos case, prosecutorial strategy shifted 
so that the majority of killings were charged as crimes against humanity. Several 
earlier indictments were also amended to charge murder as a crime against humanity 
instead of a domestic crime under the Indonesian Penal Code.202   
 
                                                 
200 Ibid, 342. 
201 Shany, note 163. 
202 For example, in Prosecutor v Lino do Carvalho, the accused was originally charged with 
one charge of murder and three counts of maltreatment. The SPSC granted leave to amend the 
indictment, and a new indictment was filed in May 2001 charging the accused with crimes 
against humanity, including one count of murder and two counts of inhumane acts. 
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Second, there may be several deficiencies in the national legal provisions to be 
applied.  For example, Jurdi has highlighted several deficiencies in the Lebanese 
definition of terrorism, 203  in particular its excessive breadth and the requirement that 
the terrorist act must utilize explosive devices, inflammable materials, poisonous or 
incendiary products or infectious or microbial agents or other means that cause public 
hazard. This would preclude the prosecution of assassinations using guns, as although 
the impact of the assassination would be to terrorize the population, a gun of itself 
does not cause a public hazard.204  Similarly, the SPSC faced a number of problems in 
utilising the definition of rape under the Indonesian Penal Code205 and only one 
indictment charged the accused with rape under domestic law.206 
 
Third, there may be significant practical problems in applying national legal 
provisions.  For example, the use of the 1956 Penal Code of Cambodia creates a 
number of problems.  Primary and secondary sources on the Penal Code are scarce, 
and fail to update the law from its adoption until 1975.  Moreover, the extent to which 
its contents remained in force during subsequent governments is not clear.  Judges, 
prosecutors and defenders have not applied the law for a considerable time, and are 
likely to be unfamiliar with its provisions and their application, and provisions of the 
law may be inconsistent with more recently developed international standards.207 
Similar difficulties were encountered in East Timor and Kosovo.  The use of 
international personnel requires translation of legal texts, working papers, trial 
proceedings and judgements, which was frequently unavailable, unreliable, or subject 
to significant delays.  Moreover, international personnel are unfamiliar with the 
national legal provisions, including both substantive and procedural law. 
5.4 Which body should decide? 
Where there is doubt as to whether the evidence justifies including a particular crime 
within the subject matter of the tribunal, or as to whether the applicable legal 
framework criminalizes the conduct in question, a related question is who should 
determine this issue.  One approach is for the drafters of the constituent instrument to 
                                                 
203 Article 314 of the Lebanese Penal Code defines terrorist acts as ‘all acts designed to create a 
state of alarm which are committed by means such as explosive devices, inflammable 
materials, poisonous or incendiary materials or infectious or microbial agents likely to create a 
public hazard’. 
204 Jurdi, note 159, 1136. 
205 There are a number of relevant provisions under the Indonesian Penal Code, all located in 
the section concerning crimes against decency.  Rape is criminalised by article 285. For 
discussion, see Linton, S., ‘Rising from the Ashes:  The Creation of a Viable Criminal Justice 
System in East Timor’ (2001) 25 Melb ULR 122, 169-170.  
206 Prosecution v Francisco Soares, 15 January 2001. 
207 See Linton, note 81 and Ratner and Abrams, note 81. 
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pre-determine the issue and to not include crimes where doubt exists.  This can be 
seen in the approach to drafting the SCSL Statute and the LST Statute, and the Special 
Law with regards to violations of international humanitarian law in internal conflicts.  
This approach has been criticised, with commentators suggesting that a broad subject 
matter jurisdiction should have been granted to the SCSL, leaving determination as to 
whether those crimes could be substantiated to the prosecutor and ultimately the 
judges.208 Similarly, terrorism as a crime against humanity could have been retained in 
the LST Statute, leaving it to the prosecution to determine whether establishing this 
offence would be possible. 
 
The other approach is to leave it for the prosecution, and the judges of the tribunal, to 
determine which charges are substantiated.  The study of existing practice suggests 
that in many circumstances, prosecutors will not prosecute offences where there is 
doubt that the elements of a crime will be satisfied or that the legal framework is 
inadequate.  For example, no indictments have been issued in respect of genocide in 
the ECCC or the SPSC.  The Serious Crimes Unit in East Timor did not support 
indictments in respect of war crimes, given the uncertainty as to whether an armed 
conflict existed, and the nature of that conflict.  The Serious Crimes Unit and the 
General Prosecutor appear to have taken the view that the violence surrounding the 
transition did not constitute an armed conflict, or else that the legal status of the 
territory – and hence the applicable legal regime – was too uncertain.  Where dubious 
indictments are issued, perhaps as a result of bias or unfamiliarity with the law, 
tribunals have refused to convict or appellate panels have overturned convictions, as 
shown by the practice of the IJPP regarding genocide. Prosecutors in Kosovo have not 
indicted individuals with crimes against humanity, perhaps due to the uncertainty as to 
whether the crime has been incorporated in domestic law.  However, the greater risk is 
when proceedings are commenced and convictions entered, despite concerns as to 
whether the applicable law supports the inclusion of such charges.  Perhaps the most 
worrying instances of this are the convictions by the IHT for offences in non-
international armed conflicts, and charges based on the definition of crimes against 
humanity in the Rome Statute being applied to conduct over twenty years before its 
adoption.   
 
                                                 
208 Beresford, S. and Muller, S., ‘The Special Court for Sierra Leone: An Initial Comment’ 
(2001) 14 LJIL 635, 642; Fritz and Smith, note 12, 408-9; McDonald, note 35, 141 – noting 
that as a result the conflict will not been seen in the context of the regional conflict. Amnesty 
International stated that the decision as to whether the evidence supported inclusion of 
genocide charges should have been left to the prosecutor:  McDonald, note 35, 140. 
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Cryer suggests that the decision as to which entity shall make this determination is 
governed, at least in part, by whether the drafters perceive the tribunal in question to 
be a ‘safe’ tribunal.  He argues that ‘[T]he trend is for the creators of international 
criminal courts to take a wider view of the definitions of crimes when they are not to 
be subject to their jurisdiction than when they are’.209  It is difficult to see to what 
extent this theory is validated in the practice of the internationalized and hybrid 
tribunals.  The personal and temporal jurisdiction of the tribunals and their context 
often effectively preclude nationals of states other than the territorial state.  The 
horizontal model that is applied to these tribunals in respect of immunity and state 
cooperation, also acts to minimise the possibility of trials of nationals of other states, 
at least in the absence of a binding resolution of the Security Council.210  Thus one 
would expect that the tribunals would have been conferred with extensive material 
jurisdiction.  However, while this is arguably so in relation to the IHT, the SPSC, the 
IJPP and the WCC, it is true to only a limited extent as to the ECCC, and incorrect for 
the SCSL and the LST.  There are two possible views of this finding.  First, this may 
suggest that states are more willing to subject their nationals to uncertain and 
potentially expansive material jurisdiction before internationalized courts, particularly 
where restrictions as to the personal jurisdiction will focus efforts on leaders of a 
previous regime. Alternatively, this may speak more to the caution of the Security 
Council in enabling the establishment of hybrid or internationalized tribunals, the 
political factors at play and the need to limit resources. 
6 Conclusion 
This Chapter has considered the emerging practice of the internationalized and hybrid 
tribunals in respect of their jurisdiction, temporal, territorial, personal and material.  It 
has not been possible within the confines of this thesis to provide an exhaustive 
discussion of the interesting and important jurisprudence that has been emerging from 
the tribunals.  However, this Chapter has drawn some conclusions as to the various 
jurisdictional issues considered.  First, the three negotiated tribunals – the ECCC, the 
LST and the SCSL – have narrower mandates.  These tribunals are subject to a limited 
temporal jurisdiction and are more likely to be subject to a seniority requirement and 
to have a restrictive material jurisdiction.  Moreover, any issues as to the crimes to be 
included have in many cases been pre-determined during drafting of the relevant 
instruments, and are not left to the prosecution or the tribunal.  This reflects both the 
temporary nature of such institutions and that they are intended to hear only a limited 
                                                 
209 Cryer, note 77, 233. 
210 See Chapter Five. 
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number of trials.  These are the terms upon which the international community 
(whether the Security Council, the United Nations or member states) is prepared to 
offer assistance and, most importantly, funding.  The remaining tribunals have more 
expansive mandates.  However, given the volume of cases that may fall within their 
jurisdiction and the scarce resources they possess, such tribunals often do, and should 
be encouraged to, adopt a focused prosecutorial strategy.  As the tribunals are also 
able to try suspects accused of a far wider range of crimes, prosecutors and the 
tribunals themselves may have to determine whether the evidence and the applicable 
legal framework enable trials for certain crimes.  It is important for the rights of the 
accused, the development of consistent and accurate jurisprudence in international 
criminal law and the integrity of the international criminal justice system that they 
reach correct, or at least justifiable, decisions on such issues.  
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TABLE TWO:  KEY FEATURES - JURISDICTION 
 
 
Regulation 64 
Panels 
SPSC SCSL ECCC WCC IHT LST 
Temporal Unlimited. 
Unlimited with 
respect to 
genocide, 
crimes against 
humanity, and 
war crimes. 
Limited to the 
period 1 
January 1999 to 
25 October 
1999 for 
murders, sexual 
offences, and 
torture. 
Crimes must 
have been 
committed 
since 30 
November 
1996. 
Crimes must 
have been 
committed in 
the period 17 
April 1975 to 6 
January 1979. 
Unlimited. 
Crimes must 
have been 
committed in 
the period 17 
July 1968 to 1 
May 2003. 
Crimes must 
have 
contributed to 
the 
assassination of 
Rafiq Hariri on 
14 February 
2005, or to 
other attacks in 
the period 1 
October 2004 
to 12 December 
2005 which the 
Tribunal is 
satisfied are 
“connected”. 
 
Territorial 
Restrictions 
applicable to 
the courts of 
Kosovo in 
general. 
No 
restriction—
universal 
jurisdiction for 
genocide, 
crimes against 
humanity, war 
Crimes must 
have been 
committed in 
the territory of 
Sierra Leone. 
No restriction. 
Crimes must 
have been 
committed in 
the territory of 
Bosnia and 
Herzegovina, 
unless 
No restriction.  No restriction. 
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crimes, and 
torture. In all 
other respects, 
panels have 
jurisdiction 
through all East 
Timor. 
universal 
jurisdiction 
conferred by 
relevant treaty. 
 
Personal        
Natural 
persons 
Yes. Yes. Yes. Yes. Yes. Yes. Yes. 
Nationality No restriction. No restriction. No restriction. No restriction. No restriction. No restriction. No restriction. 
Political 
Affiliation 
No restriction. No restriction. No restriction. 
If not fulfilling 
the general 
seniority 
criterion, 
accused must 
be leaders of 
“Democratic 
Kampuchea”. 
No restriction. No restriction. No restriction. 
Seniority No restriction. No restriction. 
Only “persons 
who bear the 
greatest 
responsibility 
for serious 
violations” of 
the law. 
Condition 
varies 
according to 
offence: certain 
offences appear 
to require the 
accused to be 
the “most 
No restriction. No restriction. No restriction. 
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responsible” 
for crimes”; 
others require 
them to be the 
“most 
responsible” or  
a “senior 
leader” of the 
country. 
Juveniles 
Yes—but only 
juveniles of 14 
years or more 
at the time of 
the crime. 
Yes—but only 
juveniles of 12 
years or more 
at the time of 
the crime. 
Yes—but only 
juveniles of 15 
years or more 
at the time of 
the crime. 
No express 
restriction—
Cambodian law 
applies. 
Yes—but only 
juveniles of 14 
years or more 
at the time of 
the crime. 
No express 
restriction—
regime under 
Criminal 
Procedure Law 
No 23 of 1971 
applies. 
No restriction. 
Peacekeepers No restriction. No restriction. 
Yes—if the 
sending State is 
unwilling or 
unable 
genuinely to 
carry out an 
investigation or 
prosecution, 
and the 
Security 
Council so 
authorises. 
N/A No restriction. N/A N/A 
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Material         
Genocide 
Yes. Panels can 
exercise 
jurisdiction in  
any “criminal” 
proceedings. 
Yes. No. Yes. Yes. Yes. No. 
War Crimes – 
Grave 
Breaches 
Yes. Yes. No. Yes. 
Certain 
offences. 
Yes. No. 
War Crimes – 
Common 
Article 3 and 
Additional 
Protocol Two 
Yes. Yes. Yes. No. 
Certain 
offences. 
Yes. No. 
War Crimes – 
Other Serious 
Violations 
Yes. Yes. Yes. No. Yes.  Yes. No. 
Crimes 
Against 
Humanity 
Yes. Yes. Yes. Yes. Yes. Yes. No. 
Other treaty-
based 
provisions 
Yes. 
Yes (with 
regard to 
torture). 
No. 
Yes (with 
regard to 
cultural 
property and 
diplomatic 
protections). 
Yes. No. No. 
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Domestic law 
crimes 
Yes—all 
crimes. 
Yes—but 
offences 
relating only to 
murder and 
sexual 
violence. 
Yes—but 
offences 
relating only to 
arson and 
female child 
abuse. 
Yes—but 
offences 
relating only to 
homicide, 
torture, and 
religious 
persecution. 
No. 
Yes—but 
offences 
relating only to 
interference 
with the 
judiciary, the 
squander of 
national 
resources, 
aggression 
against an Arab 
nation, and 
analogies to 
international 
crimes over 
which the 
Court exercises 
jurisdiction. 
Yes. Provisions 
of the Lebanese 
Criminal Code 
relating to 
terrorism, 
offences 
against life and 
the person, 
illicit 
associations, 
failure to report 
crimes, and 
ancillary 
matters; and 
Articles 6 and 7 
of the 1958 law 
on sedition and 
civil war. 
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TABLE THREE: TABLE OF RATIFICATIONS 
 
 Bosnia-
Herzegovina 
Cambodia Serbia1 Indonesia Iraq Lebanon Portugal Sierra Leone Timor-Leste 
Genocide 
Convention 
29.12.92 14.10.50 12.03.01 No 20.01.59 17.12.53 09.02.99 No No 
Geneva 
Conventions 
31.12.92 08.12.58 11.09.01 30.09.58 14.02.56 10.04.51 14.09.61 10.06.65 08.05.03 
Additional 
Protocol I 
31.12.92 14.01.98 11.09.01 No No 23.07.97 27.05.92 21.10.86 12.04.05 
Additional 
Protocol II 
31.12.92 14.01.98 11.09.01 No No 23.07.97 27.05.92 21.10.86 12.04.05 
Protection of 
Cultural 
Property 
12.07.93 04.04.62 11.09.01 No 20.01.59 01.06.60 09.02.99 No No 
CAT 01.09.93 15.10.92 10.09.91 28.10.98 No 05.10.00 09.02.89 25.04.01 16.04.03 
ICCPR 01.09.93 26.05.92 06.09.01 23.02.06 25.01.71 03.11.72 15.06.78 23.08.96 18.03.03 
CRC 01.09.93 15.10.92 12.03.01 05.09.90 15.04.94 14.05.91 21.09.90 18.06.90 16.04.03 
OP to CRC 10.10.03 16.07.04 31.01.03 No 24.07.08 No 19.08.03 15.05.02 02.08.04 
CEDAW 01.09.93 15.10.92 12.03.01 13.09.84 13.08.86 16.04.97 30.07.80 11.11.88 16.04.03 
Rome 
Statute 
11.04.02 11.04.02 06.09.01 No No No 05.02.02 15.09.02 06.09.02 
ECHR 12.07.02 N/A 03.03.04 N/A N/A N/A 09.11.78 N/A N/A 
 
                                                 
1 Several international legal instruments applied in Kosovo by virtue of Regulation 1999/24, which provides that all persons undertaking public duties or holding public office 
in Kosovo shall observe internationally recognized human rights standards: section 1.3.  Kosovo itself is not a party to any of the relevant treaties. 
 183 
CHAPTER FIVE 
LEGAL BARRIERS TO THE EXERCISE OF JURISDICTION 
 
1 Introduction 
Chapter Three identified the legal basis for the establishment of the tribunals studied, 
and suggested the possible source of the authority they exercise.  Chapter Four 
examined the judicial competence of the tribunals studied, in particular their personal, 
temporal, territorial and substantive jurisdiction.  This chapter analyzes barriers to the 
exercise of that jurisdiction, specifically legal obstacles to the exercise of personal 
jurisdiction in respect of certain accused.  Three such barriers will be studied:  the 
immunity of the head of state and other senior state officials; the applicability and 
legality of amnesties; and the requirement to obtain custody of the accused for a trial, 
which depends to a large extent on the co-operation of national authorities and third 
states.  Resolving these issues correctly is important.  Even in situations where the 
affected state, the United Nations and the wider international community have 
recognised that a particular situation requires an internationalized criminal justice 
mechanism, and the political will to establish and finance such an institution exists, 
the possibility of barriers to the exercise of jurisdiction operates to potentially reduce 
the scope of the tribunal’s jurisdictional basis and operation.  Designers of a criminal 
justice mechanism need to consider the possible application of legal barriers and, if 
considered appropriate, incorporate specific provisions into the constituent instrument 
of the tribunal.  Ultimately, it may be necessary to select a different mechanism where 
the barrier in question cannot be overcome by applying either domestic or 
international legal principles. This chapter will assess the selected issues – immunity, 
amnesty and co-operation – in the practice of the tribunals studied.  It will attempt to 
determine whether the available practice in these newly developing institutions can 
give rise to any general framework that may assist states when designing such 
tribunals, and the tribunals themselves when they are called upon the determine the 
applicability of the barrier in question. 
2 Immunity 
2.1 Introduction 
The personal jurisdiction of the tribunals studied is often restricted to those most 
responsible for the commission of serious crimes, which may include current or 
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former state officials.1 This raises the possibility that the tribunals will encounter 
arguments based on the official status of the accused and the immunity to be accorded 
to state officials under international law. It is a well-established principle of 
international law that states and state agents are immune from the jurisdiction of other 
states in certain circumstances. In particular, states and their agents cannot be the 
subject of criminal proceedings in foreign states.2  For the purpose of this thesis, there 
are three situations in which issues of immunity are most likely to arise. First, state 
officials may be tried before the courts of their own state. Immunity under 
international law does not arise. However, individuals may be accorded immunity 
under the constitution or domestic legal instruments of their own state. The application 
of national immunities will be a matter of interpreting the relevant domestic legal 
instruments. Second, state officials may be tried before the domestic courts of another 
state based on principles of extra-territorial jurisdiction, including universal 
jurisdiction. Immunities accorded by international law will be relevant and, in such 
‘horizontal’ cases, the nature of the immunity accorded will be important.  Immunity 
extended under the laws of the state of nationality of the accused may not be relevant, 
as immunity accorded under domestic law cannot preclude the exercise of jurisdiction 
by anther state.  The third – so-called ‘vertical’ - situation is a trial before an 
international criminal court, which has been established either by a treaty or a Security 
Council resolution. Again, immunities accorded under international law will be 
relevant, and immunity accorded by domestic law irrelevant. This section will outline 
the nature of immunity in international law, examine the relevant principles and apply 
those principles to the tribunals studied.  
2.2 Nature of immunity in international law 
The exact scope of protection offered by the laws of immunity, in particular in relation 
to international crimes, remains somewhat obscure. Unlike diplomatic immunity, there 
is no comprehensive treaty regulating state immunity and head of state immunity, so 
that the area is largely left to the provisions of customary international law.3 There are 
two types of immunity granted to state officials under international law: functional 
immunity (ratione materiae) and personal immunity (ratione personae).  Functional 
immunity attaches to the acts of officials while they are in office.  This type of 
                                                 
1 Chapter Four, section 4. 
2 This chapter addresses immunity in criminal proceedings only. States and state officials may, 
in limited circumstances, be the subject of civil proceedings in foreign courts. 
3 European Convention on State Immunity, ETS No 74;  United Nations Convention on the 
Jurisdictional Immunities of States and their Property, adopted by the General Assembly on 2 
December 2004.  
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immunity is limited, in that it only applies to those official acts carried out during the 
period of office. Officials may still be the subject of legal proceedings in respect of 
acts committed in a personal capacity, even where such acts were committed before or 
after their appointment.  However, immunity ratione materiae will survive the 
cessation of office, and thus may be claimed by former state officials.  The second 
type of immunity enjoyed by state officials is known as immunity ratione personae. 
This immunity ‘is conferred on officials with primary responsibility for the conduct of 
the international relations of the state’.4 It protects the office holder in the exercise of 
their representative functions and is intended to facilitate the conduct of international 
relations.  The rationale for immunity ratione personae is that the state requires certain 
state officials to be free to operate in the sphere of international relations, so as to 
allow the state to conduct effectively its international affairs and to maintain peaceful 
relations among states.5 This freedom would be restricted if such officials were 
susceptible to legal proceedings before foreign courts, including arrest and detention. 
Therefore, the immunity enjoyed when in office is absolute, even in relation to 
international crimes,6 and extends to all acts committed in a private or personal 
capacity,7 whether committed before or during the period of official service.8  
However, as the immunity is that of the state and not the individual, it does not survive 
the termination of office.9  Although the category of officials entitled to personal 
immunity has not been defined, practice and academic opinion suggest that it would 
include heads of state and government, foreign ministers and possibly others.10  
                                                 
4 Akande, D., ‘International Law Immunities and the International Criminal Court’ (2004) 98 
AJIL 407, 409.  
5 Case Concerning the Arrest Warrant of 11 April 2000 (Democratic Republic of the Congo v 
Belgium) ICJ Reports (2002) (Arrest Warrant case), Joint Separate Opinion Higgins, 
Koojimans and Buergenthal, para 75.   See Akande, ibid, 409-10; Fox, H., ‘The Resolution of 
the Institute of International Law on the Immunities of Heads of State and Government’ (2002) 
51 ICLQ 119. 
6 Arrest Warrant case, para 58: the International Court of Justice held that it could not find 
‘under customary international law any form of exception to the rule according immunity from 
criminal responsibility and inviolability to incumbent Ministers for Foreign Affairs, where they 
are suspected of having committed war crimes or crimes against humanity’.  Akande notes that 
this principle has been applied by several national courts, and that ‘[J]udicial opinion and state 
practice on this point are unanimous’:  Akande, note 4, 411, and the material cited in footnotes 
26 and 27.  See also Tunks, M., ‘Diplomats or Defendants? Defining the Future of Head of 
State Immunity’ (2003) 52 DLJ 651, 663. 
7 Arrest Warrant case, para 54. 
8 Arrest Warrant case, para 54-55. 
9 Akande, note 4, 410; Fox, note 5. 
10 It is accepted that heads of state and government possess functional immunity, as do 
diplomats, consular officials and officials on special missions:  see Watts, A., ‘The Legal 
Position in International Law of Heads of States, Heads of Governments and Foreign 
Ministers’ (1994) 247 RdC 13; Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations 1961; Vienna 
Convention on Consular Relations 1963; United Nations Convention on Special Missions 
1969.  The International Court of Justice has held that foreign ministers also enjoy immunity, 
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Personal immunity is thus one of the key ‘procedural bars to the exercise of 
jurisdiction’.11   
 
The International Court of Justice has confirmed that the personal immunity of serving 
heads of state is absolute and that individuals cannot be prosecuted in foreign national 
courts or arrested while travelling abroad as long as they remain in office.12 However, 
the Court noted that ‘immunity from jurisdiction … does not mean that they enjoy 
impunity in respect of any crimes they might have committed’.13  The Court accepted 
an exception to this general rule in four circumstances.14 First, immunities accorded 
under international law do not bar criminal prosecution of such persons in their own 
state.  Second, the state may always waive the immunity of an incumbent senior 
official.  Third, a senior state official may be subject to criminal prosecution once they 
have left office, subject to any subsisting immunity ratione materiae.  Finally, the 
Court suggested that serving heads of state may be prosecuted before ‘certain 
international courts, where they have jurisdiction’. Providing only limited material in 
support of this statement, the Court was satisfied merely to refer to the relevant 
provisions in the Statutes of the ICTY and the ICTR and article 27(2) of the Rome 
Statute.  
 
Although this statement is dictum, as the International Court of Justice was not 
required to determine the immunity applicable before an international criminal 
tribunal,15 it has been the subject of extensive debate.16 The implication from the 
paragraph is that the absolute nature of immunity ratione personae exists only in 
relation to criminal prosecution before foreign national courts, and may not be pleaded 
before international criminal courts.  This view has received general support and is 
                                                                                                                                 
as may other senior state officials: Arrest Warrant case, paras 51 and 53. A British court has 
recognised the immunity of a defence minister:  Application for Arrest Warrant Against 
General Shaul Mofaz, reprinted in (2004) 53 ICLQ 769. 
11 Frulli, M., ‘The Question of Charles Taylor’s Immunity: Still in Search of a Balanced 
Application of Personal Immunities’ (2002) 2 JICJ 1118, 1126  
12 Arrest Warrant case, para. 58. 
13 Arrest Warrant case, para. 60. 
14 Arrest Warrant case, para 61. 
15 The Arrest Warrant case concerned the immunity of the foreign minister of the Democratic 
Republic of the Congo before a national court. 
16 For example, see: Akande, note 4; Orakhelashvili, A., ‘Case Report: Arrest Warrant of 11 
April 2000 (Democratic Republic of the Congo v Belgium)’ (2002) 96 AJIL 677; Cassese, A., 
‘When May Senior State Officials Be Tried for International Crimes? Some Comments on the 
Congo v Belgium Case’ (2002) 13 EJIL 853; Wirth, S., ‘Immunity for Core Crimes? The ICJ’s 
Judgment in the Congo v Belgium Case’ (2002) 13 EJIL 877; and Wouters, J., ‘The Judgment 
of the International Court of Justice in the Arrest Warrant Case: Some Critical Remarks’ 
(2003) 16 LJIL 253. 
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consistent with the practice of the international criminal tribunals.17  However, the 
International Court of Justice’s reference to ‘certain international criminal tribunals’ 
suggests that not all international criminal tribunals may exercise jurisdiction in 
respect of current heads of state.  This statement is correct; it is not sufficient to 
remove the immunity of an incumbent head of state merely to assert that a tribunal is 
international in nature.18 Yet the International Court of Justice provided no guidance 
as to the criteria to be applied, beyond referring to the three existing international 
criminal tribunals. The approach adopted also fails to take into account the different 
legal bases of the tribunals considered.19  For instance, where a tribunal is established 
by a treaty, the international nature of a court does not, in itself, allow for the exercise 
of jurisdiction over nationals of a non-party state.20 It is submitted that the better 
approach to determining the applicability of immunities is to consider the nature of the 
court, its method of establishment and its constituent instruments.  It must also be 
determined whether the provisions of the instrument creating jurisdiction on the 
tribunal expressly or implicitly remove immunity and whether the state concerned is 
bound by that instrument.  The following section examines this question for the 
tribunals studied, adopting the three categories of such tribunals suggested in Chapter 
Three. 
2.3 The ‘national’ Courts 
2.3.1 The International Judges and Prosecutors Programme in Kosovo 
Although information concerning proceedings before the IJPP is scarce, it appears that 
immunity has not been raised before an IJPP panel, most probably due to the 
following reasons.  First, the ICTY may exercise primary jurisdiction in respect of the 
conflict in Kosovo,21 and has exercised that jurisdiction in respect of the senior 
officials of the FRY and Serbia most likely to have been entitled to immunity.  
Second, until the formal declaration of independence in 2008, Kosovo was still, de 
jure at least, considered part of the territory of Serbia.  Thus no question of immunity 
                                                 
17 Examples of the prosecution by international tribunals include the trial of Karl Donitz, acting 
head of state following Hitler’s suicide, by the IMT; the trial of Jean Kambanda, the Interim 
Prime Minister of Rwanda during the 1994 genocide, by the ICTR; the indictment of Slobodan 
Milosevic, the then President of the FRY, together with the then President of Serbia, Milan 
Milutinovic, by the ICTY; and the indictment of Charles Taylor before the SCSL, discussed 
below. 
18 Schabas, W., ‘Is an International Tribunal Equivalent to an International Criminal Court?’ 
(2008) 21 LJIL 513, 523-534. 
19 This may be dealt with by the requirement that such courts must have jurisdiction: see 
Schabas, W., The UN International Criminal Tribunals: The former Yugoslavia, Rwanda and 
Sierra Leone (2006), 329. 
20 Akande, note 4, 418. 
21 Article 9, ICTY Statute. 
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under international law would have arisen, only immunities under domestic law.  
Moreover, it would have been inconsistent with its claim to continuing sovereignty in 
respect of Kosovo for the FRY or Serbia to have raised immunity before the IJPP, or 
to have supported a claim to immunity by a senior official.  UNMIK too would have 
been reluctant to avoid a situation where the question of sovereignty arose directly. If 
the immunity of FRY officials had arisen before the IJPP, the issue should have been 
considered as one arising under domestic law before a national tribunal.  It is 
submitted that the internationalized nature of the IJPP does not alter the position 
regarding immunities.  The Security Council conferred power on UNMIK to make 
regulations concerning the territory of Kosovo only.22 UNMIK did not have 
competence to issue regulations that would affect the immunity of officials of the FRY 
or Serbia.23  Nor do the Security Council resolutions regarding obligations to co-
operate with the ICTY, or noting the need to ensure accountability for violations 
committed in Kosovo, alter this conclusion.   
2.3.2 The Special Panels for Serious Crimes in East Timor 
The potential for immunity to be raised before the SPSC was considerable, as the 
SPSC indicted several senior Indonesian military and political figures.24  Regulation 
15/2000 duplicates article 27 of the Rome Statute, with section 15(2) providing that 
‘Immunities or special procedural rules which may attach to the official capacity of a 
person, whether under national or international law, shall not bar the panels from 
exercising its jurisdiction over such a person’. The SPSC was a national institution.  
However, it was not clear what its legal status had been before independence in May 
2002.  As Indonesian authority in respect of East Timor has never been generally 
recognised, it cannot be said that the SPSC was an Indonesian institution, thus 
rendering immunity a question of national law.  The best view is that the SPSC were 
courts of an administered territory, and thus the immunity of Indonesian officials 
should have been considered in accordance with international law.  Prosecution of 
Indonesian officials would be equivalent to prosecution of an official of a foreign state 
before a national court, subject to any waiver of immunity by Indonesia, which was 
                                                 
22 Resolution 1244 (1999).  See Chapter Four, section 3. 
23 None of the regulations issued by UNMIK contain a provision on immunity.  Neither do the 
Provisional Criminal Code of Kosovo, the SFRY Criminal Code or the FRY criminal code.   
24 For example, the SPSC indicted General Wiranto, who at the time of the indictment was 
contemplating standing for election as President of Indonesia. 
 189 
not forthcoming.25 Senior officials could potentially claim personal immunity while in 
office. 
 
As with the conclusion with regards to Kosovo, it is submitted that the authority of 
UNTAET and its regulations do not affect this conclusion.  Regulation 2000/15 is a 
domestic legal instrument only, and cannot affect the immunity to which a third state, 
such as Indonesia, is entitled under customary international law; any attempt to do so 
would be ineffective and potentially a violation of international law.  Neither do the 
Security Council resolutions in relation to East Timor remove immunity.  In fact, 
Security Council resolutions support the conclusion that the immunity to which 
Indonesia was to be entitled was not to be affected, as the Security Council considered 
that Indonesian officials were to be investigated by Indonesian mechanisms for 
accountability.  This may have occurred if the trials before the Ad Hoc Court had been 
conducted in a more impartial and independent manner.26  
2.3.3 The War Crimes Chamber in Bosnia and Herzegovina 
Immunity could be raised as an issue before the WCC, with potential defendants 
including senior officials from the FRY, Serbia and Croatia.  However, as has been the 
case in Kosovo, the concurrent jurisdiction of the ICTY in relation to the conflict in 
Bosnia has largely side-stepped the issue of immunity, with the ICTY exercising its 
jurisdiction in relation to senior leaders from the FRY, Serbia and Croatia.  The 
increase in trials for crimes arising in the conflict before the courts in Serbia and 
Croatia and the improvements in co-operation in the region27 also render it unlikely 
that the WCC will face an argument based on immunity, as either Bosnia could elect 
to extradite the individual concerned to the state concerned or that state may elect to 
waive immunity.  Moreover, in none of the cases referred to the WCC from the ICTY 
was the defendant likely to raise immunity, so the interesting question of whether the 
referral from the ICTY would in some way impact upon immunity under national law 
has been avoided.  As a national institution, the immunity of senior officials from 
these states should be considered as the immunity of officials of third states before a 
national institution.  In accordance with the principles of immunity under international 
law outlined earlier, those officials would be immune while in office, and after leaving 
                                                 
25 This is confirmed by the approach to issues of co-operation between Indonesia and 
UNTAET, in particular the memorandum of understanding providing for judicial assistance in 
criminal matters, discussed in section 4 of this Chapter. 
26 See the discussion and criticism of these mechanisms in Chapter Two, in particular the 
sources cited at footnote 107. 
27 See various reports produced by the Humanitarian Law Centre concerning Transitional 
Justice in the former Yugoslav countries; ICTJ, Against the Current – War Crimes Prosecution 
in Serbia (2007) (2007); and reports of the OSCE Mission to Croatia. 
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office, immune in respect of official acts.  It is submitted that the Security Council 
resolutions concerning the situation in Bosnia and Herzegovina do not alter this 
position.   
 
The Law of the State Court does not contain a provision concerning the immunities of 
state officials, nor does the Law on Transfer.  However, article 180(1) of the Criminal 
Code of Bosnia and Herzegovina provides that ‘The official position of any accused 
person, whether as Head of State or Government or as a responsible Government 
official, shall not relieve such person of criminal responsibility nor mitigate 
punishment.’ It is submitted that this provision is directed toward official position as a 
substantive defence, and not immunity.  Even assuming that this provision is directed 
towards immunity, it must be applicable only to the extent that the provision is 
consistent with international law.  Otherwise any attempt to rely on this provision to 
try a senior official of a third state who would normally be entitled to immunity would 
represent a possible excessive exercise of jurisdiction by Bosnia and Herzegovina.   
 
It would also be open to a third state to waive the immunity of the official concerned.  
It could be argued that the parties to the Dayton Agreement have waived immunity as 
the Dayton Agreement requires parties to ‘cooperate fully with all entities involved in 
implementation of this peace settlement…pursuant to the obligations of all Parties to 
cooperate in the investigation and prosecution of war crimes and other violations of 
international humanitarian law’.28 It also requires relevant national authorities to co-
operate with the ICTY.29  However, it is submitted that this obligation to co-operate 
does not constitute a waiver of immunity in respect of trials before the courts of other 
parties to the Dayton Agreement, including the WCC.   
2.3.4 The Iraqi High Tribunal 
An accused before the IHT must be either a national of Iraq or a resident.30  This 
renders the possibility of the official of a third state being the subject of proceedings 
before the IHT virtually non-existent.  Immunity has been raised by accused based on 
their position in the previous regime.  Several of the accused were senior state officials 
of the former Iraqi regime, including the former President, Vice-President, foreign and 
defence ministers.  Saddam Hussein, as head of the Revolutionary Command Council, 
together with his deputy and members of that Council, enjoyed immunity in respect of 
                                                 
28 Article IX. 
29 Article XIII(4), Annex 6. 
30 Table Two. 
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any procedure under national law.31  Accordingly, in this context the IHT is required 
to investigate the immunity of officials under Iraqi law, not under international law.   
 
Article 15(3) of the IHT Statute provides that ‘The official position of any accused 
person, whether as president, chairman or a member of the Revolution Command 
Council, prime minister, member of the counsel of ministers, a member of the Ba’ath 
Party Command, shall not relieve such person of criminal penalty, nor mitigate 
punishment. No person is entitled to any immunity with respect to any of the crimes 
stipulated in Articles 11, 12, 13, and 14 of this law.’   This provision is an 
unambiguous statement as to the non-applicability of domestic immunities.32 In the 
Dujail case,33 the IHT refused to recognise any immunity. It based this decision on 
two grounds. First, the defendant was accused of having committed crimes against 
humanity and customary international law precludes the grant of immunity for such 
crimes.  The reasoning of the IHT on this ground displayed some confusion.  The IHT 
supported its conclusion by reference to the IMT, the ICTY and the ICTR, which are 
all international tribunals.  In contrast, the IHT is a national court considering 
immunity under domestic law.  It is certainly doubtful that a rule of customary 
international law rule presently exists such that states are prohibited from granting 
immunity under domestic law regarding criminal proceedings before domestic courts.  
The second ground for denying the immunity was that the successor Iraqi government, 
by establishing the IHT to investigate the crimes alleged to have been committed by 
the former regime, had repudiated the immunity that would otherwise have existed.  
This, it is submitted, was the preferable approach as it is more appropriate to the legal 
status and nature of the IHT. 
2.3.5 The Extraordinary Chambers in the Courts of Cambodia 
The jurisdiction of the ECCC is restricted to senior leaders of the Khmer Rouge.34  
Jurisdiction therefore will not extend to officials of neighbouring states, including 
Vietnam, Laos or Thailand, and the immunity of state officials of third states should 
not be raised before the ECCC.  The ECCC is a national institution and, as the accused 
will be Cambodian nationals, the situation is one of trials of state officials before a 
national institution.  Immunity of former state officials should not apply, as any 
immunity that had previously applied under national law has been removed by the 
                                                 
31 Article 240 of the Iraqi Constitution of 1970. 
32 Al-Dujail Lawsuit, Case No. 1/9 First/2005, Judgment, 5 November 2006 (unofficial English 
translation), 32. 
33 Ibid.   
34 Table Two. 
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Special Law.  Moreover, the Special Law removes the official position of an accused 
as a substantive defence.35  The more interesting issue for the ECCC is that of 
amnesty. 
2.4 The ‘treaty-based’ institutions – the Special Court for Sierra Leone 
Article 6(2) of the SCSL Statute provides that ‘The official position of any accused 
persons, whether as Head of State or Government or as a responsible government 
official, shall not relieve such person of criminal responsibility nor mitigate 
punishment’.  This provision is identical to that contained in the Statutes of the ICTY 
and the ICTR.  The SCSL has considered the issue of the immunity of an incumbent 
head of state in relation to an arrest warrant issued in respect of then Liberian 
President, Charles Taylor, on 7 March 2003.36 The sealed indictment was transferred, 
together with the arrest warrant, to Ghanaian authorities on 4 June 2003, as Taylor was 
present in Ghana for peace talks concerning the conflict in Liberia.  Ghana declined to 
execute the arrest warrant.  Taylor, relying on his immunity as an incumbent head of 
state, challenged both the issue of the indictment and the exercise of jurisdiction by 
the SCSL. An application to quash the indictment was filed jointly by counsel for 
Taylor and the Government of Liberia, which asserted that the issue of the indictment 
and the circulation of the arrest warrant were violations of the sovereignty of Liberia.37 
However, the Trial Chamber approved a request by the Prosecutor to strike out 
Liberia’s application.38 In the interim, Taylor had stepped down as President of 
Liberia in return for asylum in Nigeria, although the cancelling of the indictment and 
the arrest warrant was not part of the arrangement.  Nigeria indicated that it would not 
surrender Taylor to the SCSL.39 
 
The Appeals Chamber rejected the application to quash the indictment, finding that it 
was competent to exercise jurisdiction in respect of the accused, and that the immunity 
                                                 
35 Article 29new, Special Law. 
36 Prosecutor v Charles Ghankay Taylor, Indictment, 7 March 2003.  Taylor was initially 
charged with 17 counts of crimes against humanity, violations of Common Article 3 and 
Additional Protocol II, and other serious violations of international humanitarian law.  The 
indictment was subsequently reduced to 11 counts:  Prosecutor’s Second Amended Indictment, 
29 May 2007. 
37 Prosecutor v Taylor, Applicant’s Motion made under Protest and without waiving of 
Immunity requesting that the Trial Chamber do quash the approved indictment against the 
person of President Charles Ghankay Taylor, 23 July 2003. 
38 Order Pursuant to Rule 72(E) – Defence Motion to Quash The Indictment and to Declare the 
Warrant of Arrest and All Other Consequential Orders Null and Void, Trial Chamber, 19 
September 2003 
39 Nigeria’s initial decision to offer asylum and not to transfer Taylor to the SCSL was 
challenged in the Nigerian Federal High Court: David Anyaele and Emmanuel Egbuna v. 
Charles Ghankay Taylor and Others.  The proceedings were declared moot on 13 April 2006, 
following Taylor’s arrest by Nigerian authorities. 
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normally accorded to an incumbent head of state did not apply.40  In doing so, the 
Appeals Chamber relied upon the dictum of the International Court of Justice in the 
Arrest Warrant case, arguing that, provided the SCSL was a ‘certain international 
criminal court’, head of state immunity would not operate as a bar to prosecution. The 
Appeals Chamber recognised that ‘the issues in this motion turn to a large extent on 
the legal status of the Special Court’.41 After concluding that the SCSL was an 
international criminal tribunal, the SCSL then stated that ‘the sovereign equality of 
states does not prevent a head of state from being prosecuted before an international 
criminal tribunal or court’,42 thus omitting the qualifying word ‘certain’ from the dicta 
of the International Court of Justice in the Arrest Warrant case. 
 
It is not disputed that the SCSL is international in nature.  However, it is submitted 
that the Appeals Chamber failed to recognise the significance of the method of 
establishment and the legal basis of the SCSL when determining the applicability of 
immunities under international law. It held that the SCSL was ‘established in the 
framework of Chapter VII of the UN Charter’43 and thus was similar to the ICTY and 
the ICTR.  The SCSL could therefore rely on article 6(2) of the SCSL Statute as 
having removed the head of state immunity.  There are several difficulties with this 
statement.  As a preliminary point, article 6(2) and the comparable provisions in the 
Statutes of the ICTY and ICTR are directed to the issue of criminal responsibility, and 
arguably do not relate to immunities at all.44  More importantly, by focusing on the 
involvement of the Security Council, the Appeals Chamber mischaracterised the legal 
basis of the SCSL.  As Nouwen notes:45 
 
The Council did not “forget” to give the Special Court the Chapter VII powers 
enjoyed by the ICTY and the ICTR.  Both the Secretary-General in the 
establishment phase and the previous President of the Special Court in the 
operational phase of the Court have requested the Council to grant the Court 
Chapter VII powers, but that never occurred. 
                                                 
40 Prosecutor v Taylor, Decision on Immunity from Jurisdiction, Appeals Chamber, 31 May 
2004 (Taylor Immunity Decision). The application was adjudged to be a preliminary motion 
and was referred to the Appeals Chamber pursuant to Rule 72(E) of the RPE.  The Appeals 
Chamber considered the issue to be one of jurisdiction, which could be raised as a preliminary 
challenge, and not a substantive defence based on superior orders:  Schabas, note 19, 328. 
41 Taylor Immunity Decision, para 34. 
42 Taylor Immunity Decision, para. 52. 
43 Frulli, note 11, 1119. 
44 It has been suggested that this provision, which duplicates a provision found also in the 
statutes of the ICTY and the ICTR, is not intended to address the issue of international law 
immunities at all. Rather, the provision is intended to remove the substantive defence that an 
official acted in an official capacity when committing a crime: Schabas, note 19. 
45 Nouwen, S., ‘The Special Court for Sierra Leone and the Immunity of Taylor: The Arrest 
Warrant Case Continued’ (2005) 18 LJIL 645, 649. 
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As a result, the SCSL failed to address the crucial question, which is whether an 
international court, established by a treaty, may exercise jurisdiction with respect to a 
sitting head of state of a third state if the claim to immunity is otherwise supported by 
international law.  The SCSL was created by treaty and is therefore in fact closer to 
the ICC than to the ICTY and the ICTR.  The Appeals Chamber did not dispute that a 
court in Sierra Leone would have been required to uphold Taylor’s immunity or else 
risk a finding that Sierra Leone had violated the sovereignty of Liberia. By 
establishing a tribunal by agreement with the United Nations, the SCSL is purporting 
to do what Sierra Leone could not do alone, that is, to allow a court to exercise 
jurisdiction with respect to an incumbent head of a foreign state.  If the SCSL 
Agreement does represent a delegation of jurisdiction to SCSL from Sierra Leone, 
then Sierra Leone cannot transfer greater powers than it enjoys. Sierra Leone could not 
have exercised personal jurisdiction in relation to Taylor so long as Liberia claimed 
immunity, therefore it could not transfer such a power to the SCSL by entering into 
the SCSL Agreement.  Even if it were directed to immunity, reliance on article 6(2) of 
the SCSL Statute in relation to Taylor also neglects the principle that a treaty cannot 
create obligations or remove rights for a non-party state without the consent of that 
state. The SCSL Agreement may only create obligations for the parties to it, namely 
Sierra Leone and the United Nations.46 An agreement between Sierra Leone and 
another state(s) to establish a tribunal would not affect the immunity to be accorded to 
an official of a non-party state such as Liberia, even though the tribunal established 
would be international in nature.47   
 
Although the United Nations is a party to the SCSL Agreement, and not another state, 
it is submitted that this does not modify the position regarding immunity.  The United 
Nations has separate legal personality from its members.48  As Frulli notes, 
‘[T]herefore, the Agreement establishing the Special Court (with the annexed SCSL 
Statute), like any other agreement concluded by the United Nations, is binding on the 
Organisation as such and not on individual Member States, which remain third parties 
                                                 
46 Article 34, Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties 1969. 
47 See Nouwen, note 45, 656.  Similar issues have been raised in relation to the effect of article 
27(2) of the Rome Statute on the officials of non-state parties.  The better view is that, the 
article cannot affect the rights and obligations of states that are not party to the Rome Statute 
without their consent: Akande, D., ‘The Jurisdiction of the International Criminal Court over 
Nationals of Non-Parties: Legal Basis and Limits’ (2003) 1 JICJ 618, 621; Scharf, M., ‘The 
ICC’s Jurisdiction over Nationals of Non-Party States’ (2001) 64 LCP 67; and Danilenko, 
G.M., ‘The Statute of the International Criminal Court and Third States’ (2000) 21 MJIL  445. 
48 Reparations for Injuries suffered in the Service of the United Nations ICJ Reports (1949).   
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in this respect’.49 The suggestion that, by accepting the Charter, member states have 
also accepted that the United Nations may waive the immunity of any state by entering 
into an agreement to which that state is not a party is simply not credible. 50 Moreover, 
the United Nations is required to respect rules of international law in all its activities,51 
including the personal immunity of a serving head of state.  Only decisions taken by 
the Security Council acting under Chapter VII of the Charter are binding on member 
states.  The Security Council resolutions dealing with the SCSL have not imposed 
upon third states – on Liberia in particular – any obligation to co-operate with the 
SCSL that could possibly be interpreted as removing immunity.52 The SCSL also 
failed to consider what significance, if any, should be given to the fact that it was not 
included in the relevant paragraph of the judgment in the Arrest Warrant case as an 
example of a ‘certain international criminal court’.53 
 
It must be concluded that Liberia asserted correctly that the indictment and arrest 
warrant were violations of its sovereignty.  Moreover, Ghana and other states were not 
obliged to give effect to the indictment and arrest warrant issued by the SCSL, 
although the issue of the arrest warrant per se was not a violation of the sovereignty of 
Ghana.54  Similarly, Sierra Leone was not entitled to take steps to enforce the arrest 
warrant, had it chosen to do so.  It is an interesting point as to which entity had 
violated the immunity of Liberia in issuing the arrest warrant, as the SCSL Agreement 
provides that the SCSL has separate legal personality. 55 The question is whether this 
is opposable to other states, or may other states look to the parties establishing the 
SCSL, namely Sierra Leone and the United Nations.  This appears to have been the 
                                                 
49 Frulli, note 11, 1124.  See also Deen-Racsmány, Z., ‘Prosecutor v Taylor:  The Status of the 
Special Court for Sierra Leone and Its Implications for Immunity’ (2005) 18 LJIL 299 and 
Nouwen, note 45, 657. 
50 The Appeals Chamber commented that the SCSL Agreement ‘is an agreement between all 
members of the United Nations and Sierra Leone’:  Taylor Immunity Decision, para. 38. 
51 Article 1(1), Charter. 
52 This can be contrasted with the obligation to co-operate placed on Sudan in the context of 
the referral of the situation in Darfur to the ICC:  Resolution 1593 (2005), para 2.  In the light 
of the decision by the ICC to issue an arrest warrant in respect of President Bashir of Sudan, it 
has been suggested that this obligation removes the immunity of the President or, alternatively, 
obliges the Government of Sudan to waive the immunity of its head of state.  For further 
discussion see:  Williams, S. and Sherif, L., ‘The Arrest Warrant for President al-Bashir:  
Immunities of Incumbent Heads of State and the International Criminal Court’ (2009) JCSL 
forthcoming; Akande, D., ‘The Bashir Indictment: Are Serving Heads of State Immune from 
ICC Prosecution?’, Oxford Transitional Justice Research Working Paper Series, 30 July 2008; 
and Sluiter, G., ‘Obtaining Cooperation from Sudan – Where is the Law?’ (2008) 6 JICJ 871. 
53 The SCSL was established shortly before the judgment in the Arrest Warrant case:  Schabas, 
note 19, 329. 
54 The Appeals Chamber rejected the assertion by the accused that the issue of the arrest 
warrant and its transmission to Ghana violated that state’s sovereignty: Taylor Immunity 
Decision, para. 57. 
55 Article 11, SCSL Agreement. 
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approach adopted by Liberia, which filed an application against Sierra Leone before 
the International Court of Justice requesting the court to declare that the issue of the 
indictment and the arrest warrant its and circulation violated the immunity to be 
accorded to Liberia under international law.56 The International Court of Justice is 
precluded from taking any further steps unless Sierra Leone accepts its jurisdiction in 
relation to this dispute. Taylor’s counsel also filed proceedings against the SCSL and 
the Liberian Ministry of Justice in the Liberian Supreme Court challenging the legality 
of searches conducted against his home, and those of his associates.57 
 
Of course, once Taylor stepped down as President of Liberia in August 2003, he 
became a former head of state and was entitled to immunity only in respect of official 
acts committed while in office. The SCSL would have been entitled to issue a further 
indictment and arrest warrant.58 It is also likely that that the actions surrounding 
Taylor’s transfer to the SCSL in 2006 may have constituted either a waiver by Liberia 
of any residual immunity enjoyed by Taylor,59 or a removal of such immunity by the 
Security Council.60 
 
The SCSL has also indicted former officials of Sierra Leone, including the Minister of 
the Interior, Sam Hinga Norman.  The issue of immunity under domestic law has not 
been raised by the accused, and it is arguable that, by entering into the SCSL 
Agreement, Sierra Leone has waived the immunity of its own state officials under 
both domestic law and international law. This has been done either expressly, if it is 
accepted that article 6(2) of the SCSL Statute is addressed to immunity, or implicitly, 
because it has delegated jurisdiction to the SCSL and has given a mandate to the 
SCSL to pursue those most responsible, which would include senior leaders.  
However, the SCSL Agreement is not directly incorporated into domestic law by the 
Ratification Act. Thus article 6(2) may not have direct application in national law, and 
                                                 
56 Press Release, Liberia applies to the International Court of Justice in a dispute with Sierra 
Leone concerning an international arrest warrant issued by the Special Court for Sierra Leone 
against the Liberian President, 5 August 2003. 
57 Sriram, C., ‘Wrong-sizing International Justice? The Hybrid Tribunal in Sierra Leone’ 
(2006) 29 FILJ 472, 487-8. 
58 This was recognised by the Appeals Chamber, Taylor Immunity Decision, para. 59. 
59 Taylor was arrested in Nigeria in March 2006, and then transferred to Liberia, where he was 
detained by UNMIL and transferred to the SCSL.  See Frulli, M., ‘A Turning Point in 
International Efforts to Apprehend War Criminals:  The UN Mandates Taylor’s Arrest in 
Liberia’ (2006) 4 JICJ 351. 
60 Resolution 1638 (2005) had authorised UNMIL to apprehend and detain Taylor in the event 
of his return to Liberia and to transfer him, or to facilitate his transfer, to the SCSL for 
prosecution:  para. 1. The Security Council also issued requests and binding directions to 
specified states and the Secretary-General so as to facilitate the transfer of Taylor to the 
Netherlands for trial and the conduct of the proceedings:  Resolution 1688 (2006). 
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may require further legislation to remove any immunity that may exist under national 
law, which Sierra Leone would be required to do due to its international obligations 
under the SCSL Agreement. 
2.5 Tribunals established by the Security Council:  the Special Tribunal 
for Lebanon 
Immunity may prove to be a key issue for the LST. Evidence obtained by the UNIIIC 
suggests that the assassination of former Prime Minister Hariri enjoyed support from 
both the Syrian and Lebanese intelligence services.  There is also some suggestion that 
Syrian involvement was authorised at the highest levels of government.61 The LST 
was established by the Security Council pursuant to its powers under Chapter VII of 
the Charter and, in this sense, is not a treaty-based tribunal but an international one. 
Yet the International Court of Justice dictum in the Arrest Warrant case suggests that 
being ‘international’ is not sufficient to guarantee that immunities will not apply. Thus 
it is necessary to examine the legal basis, nature and constituent instruments of the 
LST to determine whether immunities must be accorded to the officials of other states, 
including Syria.   
 
Having been established by the Security Council, it is arguable that the ICTY and the 
ICTR constitute the closest precedents for the issue of immunity before the LST.  The 
ICTY and the ICTR are not required to respect the immunity of state officials, as it is 
accepted that the Security Council may establish an international criminal tribunal to 
prosecute senior officials acting pursuant to its powers under Chapter VII of the 
Charter, and may also remove the immunity of such officials.62  The International 
Court of Justice implicitly confirmed this in the Arrest Warrant case.  However, it is 
submitted that there are key differences between the ICTY and the ICTR and the LST.  
First, the officials indicted or tried by the ICTY and the ICTR have been nationals of 
the state that is the ‘target’ of the relevant Security Council resolutions.  The ICTY 
and the ICTR have tried senior officials of the territorial state, the territory of the 
former Yugoslavia and Rwanda respectively. Neither has prosecuted senior officials 
of states other than the target state.  To conclude that Resolution 1757 has removed the 
                                                 
61 See the Report of the International Independent Investigation Commission established 
pursuant to Security Council resolution 1595 (2005), S/2005/662, para. 124 – ‘the decision to 
assassinate former Prime Minister Rafik Hariri could not have been taken without the approval 
of top-ranked Syrian security officials’ . 
62 Slobodan Milosevic asserted that the ICTY lacked competence ‘by reason of his status as 
former President’. The Trial Chamber interpreted this as a challenge to article 7(2) of the ICTY 
Statute.  The Trial Chamber concluded that ‘[T]here is absolutely no basis for challenging the 
validity of Article 7, paragraph 2, which at this time reflects a rule of customary international 
law’:  Prosecutor v Slobodan Milosevic, Decision on Preliminary Motions, Trial Chamber, 8 
November 2001, para. 28-34. 
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immunity of Lebanese officials would therefore not be controversial.  In contrast, for 
the LST to prosecute an official of Syria would be to proceed further than the ICTY or 
the ICTR have done.  Though this is not to say that the ad hoc tribunals could not do 
so; in fact this appeared to be contemplated when the Prosecutor considered whether 
to investigate alleged violations of international humanitarian law by NATO forces in 
Kosovo.63   It is also similar to the resolution of the immunity of President Bashir 
before the ICC, as the basis for the ICC’s jurisdiction in respect of President Bashir is 
a referral from the Security Council acting under Chapter VII of the Charter.64  
 
Second, the LST Statute does not contain a provision that purports to remove 
immunity.  A provision on immunity in early drafts of the LST Statute was removed, 
reportedly at the request of the Russian Federation. In contrast, the Statutes of the 
ICTY and ICTR contain provisions which are considered by some to remove 
immunity.65  However, the absence of an explicit removal of immunity is not 
conclusive as to the position regarding immunity.  It could be argued that the act of 
establishing the LST, in circumstances where the Security Council was aware that 
senior officials of both Lebanon and Syria were potentially implicated, implicitly 
removed immunity.  However, unlike the position with the creation of the ICTY and 
the ICTR, it is not clear that the Security Council intended to establish the LST 
through the use of its powers under Chapter VII of the Charter.  It is therefore more 
difficult to suggest that it was the intention of the Security Council to deal with 
immunity outside of the provisions of the LST Agreement attached to Resolution 
1757.   
 
Third, Resolution 1757 does not contain the general obligation on member states to 
co-operate as is found in the resolutions establishing the ICTY and ICTR.66 Nor is the 
general obligation for member states to co-operate that is found in the Statutes of the 
ad hoc tribunals duplicated in the LST Statute.67 Obligations under the LST Statute are 
addressed to Lebanon only, not member states. This obligation could be said to extend 
                                                 
63 Final Report to the Prosecutor of the Committee Established to Review the NATO Bombing 
Campaign Against the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, 13 June 2000. 
64 Prosecutor v Omar Hassan Ahmad Al Bashir, Decision on the Prosecutor’s Application for a 
Warrant of Arrest, Pre-Trial Chamber, 4 March 2009, pars 40-45.  For discussion of the issue 
of immunity, see the sources cited at note 50. 
65 For the contrary view, that this is directed only at superior orders as a substantive defence, 
see Schabas, note 19. 
66 Resolution 827 (1993), para. 4; Resolution 955 (1994), para. 2. Both resolutions require 
member states to co-operate with the tribunal and to take all steps required under domestic law 
to implement the provisions of the resolution and the statute, including to comply with requests 
from the Trial Chambers. 
67 Article 29, ICTY Statute; Article 28, ICTR Statute. 
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to a requirement for Lebanon to waive the immunity of its officials.  However, it 
would be difficult to establish that Syria is similarly required to waive immunity.  
Syria may be obliged to waive immunity by virtue of the resolutions of the Security 
Council regarding terrorism, several of which impose binding obligations on member 
states.68  Yet these resolutions contemplate co-operation with other states, and not co-
operation with an international criminal tribunal. 
 
Finally, the subject matter jurisdiction of the ICTY and the ICTR is very different to 
that of the LST.  The jurisdiction of the LST is restricted to the crime of terrorism, as 
defined in Lebanese law.  This raises several issues.  First, does international law 
recognise an exception to the general rules of state immunity for acts of terrorism?  
This is doubtful, particularly as the Arrest Warrant case appears to reject an exception 
from immunity in respect to international crimes.  The French Cour de Cassation has 
held that terrorism does not fall within the class of international crimes permitting an 
exception to state immunity.69  Second, does the Security Council have the power to 
remove immunity in respect of the crime of terrorism? At least one permanent 
member of the Security Council has suggested that the Security Council does not have 
power to establish an international tribunal in respect of terrorism.70  It could follow 
from this that the Security Council would not have the competence to remove 
immunity.  It is unlikely that this suggestion is correct, as the Security Council has 
indicated on several occasions that terrorism is a threat to international peace and 
security,71 thus it is open to the Security Council to act in relation to terrorism.  Third, 
Syria is a party to several terrorism conventions.72  Such conventions impose only the 
obligation to extradite or prosecute, and, unlike the Genocide Convention, they do not 
require or contemplate proceedings before an international criminal tribunal.  Nor do 
they consider the issue of immunity.  Accordingly, Syria cannot be considered to have 
waived the immunity of state officials when ratifying these treaties. Moreover, Syria 
has indicated its willingness to prosecute its own nationals, which is a permissible 
                                                 
68 For example, Resolution 1373 (2001) provides that states shall ‘Afford one another the 
greatest measure of assistance in connection with criminal investigations or criminal 
proceedings relating to the financing or support of terrorist acts’: para. 2(f). 
69 Zappala, S., “Do Heads of State in Office Enjoy Immunity from Jurisdiction for International 
Crimes? The Ghaddafi Case Before the French Cour de Cassation” (2001) 12 EJIL 595. 
70 Russian Federation, S/PV.5685. 
71 See, for example, Resolution 1373 (2001); Resolution 1566 (2004); Resolution 1805 (2008); 
and, in the context of Lebanon, Resolution 1636 (2005) – ‘terrorism in all its forms and 
manifestations constitutes one of the most serious threats to international peace and security’, 
preambular para. 3 
72 For example, Syria is a state party to the Convention on the Suppression of the Financing of 
Terrorism and the Convention on the Suppression of Terrorist Bombings.’ 
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option under these conventions.73 Finally, does it matter that the LST exercises 
jurisdiction in relation to terrorism as a crime under Lebanese law?  Schabas suggests 
that it does, rendering the LST less likely to be considered a ‘certain international 
criminal tribunal’ and more likely that the Security Council intended that immunities 
in international law would be applied.74  
 
Thus it appears that should the LST attempt to try senior state officials of Syria it will 
face numerous challenges.  The argument that immunity is not applicable is not as 
clear as it is before the ICTY and the ICTR.  However, these difficulties would not be 
overcome by adopting the treaty-based approach to the jurisdiction of the LST; as was 
seen with the discussion above in relation to the SCSL, this would not affect the issue 
of immunity of officials of third states. Assuming senior officials are targeted, it 
would, of course, be open to the Security Council to issue further resolutions dealing 
more clearly with the issue of immunity.  This could include a resolution featuring 
specific wording on immunity, imposing a general obligation to co-operate on Syria 
(as it has done so with the UNIIIC) or requiring Syria to arrest and surrender to the 
LST named senior officials.75 Unless this occurs, it is unlikely that the LST will be 
able to exercise jurisdiction in relation to sitting senior officials, unless Syria 
surrenders such individuals voluntarily or waives immunity.  Moreover, other states, 
which have no obligation to co-operate with the LST, may decline to execute any 
arrest warrant, especially when to do so may violate an obligation owed to Syria under 
international law. 
2.6 Conclusion 
This examination of the practice of the tribunals studied as regards immunity reveals 
that immunity under international law will not be a major concern for many hybrid or 
internationalized tribunals.  This is particularly so where the situation leading to the 
establishment of the tribunal is mainly a domestic one, such as an internal armed 
conflict or the actions of a prior repressive regime.  Even where the situation does 
have international dimensions, such as the international armed conflicts that may be 
                                                 
73 Note that this argument did not preclude the Security Council from acting to secure a trial 
before a court outside of Libya of the individuals accused of committing the 1998 bombing of 
Pan Am Flight 103 over Lockerbie. See:  Resolution 748 (1992) and Resolution 883 (1993); 
Questions of Interpretation and Application of the 1971 Montreal Convention arising from the 
Aerial Incident at Lockerbie (Libyan Arab Jamahiriya v. United States of America), 
Preliminary Objections, 27 February 1998, ICJ Reports (1998). 
74 Schabas, note 18. 
75 For example, in Resolution 1267 (1999), the Security Council demanded that ‘the Taliban 
turn over Usama bin Laden without further delay to appropriate authorities in a country where 
he has been indicted...or to appropriate authorities in a country where he will be arrested and 
effectively brought to justice’. 
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considered by the IHT, the ECCC or the WCC, questions of immunity under 
international law will be effectively precluded where the personal jurisdiction of the 
tribunal is restricted to nationals of one state (Iraq) or a particular political affiliation 
(Cambodia) or there is an international criminal tribunal able to try senior leaders of 
any state, regardless of immunity (Bosnia).  The main issue for those designing the 
tribunal is to ensure that issues of immunity under domestic law have been resolved, 
perhaps through the use of a clause such as article 15(3) of the IHT Statute or by a 
separate law repealing any immunity under the constitution or other instrument.   
 
Immunity will be a serious potential issue where there are international aspects to a 
situation, such as the alleged support of President Taylor for the conflict in Sierra 
Leone, the role of Indonesia in the violence committed in East Timor and the possible 
involvement of Syrian officials in the assassination of Hariri in Lebanon.  In this 
context, the legal basis of the tribunal in question is vital to resolving questions of 
immunity under international law.  First, where the tribunal operates as a national 
institution - as did the SPSC - it will be required, in accordance with customary 
international law, to respect the immunity of senior state officials of third states, even 
where they have been accused of committing international crimes. This is regardless 
of any provision in national law or its constituent instrument that purports to remove 
this immunity:  any attempt to rely on such provision would arguably constitute a 
violation of the sovereignty of the state concerned.  The use of a national institution 
thus has serious disadvantages if the immunity of a third state is likely to be an issue. 
Second, adopting a treaty-based approach will also be ineffective in resolving the 
immunity issue unless the state in question is a party to the treaty or waives immunity.  
The approach adopted by the SCSL in the Taylor Immunity Decision was in some 
respects flawed and did not take into account the treaty-based nature of that institution.  
Instead, the SCSL should have confirmed that Taylor retained immunity while in 
office, unless Liberia had waived that immunity.76  Finally, even a tribunal established 
by the Security Council does not automatically remove the immunity of a third state: 
whether it does will depend on the terms of the resolution, the context to the resolution 
and the provisions of the constituent instruments of the tribunal.  If state immunity is 
likely to be an issue, the Security Council should consider including specific wording 
removing immunity in either the resolution or the constituent instruments of the 
tribunal.  Alternatively, it could include in the resolution wording imposing an 
obligation to co-operate on third states generally, or addressed to named states, or 
                                                 
76 Deen-Racsmány reaches the same conclusion:  note 49, 319. 
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could include wording as to a named individual, which would, by implication, remove 
the immunity ordinarily accorded to that individual.   
 
The difficulties with the reasoning of the Appeals Chamber in Taylor Immunity 
Decision have led some commentators to suggest that the criterion advanced by the 
International Court of Justice in the Arrest Warrant case – the distinction between a 
national and international court - is problematic.  Critics suggest that the nature of the 
conduct in question, should be used instead.77  The approach adopted by the 
International Court of Justice is problematic, as it is not always clear on which side of 
this line a tribunal will fall.  As has been seen in this study, it is not always easy to 
classify courts with an international element as either national or international.  This 
does not provide much certainty for states and the United Nations in establishing such 
tribunals, the judges that must determine whether immunity applies, and the 
defendants that are, or may be, the subject of proceedings before such institutions.  
However, the International Court of Justice was firm in its rejection of the nature of 
the conduct as the determining factor for immunity.  It is submitted here that some of 
the uncertainty may be overcome by considering potential issues of immunity when 
deciding the legal basis of the tribunal and drafting its constituent instruments. 
 
3 Amnesties 
3.1 Introduction 
Mallinder notes that ‘[A]mnesty has traditionally been understood in a legal sense to 
denote efforts by governments to eliminate any record of crimes occurring, by barring 
criminal prosecutions and / or civil suits.78 Amnesties are ‘[f]requently, evenly 
routinely, endorsed during transition from one regime to another, or as part of a peace 
settlement’,79 and are often perceived as a vital tool to ensure the end of a conflict or a 
peaceful transition.  As with immunity, an amnesty may restrict the personal 
jurisdiction of a court and also possibly the substantive jurisdiction where the amnesty 
is granted in respect of specified crimes.  The jurisdiction of several of the tribunals 
studied is potentially affected by amnesties. However, before considering the legality 
and scope of particular amnesties, it is necessary to consider briefly the lawfulness of 
                                                 
77 For example, Nouwen, note 45, 658. 
78 Mallinder, L., Amnesty, Human Rights and Political Transitions (2008, Hart), 5. 
79 Broomhall, B., International Justice & the International Criminal Court:  Between 
Sovereignty and the Rule of Law (2003), 93. 
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amnesties under customary international law.80  The permissibility of an amnesty is 
often linked to the existence of an obligation to prosecute certain crimes either under 
treaty law or in customary international law.  Treaties that incorporate an obligation to 
prosecute include the Geneva Conventions (in respect of grave breaches), the 
Convention Against Torture and the Genocide Convention. Certain commentators 
have also suggested that international human rights law requires prosecution of 
offenders and thus precludes amnesty81 and it has also been argued that customary 
international law may require prosecution in respect of crimes against humanity.  
However, there is disagreement amongst scholars as to whether there exists an 
obligation to prosecute beyond specific treaty obligations.82  An examination of recent 
state practice does not support the existence of a general duty to prosecute.  In fact, as 
Scharf concludes, ‘to the extent any state practice in this area is widespread, it is the 
practice of granting amnesties or de facto impunity to those who commit crimes 
against humanity’.83  United Nations practice is also inconclusive.  Despite issuing 
guidelines for negotiators that oppose the inclusion of amnesties in negotiated 
settlements,84 the United Nations has been involved in brokering several peace 
agreements containing amnesties, including in Sierra Leone.85   
 
However, this does not mean that amnesties are desirable or permissible in all 
circumstances.  It is possible that a rule prohibiting blanket, unconditional amnesties, 
which in effect provide total impunity to offenders, may be emerging in customary 
                                                 
80 Amnesties are not expressly prohibited or permitted in any treaty, with the exception of 
Article 6(5) of APII.  This provision, however, has been interpreted as applying to the principle 
of not prosecuting combatants for their role in an armed conflict and not amnesties in the 
broader sense. 
81 See Orentlicher, D., ‘Settling Accounts:  The Duty to Prosecute Human Rights Violations of 
a Prior Regime’ (1991) 100 YLJ 2537 and Roht-Arriaza, N., ‘The Developing Jurisprudence on 
Amnesty’ (1998) 20 HRQ 953.  It is submitted that the obligation extends only to the 
investigation of the violation, and does not require criminal measures such as prosecution. 
82 For a good discussion of the arguments, see Scharf, M., ‘The Letter of the Law:  The Scope 
of the International Legal Obligation to Prosecute Human Rights Crimes’ (1996) 59 LCP 41; 
Orentlicher, ibid; Roht-Arriaza, ibid; Ratner, S., ‘New Democracies:  New Atrocities: An 
Enquiry in International Law’ (1999) 87 Geo LJ 707; and Scharf, M., ‘Swapping Amnesty for 
Peace: Was There a Duty to Prosecute International Crimes in Haiti?’ (1996) 31 TILJ 1. 
83 Scharf, ibid, LCP, 57. 
84 In 1998 the United Nations issued a series of guidelines to staff engaged in negotiating peace 
settlements.  While the text of the guidelines are not publicly available, it is understood that 
they provide that no person representing the Secretary-General may support an amnesty for 
crimes against humanity, genocide or war crimes, or which would encourage a state to breach 
treaty obligations.  This policy was reiterated in the Report of the Secretary-General, The Rule 
of Law and Transitional Justice in Conflict and Post-Conflict Societies, 3 August 2004, 
S/2004/616. 
85 Stahn, C., ‘United Nations Peace-Building:  Amnesties and Alternative Forms of Justice: A 
Change in Practice?’ (2002) 84 IRRC 191. 
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international law.86  Various criteria for ‘acceptable’ amnesties have been advanced, 
including: the availability of complementary mechanisms, such as a truth commission, 
lustration or the payment of compensation to victims; the purpose of the amnesty (to 
facilitate peace); the proponents of the amnesty (ie, is the amnesty a ‘self-excusing’ 
amnesty, or is it introduced by a democratically elected government as part of a 
transition or as part of a United Nations negotiated settlement); and the target of the 
amnesty (are all sides to a conflict accorded the same treatment; does the amnesty 
exclude senior leaders and those most responsible for the commission of crimes).87  
Limited and more focused amnesties are more likely to be accepted as valid by the 
affected communities, other states and the international community. 
 
The question of the validity and lawfulness of an amnesty may be raised in several 
different fora: the courts of the territorial state; the courts of states exercising 
extraterritorial criminal jurisdiction; international human rights monitoring bodies; and 
international or hybrid criminal tribunals.  While the decisions of human rights 
monitoring bodies may be influential in determining whether the grant of an amnesty 
is considered to be a violation of a state’s international obligations, such decisions are 
not directly relevant to the issue of whether the tribunals studied are required to give 
effect to an amnesty.  Accordingly, the decisions of such bodies will not be considered 
further.  The next section will assess amnesties before the tribunals studied. 
3.2 Amnesties and the internationalized and hybrid tribunals 
Chapter Three identified three different legal bases for the tribunals studied. The 
previous section showed that this categorisation affects the applicability of immunity 
provisions before the different tribunals.  It is also relevant to whether a particular 
tribunal is required to give effect to an amnesty provision.  None of the ‘national’ 
tribunals studied are exercising extraterritorial jurisdiction – except in very limited 
circumstances.  In general, courts of a state exercising extraterritorial jurisdiction, 
including universal jurisdiction, are not required to give effect to an amnesty granted 
elsewhere.88 In deciding whether or not to give effect to an amnesty granted by the 
                                                 
86 Scharf, M., ‘The Amnesty Exception to the Jurisdiction of the International Criminal Court’ 
(1999) 32 CILJ 507, 512; Williams, S., Amnesties in International Law:  The Experience of the 
Special Court for Sierra Leone’ (2005) 5 HRLR 271, 293. 
87 Mallinder, note 78, Chapter 4. 
88 Courts in France have held that a Mauritanian law granting amnesty to members of the 
armed forces and the security forces did not preclude the prosecution in French courts of Ely 
Ould Dah, a Mauritanian general, as it had no legal effect in France:  Trial Watch: Ely Ould 
Dah.  Similarly, Mexican courts have held that the amnesty granted under Argentine law had 
no legal effect internationally and cannot bind the courts of another state:  Decision on the 
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territorial state, the courts of third states often examine whether the amnesty is 
precluded by international law, or would be inconsistent with the obligation of that 
state under treaty or customary law to extradite or to prosecute.89  However, such 
decisions are not directly relevant to the present discussion.  
 
The ‘national’ tribunals studied – the IJPP, the SPSC, the WCC, the ECCC and the 
IHT – all function as courts of the territorial state and can be equated to national courts 
for the purpose of the application of an amnesty provision.  As outlined by 
Mallinder,90 national courts tend to approach the treatment of amnesties from several 
perspectives.  First, a national court may assess the legality of the amnesty provision 
against pre-existing national laws, including constitutional rules.  It will then be a 
question as to whether the amnesty provision complies with those rules or, if not, 
which system of laws enjoys primacy within the domestic legal system.  Second, a 
national court may approach the legality of an amnesty from the perspective of 
international law, and the state’s obligations under both relevant treaties and 
customary international law.  This in turn is influenced by the court’s opinion as to 
where international law lies within the domestic legal system.  Moreover, it requires 
an examination as to whether amnesties, and the particular amnesty in question, are 
compatible with obligations under international human rights law and international 
humanitarian law.  However, the issue has been largely avoided in the 
internationalized tribunals, as the amnesty arrangements in question are designed or 
have been interpreted so as to exclude from their scope the international crimes that 
may be tried before the tribunals in question.  Alternatively, amnesty has not been 
recommended or granted in relation to senior figures that would most likely be the 
target of such tribunals. 
 
For example, in East Timor, the SPSC operated concurrently with the truth and 
reconciliation commission which investigated those who had committed minor 
offences during the relevant period, effectively providing an amnesty from 
prosecution.  Other offences were retained by the Office of the General Prosecutor for 
investigation and trial.91  There have been two attempts to introduce formal amnesty 
                                                                                                                                 
Extradition of Ricardo Miguel Cavallo, Supreme Court of Justicia, 10 June 2003, 42 ILM 888 
(Mexico).  See the discussion in Mallinder, note 78, 294-304.  
89 The exception would be where the amnesty is endorsed or imposed by the Council, see 
Naqvi, Y., ‘Amnesty for war crimes:  Defining the limits of international recognition’ (2003) 
85 IRRC 583, 591. 
90 Mallinder, note 78, Chapter 5. 
91 See Regulation 2001/10 On the Establishment of a Commission for Reception, Truth and 
Reconciliation in East Timor, in particular section 27. 
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laws in East Timor, although neither attempt has been successful.92  In addition, the 
Commission of Truth and Friendship had the power to request amnesty for persons 
responsible for violations of international humanitarian law, but only where such 
individuals have acknowledged their actions and apologised to the victims. However, 
in its final report, the Commission of Truth and Friendship elected not to recommend 
amnesty for any individual, finding that none of the individuals concerned had fully 
co-operated with its investigation. 93 
 
In Bosnia, the Dayton Agreement included an amnesty from prosecution for returning 
refugees or displaced persons charged with a crime, other than those accused of 
committing a serious violation of international humanitarian law.  The Dayton 
Agreement also included an obligation to cooperate with the ICTY.  Both the 
Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina and the Republic Sprska introduced broad 
amnesty laws, excluding from their scope crimes within the jurisdiction of the ICTY.94 
This would also exclude from the scope of the amnesty crimes within the jurisdiction 
of the WCC.  Amnesty is also unlikely to be an issue for the IHT.  On 13 February 
2008, the Iraqi Parliament adopted a law on amnesty.95  By the end of 2008, some 
125,000 Iraqis were released from custody pursuant to the amnesty.96  However, the 
amnesty does not extend to crimes against humanity, genocide, terrorism and other 
serious crimes that form the material jurisdiction of the IHT.  
 
The ECCC has been the only tribunal in this category to have considered the 
application of an amnesty.  The ECCC Agreement includes a provision precluding the 
Government of Cambodia from requesting ‘an amnesty or pardon for any persons who 
may be investigated or convicted of crimes referred to in the present Agreement’.97  In 
                                                 
92 A proposed amnesty law was passed by the parliament in 2004, but was never promulgated.  
The amnesty law would not have applied to offences with a possible sentence exceeding five 
years, but would allow a sentence reduction for such crimes.  A second amnesty law – the Law 
on Truth and Measures of Clemency for Diverse Offences - was passed by parliament on 4 
June 2007, but subsequently found unconstitutional by the Court of Appeals.  This law was 
directed at offences committed during the 2006 elections, and their aftermath, not at the 1999 
referendum or at the period of the Indonesian occupation. 
93 From Remembering Comes Hope, presented 15 July 2008. 
94 Law on Amnesty of the Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina (30 June 1996), replaced by 
Law on Amnesty of the Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina (3 December 1999).  See also 
Amnesty Law of the Republika Srpska (4 July 1996), as amended by Law on Changes and 
Amendments to the Law on Amnesty (1999), and the Law on Amnesty of the Republic of 
Bosnia and Herzegovina (23 February 1996). 
95 Rubin, A., ‘Ending Impasse, Iraq Parliament Backs Measures’, New York Times, 14 
February 2008. 
96 The actual figures of detainees released pursuant to the amnesty are unclear, this is the figure 
released by Chief justice Abdelsattar al-Berqadar on 14 December 2008. 
97 Article 11(1), ECCC Agreement. 
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relation to the one case in which the Government indicated that a pardon had been 
granted before entering into the ECCC Agreement, it was agreed that the ECCC would 
decide the scope of this pardon.98 This is reflected in the Special Law, which provides 
‘The Royal Government of Cambodia shall not request an amnesty or pardon for any 
persons who may be investigated for or convicted of crimes referred to in Articles 3, 
4, 5, 6, 7 and 8 of this law.  The scope of any amnesty or pardon that may have bee 
granted prior to the enactment of this Law is a matter to be determined by the 
Extraordinary Chambers’.99   
 
The amnesty in question was granted on 14 September 1996100 to Ieng Sary in relation 
to a conviction in absentia in 1979 on the charge of genocide101 and under a 1994 law 
to prohibit the Khmer Rouge as an organisation.102  In an appeal against the order for 
provisional detention, Ieng Sary raised the issue of the amnesty.103  The relevant 
provision of the amnesty states: 
 
An amnesty to Mr Ieng Sary, former Deputy Prime Minister in charge of 
Foreign Affairs in the Government of Democratic Kampuchea, for the 
sentence of death and confiscation of all his property imposed by order of the 
People’s Revolutionary Tribunal of Phnom Penh, dated 19 August 1979; and 
an amnesty for prosecution under the Law to Outlaw the Demoractic 
Kampuchea Group, promulgated by Reach Kram No. 1, NS 94, dated 14 July 
1994. 
 
The Pre-Trial Chamber interpreted this provision such that there were two amnesties 
granted by the Royal Decree. The first was in relation to sentence only (technically a 
pardon).  The Pre-Trial Chamber held that its validity was uncertain and it most likely 
would not preclude a conviction for genocide before the ECCC.104  The second 
amnesty was an amnesty from prosecution under the Law to Outlaw the Khmer 
Rouge.105  The Pre-Trial Chamber noted that the offences listed in this law were not 
the same as the crimes within the jurisdiction of the ECCC and thus did not preclude 
prosecution.106  Thus the chamber did not consider the effect of the amnesty further, or 
                                                 
98 Article 11(2), ECCC Agreement. 
99 Article 40. 
100 Royal Decree No. NS/RKT/0996/72. 
101 Judgment of the People’s Revolutionary Tribunal, August 1979. 
102 Law to Outlaw the Democratic Kampuchea Group, promulgated by Reach Kram No. 1, NS 
94, 14 July 1994. 
103 See Decision on Appeal Against Provisional Detention Order of Ieng Sary, 17 October 
2008. 
104 Paras 57-58.  The Pre-Trial Chamber also rejected an argument based on the ne bis in idem 
principle. 
105 Para 59. 
106 Para 61. 
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the validity of the amnesty under international law.  However, it did leave scope for 
this question to be revisited at a later stage of proceedings.107  The ECCC has 
otherwise not been expressly granted jurisdiction to consider the legality of the 1994 
amnesty law, and should not be called upon to do so, as the amnesty excludes leaders 
of the Khmer Rouge.108 
 
The final forum to be considered is an international criminal court.  Into this category 
would fall the ad hoc tribunals, the ICC, the SCSL and the LST.  Again, it is suggested 
that it is not enough merely to recognise the international status of the tribunal, but 
rather the legal basis, nature and constituent instruments of the tribunal must be 
examined.  The ICTY and the ICTR would not be required to give effect to amnesty 
laws passed by the relevant territorial states, despite the absence of an express 
provision in their statutes to this effect.  This is because their jurisdiction flows from 
the authority of the Security Council acting under Chapter VII of the Charter. The 
Security Council has given the tribunals primacy in respect of national laws and 
courts, and any amnesty would be inconsistent with the intention of the Security 
Council to render offenders accountable.109  The ICTY has confirmed that amnesty 
would not preclude prosecution before the tribunal, at least in relation to the crime of 
torture.110  It is also important to recall that, since the imposition of the completion 
strategy, both tribunals are focused on those most responsible, thus amnesty remains 
an option for lower level offenders who would not be targeted by the ICTY or the 
ICTR.111   
 
                                                 
107 The Pre-Trial Chamber noted that not making submissions at this stage cannot be 
considered a waiver of the right to do so at a later stage, para 23. 
108 Slye, R., ‘The Cambodian Amnesties:  Beneficiaries and the Temporal Reach of Amnesties 
for Gross Violations of Human Rights’ (2004) 22 Wis ILJ 100.  Slye suggests that the ECCC 
should issue an opinion on the validity of the 1994 amnesty law, arguing that ‘the tribunal 
judges might piece together a limited amnesty that contributes to both truth and justice’, 123.  
However, it is submitted that this would exceed the jurisdiction of the ECCC. 
109 Naqvi, note 89, 615-616. 
110 Prosecutor v Furundzija, Judgment, Trial Chamber, 10 December 1998.  Note here that the 
ICTY reached this conclusion based on the erga-omnes nature of torture, para 153.  It did not 
address the issue based on the legal basis of the ICTY. 
111 Both Rwanda and the states of the former Yugoslavia have passed amnesty laws, excluding 
from the scope of the amnesty crimes within the jurisdiction of the ICTR and the ICTY.  For 
example, in Rwanda, offenders in the lowest two categories would be prosecuted before 
national gacaca courts, with the lower level offenders not liable to imprisonment, but 
punishment comprising community service or some sort of arrangement with the victim.  See:  
Schabas, W., ‘Genocide Trials and Gacaca Courts’ (2005) 3 JICJ 879; Fierens, J., ‘Gacaca 
Courts:  Between Fantasy and Reality’ (2005) 3 JICJ 896; and Kirby, C., ‘Rwanda’s Gacaca 
Courts:  A Preliminary Critique’ (2006) 50 JoAL 94. 
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The position regarding amnesties before the ICC is deliberately ambiguous.  During 
the negotiation of the Rome Statute, two positions emerged.  Certain delegates 
advocated that permitting amnesties for crimes within the jurisdiction of the ICC 
would enable perpetrators to absolve themselves of responsibility.112  Other states 
suggested that as amnesties were not prohibited by international law and can be a 
valuable tool for achieving peace in situations of conflict, the ICC should take account 
of domestic amnesties when deciding whether to exercise jurisdiction.113  This 
difference of opinion was never resolved and, as a result, the Rome Statute is silent on 
the issue.  It has been suggested that the ICC could accommodate a domestic amnesty 
provision in a number of ways.114 The ICC’s approach to amnesty has been discussed 
following the issue of indictments and arrest warrants in respect of leaders of the 
Lord’s Resistance Army in northern Uganda in 2005.  The leaders are eligible for 
amnesty under a 2000 act which provided a blanket amnesty in order to encourage the 
LRA to surrender.115 
 
The SCSL Statute and the LST Statute contain a provision concerning the applicability 
of amnesties.  Article 10 of the SCSL Statute provides ‘An amnesty granted to any 
person falling within the jurisdiction of the Special Court in respect of the crimes 
referred to in articles 2 to 4 of the present Statute shall not be a bar to prosecution’.  
The provision is directed at article 9 of the Lome Accord, which extended a blanket 
amnesty to ‘all combatants and collaborators’ and in particular that ‘no official or 
judicial action’ be taken in respect of any member of the RUF, AFRC, SLA or CDF 
for their actions from March 1991 up to the date of signature of the Lome Accord.  In 
the Lome Amnesty Decision,116 the accused argued that the Government of Sierra 
                                                 
112 For a discussion of the negotiations see Roht-Arriaza, N., ‘Amnesty and the International 
Criminal Court’ in Shelton, D. (ed) International Crimes, Peace and Human Rights:  The Role 
of the International Criminal Court (2000, Transnational Publishers); Gavron, J., ‘Amnesties 
in the Light of Development in International Law and the Establishment of the International 
Criminal Court’ (2002) 51 ICLQ 91; and Wedgwood, R., ‘The International Criminal Court:  
An American View’ (1999) 10 EJIL 93. 
113 See, in particular, the non-paper circulated by the United States Delegation to the 
Preparatory Commission, ‘State practice Regarding Amnesties and Pardons’ (August 1997). 
114 Several provisions of the Rome Statute are said to allow the ICC to defer to domestic 
amnesties:  article 15 (prosecutorial discretion); article 16 (deferral at the request of the 
Council); article 17 (complementarity); article 20 (non bis in idem); and article 53 
(prosecutorial discretion).  For further discussion, see:  Scharf, M., ‘The Amnesty Exception to 
the Jurisdiction of the International Criminal Court’ (1999) 32 CILJ 507; Robinson, D., 
‘Serving the Interests of Justice:  Amnesties, Truth Commissions and the International 
Criminal Court’ (2003) 14 EJIL 481; and Mazjub, D., ‘Peace or Justice? Amnesties and the 
International Criminal Court’ (2002) 3 Melb JIL 248; Mallinder, note 78, Chapter 6. 
115 See discussion in Mallinder, 78, 280-282, and case study 2. 
116 Prosecutor v Kallon and Kamara, Decision on Challenge to Jurisdiction, Lome Accord 
Amnesty, Appeals Chamber, 13 March 2004 (Amnesty Decision).  Counsel for two other 
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Leone was bound by the Lome Accord, as an international agreement, which could not 
be amended without the consent of all the parties to the agreement, including the RUF.  
The Appeals Chamber rejected this argument, finding that although international 
actors, including the United Nations, had signed the agreement as mediators, this did 
not render the agreement international in nature.117  Moreover, the Appeals Chamber 
considered it to be unlikely that the parties to the conflict, in particular the RUF, had 
the capacity to enter into international agreements.118  The Appeals Chamber then 
considered whether it had the competence to review the legality of the SCSL Statute, 
in particular article 10, and the SCSL Agreement.  It concluded that it did not, unless it 
considered the provisions in question to be void for being inconsistent with a 
peremptory norm of international law.119 
 
The Appeals Chamber then considered whether amnesties may lawfully be granted in 
respect of international crimes.  Having reached the conclusion it did with respect to 
the jurisdictional issue, the SCSL did not have to consider the validity of the amnesty 
further, so this discussion was technically dicta.  The Appeals Chamber held that, 
where international crimes are subject to universal jurisdiction, ‘a State cannot deprive 
another State of its jurisdiction to prosecute the offender by the grant of an 
amnesty’.120  It also indicated that this principle would apply to prosecution before an 
international tribunal.121  While the Appeals Chamber recognised that ‘not every 
                                                                                                                                 
accused – Fofana and Gbao - submitted briefs as interveners.  The amnesty provision was also 
raised in three other decisions:  Prosecutor v Kondewa, Decision on Lack of Jurisdiction / 
Abuse of Process:  Amnesty Provided by the Lome Accord, Appeals Chamber, 25 May 2004; 
Prosecutor v Gbao, Decision on Preliminary Motion on the Invalidity of the Agreement 
between the United Nations and the Government of Sierra Leone, Appeals Chamber, 25 May 
2004; and Prosecutor v Fofana, Decision on Preliminary Motion on Lack of Jurisdiction: 
Illegal Delegation of Jurisdiction by Sierra Leone, Appeals Chamber, 25 May 2004.  In all 
three cases, the SCSL adopted the reasoning in the Amnesty Decision. 
117 Amnesty Decision, paras 41-42.  For the view that negotiated settlements in respect of 
internal armed conflicts can constitute treaties, see Kooijmans, P., ‘The Security Council and 
Non-State Entities as Parties to the Conflict’, in Wellens, K. (ed), International Law: Theory 
and Practice, Essays in Honour of Eric Suy (1998, Kluwer Law International), 333-346, 
discussed by the Appeals Chamber, paras 38-9, and Cassese, A., ‘The Special Court and 
International Law:  The Decision Concerning the Lome Agreement Amnesty’ (2004) 2 JICJ 
1130, 1134-35. 
118 Amnesty Decision, para. 48. 
119 Amnesty Decision, para 62, relying upon articles 53 and 64, of the Vienna Convention on 
the Law of Treaties.  The Appeals Chamber distinguished the decision of the ICTY in the 
Tadic Jurisdiction Decision based on the status that the SCSL is a treaty-based institution.  For 
criticism of this aspect of the decision, see Meisenberg, S., ‘Legality of Amnesties in 
international humanitarian law:  The Lome Amnesty Decision of the Special Court for Sierra 
Leone’ (2004) 86 IRRC 837, 841-2 and Williams, S., Amnesties in International Law:  The 
Experience of the Special Court for Sierra Leone’ (2005) 5 HRLR 271, 282-286. 
120 Amnesty Decision, para 67. 
121 Amnesty Decision, para 72. 
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activity that is seen as an international crime is susceptible to universal jurisdiction’,122 
it concluded that the crimes in articles 2 to 4 of the SCSL Statute ‘are international 
crimes and crimes against humanity’123 and that States can exercise universal 
jurisdiction in respect of such crimes.124  The Appeals Chamber also endorsed the 
submission of the amicus curiae that ‘given the existence of a treaty obligation to 
prosecute or extradite an offender, the grant of amnesty in respect of such crimes as 
are specified in Articles 2 to 4 of the Statute of the Court is not only incompatible 
with, but is in breach of an obligation of a State towards the international community 
as a whole’.125  The Appeals Chamber noted that a prohibition against amnesties in 
relation to serious violations of international law was a ‘crystallising international 
norm’126 and that ‘this court is entitled in the exercise of its discretionary power, to 
attribute little or no weight to the grant of such an amnesty’.127  It therefore concluded 
that, regardless of any affect the amnesty may have had in domestic law, ‘it is 
ineffective in removing the universal jurisdiction to prosecute persons accused of such 
crimes that other states have by reason of the nature of the crimes.  It is also 
ineffective in depriving an international court such as the Special Court of 
jurisdiction’.128   
 
The Lome Amnesty Decision has been heavily criticised, and rightly so. Most 
importantly for the present study, the decision failed to consider the legal basis of the 
SCSL as a court established by a treaty.  The SCSL operates on the basis of delegated 
territorial jurisdiction from Sierra Leone and does not operate on the basis of universal 
jurisdiction.  If Sierra Leone by granting an amnesty has relinquished the jurisdiction 
its courts could otherwise have exercised, it could not have delegated that jurisdiction 
to the SCSL.  Similarly, the analogy made between the SCSL and the position of a 
foreign state is not appropriate in these circumstances.  Accordingly, there is some 
merit in the arguments of the accused on this point.  Second, the Appeals Chamber 
reached a sweeping conclusion that all the international crimes within its material 
jurisdiction were subject to universal jurisdiction.  This is not necessarily so, 
particularly regarding the commission of war crimes in internal armed conflicts.  As 
                                                 
122 Amnesty Decision, para 68. 
123 Amnesty Decision, para 69. 
124 Amnesty Decision, para 70. 
125 Amnesty Decision, para 73. Submissions were filed on behalf of Redress and by Professor 
Diane Orentlicher. 
126 Amnesty Decision, para 82, quoting the submission by the Prosecutor. 
127 Amnesty Decision, para 84. 
128 Amnesty Decision, para 88. 
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Cassese notes, ‘the Court did not corroborate [this proposition] with any authority’.129  
Third, the Appeals Chamber referred to treaties imposing an obligation to prosecute or 
extradite, but did not examine whether such an obligation existed in the circumstances 
in question, particularly having regard to Sierra Leone’s treaty obligations.  There is 
no treaty obligation on Sierra Leone to prosecute the crimes within the SCSL 
Statute.130 Fourth, the reasoning of the Appeals Chamber ‘appears obscure and 
unnecessarily torturous’.131  Finally, the position adopted by the SCSL was not 
supported by customary international law.132  The SCSL itself accepted that there was 
at present no norm precluding the grant of an amnesty, accepting that ‘such a norm is 
developing under international law’.  The better view is that no such rule presently 
exists.133  Moreover, the rule applied is an absolute one, which would remove amnesty 
as a possible tool in all circumstances. As Schabas notes, ‘Peace and reconciliation are 
both legitimate values that should have their place in human rights law. They need to 
be balanced against the importance of prosecution rather than simply discarded’. 134 
The Sierra Leone truth and reconciliation commission adopted a different approach to 
the amnesty provision.  While not required to pronounce as to the legality of the 
provision, the truth and reconciliation commission indicated its sympathy for the 
reasons justifying the grant of an amnesty, commenting that the amnesty ‘provided the 
framework for a process that pacified the combatants and, five years later, has returned 
Sierra Leoneans to a context in which they need not fear daily violence and 
atrocity’.135  As a practical matter, the approach adopted by the SCSL is problematic 
as Sierra Leone remains bound by the amnesty,136 yet the SCSL depends on the 
authorities to arrest and surrender the accused.137  As Meisenberg notes, such acts are 
‘undoubtedly of a judicial and official character’ and would be within the scope of the 
amnesty provision.138   
 
                                                 
129 Cassese, note 117, 1133. 
130 As discussed in Chapter Four, the material jurisdiction of the SCSL is restricted to 
violations of Common Article 3, APII, other serious violation as set out in the SCSL Statute 
and crimes against humanity.  Obligations under the grave breaches provisions of the Geneva 
Conventions, the CAT and the Genocide Convention are not relevant.  See Schabas, W., 
‘Amnesty, the Sierra Leone Truth and Reconciliation Commission and the Special Court for 
Sierra Leone’ (2004-05) 11 UC Davis JIL&P 145, 161-2; Williams, note 86, 291-293. 
131 Cassese, note 117, 1131. 
132 Amnesty Decision, para 82. 
133 Schabas, note 130, 168, suggesting that the Appeal Chamber’s conclusions ‘most certainly 
go beyond existing law, as is evident from even a cursory reading of the judgment’. 
134 Schabas, note 130, 168.   
135 Commission Report, quoted from Schabas, note 3130, 164. 
136 The Appeals Chamber did not declare the amnesty to be unlawful for the purpose of the 
domestic legal system: Amnesty Decision, para 50. 
137 Article 17(2), SCSL Agreement. 
138 Meseinberg, note 119, 847. 
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Apart from the approach adopted by the Appeals Chambers, there are several ways in 
which the application of the amnesty provision could have been avoided.  It has been 
suggested that the grant of the amnesty was conditional upon the support of the peace 
process by the accused, and that the Lome Accord became void due to the continued 
material breaches of its terms.139 The agreement, and its implementing legislation, 
would then be considered void and would not apply, including before the domestic 
courts of Sierra Leone.140  Thus the Lome Accord would not have restricted the 
capacity of the Government of Sierra Leone to establish the SCSL.  Alternatively, it 
could be argued that by entering into the SCSL Agreement, which delegated 
jurisdiction to the SCSL, and by passing the Ratification Act, the government 
repudiated the amnesty, at least in relation to a limited category of offenders, senior 
leaders and those most responsible.  Successor governments are entitled to vary or 
extinguish an amnesty, although presumably such action must comply with domestic 
legal requirements.  However, the Appeals Chamber unfortunately rejected this 
approach, finding that: ‘No reasonable tribunal will hold that the Government of 
Sierra Leone has reneged on its undertaking by agreeing to Article 10 of the Statute 
which is consistent with the developing norm of international law and with the 
declaration of the representative of the Secretary-General on the execution of the 
Lome Agreement’.141 A final option would have been for the SCSL to have precluded 
the application of the amnesty to the accused by interpreting the terms of the amnesty 
strictly.   
 
Article 16 of the LST Agreement provides that the Government of Lebanon shall not 
grant an amnesty to any person for a crime falling within the jurisdiction of the LST, 
and that any such amnesty granted will not be a bar to prosecution.  Thus the 
Government of Lebanon is under a clear obligation not to grant an amnesty.  The 
second part of article 16 is reflected in article 6 of the LST Statute, which provides 
                                                 
139 Cassese, note 117, 1135-39, noting that although some aspects of implementation of the 
Lome Accord did continue, this was merely paying lip service to its provisions.  Judge 
Robertson adopted a similar approach in his separate opinion:  Prosecutor v Kondewa, 
Decision on Lack of Jurisdiction / Abuse of Process: Amnesty Provided by the Lome Accord, 
Separate Opinion of Justice Robertson, 25 May 2004.  See also Williams, note 86, 296-300.  
For the view that amnesty provisions cannot be conditional, see Schabas, note 130. 
140 Cassese reaches this conclusion, but also recognizes that it is possible that the implementing 
legislation may continue to have effect within the domestic legal system of Sierra Leone:  note 
117, 1139-1140.  However, he concludes that this would not bar the exercise of jurisdiction by 
the SCSL.  Given the legal nature of the SCSL, it is submitted that this would bar the exercise 
of jurisdiction by the SCSL, for the reasons noted above. 
141 Amnesty Decision, para 62.  Schabas notes that this statement was surprising and odd, 
particularly given the statements of the President of Sierra Leone on the amnesty provision:  
Schabas, note 130, 159-160. 
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that ‘An amnesty granted to any person for any crime falling within the jurisdiction of 
the Special Tribunal shall not be a bar to prosecution’.  To date, no amnesty has been 
granted in relation to the assassination of former Prime Minister Hariri or the 
connected acts of terrorism.  The Secretary-General did not indicate why the amnesty 
provision was included in the LST Statute.  Perhaps there had been concerns that, 
given the supposed high-level involvement of Lebanese officials and the possibility of 
changes in government, an amnesty might have been granted in the future.  Lebanon 
does have a history of adopting amnesties, having granted a general amnesty law in 
relation to crimes committed during the conflict in Lebanon from 1975 to 1990.142  
However, that amnesty excluded prosecutions against individuals accused of the 
assassination or the attempted assassination of religious and political leaders and 
foreign diplomats.143  Wierda et al note that ‘this exception opened the door to 
selective prosecutions for those opposed to the Syrian hegemony’. Thus a study of 
previous Lebanese practice reveals that amnesties have been granted in the past, and 
have become politicized.144  
 
It would be a violation of Resolution 1757 if Lebanon were to grant an amnesty, as the 
terms of the LST Agreement were incorporated into the resolution.  Yet it is not clear 
what action the Security Council would – or could - take in response to the violation.  
Assuming sufficient political support, it could possibly condemn the grant of the 
amnesty, withdraw support for the LST and/or impose a sanction of some description 
under article 41 of the Charter. The LST could also determine the applicability of any 
amnesty granted in accordance with article 6 of the LST Statute.  Interesting questions 
would also be raised if Syria were to grant an amnesty to any of its nationals in respect 
of the terrorist attacks within the jurisdiction of the LST.  Amnesties issued in relation 
to terrorist offences may raise different considerations than those raised in relation to 
international crimes, such as crimes against humanity, genocide and war crimes.  First, 
terrorism is not accepted as an international crime that would be included in any 
emerging rule of customary international law prohibiting amnesty for international 
crimes.  This difficulty is compounded in the LST Statute, as the crime is defined 
solely by reference to domestic law.  Second, as Saul notes, terrorist crimes tend to 
target a smaller part of the population and are not widespread.  Therefore, ‘amnesties 
for terrorism may not be justifiable as necessary to achieve national reconciliation or 
                                                 
142 Amnesty Law, passed by the Lebanese Parliament on 26 August 1991.  
143 Article 3(3) Amnesty Law.   
144 Wierda, M., Nassar, H. and Maalouf, L., ‘Early Reflections on Local Perceptions, 
Legitimacy and Legacy of the Special Tribunal for Lebanon’ (2007) 5 JICJ 1065, 1070-71. 
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to restore harmony between rival ethnic or religious groups’.145  However, ‘amnesties 
for terrorism may be appropriate where it is sectarian and affects significant parts of 
the population or in specific cases where life is at imminent risk’.146  Third, the effect 
of the various terrorism conventions and the resolutions of the Security Council on 
terrorism must also be considered.  To the extent that such instruments establish for a 
particular state a duty to prosecute or to extradite, they may preclude the grant of an 
amnesty, particularly where terrorism affects victims or perpetrators from more than 
one state.147  As the Security Council has indicated that the terrorist acts that form the 
substantive jurisdiction of the LST constituted threats to international peace and 
security, and the Security Council has acted to establish the LST with jurisdiction in 
respect of those acts, arguably any grant of amnesty would be inconsistent with 
Resolution 1757.  Accordingly, the LST would be entitled to not apply the amnesty 
provision. 
3.3 Conclusion 
What does the above practice demonstrate?  The experience of the SPSC, the WCC, 
the IHT and the ECCC in some respects supports the assertion that a principle is 
developing in customary international law such that amnesty should not be granted in 
respect of serious crimes.  The national parliaments have passed general amnesty laws, 
yet all exclude from the scope of the amnesty either high-level offenders or those 
accused of committing serious crimes.  Where an internationalized tribunal is 
established as part of the national judicial system, the United Nations or the state(s) 
providing the assistance should to the extent possible, commit the affected state to an 
obligation not to grant an amnesty in respect of crimes within the subject matter 
jurisdiction of the tribunal or, at least should ensure that senior leaders are excluded 
from the scope of the amnesty.  Where an amnesty has already been granted to either 
senior leaders or a named individual that is the target of investigation, as is the case in 
Cambodia, it is submitted that there are three options.  First, the tribunal could be 
allowed to determine the validity and/or applicability of the amnesty provision.  This 
is the approach adopted in the ECCC Agreement and the Special Law.  Second, the 
government of the affected state could repeal the amnesty in question, if this was 
possible under domestic law and would not be problematic politically.  Third, a 
decision could be taken to recognize the amnesty for a particular individual or 
individuals. However, this option would raise issues for United Nations involvement 
                                                 
145 Saul, B., Defining Terrorism in International Law (2006, OUP), 125. 
146 Ibid, 125. 
147 Saul, note 145, 126-7. 
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in the tribunal and may violate any rule of customary international law precluding the 
grant of amnesties that may emerge. 
 
Similarly, where a tribunal is established by a treaty, the agreement should oblige the 
government of the affected state to not grant a future amnesty in respect of crimes or 
individuals within the tribunal’s jurisdiction.  In terms of amnesties already granted, 
such as the amnesty in the Lome Accord, the affected state should be encouraged to 
revoke the amnesty in relation to those crimes and individuals within the tribunal’s 
jurisdiction.  Where this is not possible, the parties may elect to leave the applicability 
of the amnesty to the tribunal to resolve, either by finding the amnesty to be invalid by 
reference to international or domestic law, by limiting the scope of the amnesty 
through a restrictive interpretation or by upholding the amnesty.  Alternatively, the 
parties could attempt to pre-determine the issue by including a provision, similar to 
article 10 of the SCSL Statute, in the constituent instrument of the tribunal.  However, 
as has been seen in proceedings before the SCSL, this will not preclude the court 
facing arguments based on the amnesty law.   
 
Where the tribunal is to be established by the Security Council, an amnesty that would 
apply to senior leaders in respect of international crimes may be inconsistent with any 
obligations placed on the affected state(s) to co-operate with the tribunal.  The affected 
state should ensure that any amnesty laws passed exclude individuals and crimes 
within the jurisdiction of the tribunal.  If an amnesty has already been granted, the 
Security Council could consider including a provision excluding the application of the 
amnesty in respect of proceedings before the tribunal.  Alternatively, the Security 
Council could leave the issue to the tribunal to resolve.  As has been shown in relation 
to Lebanon, an amnesty provision in respect of terrorist attacks may raise particular 
issues. 
4 Securing custody of the accused  
4.1 Introduction – co-operation and international criminal tribunals 
All of the tribunals studied recognise the right of the accused to be present during the 
trial.148 They also restrict this right in varying circumstances.149  This means that, in 
                                                 
148 Article 17(d) SCSL Statute; Article 35(d) Special Law; Article 7 Criminal Procedure Code 
Bosnia and Herzegovina; Article 20(1)(4) IHT Statute; Article 16(4)(d) LST Statute; sections 
6(2) and 5(1) of UNTAET Regulation 2000/30. 
149 Rule 60, RPE SCSL; Articles 247 and 242 Criminal Procedure Code Bosnia and 
Herzegovina; Rule 81, RPE ECCC; UNMIK Regulation 2000/1, On the Prohibition of Trials in 
Absentia for Serious Violations of International Humanitarian Law; Section 5, UNTAET 
 217 
most situations, it will be necessary to secure the custody of the accused before a trial 
can commence.  As none of the tribunals studied have their own enforcement 
mechanism, they depend on the co-operation of the relevant national authorities and 
those of other states to enforce their orders.150  In some situations, peacekeeping forces 
may also play a role in detaining and transferring the accused to the custody of the 
tribunal.151  
 
International law presently recognizes two models of co-operation: the vertical, or 
supra-state model, and the traditional, state-based horizontal model.  The vertical 
model is characterised by an international judicial authority, vested with sweeping 
powers as regards both subjects within the state and the state itself.  The court has the 
power to issue binding orders and to enforce its orders, and states may not rely on 
national security or other grounds to withhold co-operation.  In contrast, the horizontal 
model is based on consensus, and the sovereign equality of states.  Co-operation is 
generally provided for in a treaty, and is based on reciprocity.   The normal exceptions 
to extradition apply and co-operation may be refused on the basis of national security 
and other grounds.  Disputes as to the interpretation of the obligation to co-operate are 
to be resolved by dispute settlement measures, including diplomatic channels.152   
 
The ICTY and the ICTR fall within the first model of co-operation, the supra-state 
model.  Both were established by the Security Council acting pursuant to its powers 
under Chapter VII of the Charter, and states have an obligation to comply with their 
orders.153  The general obligation to co-operate with the tribunal is confirmed in the 
                                                                                                                                 
Regulation 2000/30;Article 19(4)(D), IHT Statute; Article 22, LST Statute.  Article 22 of the 
LST Statute is the most expansive provision, as, unlike the other tribunals, the accused is not 
required to have been present at any stage of the proceedings.  For further discussion, see 
Gaeta, P., ‘To be (Present) or Not to Be (Present):  Trials in Absentia before the Special 
Tribunal for Lebanon’ (2007) 5 JICJ 1165 and Aptel, C., ‘Some Innovations in the Statute of 
the Special Tribunal for Lebanon’ (2007) 5 JICJ 1107. 
150 The tribunals also require co-operation in gaining access to evidence, including physical and 
documentary evidence and witness testimony, and in enforcing sentences following conviction.  
While such co-operation is essential if the tribunal is to perform its mandate, these forms of co-
operation will not be considered separately here. 
151 For example in the former Yugoslavia, the NATO-led SFOR assisted in the arrest and 
surrender to the ICTY of several accused.  For discussion, see Zhou, H., ‘The Enforcement of 
Arrest Warrants by International Forces’ (2006) JICJ 202 and Gaeta, P., ‘Is NATO Authorized 
or Obliged to Arrest Persons Indicted by the International Criminal Tribunal for the Former 
Yugoslavia?’ (1998) 9 EJIL 174. 
152 Sluiter, G., ‘Legal Assistance to the Internationalized Criminal Tribunals’ in Romano et al 
(eds) Internationalized Criminal Courts and Tribunals: Sierra Leone, East Timor, Kosovo and 
Cambodia (2004, OUP), 382. 
153 Para. 4 of Resolution 827 (1993) (ICTY) and para. 2 of Resolution 955 (ICTR) state that the 
Council ‘decides that all States shall cooperate fully with the International Tribunal and its 
organs…’.  This is binding on member states by virtue of article 25 of the Charter. See also 
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statutes of both tribunals.154  In terms of enforcement of its orders, the President may 
inform the Security Council of a judicial finding of non-compliance by a state, and the 
Security Council may then choose to take action.155  However, securing the co-
operation of states has proved to be one of the greatest challenges of the ad hoc 
tribunals, particularly for the ICTY in relation to the states of the former Yugoslavia.  
The President of the ICTY has in the past reported non-co-operation to the Security 
Council in relation to Croatia156 and the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia.157  The 
Security Council responded merely by issuing further calls for co-operation and 
confirming that states are under a general obligation to co-operate with the ICTY158  
The authorities of the Republika Sprska have also largely failed to cooperate with the 
ICTY, although co-operation has improved in recent years.159   
 
                                                                                                                                 
Prosecutor v Blaskic, Judgment on the Request of the Republic of Croatia for Review of the 
Decision of Trial Chamber II of 18 July 1997, 29 October 1997, with the Appeals Chamber 
confirming that the ICTY has the power to issue binding orders to states, paras 26-31; and 
Chaumette, A., ‘The ICTY’s Power to Subpoena Individuals, to Issue Binding Orders to 
International Organisations and to Subpoena Their Agents’ (2004) 4 ICLR 357. 
154 Article 29, ICTY Statute; Article 28, ICTR Statute. This provision states that member states 
shall cooperate with the ICTY/ICTR in the investigation and prosecution of crimes and shall 
comply without undue delay with a request for assistance or an order of the ICTY/ICTR.  This 
would include a request for the arrest and surrender of an accused.  For further details see 
Warbrick, C. and McGoldrick, D., ‘Co-operation with the International Criminal Tribunal for 
Yugoslavia’ (1996) 45 ICLQ 947 and Sarooshi, D., ‘The Powers of the United Nations 
International Criminal Tribunals’ (1998) 2 MPYbIL 141. 
155 Rule 7bis , RPE of both tribunals.  
156 See Letter from President Gabrielle McDonald to the President of Security Council, 2 
November 1999, reporting the failure of Croatia to arrest Ivica Rajic and Mladen Naletilic, and 
the failure by Croatia to recognise the tribunal’s jurisdiction in respect of Operations Storm and 
Flash. 
157 See: Letter from President Gabrielle McDonald to the Security Council 8 September 1998 
(S/1998/839) and Letter from President Gabrielle McDonald to the President of the Security 
Council 22 October 1998 (S/1998/990), concerning the failure of the FRY to arrest Mile 
Mrksic, Miroslav Radic and Veselin Slijvancanin; Letter from President Gabrielle McDonald 
to the Security Council 6 November 1998 (S/1998/1040) (refusal of the FRY to grant visas to 
ICTY investigators in order to conduct investigations in Kosovo); Letter from President 
Gabrielle McDonald to the President of Security Council 2 November 1999 (failure to arrest 
the three suspects in the Vukovar case, and Mladic and Karadzic); and Letter from President 
Claude Jorda of the ICTY to President of the Security Council 23 October 2002 (non-
cooperation in arresting and transferring remaining suspects). 
158 See Resolution 1160 (1998) (noting the FRY is required to co-operate with ICTY 
investigations); Resolution 1199 (1998) (calls upon the FRY to co-operate regarding the ICTY 
investigation in Kosovo); Resolution 1207 (calling upon the FRY to implement its obligation 
to co-operate with the ICTY into domestic law and condemning the FRY for its failure to 
execute outstanding arrest warrants); Statement of the President of the Security Council , 18 
December 2002 (reiterating the Council’s support for the ICTY and recalling the mandatory 
obligation of member states to co-operate with the ICTY). 
159 The President of the ICTY reported to the Council the failure of the authorities of the 
Republika Sprska to arrest and surrender Dragan Nicolic:  Letter from President Gabrielle 
McDonald to the President of Security Council 2 November 1999. 
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The ICC adopts a different model of co-operation, which is ‘a mixture of the 
“horizontal” and the “vertical”’.160 As a treaty-based institution, the ICC relies on state 
consent, and lacks the support provided by a mandate from the Security Council acting 
under Chapter VII of the Charter. As Broomhall comments, the ‘cooperation 
provisions reflect a balance between the needs of an effective Court and the 
prerogatives of the sovereign States whose support for the Statute will underlie its 
success’.161  Article 86 of the Rome Statute imposes a general obligation on states to 
cooperate with the ICC, while article 87 enables the ICC to issue requests for 
assistance – not orders – to states. States must also provide the necessary procedures 
under domestic law required for co-operation with the ICC.162  Where a state has 
failed to co-operate, and that failure affects the ability of the ICC to exercise its 
powers and functions, the ICC may make a judicial finding to that effect and refer the 
matter to the Assembly of State Parties.163  It is important to recall that, other than in 
the specific cases of the referral of a situation to the ICC by the Security Council164 or 
by a state that is not party to the Rome Statute,165 these obligations apply to state 
parties only.166  Moreover, the framework adopted also ‘entails that the Contracting 
Parties may not assume reciprocal obligations that would infringe upon rights of third 
States under treaties or general international law’.167 
4.2 Co-operation and the internationalized tribunals 
The following section will assess the co-operation model(s) that apply to the tribunals 
studied.  There are three situations to consider: first, securing co-operation from the 
territorial state; second, the co-operation of states ‘directly affected’; and third, co-
                                                 
160 Swart, B., ‘International Co-operation and Judicial Assistance: General Problems’ in 
Cassese et al (eds) The Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court (2002, OUP), 1590.  
See also Oosterveld, V., Perry, M. and McManus, J., ‘The Co-operation of States with the 
International Criminal Court’ (2001) 25 FILJ 767. 
161 Broomhall, note 79, 155. 
162 Article 88, Rome Statute. 
163 Article 87(5). The Assembly of State Parties is required to ‘consider…any question relating 
to non-cooperation’, Article 112(2)(f).  In the case of referral of a situation to the ICC by the 
Security Council, the ICC will inform the Security Council:  Article 87(7).    
164 It is not clear which framework for co-operation will apply in the event a situation 
concerning a non-party state is referred to the ICC by the Security Council.  Paragraph 2 of 
Resolution 1593, referring the situation in Darfur to the ICC, imposes an obligation on Sudan 
(a non-party state) to co-operate with the ICC.  For a discussion of the difficulties in applying 
the framework adopted in Part 9 of the Rome Statute to a non-party state, see Sluiter, note 152. 
165 Article 12(3), Rome Statute.  States accepting the jurisdiction of the ICC in this manner 
‘shall cooperate with the Court without any delay or exception in accordance with Part 9’. 
166 The Rome Statute permits the ICC to accept co-operation from non-party states, 
international organizations and other international bodies on an ad hoc basis:  see articles 
87(5), 87(6) and 54(3)(c).  For further discussion, see Ciampi, A., ‘The Obligation to 
Cooperate’ in Cassese et al The Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court (2002, OUP) 
1607. 
167 Swart, note 160, 1594, citing articles 73, 90, 93 and 98 of the Rome Statute. 
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operation from other states.  Both UNTAET and UNMIK acted as the national 
authority when establishing and operating the SPSC and the IJPP.  In relation to 
individuals located outside Kosovo or East Timor, the horizontal model should have 
been applicable, as the SPSC and the IJPP are to be considered national institutions.  
The better view is that the obligation upon member states to assist UNTAET and 
UNMIK in the performance of their mandate168 did not extend to a general obligation 
to co-operate with the SPSC and the IJPP, including extradition and the provision of 
legal assistance.169 This appears to have been the model that was applied in practice.  
In East Timor, UNTAET entered into a Memorandum of Understanding with 
Indonesia to govern co-operation on criminal matters.170  As Sluiter notes, the 
memorandum was ‘not based on the assumption of a full and unconditional obligation 
incumbent upon Indonesia to provide UNTAET with all necessary assistance’.171 
Ultimately, co-operation with UNTAET was extremely limited, with Indonesia 
refusing to extradite any suspect to East Timor for trial.172  Following independence, 
East Timor entered into negotiations with Indonesia in a number of areas, including 
co-operation in legal and judicial measures, but the two states are yet to enter into a 
general bilateral agreement on this topic. UNTAET also exercised its capacity to enter 
into international agreements and to negotiate agreements with third states if required 
for judicial co-operation.  Following independence, East Timor needed to negotiate 
new bilateral agreements with third states to allow for extradition and mutual legal 
assistance in criminal matters. 
 
The position of UNMIK concerning the FRY authorities was more problematic, as 
until independence, Kosovo remained legally part of the FRY and requests for 
extradition and judicial assistance technically came from the same jurisdiction.173  
However, both the FRY and UNMIK appear to have treated the court systems as 
                                                 
168 In Resolution 1244 (1999), the Security Council demanded that ‘all states in the region 
cooperate fully in the implementation of all aspects of this resolution’, para 18.  Resolution 
1272 (1999) states that the Security Council ‘Stresses the importance of cooperation between 
Indonesia, Portugal and UNTAET in the implementation of this resolution’, para 7. 
169 See Sluiter, note 152, 385-6, noting that it was possible that the Security Council had 
intended a general obligation to co-operate with the SPSC and the IJPP. 
170 Memorandum of Understanding between the Republic of Indonesia and the United Nations 
Transitional Administration in East Timor Regarding Co-operation in Legal, Judicial and 
Human Rights Related Matters, 5 April 2000 . 
171 Sluiter, note 152, 391. For detailed discussion of the relevant provisions of the MoU, see 
391-393. 
172 Indonesia relied upon the provisions of the MoU itself, which allow for refusal of 
extradition and cooperation in a number of situations, and on the provision in its domestic law 
prohibiting the extradition of nationals.  By the conclusion of the SPSC’s activities, a total of 
339 indicted people remained beyond the jurisdiction of the SPSC, many believed to be at large 
in Indonesia:  JSMP, Overview of the Justice Sector, 2005, 30-1.  
173 Sluiter, note 152, 390. 
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distinct, and adopted a horizontal model of co-operation, entering into arrangements 
for extradition and legal assistance in criminal matters on an ad hoc basis.174 The 
ambiguous legal status of Kosovo during the transitional administration also impacted 
upon the ability of the IJPP to secure co-operation from other states.  UNMIK could 
request assistance on behalf of the IJPP, but there would be no legal obligation for the 
requested state to comply.  Similarly, without the support of the Government of the 
FRY, the IJPP was unable to rely upon the treaties to which the FRY was a party.  
Requests to extradite suspects to and from Kosovo were made on an ad hoc basis 
between UNMIK and the state concerned.175  UNMIK did negotiate a number of 
memoranda with states such as Albania, the Federal Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia 
and Montenegro providing for co-operation in criminal justice matters and bilateral 
agreements with states to enable extradition. 
 
The WCC adopts a horizontal model of co-operation in relation to the states of the 
former Yugoslavia and other states.  As a national court, the WCC relies on requests 
for extradition and legal assistance made by the relevant national authorities either on 
an ad hoc basis or in accordance with treaties for extradition and mutual legal 
assistance.  Co-operation with other states in the region has improved following 
ratification by Bosnia of the European Convention on Extradition.176  Co-operation 
from the authorities of the Republika Sprska also appears to have improved, and any 
difficulties in obtaining co-operation with the constituent entities have been 
considered a matter of domestic law.  The WCC also enjoys a relationship with the 
ICTY and has received several cases referred to it by the ICTY, with the accused 
transferred from the ICTY to the Bosnian authorities, and then to the WCC.  Rule 
11bis of the ICTY RPE also contemplates the transfer of an indictment to the WCC; 
                                                 
174 For example, in 2004, the War Crimes Prosecutor of Serbia entered into an agreement with 
UNMIK’s Prosecutors’ Office which enabled the investigation of witnesses located in Kosovo 
by Serb authorities, with reciprocal access for witnesses located in Serbia.  UNMIK has issued 
requests for extradition to authorities in Serbia.  However, both UNMIK and the Serbian 
authorities maintained that Serbia was not a foreign jurisdiction. See ‘UNMIK Requests Serbia 
to Extradite Serb Leader from Northern Kosovo’ Yugoslav Daily Survey, 22 August 2002. 
175 UNMIK has received requests for extradition from the national authorities of the former 
Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia and Rwanda.  UNMIK has issued requests on behalf of the 
IJPP for extradition to the national authorities of Austria, which refused extradition.  In light of 
concerns that the law in Kosovo did not provide an acceptable basis for the extradition of 
suspects, UNMIK introduced UNMIK Regulation 2003/34, Amending the Applicable Law on 
Procedures for the Transfer of Residents of Kosovo to Foreign Jurisdictions.  The Regulation 
depended on a bilateral agreement between UNMIK and the requesting country being in place 
prior to transfer. 
176 CETS No. 024. Bosnia ratified on 25 April 2005, with the treaty entering into force for 
Bosnia on 24 July 2005.  Croatia, Serbia, the FRY Macedonia and Montenegro are also parties 
to this treaty.  All are also parties to the European Convention on Mutual Assistance in 
Criminal Matters, CETS No. 030. 
 222 
that is where the accused is not yet in custody, the ICTY can determine that once the 
accused is arrested, the arresting state must surrender the accused to the WCC.  As 
Bohlander notes, this potentially allows the WCC to bypass bilateral or multilateral 
agreements, and to call on the custodial state to transfer the accused even in the 
absence of a treaty arrangement.177 
 
The IHT may draw upon the resources of the Iraqi police, court and penal system.  
Article 39 of the IHT Statute provides that the Council of Ministers, in conjunction 
with the President of the IHT, shall issue instructions to facilitate the implementation 
of the IHT Statute.  This presumably would include instructions to other national 
institutions to assist and to co-operate with the IHT.  The IHT relies on a horizontal 
co-operation model in relation to other states, with requests for arrest and surrender to 
be issued by Iraqi authorities in accordance with Iraqi law and agreements to which 
Iraq is a party.  The IHT has been heavily dependent on the assistance of the forces of 
the United States, the United Kingdom and other coalition partners in securing 
custody of and detaining suspects.178  For example, the former President, Saddam 
Hussein, was detained by US forces.  He remained in US custody during his trial and 
was released to Iraqi authorities for his execution.  The availability of the death 
penalty as a potential sentence before the IHT has produced difficulties for some 
states, such as the United Kingdom, in transferring suspects to the custody of the IHT 
for trial.179  It also raises the issue, relevant to all the tribunal studied, of whether the 
tribunals satisfy minimum fair trial standards and ensure basis human rights.180  If this 
standard is not satisfied, states may be obliged by international agreements to which 
                                                 
177 Bohlander, M., ‘Referring an Indictment from the ICTY and ICTR to another Court – Rule 
11bis and the Consequences for the Law of Extradition’ (2006) 55 ICLQ 219. 
178 See CPA Memorandum 3 of 18 June 2003, as amended and supplemented by the TAL 
(article 26).  This provides for national contingents of the multinational force in Iraq to arrest 
and to detain criminal and security detainees and for the transfer of detainees to Iraqi 
authorities.  See also the Memorandum of Understanding regarding criminal suspects between 
the United Kingdom and Ministries of Justice and the Interior of Iraq, 8 November 2004. 
179 In 2003 the United Kingdom contingent arrested two Iraqi nationals, suspected of 
involvement in the murder of British troops.  The Central Criminal Court of Iraq commenced 
an investigation, but in December 2007, the IHT requested the British forces to transfer the 
accused to the IHT, as the conduct constituted a war crime.  The possible transfer to the IHT 
was the subject of legal proceedings in the United Kingdom on the basis of article 3 of the 
ECHR.  See R (Al-Saadoon) v Secretary of State for Defence, [2008] EWHC 3098 (Admin) 
(High Court) and [2009] EWCA Civ 7 (Court of Appeal).  Following the dismissal of the 
appeal by the Court of Appeal, the United Kingdom authorities transferred the suspects to the 
IHT, despite an order for interim measures issued by the European Court of Human Rights 
precluding the transfer. 
180 It is not possible to explore the issue of fair trial standards in this thesis. 
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they are party not to extradite or transfer individuals to the custody of the tribunal 
concerned.181 
 
The ECCC Agreement imposes an obligation on the Government of Cambodia to co-
operate with the ECCC.  This obligation, which appears to have been based on the co-
operation provisions in the Statutes of the ICTY and ICTR, ‘appears to result in the 
imposition of far-reaching duties on the Cambodian authorities vis-à-vis the 
Extraordinary Chambers’.182 Failure to co-operate could result in the United Nations 
claiming that the ECCC Agreement has been violated, although as there is no third 
party dispute resolution mechanism the only sanction appears to be the withdrawal of 
United Nations funding and assistance.183  The inclusion of a specific provision on co-
operation also results in the ECCC having a separate procedure for relying on the 
national authorities than national courts.  This is not necessarily a negative result, as 
the ECCC may still rely directly on the national authorities, but have a separate means 
of ensuring that requests for assistance are met.184  The position is less clear in relation 
to co-operation from other states.  The ECCC Agreement has not created obligations 
for states other than Cambodia, consistent with the principle that a treaty cannot create 
obligations for third states.  The ECCC lacks separate legal personality and cannot 
negotiate agreements with states to secure their co-operation.  Instead, it is dependent 
on the existing bilateral agreements to which Cambodia is a party and on the 
Government of Cambodia to issue the necessary requests for assistance.185  This may 
not prove to be a major issue, as to date all of the accused have been located within the 
territory of Cambodia and have been arrested and transferred to the ECCC by the 
Cambodian authorities. 
 
The SCSL is an entity separate to the domestic legal system, and cannot rely directly 
upon the national authorities of Sierra Leone.  Instead, the SCSL Agreement imposes 
an obligation on the Government of Sierra Leone to co-operate with the court.186  This 
includes requests for the arrest, detention and transfer to the SCSL of persons within 
                                                 
181 Article 6 of the European Convention on Human Rights has been interpreted as requiring 
contracting parties to not extradite an individual to a state in which the accused is unlikely to 
obtain a fair trial. 
182 Sluiter, note 152, 398. 
183 Chapter Three. 
184 Sluiter, note 152, 398. 
185 Note Sluiter’s view that while the ECCC Agreement would extend to the Government of 
Cambodia issuing requests to other states, it would not require the Government to negotiate 
new bilateral agreements, 403-4. 
186 Article 17, SCSL Agreement. 
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the territory of Sierra Leone.187  The Ratification Act incorporated this obligation in 
national law and provides the mechanisms for such co-operation. The RPE also 
regulate co-operation with the national authorities.188  There are two mechanisms for 
obtaining co-operation.189  First, the SCSL may issue a request to the Attorney-
General of Sierra Leone, who is then obliged to ensure the request is satisfied.  
Second, the SCSL may issue an order that has a direct binding effect in domestic law.  
It is the ability to issue such orders binding as a matter of national law that 
distinguishes the SCSL from the ICTY and the ICTR.  In the event of non-
cooperation, there is no enforcement mechanism, although the President, after a 
judicial finding of non-cooperation, may ‘take appropriate action’.190  This may 
include drawing the matter to the attention of the relevant authority in Sierra Leone, 
such as the Attorney-General, or notifying the Secretary-General.  Any dispute 
between the Government of Sierra Leone and the United Nations as to co-operation is 
to be resolved by negotiation between the parties.191 
 
In relation to third states, as with the ECCC Agreement, the SCSL cannot create 
obligations for non-parties.  As a general matter, states are not under an obligation to 
co-operate with the SCSL.  However, unlike the ECCC, the SCSL has separate 
international legal personality and has been able to negotiate bilateral arrangements 
with states and international obligations as and when required.192  It need not rely on 
the Government of Sierra Leone to issue requests to third states on its behalf.  Yet, as 
a court outside the domestic legal system, it cannot rely on the existing treaty 
arrangements of Sierra Leone.  While the Security Council did not establish the SCSL, 
it maintains an interest in its activities and has, in resolutions subsequent to Resolution 
1315, called upon and urged states to co-operate with the SCSL.193  Such requests are 
not binding, but may encourage states to co-operate.  The Security Council has issued 
binding resolutions regarding the SCSL in one situation, in relation to the transfer of 
former President of Liberia, Charles Taylor, to The Hague for trial.194  The legal basis 
                                                 
187 Article 17(2), SCSL Agreement. 
188 Rule 8(A), SCSL RPE. 
189 See discussion of the provisions of the Ratification Act in Sluiter, note 152. 
190 Rule 8(B), SCSL RPE. 
191 Article 20, SCSL Agreement. 
192 Article 11, SCSL Agreement provides that the SCSL shall possess the juridical capacity ‘to 
enter into agreements with States as may be necessary for the exercise of its functions and for 
the operation of the Court’.  Rules 8(C) and (D) of the SCSL RPE enable the SCSL to request 
assistance from third states on the basis of an ad hoc arrangement, a bilateral agreement with 
the state or any other basis. 
193 Resolution 1508 (2003), para 6, and Resolution 1537 (2004), para 9.  
194 Resolution 1688 (2006), paras 7 and 8, deciding that the Netherlands shall not exercise its 
jurisdiction in relation to Taylor while he is in the custody of the SCSL and that the 
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of the SCSL has posed a legal obstacle to some states otherwise willing to assist the 
tribunal, where domestic legislation requires either a treaty basis for extradition or 
assistance, or a binding decision of the Security Council.  For example, the United 
Kingdom agreed to accept Taylor in the event that he was convicted.  Yet the relevant 
legal basis for such co-operation was not in place195 and took some time to enact.196  
While the delay was not significant in relation to enforcement of a possible sentence 
of an accused whose trial had not concluded, it may have been if the request had been 
for the arrest and surrender of an accused. 
 
The LST is also to operate as an institution separate from the domestic legal system.  
The Government of Lebanon is subject to an obligation to co-operate with the LST, as 
set out in article 15 of the LST Agreement.197  This obligation was incorporated into 
Resolution 1757 and thus binds Lebanon as a decision of the Security Council under 
article 25 of the Charter. However, unlike the ICTY and the ICTR, there is no 
mechanism by which the LST may report non-compliance to the Security Council, 
although this may be included in the RPE when drafted. That the LST Statute includes 
provisions regulating the relationship between the LST and the Lebanese authorities 
and with the UNIIIC is ‘an interesting innovation’.198 The co-operation of the national 
authorities will be essential, particularly as the Lebanese authorities shall ‘as 
appropriate’ assist the Prosecutor in investigative activities.199  The provisions 
regulating the use by the LST of evidence collected by the national authorities and the 
UNIIIC duplicate in many respects the arrangements for the use by the WCC of 
evidence collected by the ICTY.200  Reports of the UNIIIC suggest that ‘a practice of 
large-scale and systematic cooperation has developed between Lebanon and the 
                                                                                                                                 
Netherlands ‘shall facilitate the implementation of the decision of the Special Court to conduct 
the trial of former President Taylor in the Netherlands’. 
195 The legal basis for co-operation with the ICTY and the ICTR is the United Nations Act 
1946, supplemented by the United Nations (International Tribunals) (Former Yugoslavia) 
Order 1996 and the United Nations (International Tribunals) (Rwanda) Order 1996.  The 
United Nations Act allows the United Kingdom to implement resolutions of the Council under 
article 41 of the Charter only.  The International Criminal Court Act 2001 was limited to co-
operation with that institution.  
196 The International Tribunals (Sierra Leone) Act 2007 entered into force on 18 June 2007.  
See also the International Tribunals (Sierra Leone) (Application of Provisions) Order 2007, 
which permits the implementation of the sentence enforcement agreement entered into between 
the United Kingdom and the SCSL. 
197 Article 15 requires the Government of Lebanon to cooperate with all organs of the LST and 
to allow access to sites, persons and relevant documents. The Government is also required to 
comply, without undue delay, with requests for assistance from the LST. 
198 Aptel, note 149, 1115. 
199 Article 11(5), LST Statute, discussed in Aptel, note 149. 
200 Article 19, LST Statute.  See discussion by Aptel, note 149, 1113-4. 
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[UNIIIC]’.201  It is to be hoped that this level of cooperation will continue once the 
LST commences its operations. 
 
In relation to the obligations of third states, neither the LST Agreement nor Resolution 
1757 impose an obligation to co-operate with the LST in respect of states other than 
Lebanon, including Syria. This is in contrast to the resolutions establishing the ICTY 
and the ICTR, which direct states to co-operate fully with the ad hoc tribunals.202 
Security Council resolutions require member states, and specifically Syria, to 
cooperate fully with the UNIIIC.203 The Secretary-General had suggested that a similar 
obligation to co-operate be considered for the benefit of the LST but the Security 
Council did not act on this suggestion.204  As a tribunal that operates outside the 
domestic legal system, the LST will not be able to rely on existing agreements 
between Lebanon and other states or organisations in such areas as extradition or 
mutual legal assistance.  However, as it will possess separate legal personality,205 the 
LST will be able to negotiate bilateral agreements with states as necessary.  Thus the 
co-operation of third states with the LST ‘depends on three factors:  the ability, the 
duty and the willingness of those states to provide it’.206 
 
It may be argued that the existing terrorism conventions to which Lebanon or the 
requested state are a party may give rise to a duty to co-operate with the LST.  
However, these treaties contain only an obligation to extradite or to prosecute.  As 
Syria has indicated that it will try any of its nationals implicated in the attacks, it 
would be entitled to refuse to extradite those individuals.  Moreover, these 
conventions are restricted to co-operation between state parties, and do not extend to 
co-operation with an international court.207  The LST could rely on the Security 
                                                 
201 Swart, B., ‘Cooperation Challenges for the Special Tribunal for Lebanon’ (2007) 5 JICJ 
1153, 1155.  See also the reports of the UNIIIC. 
202 Ibid. 
203 Resolutions 1595 (2005), 1636 (2005) and 1644 (2005).  In relation to Syria, see Resolution 
1636 (2005), para 11. 
204 Report of the Secretary-General on the establishment of a special tribunal for Lebanon, 
S/2006/893, para 53. 
205 The separate legal personality is based on article 7 of the LST Agreement, which provides 
for the juridical capacity of the tribunal, and includes the capacity to enter into agreements with 
states as is necessary.  Alternatively, the separate legal personality could be based in the 
establishment of the LST by the Security Council, thus characterizing the LST as a subsidiary 
organ of the Security Council. 
206 Swart, note 201, 1157. 
207 The terrorism conventions contain obligations to extradite or prosecute and to afford 
assistance in investigations and extradition. Lebanon is not a party to the International 
Convention for the Suppression of Terrorist Bombings or the International Convention for the 
Suppression of Terrorist Bombings. However, both Lebanon and Syria are party to the Arab 
Convention for the Suppression of Terrorism. 
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Council’s resolutions regarding terrorism as establishing a duty to co-operate in 
terrorism matters.  This approach is suggested by Resolution 1636, which states that, 
in the context of co-operation with the UNIIIC, ‘Syria’s continued lack of cooperation 
to the inquiry would constitute a serious violation of its obligations under relevant 
resolutions, including 1373 (2001), 1566 (2004) and 1595 (2005)’.208  However, again 
it may be argued that such instruments are directed at co-operation between states and 
not with an international tribunal.209  As with the terrorism conventions, these 
resolutions also contemplate prosecution by the state of nationality as an alternative to 
extradition.  It is possible that the Security Council could adopt further resolutions – as 
it did regarding the UNIIIC – requiring Syria in particular, or member states in 
general, to co-operate with the LST.  The Security Council has issued such requests 
for the arrest and extradition of suspects accused of committing terrorist offences in 
the past.210  However, in the absence of a further resolution from the Security Council, 
the LST will be in a worse position than the Lebanese authorities to secure the co-
operation of third states and the extradition of suspects.211 
4.3 Conclusion 
The ability to obtain the custody of the accused has been a major issue for the ad hoc 
tribunals, despite the statutes for the tribunals adopting a vertical co-operation model.  
It appears as if state co-operation will also be vital to the success of the ICC, and 
already several arrest warrants have not been executed.  Perhaps the most important 
issue it to secure the co-operation of the affected state, in which the majority of the 
accused would normally be located.  This may be done in an informal, non-binding 
manner, by engaging the national authorities in the design and establishment of the 
tribunal, and allowing normal domestic provisions to govern the assistance provided to 
the tribunal.  This appears to have been the model adopted in Bosnia.  This may not be 
an issue when the United Nations retains control of the territory and the national 
authorities as in East Timor and Kosovo.  Alternatively, the obligation may be 
formalised as a treaty obligation by inclusion in the agreement establishing the 
tribunal (SCSL) or governing the terms under which assistance is to be provided 
(ECCC).  The final option is to issue a binding order to co-operate addressed to the 
affected state in a Security Council resolution (LST).  Even where such obligations to 
                                                 
208 Resolution 1636 (2005), para 5. 
209 Swart dismisses this option, arguing that the terrorism resolutions create obligations only 
between states. However, this is a limited interpretation of the obligations imposed, and does 
not appear to be shared by the Security Council. See: Swart, note 201, 1159. 
210 Resolutions 748 (1992) and 1192 (1998) (Libya), Resolution 1267 (1999) and 1333 (2000) 
(Afghanistan) and Resolution 1070 (1996) (Sudan). 
211 Swart, note 201, 1159. 
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co-operate are created, such obligations may not be enforced, either because the only 
option is to withdraw funding, or because there is insufficient political will to take 
action against the affected state. 
 
All of the tribunals studied – even those established by the Security Council - have 
adopted a horizontal co-operation model in relation to third states, and are to an extent 
therefore dependent on the co-operation of such states to fulfil their mandate.  This 
will not be a significant issue where the majority of accused are located within the 
territory of the affected state, as in Cambodia.  However, it may undermine the 
effectiveness of the tribunal where the majority of the accused, particularly the senior 
level accused, are located outside the territory of the affected state, as occurred in East 
Timor.  In such circumstances, impunity will only be avoided if the state in which the 
accused are present is prepared to co-operate by extraditing the accused to the tribunal 
or is willing and able to try the accused before its own courts, or where there is an 
international tribunal able to exercise jurisdiction in respect of the accused.  Of course, 
the Security Council may be prepared to support the tribunal to obtain custody of the 
accused using its binding powers under Chapter VII of the Charter, either by imposing 
a general obligation to co-operate with the tribunal addressed to all member states, or 
a specific instruction to a named member state.  However, it is noted that the Security 
Council has not opted to do so in support of any of the tribunals studied, despite 
requests that it do so.  It is thus vital to consider the potential location of the accused 
when designing a hybrid or internationalized criminal tribunal. Where obtaining 
custody of the accused looks unlikely, one possible option is to allow trials in absentia 
in a wider range of circumstances, as has been done in relation to the LST, or adopting 
a procedure similar to Rule 61 of the ICTY RPE. Another approach is that adopted by 
the SPSC in its later stages, issuing indictments containing a large number of 
defendants, so that while there is no prospect of obtaining custody of the defendants, 
the evidence is available as a matter of historical record.     
5 Conclusion 
This Chapter has considered three potential barriers to the exercise of jurisdiction by 
the tribunals studied: immunities under customary international law; amnesties; and 
obtaining the custody of the accused.  Each has the potential to undermine the 
effectiveness of the tribunal in question and to render the tribunal an imperfect 
solution to impunity for a particular situation.  Immunities and amnesties may exclude 
key individuals from the scope of the tribunal’s operations.  Similarly, difficulties in 
obtaining custody of an accused may protect senior leaders and force the tribunal to 
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concentrate on lower and mid-level offenders.  This may frustrate the affected 
population and does not serve as a warning to future offenders in other contexts.  
Examining the possible application of these three potential barriers to the tribunals 
studied has highlighted the importance of identifying where one or all of these barriers 
may be an issue in a particular situation and possibly to attempt to pre-empt the issue 
in the design of the tribunal, in particular its legal basis, and in the terms of its 
constituent instrument and supporting agreements.  However, it is also essential that 
the tribunals themselves, in the event they are called upon to determine the 
applicability of an amnesty or immunities, must respect the legal basis adopted for the 
tribunal and the terms of the relevant instruments, even when to do so may result in a 
trial being halted.  It is submitted that this has not always occurred, which, as well as 
potentially violating rules of international law, risks undermining the authority of the 
tribunal in question and respect for the model as part of the system of international 
criminal law enforcement. 
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CONCLUSIONS 
 
Recent practice demonstrates that some crimes – in particular genocide, crimes against 
humanity and certain war crimes – are of concern not just to the immediate victims 
and their society, but also to all states and the wider international community.  There 
is a trend towards requiring accountability for these crimes; however, weaknesses in 
the available mechanisms of accountability have been revealed.  The traditional 
mechanism for enforcement of criminal law – the courts of the territorial state – fails 
to provide accountability in a number of situations.  These include circumstances 
where the territorial state has effectively collapsed as the result of armed conflict and 
there is no capacity in the judicial system to try individuals accused of committing 
serious crimes.  Similar difficulties exist where the judicial system lacks independence 
from the government or major political factions, or is (or is perceived to be) partial to 
particular groups within society.  The conflict may be ongoing, presenting domestic 
tribunals with serious security threats and practical limitations.  There may be no 
political will to conduct trials, as the offending authorities may remain in power or 
retain their influence at the national level.  Accountability may be traded for other 
aims, such as securing a peace agreement or improving relations with a neighbouring 
state that was formerly a party to the conflict.  Domestic law may be underdeveloped 
and may not incorporate international crimes and theories of criminal responsibility, or 
its application may be hindered by domestic provisions such as immunity, amnesty or 
statutes of limitation. 
 
As a result, states have turned to other mechanisms to secure accountability.  States, 
acting both through the Security Council and collectively on the basis of the Rome 
Statute, have established international criminal tribunals to try alleged perpetrators.  
Yet these tribunals are not a panacea:  they have limited jurisdictional reach and finite 
resources.  Such tribunals will only consider a fraction of the crimes that have been 
committed in a given context, and they are highly selective in their enforcement of 
violations.  They have tended to be expensive, to encounter long delays, and to be 
isolated from the communities affected.  Moreover, the International Criminal Court is 
intended to complement national accountability mechanisms and will only act where 
the territorial state or the state of nationality does not investigate or prosecute or is 
unable or unwilling to do so genuinely.1  In light of these weaknesses, states other than 
the territorial state have conducted trials based on the principle of universal 
                                                 
1 Article 17, Rome Statute. 
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jurisdiction.  However, such attempts have also faced many difficulties, both legal and 
political, and the scope of the principle of universal jurisdiction itself is under review.   
 
A further mechanism used to achieve accountability has been the creation of hybrid 
tribunals or the internationalization of national institutions.  This study has 
concentrated on the hybrid and internationalized tribunals and has examined the 
practice of seven such courts.  These tribunals can be distinguished from situations in 
which states or international organisations offer assistance to national institutions:  for 
example, the support of war crimes trials in Serbia.  Much of the assessment of these 
tribunals is negative.2  Criticisms include: a lack of resources; structures and 
procedures that do not ensure independence or impartiality; allegations of corruption 
and political interference; difficulties in securing the custody of the accused; failing to 
engage with the affected population; security concerns; procedural rules and practices 
that do not meet international fair trial and due process standards; and failure to 
develop local judicial capacity.  To this list may be added concerns that the 
jurisprudence adopted is not consistent with relevant international legal principles and 
serves to fragment and undermine the integrity of international criminal law.3  While it 
has not been possible to examine all of these concerns within the scope of this study, it 
is clear that the hybrid and internationalized tribunals have to date not been perfect 
institutions, and each tribunal has had its flaws, both in its design and in its practice.  It 
has been commented that: 4 
The increased interest in criminal responsibility for perpetrators of gross 
violations of humanitarian law and human rights has stimulated a remarkable 
multiplication of international judicial fora.  As institutional mechanisms to 
sanction atrocity flourish, ranging from domestic trials to hybrid tribunals and 
international courts, it is becoming imperative to hone and develop more 
effective accountability mechanisms.  
 
This study has attempted to develop the potential of the hybrid or internationalized 
tribunal as a model for international criminal justice.  It has done so by focusing on the 
context of the creation of the tribunals, and the legal basis and jurisdictional reach of 
the tribunals established to date.  It has explored the central issue of the available 
                                                 
2 A number of commentators and non-governmental organizations have reviewed the success 
or otherwise of the hybrid and internationalized tribunals, as well as their jurisprudence.  For 
example, see: Mendez, P, ‘The New Wave of Hybrid Tribunals:  A Sophisticated Approach to 
Enforcing International Humanitarian Law or an Idealistic Solution with Empty Promises?’ 
(2009) 20 Crim LF 53; Dickinson, L., ‘The Promise of Hybrid Courts’ (2003) 97 AJIL 295; 
and Stromseth, J., ‘Pursuing Accountability for Atrocities After Conflict: What Impact Upon 
Building the Rule of Law’ (2007) 38 Geo JIL 251. 
3 Higonnet, E., ‘Restructuring Hybrid Courts:  Local Empowerment and National Criminal 
Justice Reform’ (2006) 23 Arizona.Journal of International and Comparative Law 347. 
4 Ibid, 413-4. 
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options for the legal and jurisdictional basis for these tribunals, and how the selection 
of the legal framework impacts upon the operation of the tribunal in question. 
Concentrating on the legal basis has allowed the identification of three categories of 
hybrid or internationalized tribunals: courts effectively operating as national 
institutions of the affected state; courts established by treaty; and courts established by 
the Security Council acting under its powers pursuant to Chapter VII of the Charter.  
The study rejects the notion of universal jurisdiction as a basis for such an 
internationalized or hybrid tribunal.  The study has demonstrated that it is important 
when assessing any aspect of an internationalized tribunal to consider its legal basis 
and the category into which the tribunal falls.  This will in turn determine the 
appropriate response to jurisdictional questions such as the applicability of amnesties 
and immunities. The legal basis and the context within which a tribunal is created will 
also impact upon the jurisdictional framework to be adopted, including the personal, 
temporal, territorial and material jurisdiction. 
 
 The first category comprises those institutions operating effectively as national courts, 
although with international elements. Into this category were placed the International 
Judges and Prosecutors Programme in Kosovo, the Special Panels for Serious Crimes 
in East Timor, the Extraordinary Chambers in the Courts of Cambodia, the War 
Crimes Chamber for Bosnia and Herzegovina and, more controversially, the Iraqi 
High Tribunal.  Each of these tribunals was established in a different context.  The 
creation of the IJPP followed a previous repressive regime and an internal armed 
conflict, and was imposed on Kosovo as part of an international territorial 
administration in circumstances where the future status of the territory was – and to an 
extent remains – uncertain.  The SPSC were similarly established as part of an 
international territorial administration, but in this case it followed almost 25 years of 
unlawful occupation of East Timor by Indonesia and establishment took place in the 
context of severe violence during and after the referendum on independence.  Unlike 
in Kosovo, it was clear that the transitional administration was to prepare East Timor 
for statehood.5  The IHT was the product of an occupation by coalition forces after the 
controversial invasion of Iraq in March 2003.  The tribunal was an attempt to provide 
accountability for a previous oppressive regime which had also engaged in a number 
of international armed conflicts with neighbouring states.  The WCC resulted from the 
need to wind down the activities of the ICTY and was a co-operative venture between 
that institution and the Office of the High Representative.  Finally, the ECCC followed 
                                                 
5 Resolution 1272 (1999). 
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a request from the Government of Cambodia for assistance in securing accountability 
for the acts of the Khmer Rouge, another oppressive regime, some 20 years earlier. 
 
The process leading to the creation of these tribunals has impacted upon the design of 
the tribunals, as can be seen in Table One.  It has also resulted in different legal 
structures.  Some are clearly based in national law (the ECCC and the WCC), albeit 
supported in some cases by obligations contained in an international agreement (the 
ECCC).  The legal basis of other tribunals is not so clear and requires consideration of 
complex and often unresolved questions of international law.  For example, what it the 
legal authority of legislation adopted by an international territorial administration?  
And in what capacity does an occupying power act when it, or a body it has created, 
establishes a criminal tribunal?  In each situation the international community, acting 
mainly through the United Nations and in some situations states as in Iraq, has 
performed a different function – occupier, administrator, partner, and/or supporter – 
which makes it difficult to assess the legal basis of the tribunals established.  The 
approach adopted here has been functional:  where the authority in question acts as a 
national actor, the tribunal has been considered a national institution.  Other factors 
support the conclusions reached, such as the absence of separate legal personality for 
the tribunal and the lack of the direct involvement of the Security Council in the 
tribunal’s establishment and operation.     
 
The second category comprises tribunals established by an agreement between the 
territorial state and the United Nations.  This is not the only possible formulation, and 
there is no reason in principle why a tribunal could not be established by an agreement 
between a state and an international organisation other than the United Nations, or 
between two or more states acting collectively.  The ICC, after all, is an example of a 
tribunal established in this manner.  It is not yet established that jurisdiction based on 
recognised principles of jurisdiction other than territoriality may form the basis of 
such a tribunal.  However, it is submitted that the nationality principle would also 
support such a delegation, while more controversial bases, in particular universal 
jurisdiction, would not.  The SCSL is the only tribunal currently to fall within this 
category.  Such tribunals enjoy separate legal personality and operate outside both the 
national and international legal systems.  The agreement forms the constituent 
instrument of the tribunal, and its terms govern both the nature of the international 
community’s involvement and the obligations of the territorial state.  Being based on a 
treaty, such courts may only be established with the consent of the territorial state, and 
represent a limited delegation of sovereignty from that state to the tribunal.  
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Accordingly, these tribunals would normally – but not always – follow a request for 
assistance from the territorial state. 
 
The final category is that of hybrid or internationalized tribunals established by the 
Security Council utilizing its Chapter VII powers in relation to international peace and 
security.  The LST is the only tribunal to date to have been established in this manner, 
although its inclusion in this category – and not as a treaty based institution – may be 
seen as controversial.  The Security Council may only establish a tribunal as a 
response to a threat to international peace and security.6  While in most cases this may 
be easily established, given the expansive interpretation the Security Council has 
accorded to that term, it may not be so readily satisfied in situations such as Cambodia 
where the violations occurred several decades before.  Hybrid and internationalized 
tribunals have been said to be supportive of state sovereignty, in that the tribunals are 
established in co-operation with and with the consent of the state concerned.7  
However, the experience of the LST suggests that this may not necessarily be the case.   
 
This study has shown that it can be very difficult to classify accurately tribunals in the 
first place.  For example, the IHT is considered by some to be a purely national 
institution, and by others to be a national institution receiving international assistance, 
although not an internationalized tribunal. It is impossible to define a conclusive set of 
criteria.  Similarly, even when considered to be a hybrid or internationalized tribunal, 
placing a tribunal into one of the three categories identified in this study also presents 
challenges, often because the circumstances leading to its establishment do not clearly 
suggest that the tribunal has a particular legal basis.  For example, it is doubtful 
whether the members of the Security Council would reach the same conclusion as the 
author or one another when considering the legal basis of the LST.   
 
Does this ambiguity or uncertainty matter?  It is argued that it does.  The legal basis of 
a tribunal is relevant to several key issues.  This study has considered several of these 
issues: the source of the tribunal’s authority, the applicability of immunities under 
both international and national law, the enforceability of amnesties granted under 
national law, and the arrangements for securing custody of the accused and other 
forms of state co-operation.  In all cases the legal basis is an important factor in 
                                                 
6 For the argument that international peace and security should not be the sole criterion, see 
Knopps, G., ‘International and Internationalized Criminal courts: the new face of international 
peace and security’ (2004) 4 ICLR 527. 
7 Broomhall, B., International Justice & The International Criminal Court:  Between 
Sovereignty and the Rule of Law (2003), 103. 
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resolving the issue.  For example, in relation to whether immunities under 
international law may be pleaded before a tribunal, whether a court is international or 
national in nature is, following the decision in the Arrest Warrant case,8 said to be the 
key factor.  The International Court of Justice recognized that in relation to incumbent 
heads of state and other senior officials, there is no exception to immunity in respect 
of international crimes before national courts.9  However, the Court suggested that 
immunities of any type would not be applicable before certain international criminal 
courts.10  Thus, as the SCSL did in the Taylor Immunity Decision,11 it is necessary to 
consider whether a tribunal is national or international to resolve a plea of head of 
state immunity.  As has been seen, it can be difficult in the context of the hybrid and 
internationalized tribunals to resolve this issue, as it is not certain as to how a 
particular tribunal will ultimately be characterised. 
 
While this thesis asserts that evaluating the legal basis of a tribunal is important, it has 
also demonstrated that ascertaining the legal status is not by itself sufficient to resolve 
issues such as immunity.  It is also necessary to examine the terms of the constituent 
instrument and to assess whether the state in question is bound by the provision.  For 
example, a provision in a treaty cannot remove the immunity of a state that is not a 
party to that agreement.  Similarly, just because a tribunal has been established by the 
Security Council it does not automatically follow that states may no longer claim 
immunity before the tribunal established, or that all states must co-operate with that 
tribunal.  The LST demonstrates this point well.  The legal basis is important but will 
not always be determinative:  states and the Security Council are to an extent able to 
modify the general position in international law through the provisions of the relevant 
legal instruments.  Moreover, states may adopt a position inconsistent with the general 
propositions at the international level and even with particular rules. For example, a 
state may agree to provide co-operation when required in the absence of an obligation 
to do so or may adopt a more expansive interpretation of material jurisdiction where 
its own nationals are concerned.  Thus states should study the emerging practice to 
enable them to create tribunals with the legal powers they consider appropriate to a 
given situation and which they are prepared to support.   
 
                                                 
8 Arrest Warrant of 11 April 2000 (Democratic Republic of Congo v. Belgium) ICJ Reports 
(2002). 
9 Para. 58. 
10 Para. 61. 
11 Prosecutor v Taylor, Decision on Immunity from Jurisdiction, Appeals Chamber, 31 May 
2004. 
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This thesis assists those designing future such tribunals, and the judges and personnel 
appointed to them, by studying the existing decisions and practice so as to promote 
clear and consistent decision-making in future.  It also examines the existing examples 
of such tribunals and suggests the scenarios in which such tribunals are likely to be 
established in the future. It also makes recommendations as to the lessons that should 
be learned from the existing practice, for example, the difficulties faced when 
evidence or suspects are located within the territory of a third state.  
 
What are some of the conclusions and concrete suggestions to emerge from this study 
of practice?  First, this study rejects the proposition that hybrid or internationalized 
tribunals should be established only where an international tribunal does not have 
jurisdiction for the conduct in question or where it is unlikely that an international 
tribunal will be established.12  While it is true that some of the tribunals studied were 
established following unsuccessful calls for the establishment of an international 
criminal tribunal, in particular in East Timor and Cambodia, that was certainly not 
always the case.  In fact, two tribunals, the IJPP and the WCC, were established in 
circumstances where the ICTY was operational and had jurisdiction.  Their creation 
assisted the ICTY in performing its mandate, by enabling cases involving lower and 
mid-level defendants to be dealt with at the national level.13  Moreover, even though 
none of the tribunals established would have been within the jurisdiction of the ICC, 
this does not mean that a hybrid or internationalized tribunal cannot or should not be 
established in circumstances where the ICC may also exercise jurisdiction.14  It is 
possible that such a tribunal could operate to support the activities of the ICC and 
may, in some cases, be subject to its ‘supervisory’ jurisdiction.15  Hybrid and 
internationalized tribunals thus represent another face to the complementarity 
principle:  they can complement the efforts of both international institutions and also 
                                                 
12 For instance, Cassese suggests that hybrid or internationalized courts should only be 
established where the political will required to establish an international tribunal is lacking, or 
the resources unlikely to be available:  Cassese, A., ‘The Role of Internationalized Courts and 
Tribunals in the Fight Against International Criminality’ in Romano et al (eds) 
Internationalized Criminal Courts: Sierra Leone, East Timor, Kosovo and Cambodia (2004) 
(hereafter ‘Romano’), 5. 
13 For discussion of the relationship between the WCC and the ICTY, see Burke-White, W., 
‘The Domestic Influence of International Criminal Tribunals: The International Criminal 
Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia and the Creation of the State Court of Bosnia & 
Herzegovina’ (2008) 46 Col JTL 279. 
14 Contrast, Turns, D., ‘“Internationalized” or Ad Hoc Justice for International Criminal Law in 
a Time of Transition:  The Cases of East Timor, Kosovo, Sierra Leone and Cambodia’ (2001) 6 
Austrian Review of International and European Law 123, 178-9. 
15 Stahn, C., ‘The Geometry of Transitional Justice:  Choices of Institutional Design’ (2005) 18 
LJIL 425, 463-4; Benzig, M. and Bergsmo, M., ‘Some Tentative Remarks on the Relationship 
Between Internationalized Criminal Jurisdictions and the International Criminal Court’ in 
Romano, 407. 
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those of domestic institutions.  These tribunals may offer several advantages to trials 
before international tribunals, not least the fact that they tend to require fewer 
resources.  The hybrid and internationalized tribunals can therefore be viewed as part 
of a multi-layered approach to international criminal justice.16 
 
The study of the available practice reveals that hybrid or internationalized tribunals are 
most likely to be established where the United Nations or third states are already 
involved in the situation in the affected state.  In Kosovo and East Timor, the United 
Nations was administering the territory and, in East Timor, had been instrumental in 
securing agreement for and conducting the referendum on future independence.  In 
Bosnia, the OHR had been exercising powers under the Dayton Agreement to manage 
the state for almost a decade and the Security Council, through the ICTY, had been 
concerned with accountability for violations committed during the conflict for an even 
longer period.  Iraq was occupied by the United States, the United Kingdom and other 
states from 2003 to 2004.  The occupation was supported if not authorized by the 
Security Council in Resolution 1483, and the abuses committed by the Hussein regime 
was one of the reasons given by the occupying states in support of the invasion and 
occupation of Iraq. Even where the assistance has been provided in response to a 
request from the affected government, the United Nations was either operating, or had 
been operating, in the country concerned.   
 
Most of the tribunals have been created during or after an armed conflict or to provide 
accountability for the acts of a previous repressive regime.  However, the creation of 
the LST suggests that the use of these mechanisms may now be extended to other 
contexts, in particular terrorist acts, which may be of concern to the international 
community.  Related to the context of their creation is the material jurisdiction of the 
tribunals.  With the exception of the LST, all of the tribunals have jurisdiction in 
relation to the ‘core’ crimes: crimes against humanity, war crimes and genocide.  
While there are differences between the definitions adopted for each tribunal, the 
crimes are as defined in international law, and are based on the relevant treaty 
obligations of the state concerned or customary international law.  Other crimes under 
international law have been included where relevant, but only where there is a 
sufficient treaty basis for the inclusion of the crime.17 
                                                 
16 Burke-White, W., ‘A Community of Courts: Toward a System of International Criminal Law 
Enforcement’ (2002) 24 Mich JIL 1; Rikhof, J., ‘Fewer Places to Hide? The Impact of 
Domestic War Crimes Prosecutions on International Impunity’ (2009) 20 Crim LF 1. 
17 For example, the Special Law incorporates violations of the Hague Convention for the 
Protection of Cultural Property in the Event of Armed Conflict 1954. 
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Definitions of the term hybrid or internationalized tribunals tend to include a 
requirement that the substantive jurisdiction of the tribunal include both crimes under 
international law and crimes under national law.  While this is certainly the case for 
six of the seven tribunals studied, the LST Statute includes the crime of terrorism as 
defined under national law only.  Thus there are no international crimes within the 
jurisdiction of the LST and this criterion can no longer be said to be a requirement for 
a tribunal to be considered internationalized.  The fact that the jurisdiction of the LST 
extends only to the crime of terrorism under national law does not render the LST a 
national institution,18 as too many other features, including its legal basis, support the 
internationalized nature of the LST.   
 
The hybrid and internationalized tribunals display an element of selectivity in the 
jurisdiction conferred upon them.  The selection of the temporal, territorial, personal 
and material jurisdiction requires important choices, and is often driven by resources 
and political factors.  Designers of the tribunals must also consider the other 
accountability mechanisms, both international and domestic, that will operate 
alongside the tribunal.  In light of the limited resources allocated to such tribunals, it 
would assist each tribunal to have a focused strategy, which should be included as a 
jurisdictional requirement.  When selecting the material jurisdiction, there are 
numerous factors to be considered, including whether the conduct was criminalized at 
the time of commission, whether under international or national law, and other factors 
in respect of both substantive criminal law and theories of criminal responsibility.  
Where the tribunal is a national institution, have the relevant international crimes been 
incorporated into domestic law?  Does the likely evidence substantiate including a 
particular crime, in particular whether the context elements of the international crimes 
are satisfied?  Unlike purely international tribunals, when designing a hybrid or 
internationalized tribunal it is also necessary to consider whether to include crimes 
under domestic law.  Domestic crimes have been included in the following 
circumstances: where international law does not criminalize the conduct in question or 
the full range of conduct; where there is not an accepted definition of the crime in 
international law; and where the evidence may not satisfy the elements of the 
international crimes. 
 
                                                 
18 Consider the views on this issue in Schabas, W., ‘Is an International Tribunal Equivalent to 
an International Criminal Court?’ (2008) 21 LJIL 513. 
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All of the tribunals rely upon the co-operation of the territorial state.  Thus, whichever 
legal basis is selected, there must be clear obligations for that state to co-operate with 
and to support the tribunal.  This may be achieved by integrating the tribunal into the 
domestic system and relying on the national authorities in accordance with normal 
provisions (as is the case with the WCC, and to an extent the IJPP and the SPSC), or it 
could be achieved by an agreement moderating the terms of the assistance to the 
tribunal (the ECCC Agreement), or by a binding resolution under Chapter VII of the 
Charter (the LST).  However, even where the obligation to co-operate is legally 
binding, it is not clear what can be done in the event the state violates the obligation to 
co-operate.  It appears that the only legal option is to withdraw international support 
for the tribunal. 
 
The tribunals have all adopted a horizontal model of co-operation with respect to 
states other than the affected state.  Even the LST, which was established by a 
resolution of the Security Council acting pursuant to its powers under Chapter VII of 
the Charter, does not create binding obligations for states other than Lebanon.  The 
Security Council has never acted to enforce the orders of a hybrid or internationalized 
tribunal through a binding resolution under Chapter VII of the Charter.  Thus it must 
be considered whether this model is appropriate where the accused are located outside 
the territorial state.  The difficulty in ensuring co-operation in such circumstances is 
demonstrated by the experience of the SPSC, where a number of those considered 
most responsible for the atrocities committed in East Timor were in Indonesia and 
could not be extradited for trial.  The situation may not be so serious where the 
custodial state is prepared genuinely to prosecute the accused; however, where this 
does not happen, as in Indonesia, impunity remains.  In such circumstances an 
international tribunal may be the only option. 
 
The question of whether a tribunal must give effect to immunities under international 
law raises similar issues.  Where senior offenders are located in and are nationals of 
the territorial state, international immunities should not be an issue.  However, where 
senior officials of a third state are to be likely subjects of investigation, a horizontal 
relationship between the tribunal and the third state will not preclude the state from 
pleading sovereign immunity. This thesis suggests that a horizontal relationship 
regarding immunity is found in relation to the five ‘national’ institutions and also the 
SCSL in relation to officials of states that are not a party to the SCSL Agreement.  It is 
also submitted that, given the absence of a provision on immunity in the LST Statute 
and the omission of an obligation on states to co-operate with the LST in Resolution 
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1757, it may also include the LST.  Again, this may not be an issue where the state is 
willing to waive immunity or to try the official before its own courts, or where an 
international tribunal may exercise jurisdiction in respect of that official and the 
immunity will not apply.  However, in other circumstances relying on a hybrid or 
internationalized model may involve recognizing that immunity is an important 
principle of international law and that some individuals will escape immunity until 
they are no longer in office or until the relevant state waives the immunity and 
surrenders the person concerned. 
 
The practice of the hybrid or internationalized tribunals supports the suggested trend 
towards accepting only limited amnesties.  Several of the territorial states granted 
amnesties that were either explicitly or implicitly excluded from the scope of the 
amnesty crimes within the jurisdiction of the internationalized tribunals.  The practice 
could also be said to support the principle that there can be no amnesty for 
international crimes.  However, it is submitted that this principle is not established yet.  
The decision of the Appeals Chamber in the Lome Amnesty Decision19 relied upon a 
principle that arguably has not yet crystallized in customary international law.  It is 
submitted that the SCSL, which operates on the basis of a transfer of jurisdiction from 
the territorial state, was bound by the amnesty, but it was open to the Court to interpret 
its terms strictly.   Similarly, the decision of the ECCC Pre-Trial Chamber on the 
amnesty accorded to Ieng Sary is based on the terms of the amnesty itself, and did not 
find that the amnesty was invalid, either under national or international law.20  States 
emerging from conflicts will continue to grant amnesties.  Arrangements to establish a 
tribunal should include an obligation on the affected state not to grant future amnesties 
to those within the jurisdiction of the tribunal.  It will also be necessary to determine 
how to deal with amnesties already granted that may impact upon the jurisdiction of 
the proposed tribunal.  Can the amnesty be repealed under national law, at least in 
relation to senior offenders?  Can the terms of the amnesty be interpreted strictly?  If 
they cannot, a national or treaty-based jurisdiction may be inappropriate.   
 
This thesis has identified several of the key issues concerning the design of the hybrid 
and internationalized tribunals, in particular their legal basis and jurisdictional 
features.  While there are variations between the tribunals, it is still possible to identify 
some common principles and emerging practice.  In light of the probable future role of 
                                                 
19 Prosecutor v Kallon and Kamara, Decision on Challenge to Jurisdiction, Lome Accord 
Amnesty, Appeals Chamber, 13 March 2004. 
20 Decision on Appeal Against Provisional Detention Order of Ieng Sary, 17 October 2008 
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such tribunals in the system of international criminal justice, this practice warrants 
continued study by states and the wider international community so as to ensure that 
tribunals are established with the powers and framework required by a particular 
context.  Such a study will not address other weaknesses in the practice of such 
tribunals, in particular the failure to provide adequate resources and the selectivity 
inherent in the creation and design of such tribunals.  However, it should render these 
tribunals more effective mechanisms in the trend to ending impunity for international 
crimes. 
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